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FO406/54

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**406**

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE**

RESPECTING

**EASTERN AFFAIRS**

**PART XV**

**CLOSED  
UNTIL**

1975

**JULY TO DECEMBER 1924**

54



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## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

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## EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XV

JULY TO DECEMBER 1924



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## ERRATA.

Page 66, paragraph 9, for "Zaho" read "and Zakho."  
 Page 83, documents Nos. 82 and 83 should be transposed.  
 Page 131, question XXI, line 2, for "144" read "146."  
 Page 147, paragraph 15, for "au 17<sup>e</sup> siècle," read "au 7<sup>e</sup> siècle."  
 Page 183, No. 130 should be numbered No. 131.  
 Page 219, No. 185, first line, for "381," read "38."  
 Page 294, paragraph 3, for "coverts" read "covets."



CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XV.

CHAPTER I.—MOSUL.

[E 5903/7/65]

No. 1.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, July 7, 1924.*

I HAVE repeatedly pressed Adnam Bey for reply to His Majesty's Government's suggestion for concerted reference to League of Nations of Irak frontier dispute.

He read to me to-day telegram which he had just received from Ismet Pasha to the effect that Turkey could not agree to approach League first, inasmuch as treaty not having come into force, article 3 (2) was not yet applicable, and secondly, because she feared to expose herself to risk of seeing unlimited territorial claims put forward on behalf of Irak.

Treaty never contemplated recourse to League on such terms.

Ismet Pasha added that Turkish Government was still convinced Irak frontier could be settled direct by the two Governments and was confident satisfactory result could be achieved if Great Britain manifested desire for friendly agreement.

[E 5909/7/65]

No. 2.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, July 7, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Second reason given for unwillingness of Turkey to approach League is undoubtedly the principal one.

I pointed out first reason, which my Government regarded in any case as inadmissible, would presumably, since Ireland's adhesion to Treaty of Lausanne, cease to exist in the course of the next few weeks.

As regards the suggestion that way was still open for direct negotiation, I told Adnan that it was impossible for either Turkey or Great Britain once the treaty came into force to evade their obligations thereunder, and that there was not the least chance that His Majesty's Government would or could contemplate any solution except through the League.

I quoted in this connection your despatch No. 746 of 30th June as showing that you considered that this procedure offered best chance of removing chief obstacle to renewal of friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey.



I did my best to convince Adnan that second ground for refusal was unjustifiable. He seemed impressed personally, but Turkish apprehensions on this score are so great that I do not believe Turkish Government will agree to reference to League of Nations unless they can be allayed. I doubt if this can be achieved unless His Majesty's Government were willing to inform Turkish Government that in stating case to League of Nations they would not press for territories beyond present administrative frontiers of Irak.

I am in any case of opinion that it is undesirable that His Majesty's Government should make unilateral reference to the League before treaty actually comes into force.

[E 5903/7/65]

No. 3.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1924.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 120 and 121 of 7th July: Turco-Irak frontier.

Though I welcome their statement, I cannot help regretting that the Turkish Government did not show during recent conference with Sir P. Cox their preference for settlement by direct negotiation between the two Governments. Failure of recent discussions at Constantinople cannot be attributed to His Majesty's Government. They are now preparing case for reference to League of Nations, but are willing to consider any new proposals which Turkish Government may desire to make on the subject, until such time as British case is ready for submission to the League. You must make it clear, however, that we cannot allow delay by seeming negotiations in putting matter in hands of League, as we wish for an early settlement in a matter for which we are acting on behalf of another State—Irak. It must not drag on or be left in state of uncertainty. The Turkish Government must therefore transmit to His Majesty's Government their proposals at once. It is only on that understanding that we are willing to reconsider the matter, and no doubt on this point must be allowed to rest in the minds of the Turkish Government.

Question of ratification of treaty does not arise for reasons explained in my despatch No. 632, and ratification is, moreover, imminent. Further, His Majesty's Government do not admit Turkish contention that recourse to League was never contemplated on terms put forward by His Majesty's Government. If they did they would not proceed in that way.

[E 6051/32/44]

No. 4.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 536.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, July 4, 1924.*

ADNAN BEY called on me late yesterday evening. He has been spending a few days at Therapia, and I asked him to come and see me at Yenikeuy on his way back from Stamboul.

2. I said that I wished to take an opportunity before his apparently imminent departure to complain very seriously to him of the attitude of his Government at Angora. Six months had elapsed since I had addressed an urgent communication to him on the subject of the Indian reservation to the Treaty of Lausanne. I had been waiting a month for an answer to a perfectly straightforward proposal to submit the dispute regarding the terminal charges at Smyrna of the Eastern Telegraph Company to arbitration, either before a British court or at The Hague; while a fortnight had now passed since I had, on behalf of my Government, asked him to transmit to Angora the equally plain and urgent suggestion that the Turkish Government, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, should join His Majesty's Government in referring the dispute respecting the frontier between Turkey and Irak to the Council of the League of Nations.

3. I had noticed, I said, in the Turkish journal "Djoumhouriet" a significant statement to the effect that the Turkish Government did not intend to make any reply to the latter proposal, but to leave it for discussion in London by the new Turkish Ambassador, whose *agrément* would shortly be requested. I would refer to the point of a new Turkish Ambassador later, but, as regards the three questions above

mentioned, the sands of time were running out. The period of nine months stipulated in article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol for the direct negotiations relating to the Turkey-Irak frontier expired on the 6th July. As he was well aware and as I had expressly told him, His Majesty's Government, on the expiration of that period, had the right and even obligation in the matter of reference to the League to act alone if the Turkish Government declined to co-operate. If the Turkish Government preferred that contingency to come to pass, let them say so. However unwise and unfortunate such a decision would be, it was calculated to indispose His Majesty's Government less than the discourtesy of silence.

4. Nor was the attitude of Angora in respect of the Indian reservation less unsatisfactory. It was clear from your language in the House of Commons on the 30th June as well as from an inspired statement (which I handed to him) in the "Times" of the 28th June, giving the text of the resolution which was to be submitted to the Dail Eireann, that the Irish difficulty in the way of the final ratification by Great Britain of the Treaty of Lausanne would be overcome in a few days. The instrument of ratification could then be immediately signed by His Majesty the King and deposited at Paris. It was of very great importance, particularly with a view to framing its text, that the Turkish consent to the Indian reservation should be received before that instrument was drawn up in its final form.

5. Finally, the action of the Turkish authorities in forcibly sealing up the private residences of the employees of the Eastern Telegraph Company at Chanak and Tenedos was still further complicating the position in respect of that dispute and rendering an amicable solution, so desirable in the interests of the Turks themselves, doubly difficult and problematical.

6. I asked Adnan Bey whether it was the studied intention of his Government to return no answers to the proposals of His Majesty's Government and the notes of His Majesty's representative in Constantinople. Such was, by experience, the only inference which could be drawn. Apart from its utter and inexcusable discourtesy, against which I wished to protest most vigorously and categorically, it was an attitude which was calculated to serve his country an ill-turn, and to recoil upon Turkey's own head. I was making a formal complaint, and I desired Adnan Bey to convey it to Ismet Pasha in no less strong terms than I was using to himself. He was about to give up the post of delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which he had held for over a year and a half with such distinction. Our personal relations had, I was glad to recognise, always been excellent. We had worked together during periods of considerable difficulty and tension last year. I was very grateful to him for his personal co-operation and assistance, but I hoped he would do me a last favour and take advantage of his retirement from his post to use the plainest and most forcible language in reporting to his Government what I had said.

7. Adnan Bey said that he had just received the reply to our suggestion for arbitration in the case of the Eastern Telegraph Company dispute. It was, he regretted to say, unprofitable. The Turkish Government maintained their point of view that they could not accept arbitration, since they could not admit any shadow of Greek claim to the moneys. I had the honour to acquaint you with this refusal in my telegram No. 119 of the 4th instant, and I will deal in a separate despatch with the situation thereby created.

8. As regards the Indian reservation, Adnan Bey confessed that any explanation which he could give of the failure of his Government to furnish us with a reply could not be regarded as adequate. It was true that the question was complicated and had to be referred to two different Government Departments. He had been instructed by Ismet Pasha, in response to a protest made some time ago by Mr. Lindsay, to explain away the delay in this fashion. He had done so, but, in notifying the Prime Minister accordingly, he had himself represented the insufficiency of such an excuse. He undertook to telegraph immediately to Angora on the subject. He expressed great gratification at the prospect of the early ratification by Great Britain of the treaty, but asked anxiously whether I could assure him that there was no connection, in the sense of pressure on Turkey, between the Indian reservation and the accomplishment by His Majesty's Government of the final formalities of ratification. I told him that there was none, and that the final formalities would be completed whatever were the Turkish reply.

9. Adnan Bey also promised to telegraph once more on the subject of the reference to the Council of the League of Nations of the Irak frontier dispute. He disclaimed personally any desire to leave His Majesty's Government to act alone, and professed not to have seen the article in the "Djoumhouriet" to which I referred. He stated,

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B 2



however, that the Turkish Government and people had been greatly disillusioned by the standpoint adopted by the Cox delegation. They had deduced therefrom that His Majesty's Government had not had the slightest desire for a direct settlement, but had been determined to force the arbitrament of the League upon Turkey. Such an attitude had rendered them suspicious both of the League and of the ulterior motives of Great Britain. They had been prepared to see Sir Percy Cox demand for Irak the present administrative frontier of Mosul, but the demand for territory outside that frontier, and actually in the possession of Turkey, had created a most unfortunate impression on, and greatly irritated, not only Government, but all circles in this country.

10. Adnan's language in this respect makes me less hopeful, even than I was before, of a satisfactory reply from Angora to the proposal for joint reference to the League. I told him, however, that I regretted that such an erroneous impression should have been caused by the exercise on the part of His Majesty's Government, acting impartially, of an undeniable right to claim a suitable frontier for Irak. Those negotiations were, however, now over and done with, and, having failed, the only course now was to refer the dispute to the League. His Majesty's Government hoped to be able to concert with the Turkish Government in making that reference, and I thought the latter would be well advised to agree to join in it. Adnan Bey undertook to telegraph accordingly, and the conversation turned to the question of Nusret Bey's appointment to succeed Adnan as delegate in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about which I am reporting in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.  
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6055/7/65]

No. 5.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 541.)  
Sir,

*Constantinople, July 6, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to record, with somewhat melancholy satisfaction since none of them are favourable, that I have now been furnished with replies, either owing to a coincidence or as a result of my representations, to all the various notes about which I complained to Adnan Bey as reported in my despatch No. 536 of the 4th instant.

2. I had the honour, in my telegrams Nos. 120 and 121 of yesterday, to acquaint you with the terms of the answer of the Turkish Government to your proposal for a joint reference of the Irak frontier dispute to the Council of the League of Nations. In accordance with the Turkish principle of avoiding as far as possible the written word, Adnan Bey had been instructed to make only a verbal communication and confined himself to reading to me the text of the telegram which he had received from Ismet Pasha.

3. I have little to add to the telegraphic summary which I have already sent to you of our conversation. Unless His Majesty's Government are already too far committed, I am still of opinion that the British case would be weakened by any premature unilateral reference to the League, particularly since the adhesion of Ireland, which is reported in the press, removes presumably the last obstacle to the final ratification by Great Britain and the early entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne.

4. Adnan Bey showed evident disappointment when I informed him that I could not imagine there to be the faintest prospect of further direct negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Turkey. He reverted to this when he brought Nusret Bey to see me this morning. I told him that His Majesty's Government had no intention nor even the right to avoid the obligation under the treaty to refer the dispute to the League once the nine months' period for direct negotiations had elapsed. Neither could Turkey evade her obligations in this respect. It was useless and unwise for her to raise difficulties over a matter in which she was no less bound than ourselves to accept the arbitration of the League.

5. Adnan Bey, while admitting himself the value of impartial arbitration, laid stress on the undoubtedly real apprehensions of his Government respecting the possible territorial demands which His Majesty's Government might put forward in stating the case in favour of Irak to the League. I doubt if the Turkish Government will ever consent to submit to reference to the League unless those apprehensions can be relieved.

They would probably base their refusal on the ground that the treaty could not be interpreted in any manner which could expose them to the risk of seeing such claims preferred against them. I venture to submit for your consideration whether, since it may almost be taken for granted that the League will in no event decide in favour of the inclusion in Irak of territories beyond her present administrative frontiers, it would not be politic, on practical grounds, to give the Turkish Government some assurance in this respect.

6. When I visited Adnan Bey yesterday afternoon I was unaware that he was in receipt of a reply from his Government in regard to the Irak frontier arbitration. I had, however, received by bag on the 5th July your despatch No. 746 of the 30th June, and I accordingly took with me a literal French translation of paragraph 3 of that despatch, as I considered that its text was calculated, if anything could do so, to mitigate the Turkish anxieties and to induce them to abandon their hesitation in joining with us in reference to the League. I handed this translation to Adnan Bey, who will doubtless communicate it to Angora. It served a very useful purpose when I emphasised the disinterestedness of His Majesty's Government and your own conviction that in reference to the League lay the best prospect of overcoming the main obstacle to the renewal of friendly relations between our countries.

I have, &c.  
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 6.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 125.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, July 14, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 96.

As it would be of little use to make any communication before 17th or 19th July owing to Bairam holidays, I venture to submit following observations for consideration during the interval:—

I should prefer to say nothing based on the first two sentences of your telegram. It would merely conduce to futile controversy. Nothing will convince Turks that failure of conference was not due to inelastic nature of instructions to Sir P. Cox.

Even with this omission I fear lest communication to Turkish Government in terms indicated may tend to produce confusion. What, they will ask, is it that His Majesty's Government are willing, conditional on getting a prompt answer, to reconsider?

As I understand it, submission to League of Nations would comprise two stages: (a) Request to Council of League of Nations to take cognisance of dispute; and (b) submission of British case for Irak after League has expressed willingness to arbitrate and procedure has been settled. His Majesty's Government have hitherto claimed right to perform stage (a) forthwith and unilaterally if necessary, but I gather stage (b) cannot take place before [? September].

Am I to say His Majesty's Government are unwilling, provided they are made immediately to hear Turks' proposal before taking action under (a)? If so, would note entry into force of treaty be suitable time limit in view of its imminence, its definiteness and fact that it cuts the ground under the most obvious of Turks' objections reported in my telegram No. 120? Owing to probability of early entry into force of treaty, it is, apart from all else, now scarcely worth insisting upon argument, which is technical and debatable, in your despatch No. 632. Would it not be preferable to take advantage of this in making communication to Turkish Government? It might be stated that His Majesty's Government, while still maintaining, are prepared to waive right of immediate reference to League of Nations, and that, since neither they nor Turkish Government can defer doing so after entry into force of treaty, they would be glad to take advantage of this delay to consider any proposals which Turkish Government wish put forward, provided that they are made before treaty becomes operative.

It would, however, be dangerous to invite proposals without defining their [group undecipherable] scope and extent to which His Majesty's Government are willing to reconsider previously expressed intentions. Turks may imagine you were even ready to abandon reference to League of Nations if their proposal were

[13028]



sufficiently wide to afford basis for fresh direct negotiations. I presume this is not your intention, but should be grateful if it could be made clear to me exactly how far you are ready to go before I attempt to dispel doubts, whatsoever they may be, in minds of Turks.

Last sentence in your telegram under reference is undecypherable.

No. 7.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 125 of 14th July: Turco-Irak frontier.

I appreciate the arguments you submit, but at the same time you will realise the importance of simplifying the issue and of avoiding waste of time on debating points of details. I agree to the suppression of the first two sentences of my telegram No. 96. As regards the nature of the Turkish proposals, we can offer no suggestions; our proposition is that we are ready to consider whatever they may be prompted by their expressed preference for direct negotiation (your telegram No. 120) to say to us. As regards method of approaching League, we need not at present contemplate exact procedure or successive stages. Nor does it seem necessary or desirable to specify a time-limit for receipt of Turkish proposals.

What is to be made clear to the Turks is that our position is as follows:—

- 1 We intend to refer the issue to the League and are taking the necessary steps therefor.
- 2 Meanwhile, the Turks have expressed a preference for direct negotiation, to which we see no objection, provided that we can be satisfied that they are sincere and are not merely playing for time and that they prove it by making definite proposals to us. We shall continue the preparation of our case for the League, and shall only be prepared to consider any Turkish suggestions for direct settlement if they are received before it has been completed and submitted to Geneva.

No. 8.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, July 22, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 102.

I have made communication accordingly.

No. 9.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 102 of 19th July and your telegram No. 128 of 22nd July: Turco-Irak frontier.

If our reference of the question to the League is to be considered at the next meeting of the council in September it is essential that any communication to Geneva should be despatched from here not later than 6th August, as this would only leave minimum time for necessary notification of members of the League.

Please inform Turkish Government and add that we propose to address a communication to the League on 6th August formally referring the issue to the League for decision and promising the submission of our case in time for the September meeting of the council. In these circumstances, if the Turkish Government contemplate any further communication or proposals to us with a view to direct settlement these must reach us not later than 4th August.

[E 6449/7/65]

No. 10.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 28).*

(No. 565.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, July 22, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note relating to the frontier between Turkey and Irak which, accompanied by a non-guaranteed French translation, also herein enclosed,\* I handed to Nusret Bey yesterday in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 96 and 102 of the 11th and 19th instant respectively.

2. This note together with the verbal explanations which I gave to Nusret Bey can, I think, have left no doubt in his mind as to the exact position taken up by His Majesty's Government. I said that you saw no objection to the direct negotiation for which Ismet Pasha had expressed his preference, provided you could be satisfied that such proposals were sincere and not merely evasive and that his Government gave proof of their sincerity by a definite and prompt reply. I made it quite clear that it was only on this condition that you had been willing to reconsider your intention of an immediate reference to the League of Nations, and that His Majesty's Government could not in the meantime discontinue the preparation of their case for submission to that body. I also stated that His Majesty's Government could not admit for a moment the argument advanced by Ismet Pasha that recourse to the League was not contemplated on the conditions implied by the standpoint adopted by them, and laid stress on the proof of goodwill which was being shown by you in expressing your readiness to listen to the further proposals which the Turkish Government might have to make.

3. Nusret Bey said that he would transmit my communication at once to Angora, and that he was convinced that we would meet with equal goodwill on the part of his Government. For the moment, however, Ismet Pasha is still in the neighbourhood of Smyrna, and will not return to the capital for several days.

4. I am myself less convinced of the prospect of attaining some result than Nusret professed to be. Ismet Pasha will not, in my opinion, risk compromising the future Turkish case by recording on paper any possible abridgement of the Turkish claim without a corresponding and previously expressed declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government that they for their part are not unwilling to reduce the British claim on behalf of Irak. Ismet Pasha will, it seems to me, find himself in a predicament. He is probably sincere in his desire, rather than go to the League, to find a ground for a friendly agreement between the two Governments, but he will not dare to take upon himself the responsibility of making the first advance in that direction.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Mr. Henderson to Nusret Bey.*

M. le Délégué,

*Constantinople, July 21, 1924.*

I HAD the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to suggest in my note of the 23rd June last that the Turkish Government should concert with His Majesty's Government in addressing a joint communication to the Council of the League of Nations inviting it, in accordance with article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne and article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol, to take cognisance of the dispute concerning the frontier between Turkey and Irak.

2. On the 7th July his Excellency Dr. Adnan Bey, under instructions from the President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed me verbally that the Turkish Government was unwilling to accept this proposal on the ground, firstly, that the treaty had not yet come into force, and that accordingly article 3 (2) was not yet applicable; and secondly, because Turkey in approaching the League would be exposing herself to unlimited territorial claims put forward by Great Britain on behalf of Irak. Dr. Adnan Bey added that his Excellency General Ismet Pasha had authorised him to declare that the recourse to the League of Nations under the treaty was not contem-

\* Translation not printed.



plated on such conditions, and that the Turkish Government, still convinced that a settlement could be reached between the two Governments, were confident that a satisfactory result could be attained if Great Britain manifested her readiness to come to a friendly agreement.

3. I did not fail to bring this reply immediately to the knowledge of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who has given it his most careful and sympathetic consideration. The position of His Majesty's Government is as follows: They cannot divest themselves of their responsibility under the treaty to refer this dispute to the League of Nations, and they are in fact engaged in preparing their case for submission to the League. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government, though they would not feel themselves justified on that account in discontinuing their preparations to this effect, are willing in the meantime to consider any new proposals which the Turkish Government may desire to make with a view to the settlement of this dispute in a manner which would dispense the two Governments from the necessity of invoking the intervention of the League.

4. I have accordingly the honour, by direction of Mr. MacDonald, to request your Excellency to be good enough to inform General Ismet Pasha that he is prepared to take into careful consideration any definite proposals which his Excellency may wish to make with this end in view. I am, however, to point out that an early settlement is essential, particularly since in this matter His Majesty's Government are acting on behalf of another State, namely, Iraq. It is indispensable, therefore, that the proposals of the Turkish Government should be made as soon as possible in order that there may be no delay in arriving at a solution in one form or the other, and that no uncertainty be allowed to exist on the subject.

I avail, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

#### No. 11.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Constantinople, July 29, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 107.

I notified Turkish delegate here accordingly on 26th July. He informed me yesterday that he had received telegram from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs promising to communicate Turkish proposals as soon as possible after Ismet Pasha's return to Angora, which, according to Nusret Bey, would be on 31st July.

#### No. 12.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, August 2, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 132.

Turkish delegate has communicated to me in form of a private letter Turkish reply.

It refers to delay in entry into force of the treaty and impossibility of submission of case to League of Nations beforehand. It repeats previous reserves as to recourse to the League on a basis of unlimited claims.

It expresses satisfaction at His Majesty's Government's acceptance of principle of direct negotiations and conviction of Turkish Government that in discussing question with His Majesty's Government as soon as possible and in a wide spirit of good understanding, they will be able to find a truer and more reassuring solution from point of view of both parties.

Letter concludes by expressing hope that His Majesty's Government will recognise that it is materially impossible to begin pourparlers and reach an agreement by 4th August on a question of this kind.

I pointed out to secretary of Turkish delegate, who brought this letter to me, that no new proposals were formulated and that I feared that my Government

would only regard such a reply as evasive and consequently not feel themselves justified in withholding communication to the League on 6th August.

He assured me that reply was not intended to be evasive and that its salient point was goodwill of Turkish Government, which inspired their conviction that a direct agreement was possible.

#### No. 13.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 3, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish persistence in avoiding official written communications is significant and due perhaps partly to traditional instinct and partly to unwillingness to express on paper view which Turkish Government hold that recent conference at Constantinople was not serious attempt to find solution, and cannot therefore be regarded as direct negotiations which His Majesty's Government undertook to attempt before having recourse to League of Nations.

Two courses only seem open: (a) To proceed with reference to League of Nations on the ground that last Turkish reply is identical with previous communication made to me, and consequently does not constitute those definite proposals, immediate receipt of which were condition on which His Majesty's Government accepted principle of direct agreement; or (b) to accept at its face value Turkish Government's assurance of feasibility of solution between Governments, and to express willingness to re-examine basis of such agreement, not through conference, but through individual contact, either in London or at Angora.

My impression is that Turkish Government, who, while doubtless seeing advantage to themselves in playing for time, and distrustful in any case of League of Nations, regarded by Sir P. Cox as personally committed to an uncompromising policy, are possibly honestly convinced that agreement is attainable on basis of economic advantages with greater or lesser amount of territorial concessions.

Attitude of Turkish Government as to formulating definite proposals is, in my opinion, that indicated in last paragraph of my despatch No. 565 of 22nd July.

[E 6620/7/65]

#### No. 14.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 112.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1924.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 134 and 135 of 2nd August: Turco-Irak frontier.

I regret that with the best will in the world His Majesty's Government cannot regard Turkish reply as meeting conditions. It strikes me as evasive and dilatory. They must therefore press for a definite proposal if effect is not to be given to their request to the League of Nations for consideration of matter at the session of the 29th August.

Papers for council's consideration must be in hands of members a fortnight before that date, and should therefore leave here within the next few days, in order to reach Geneva and be circulated by secretariat before 14th August.

[E 5531/7/65]

#### No. 15.

*Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1924.*

ARTICLE 3 (2) of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, provides that the frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in a friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months, and that, in the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. By article 7 of the protocol relating to the



evacuation of Turkish territory (also signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923). The British and Turkish Governments agreed that the negotiations referred to in article 3 (2) of the Peace Treaty should be commenced as soon as the evacuation operations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the protocol had been completed, and that the period of nine months prescribed in article 3 (2) of the treaty should begin to run from the date on which the said negotiations commenced.

2. The evacuation operations were completed on the 4th October last, and the negotiations contemplated by the treaty were initiated on the 5th October last and culminated in a conference at Constantinople, which lasted from the 19th May to the 9th June, but it was unfortunately found impossible to reach an agreement within the prescribed period, which expired on the 5th July. The treaty has been ratified on behalf of the British Empire and Turkey, and His Majesty's Government understand that the first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up in the course of the next few days, when the treaty will, in accordance with article 143, come into force as between the high contracting parties who have ratified it.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs directs me to inform you that His Majesty's Government will therefore be glad if the following item may be placed on the agenda of the council's next session:—

"Irak frontier: article 3 (2) of the treaty signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923."

4. The documents which His Majesty's Government desire to place before the council are being prepared, and will be submitted at a later date.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

#### No. 16.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, August 10, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 112.

Owing to delay in transmission I could not make relevant communication until yesterday morning when, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I handed to Turkish delegate written summary thereof.

He could not tell me whether his Government had concrete proposal to make or not. I said it was useless to waste more time if they had not, and that if they had it was as easy to communicate it within the next few days as within next few months.

In summary I made it clear that unless concrete proposal was forthcoming by 14th August, His Majesty's Government would have no alternative but to proceed with communication of documents to secretariat of League of Nations.

[E 6858/7/65]

#### No. 17.

*Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 14, 1924.*

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 6th instant, requesting that the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak may be included in the agenda for the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you herewith, for communication to the members of the council, copy of a memorandum summarising the reasons for which, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the line indicated on the attached map (in three sections) represents the most equitable and natural frontier between the two States.

The ethnographical map to which the memorandum refers is being prepared and will be communicated to you very shortly.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

Enclosure in No. 17.

#### *Memorandum on the Frontier between Turkey and Irak.*

THIS memorandum is submitted by His Britannic Majesty's Government in order to summarise the reasons for which it is considered that the frontier line which has been traced on the map attached to the memorandum represents the most equitable and natural frontier between the two States concerned.

These reasons are racial, political, historical, economic and strategic. In putting them forward it is necessary to refer in some detail to the discussions which took place at the Lausanne Conference in January 1923 and to the subsequent negotiations which were undertaken at Constantinople in May and June of the present year in accordance with the provisions of article 3 (2) of the Lausanne Treaty. The memorandum will therefore deal not only with the area lying immediately to north and south of the proposed frontier, but with a much larger area lying to the south of that line, a procedure which is necessitated by the fact that during the Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegation persisted in claiming that the whole of the old Mosul Vilayet should be restored to Turkey. Similarly, during the subsequent conversations at Constantinople, the Turkish representatives refused to enter into any discussion as to the position of a frontier line between the two States, but confined themselves to reasserting their demands for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet. While, therefore, the question now being submitted to the council, as the British Government conceive it, is not whether the Mosul Vilayet should belong to Turkey or Irak, but rather what should be the actual northern boundary of the Irak State, it is necessary that the present memorandum should not only justify the frontier line now proposed, but should recapitulate the reasons for which the British Government have found it necessary to reject the demand for the rendition of the whole Mosul Vilayet, in which demand it is understood that the Turkish Government still persist.

#### 1. Racial.

The two subjoined tables show the population of the Mosul Vilayet by religions and races respectively, according to two estimates made in 1919 and 1921. Both tables were compiled by British officers who had, in spite of Turkish assertions to the contrary, visited and spent some time in all corners of the vilayet.

The second table, which, since it is by races, is the more important for present purposes, was the result of closer and more prolonged investigation than the first. It confirmed, however, the comparative accuracy of the first, the difference of 82,000 odd in the totals being fully accounted for by—

1. The return of large numbers of the population after the war.
2. The return of still larger numbers of families to villages which, owing to the state of starvation resulting from war conditions, had been abandoned before the British occupation.
3. The settlement of large numbers of Assyrian refugees.

The Turkish delegation at Lausanne relied upon a different set of figures. No date for their compilation was given, and their reliability may be gauged from the fact that they divide the population of the Sulaimani Sanjak as follows:—

Kurds ...	...	...	...	...	62,830
Turks ...	...	...	...	...	32,960
Arabs ...	...	...	...	...	7,210

Not even the most ardent Arab patriot would, as a matter of fact, claim that, with the exception of a few individual traders, there are any Arabs at all in the Sulaimani Sanjak, and to state that there are more than half as many Turks as Kurds in the sanjak is incorrect. There is a small Turkish (or rather Turkoman) settlement in Sulaimani town itself, and a few scattered families in the villages. The round figure of 1,000 given in the two British statements is probably a liberal estimate. So unreliable, in fact, was the Turkish estimate, that it was not even repeated by the Turkish representatives during the recent conversations in Constantinople. It may be taken that the British estimate of the distribution of population by races in 1921 was substantially accurate, and that this distribution has not altered materially since, except for the addition of some 15,000



Assyrian Christians who have, since the 1921 statement was compiled, been settled in villages on the southern side of the proposed frontier. The population of the area between the proposed frontier line and the southern, western and eastern borders of the old Mosul Vilayet may therefore be taken to be approximately at the present moment—

Arabs	...	...	...	...	185,700
Kurds	...	...	...	...	454,700
"Turks"	...	...	...	...	65,800
Christians	...	...	...	...	77,000
Jews	...	...	...	...	16,800
					800,000

Among the Kurds are included 30,000 Yezidis, who, though believed to be closely akin to the Kurds by race, are non-Moslem, and have no Turkish sympathies whatever. As regards the distribution by locality of their numbers, it will be seen from the ethnographical map attached to this memorandum that the Arab population forms a solid block comprising the whole portion of the old Mosul Vilayet lying on the right bank of the Tigris, Mosul town itself, and a further strip on the left bank of the Tigris below Mosul extending nearly to the Arbil-Altun Keupru-Kirkuk road. The only non-Arab elements in this area are the Yezidis in the Jebel Sinjar, and the "Turks" (approximately 10,000) in Tel Afar. In other words, that portion of the Mosul Vilayet which is contiguous to the Bagdad Vilayet, and which comprises approximately one-third of the whole area with which this memorandum deals, is inhabited by 185,000 odd Arabs, about 30,000 Yezidis, and 10,000 so-called Turks. Assuming, for the moment, that the last-named definitely desire inclusion in Turkey, there can be no doubt about the contrary desire of the remaining 215,000. To dispose of an area of this size solely in accordance with the (assumed) wishes of less than 5 per cent. of its population would be scarcely in accord with accepted principles, and from this aspect only of racial distribution, the Turkish claim to the whole of the Mosul Vilayet is demonstrably unsound.

Turning from the question of local distribution to the actual numbers of the various races in the whole area under discussion:—

As to the "Turks," they are not Osmanli Turks; they call themselves Turkomans, and the Turanian language they speak resembles Azerbaijani rather than the Turkish of Constantinople or Anatolia. They are undoubtedly descendants of Turkomans who came to Irak long before Osman founded the Ottoman Empire, probably from those Turkomans whom the Abbasside Caliphs hired to defend their territory. The theory that the Turkomans are descendants of what was formerly a foreign mercenary garrison is supported by their distribution. Tel Afar, an almost exclusively Turkoman town, stands guard 45 miles west of Mosul on the border of the Syrian desert. Except for this town and the neighbouring Turkoman villages, and for a few scattered Turkoman villages in the Mosul Plain, the whole of the Turkoman population is distributed along the eastern road from Mosul to Bagdad, notably in and around the towns of Arbil, Altun Keupru, Kirkuk, Taza Khurmatu, Taik, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri and Kara Tepe. The estimates of numbers are:—

Tel Afar and surrounding villages	...	10,000
Villages in the Mosul Plain	...	4,895
		14,895
Kirkuk and surrounding villages	...	25,000
Kifri, Taza Khurmatu, Taik, Tuz Khurmatu and Kara Tepe	...	10,000
		35,000
Erbil and Altun Keupru	...	15,000
Grand total of "Turks" (the few in the Sulaimani area being omitted)	...	64,895

The proportion of "Turks" to Arabs can be shown most effectively by the statement that the "Turks" in the whole of the Mosul Vilayet are less numerous than the Arabs in the town of Mosul alone.

The Kurds are estimated to be more than twice as numerous as the Arabs in the Mosul Vilayet, and about seven times as numerous as the Turkomans. They are separated from the Arabs by a line which follows roughly the line of Turkoman towns mentioned above, and north of that the foothills of the mountains. They are believed to be descended from the Medes, who were so closely identified with the Persians in early times; but whether this is true or not, they speak an Iranian tongue closely allied to Persian and resemble the Persians far more closely than either the Turks or the Arabs.

Of the non-Moslem populations, though in the aggregate they outnumber the Turkomans considerably, it is not necessary to speak in great detail. The estimates are:—

Yezidis (probably of Kurdish origin, but holding a non-Moslem belief)	...	...	...	30,000
Christians (mainly Assyrians—some Nestorian, some Catholic)	...	...	...	77,000
Jews	...	...	...	16,865

The main body of the Yezidis live in Jebel Sinjar, but there are many Yezidi villages north-east of Mosul. The Christians are to be found mainly in Mosul city, in the Arbil area, in a string of prosperous villages (of which Al Kosh and Tel Kaif are the largest) to the east of the Tigris, and in the Dohuk-Amadia country. Most of the Jews live in Mosul city, but Jewish communities are to be found in the Kurdish and Turkoman towns, and isolated individuals or families among the Kurdish tribes.

The case of the Turkish delegation in so far as it is based on ethnic considerations comes, therefore, to this:—

They ask that there should be united with the Turks of Asia Minor a population consisting as to one-twelfth of Turkomans, with whom they may be admitted to have some racial affinity; as to nearly six-twelfths of Kurds, who have no affinity with the Turk, except the possession of a common religion; as to three-twelfths of Arabs, who not only differ from the Turks in race and language, but are connected by the strongest bonds of language, race and sympathy with the population of Bagdad and Basra; and as to more than two-twelfths of non-Moslem elements, which, however much they may differ from each other, have not a single bond—racial, linguistic, religious or cultural—with the Turks.

As regards the racial distribution along the actual frontier line proposed, it will be seen from the ethnographical map that the western two-fifths run through country inhabited, both to the north and the south, by Kurds. The middle two-fifths run through country now inhabited, both to the north and south, by Assyrians, while the country to the south of the eastern one-fifth is inhabited entirely by Kurds, that to the north being partly inhabited by settled Kurds, but mostly being an ancient Assyrian habitat, now hardly occupied except by nomad Kurds. The country further to the north of the middle section is of this latter nature. Had it been desirable or possible to decide the frontier on racial grounds alone, the British Government would have felt it necessary to include the whole of the Assyrian country within the proposed frontier. Due weight, however, had to be given to economic and strategic considerations, which will be dealt with elsewhere in this memorandum.

Table I.—POPULATION of the Vilayet of Mosul by Religions according to an Estimate made in 1919.

Division.	Sunni.	Shiah.	Jewish.	Christian.	Other Religions.	Total.
Mosul ...	244,713	17,180	7,635	50,670	30,180	350,378
Arbil ...	96,100	...	4,800	4,100	1,000	106,000
Kirkuk ...	85,000	5,000	1,400	600	...	92,000
Sulaimani ...	153,900	...	1,000	100	...	155,000
Total ...	579,713	22,180	14,835	55,470	31,180	703,378



Table II.—POPULATION of the Vilayet of Mosul by Races according to an Estimate made in 1921.

Division.	Arabs.	Kurds.	"Turks."	Christians.	Jews.	Total.
Mosul ...	170,663	179,820*	14,895	57,425	9,665	432,468
Arbil ...	5,100	77,000	13,000	4,100	4,800	106,000
Kirkuk ...	10,000	45,000	35,000	600	1,400	92,000
Sulaimani ...	...	152,900	1,000	100	1,000	155,000
Total ...	185,763	454,720	65,895	62,225	16,865	785,468

\* Including 30,000 Yezidis.

## 2. Political.

(i.) *Arabs*.—It is scarcely necessary to state that the solid block of Arabs to which reference has been made in the preceding paragraph is wholeheartedly desirous of inclusion in the the Arab State of Irak. The Arab tribes of the Mosul Vilayet differ in no way from those of the Southern Jezirah and the rest of Irak, and have welcomed, equally with their southern brethren, the prospect of independence from Turkish domination and freedom of development under a Government of their own race, in which they will be fully represented. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne stated that "in the city of Mosul the Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic languages are all spoken; those of the inhabitants of this city who at present speak Arabic and who are taken for Arabs are in reality Turks, who, having long been in contact with Kurds and Arabs, have also learnt those two languages." The exact converse is in fact the case. Under Turkish rule, the use of the Arabic language was not encouraged. Turkish was the sole official language, and the inevitable tendency was for Arabs to learn Turkish rather than the reverse. As a matter of fact, approximately three-quarters of the inhabitants of Mosul town are pure Arabs, who, in spite of centuries of Turkish rule, have kept to their own language. It is true that a certain amount of Turkish and Kurdish is spoken in Mosul, Turkish because it was, until recently, the official language, Kurdish because of the proximity of a large Kurdish population, who continuously trade with Mosul; but the predominant language of the town is undoubtedly Arabic. In fact, the purest Arabic in Irak is spoken in Mosul.

(ii.) *Yezidis*.—The Turkish delegation at Lausanne stated that the Yezidis are Kurds by race and have the same habits and customs as the Kurds, differing from them only in sect, and should therefore be treated in the same way as the Kurds. This argument, besides being based on the false assumption that the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan desire a return of Turkish rule,\* minimises greatly the difference between the two peoples. The Yezidis are probably, it is true, Kurdish in origin, and they speak the Kurdish language. But the difference between them is one of religion, and not merely of sect, and it is incontestable that in the past they have suffered severely from religious oppression. Their numbers have been reduced enormously during the last generation, and this reduction they impute, rightly or wrongly, to Turkish methods of government. However sincere may be the intentions of the Turkish Government in regard to the future treatment of religious minorities under their rule, and to whatever extent they may find it possible to carry out those intentions, there can be no doubt about the wishes and feelings of the Yezidis in the matter. They are happy and contented under the impartial Government which has ruled them for the past 5½ years; they unanimously dread a return of Turkish rule, and desire nothing better than permanent association with a State which will enjoy for a time a measure of British guidance and protection and which has already evinced its sincere desire to treat them with justice and impartiality.

(iii.) *Jews*.—While it is not claimed that the wishes of a comparatively small number of Jews should be a deciding factor in determining the future of the whole area concerned, and while it is probable that elsewhere Jews will live in prosperity under Turkish rule, there can be no doubt that the Jews of Mosul, who have on more than one occasion explicitly stated their views on the subject, are guided by the same wishes as the Yezidis, and for the same reasons.

(iv.) *Christians*.—The political feelings of the Chaldean Christians may be shortly described as being in every way similar to those of the Yezidis and Jews.

\* See paragraph (vi) below.

Those of the Nestorian Assyrians demand rather fuller treatment. In spite of their isolated position in the heart of a country under Turkish rule, this small people, in the very early days of the great war, determined to espouse the cause of the Allies and to seize the opportunity to break away from the rule of those whom their past history has led them to regard as their persistent oppressors. It is unnecessary to detail the sufferings which overcame them as the result of this decision. They were driven from their own country and died in thousands in their flight to Irak. The remnant were supported for a time in Irak by the British Government, and have now been settled, partly in the southern portion of their own country, and partly among the Kurds and indigenous Christians of the country immediately to the south of their old habitat. The British Government feel under the strongest obligation to secure their settlement in accordance with the reasonable claims and aspirations of their race. They have made an earnest appeal for the establishment, in the whole of their ancient habitation, of a British protectorate. However greatly such a solution might appeal to Christendom at large, His Britannic Majesty's Government have been unable, for various reasons, to contemplate so grave an extension of their responsibilities. While, however, not prepared to respond to their aspirations in full, the British Government have endeavoured in their negotiations with Turkey, and are now requesting the Council of the League of Nations, to secure a frontier which, while fulfilling the recognised requirements of a good treaty frontier, will at the same time admit of the establishment of the Assyrians in a compact community, within the limits of the territory in respect of which His Britannic Majesty holds a mandate under the authority of the League of Nations, if not in every case in their ancestral habitations, at all events in suitable adjacent districts. This policy has the full sympathy and support of the Irak Government, who are prepared, for their part, to give the necessary co-operation for giving effect thereto. His Britannic Majesty's Government have given their careful and sympathetic consideration to the undoubted desirability of including within the Irak frontier as much as possible of the old Assyrian country. They have had to hold the scales between racial and political considerations on the one side, and economic, strategic and geographical considerations on the other. They have reluctantly come to the conclusion that weight must be given entirely to the latter considerations in the case of the Assyrian country which lies to the north of the proposed frontier. That this decision will be a bitter disappointment to the Assyrians is, they fear, inevitable. It is equally inevitable that the Turkish Government will undergo no small embarrassment in dealing with the small remnant of this people who, in spite of their bitter memories of the past and their fears for the future, may elect to remain in that large but now almost uninhabited portion of their ancient home which will remain on the northern side of the frontier. Nevertheless, it is felt that a further extension of the frontier northwards is impracticable. To draw the line further to the south in this region would, apart from economic and strategic disabilities, produce such a panic among the Assyrians that they would find no alternative but a resort either to mass emigration, or to a fight to the death in defence of their ideals. Peace and prosperity upon this section of the frontier would be impossible.

(v.) *Turks*.—The small so-called Turkish minority has been adequately described in the preceding section of this memorandum. Unlike the Arabs, Christians and Kurds, the Turkomans do not form a solid block in any part of the area, but are distributed in various towns and villages the position of which has been described above. They are prosperous and content under their present rule, though it is not denied that there are those among them who would welcome a return of Turkish rule, and of the advantages which they enjoyed over their neighbours under that rule. Let it be assumed even that they are unanimously desirous that they should once more be governed by Turkey.

(vi.) *Kurds*.—The Kurds proper, excluding the Kurdish-speaking Yezidis, constitute a little more than half of the whole population of the area with which this memorandum deals. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne contented themselves with a mere assertion that they are practically Turks. They are not Turks, nor is it claimed that they are Arabs. They are a separate and distinct people, some of whom live in Turkey, some in Persia, and some in the country at present administered by the Irak Government. They speak an entirely separate language, of Iranian origin, and for purposes of written communication ordinarily use Persian, though the use of written Kurdish is growing in Kurdistan. Turkish and Arabic are languages equally foreign to them. Any claim that they are akin to the Arabs would be as false as the



claim that they are akin to the Turks, but not more so. It remains to be seen where lie the political sympathies of the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan, who form a solid block inhabiting approximately the eastern and north-eastern two-thirds of the area under consideration. Their economic connection with Bagdad is set forth in a later paragraph, and is indisputable. Politically they, in common with the Kurds north of the proposed frontier, and with many of the Persian Kurds, have, partly as a consequence of the draft Treaty of Sèvres, entertained hopes that they would be constituted into a separate nation, and nationalist movements among all the Kurds have been rife of recent years, the most notable being the recently suppressed revolt of Ismail Agha against the Persian Government. Whether Southern Kurdistan be restored to Turkey or included within Irak, traces of this nationalist sentiment will remain, though it is significant that when the small Turkish garrison retired from Rowanduz in April 1923, the assembled chiefs of the surrounding tribes gave an unsolicited but emphatic expression of the opinion that they had seen enough of the disorder that had followed nationalist risings and were eager to become an integral part of the Irak State, provided that they were given certain safeguards as to the use of their own language and the appointment among them of Kurdish officials. These safeguards were readily accorded by the Irak Government, and this mountainous and difficult area is now in a state of peace and order which it has not enjoyed for many years, and is looking forward, provided that the present Administration remains undisturbed, to an era of peace and prosperity unprecedented in its history. The remainder of the Kirkuk Sanjak is similarly content with its present position. The whole of the Kirkuk Sanjak, together with the Kurdish districts of the Mosul Sanjak, unanimously declared early in 1919 that they wished to be part of one State, comprising the three vilayets of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul. The Turkish Government have stated that no reliance can be placed upon this declaration, as it was made when the whole country was under military occupation. It is sufficient to say that other questions were asked at the same time to which the British Government was most anxious to obtain a definite answer. All shades of opinion were freely expressed without fear of the consequences, and upon the other questions no definite or decided public opinion was found to exist. But the demand that the three vilayets should remain united was unanimous and unequivocal, and it is impossible to doubt that it was genuine. Similarly, when the referendum with regard to the enthronement of King Feisal took place in the summer of 1921, the above-mentioned Kurdish districts, with the sole exception of the town of Kirkuk, voted unanimously for inclusion in the Irak State under King Feisal. Doubts have been thrown by the Turkish Government upon the genuineness of this referendum. They state that strong pressure was brought to bear on the whole country. The amount of this "pressure" may be estimated from the well-known fact that a deputation from Kirkuk which visited Bagdad could elicit no reply from the High Commissioner to their enquiry as to the wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government, except the unvarying statement that they were free to do as they wished. Had the High Commissioner given the slightest indication in that direction there is no doubt that they, too, would have voted for Feisal. As it was, they did not, being largely swayed by the considerable Turkoman element in Kirkuk town.

It will be noted that the Sanjak of Sulaimani was excluded from both these referenda. The reason for this was twofold. In the first place, Sulaimani was, at both times, under a separate and distinct administration, its finances being kept separate from those of the rest of Irak. It was recognised as more essentially the home of a nationalist feeling which was far more prominent then than now, and which, in view of the draft of the Treaty of Sèvres, it was impolitic to discourage. Secondly, the people of the sanjak are generally so backward and remote from modern civilisation that it would have been quite impossible to obtain a coherent expression of opinion from them. They have recently enjoyed, or rather suffered under, a fairly advanced form of autonomy. The experiment, which was made in response to the demands of a body of local Nationalists, has proved a failure, a fact which is recognised most clearly by the people of Sulaimani themselves. They have freely recognised their economic inseparability from Bagdad, and are now almost unanimously desirous of a political unity subject to the same safeguards as were granted in the case of the Rowanduz area. It is noteworthy that when the elected Constituent Assembly of Irak met recently to discuss the Anglo-Irak Treaty, the Kurdish districts were represented by nineteen Kurds. Of these only three voted against the treaty. The four Sulaimani Deputies present voted solid in favour of ratification.

(vii.) In short, one-twelfth of the population of the area is racially and politically allied to Turkey. Nearly five-twelfths, the Arabs, Yezidis and Christians, are emphatically desirous of inclusion within Irak. The remaining half are a separate people with some leanings, which are fast disappearing, towards an independent political union with the remainder of their own nation who are Turkish or Persian subjects; they have a close and indissoluble economical connection with Bagdad, and desire to continue their present political unity under certain safeguards which the Irak Government is ready to accord.

### (3.) *Economic.*

The customs statistics of the Government of Irak show that Lord Curzon at Lausanne was correct in maintaining that the outlet of the export trade of the Mosul Vilayet was to and through Irak, and to a lesser extent Syria. Trade between Mosul and Turkey is insignificant. The imports from Turkey to Mosul are chiefly timber, which can find no outlet save by the Tigris, on which it is floated down cheaply, and a small quantity of pulse, cordage, dried fruits, and tanning materials. The exports from Mosul to Turkey are chiefly piece-goods and groceries previously imported into Irak through the port at Basra, and in lesser quantities via Aleppo. Central and Southern Irak are vitally dependent on the products of the northern area. After the British occupation of Bagdad, when for eighteen months Turkish forces denied access to the Mosul Vilayet, great difficulty was experienced in feeding a population which was thus cut off from the northern wheat-producing plains—the granary of the country. Only by wholesale and very costly importation from India, coupled with careful rationing, were famine conditions avoided. It was this experience which impressed on the mind of the population the essential unity of the three vilayets, which they unanimously demanded when asked for an expression of their desires after the armistice.

Ismet Pasha at Lausanne did not deny the dependence of Bagdad upon the wheat of the Mosul Vilayet, but sought to qualify the argument by stating that nearly all the grain emanates originally from Diarbekr, and only passes Mosul in transit. This contention is in conflict with the customs statistics, and the little grain that comes in from Diarbekr is not wheat, but the smaller grains and pulses which are not used for bread. The Mosul Vilayet, owing to the encouragement and development of agriculture, grows enough wheat to feed the central and southern districts of Irak, which depend upon it. The peculiar products of the mountain regions of Irak, such as raisins, dried fruits, galls and nuts, are exchanged in the market towns of Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimani for the grain of the plains, while the tobacco, by the sale of which some portions of Iraki Kurdistan subsist, is all taken to Bagdad, whence are brought back to Kurdistan and to the three market towns mentioned piece-goods and groceries imported by sea through Basra.

That the Turkish delegation recognised the force of the economic arguments against the severance of Mosul from Irak is shown by the fact that they thought it advisable, at Lausanne, to state definitely that economic arguments should not determine the demarcation of the frontier.

With regard to the actual frontier proposed, the principle of ensuring that confederations are not split, and that communities are not cut off from their marketing centres, has been given importance. Thus, as far as possible, the line runs along the features which separate the regions inhabited by those who market in Mosul, from the regions of those who market in Turkish towns. It still excludes, however, certain communities which draw their piece-goods and groceries from the Mosul shops, and exchange their mountain produce for the grain of Mosul Plain. Such tribes which are excluded are the Goyan, and some of the sedentary sections of the Artoshi confederation, who live about the head-waters of the Hezil and Khabur. On the other hand, it will ensure to Irak some of the summer grazing grounds of the nomads of the Kurdish confederation, who winter in the Mosul plain, trade with Mosul capital, and shepherd the sheep of Mosul owners. To separate by a frontier the grazing grounds from the chief habitats of the shepherds and sheep-owners would cause hardship, and probably encourage frontier friction. The line keeps in Irak the few passes by which Irak could be entered through the mountains, the Geramus Pass and Tkhuma Pass, which are used by the nomads who winter in the Mosul Plain. Control of these passes is also necessary to Irak to refuse ingress to the brigand tribes, such as the Kashuri and Zhirki, who live on the further side, and who raid into the districts of Dohuk, Zakho and Amadia. On the east it includes the Zini-a-Berdi Pass, which is the only passage for troops over the line of high moun-



tains along which the line runs from the Jelo peaks to the Persian frontier. Of the Assyrian country, the line will include in Irak the inaccessible mountain fastnesses of the Tiari, Tkhuma, Jelo and Baz tribes, for whom, for climatic reasons, settlement in lower altitudes is unhealthy. It will bring under Irak the Pinianish tribe of Chal, whose chief, nominally a Turkish mudir, is at present, owing to the proximity of the Assyrians, who have returned to their homes west and north of Chal, in closer touch with the Iraki Governor of Amadia than with his Turkish superiors. It will include also the Oramar tribe, a number of whom, under their chief and allied with Assyrians, led by the Bishop of Jelo, rescued the Amadia Administration from the attack by a number of Kurdish malcontents stirred up from Rowanduz in the autumn of 1922. The Oramar depend economically upon Mosul. Besides the Tovi, a tribe of merchants who trade with Mosul capital, and the Nerva and Raikan, who have been consistently loyal to the British and Irak Governments, the frontier also includes in Irak the northernmost section of the Girdi tribe, who by the present nominal boundary are under another Government from that of the other section of the same tribe, and who belong to the Diwana confederation of Iraki Kurds.

Generally speaking, the frontier line consists of inaccessible heights and barren ridges, unattractive to the settler, and prohibitive of military movement or economic development. Control of the tribes who live there was always a source of embarrassment to the Turkish Government, and the region is not one which would be coveted by either side as a field for commercial enterprise or economic development.

#### (4.) *Geographical and Strategic.*

The frontier line claimed is defined as follows:—

1. From the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Khabur to the confluence of the rivers Khabur and Hezil; a line following the right bank of the Khabur.
2. From the confluence of the rivers Khabur and Hezil to the confluence (about 13 kilom. west of Baijo) of the River Hezil, and of the stream which flows from the Tanin Mountains; a line following the right bank of the Hezil.
3. Thence eastwards to a point about 4 kilom. north-west of Baijo; a line following the crest line.
4. Thence north-eastwards to a point on the River Khabur about 1 kilom. south of Bait-us-Shabab; a line to be determined on the ground, passing about 3 kilom. north-west of Testian.
5. Thence eastwards to a point about 2 kilom. west of the pass Deri-a-Zin; a line to be determined on the ground.
6. Thence eastwards to a point on the River Greater Zab, about 2 kilom. south of Tulamerik; a line following the crest line, and cutting the stream Berdzaw Su about 2 kilom. south of Kawara.
7. Thence south-eastwards to the confluence (about 5 kilom. south-west of Neri) of the River Shamsdinan Su and of the stream which flows from the mountains east of Neri; a line following the crest line Khisara, Supa Durig, Nakhira Shirka, Sarta Dagh, Sat Dagh, Chahr Chelli Sei-i-mazri.
8. Thence south-eastwards to the crest 10,990; a line to be fixed on the ground.
9. Thence eastwards to a point on the frontier of Persia (Dalarper Dagh), about 6 kilom. north of the Gadir Pass; a line to be fixed on the ground.

The frontier line thus constituted has been selected with due regard for strategic considerations: no other line will, by geographical features, so decisively separate the new State of Irak from Turkey. Except for the small portion on the west which runs along the right bank of the Hezil and Khabur Rivers, the line of division consists of a continuous line of peaks and high mountains, forming an obstacle-wall, in winter practically unsurmountable owing to snow, and in summer only traversible by a few difficult passes. Especially in the eastern portion this wall forms the line of economical and ethnological divisions between the regions dependent upon Irak and between those which incline to the north. The separation by such a barrier from Turkey of the communities which naturally associate with and are related to Irak will give these communities a better chance of living less troubled by the encouragements to restlessness which are apt to affect the frontier communities of rival States separated by indefinite features. Under the political section of this memorandum the case of the Assyrians has been

stated. The inability of this warlike people, who live on the most northerly portion of the frontier, to become reconciled to the Turks, and their consequent willingness to give their loyalty to Irak in exchange for considerate treatment by that Government makes them a valuable frontier community to the Irak State. The experience of the difficulties of administration in the liwas of Sulaimania, Kirkuk, Arbil and Mosul during the time that a number of Turkish irregulars were occupying Rowanduz was a convincing proof of the strategic indispensability of Rowanduz to the Irak State. The experience of the frontier guards on the north-western side have similarly proved the strategic indispensability of the towns of Zakho and Amadia, which both lie in a great valley which opens at one end on to the Turkish frontier town of Jezrieh-ibn-Omar, and is closed at the other end by the mountains immediately surrounding Rowanduz.

The occupation or administration by Turkey of the region immediately on the Irak side of the claimed frontier would be difficult and not productive of any good results for the inhabitants of those regions, as the snows in winter close the few passes, and difficulties of lateral communication make administration difficult. Owing to the good roads which have been constructed from Mosul to Zakho, Amadia and Rowanduz, and the fact that less snow falls to the south than to the north of the proposed frontier, communication with Mosul is nearly always possible.

From the point of view of the military resources of the new Irak State, the proposed frontier actually requires less troops for its protection than would a frontier line drawn considerably closer in to the plains of Irak, and it has the inestimable advantage of denying to a potential enemy country which, as far as large bodies of troops are concerned, is a military "No Man's" land, but remains at all times ripe for intrigue and consequent tribal trouble if in the hands of a hostile Government.

The Turks suggest the Jabal Hamrin as a frontier between Irak and Turkey. It is well known that this is not a range of mountains but a line of downs, parts of which are only 60 miles from Bagdad.

Dependent as they are upon the wheat of Mosul, the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra would be at the mercy of a Turkish army in the Mosul Vilayet, which not only could deprive Bagdad of all supplies from the north, but could choose from numerous lines of attack, and could without difficulty block the only road from Bagdad to Persia. Such an army occupying as far south as the Jabal Hamrin could make an Arab State well nigh impossible.

It must not be understood that His Britannic Majesty's Government anticipate that Turkey will nourish hostile designs against Irak. They hope, on the other hand, and they believe, with good reason, that once the frontier has been settled, these two Moslem States will be united by the closest ties of religion and mutual interest. But, other things being equal, a frontier line, which is difficult to penetrate except by a few well-defined trade routes, is clearly to the advantage of both parties. Other things in this case are, as has been shown, not equal, and though strategic considerations, as between two naturally friendly countries, should not be given too much weight if they run counter to racial, political and economic factors, it has been thought right to refer to them in this instance where they agree to such a remarkable extent with other factors, in particular the economic.

#### (5.) *Summary.*

The reasons for which the proposed frontier line has been chosen may then be briefly summed up as follows: From the racial point of view it has the sole disadvantage of including in Irak a few scattered settlements of Turkomans with Turkish sympathies. Even in their case economic relations are with Bagdad and not with Anatolia. The Turkish claim that, because of their existence, there should be included in Turkey a compact body of pure Arabs and another of Christians, numbering, with the Yezidis, considerably more than four times the total of the Turkomans, is palpably impracticable. Any line which would include in Turkey the Turkomans, but exclude the Arabs, would be both economically and strategically impossible, and would also give to Turkey the Assyrians, who have repeatedly announced their determination to emigrate or fight to the death rather than to submit once more to Turkish domination. The British Government do not believe that this disadvantage, namely, the inclusion in Irak of a few Turkoman settlements, is of any real importance. They have for long been very



closely connected with Bagdad; they at present supply a large number of Government officials, civil and military, in both the Bagdad and Basra vilayets. But the point has been dealt with at some length because it appears to be the real, though remarkably slender, foundation upon which the whole structure of the Turkish claim is based. Politically and economically the whole of the area under consideration naturally turns to Bagdad. Strategically the proposed frontier is nearly ideal, and the fact that for the greater part of its length it consists of a barren no-man's land which cannot possibly be coveted by the neighbours on either side is of great importance. There are Arabs to the north-west as far as Diarbekr, there is a large tract of erstwhile Assyrian country to the north of the proposed frontier, and various Kurdish tribes to the north of the line have from time to time made overtures to the Irak Government. The British Government claim, not the utmost extent of valuable territory for which it would be possible to make out a plausible case, but a frontier which they are convinced, after due and careful consideration, will conduce more than any other to the peace, development and prosperity of the surrounding districts.

August 14, 1924.

No. 18.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 10th August: Turco-Irak frontier.

You should now inform Turkish Government that, as no fresh proposals have been made by them, His Majesty's Government have no alternative but to proceed with the reference of the matter to the Council of the League of Nations; that the secretary-general of the League was formally requested on 6th August, as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 107 of 25th July, to place the question on the agenda of the council at the session beginning on 29th August; and that the British case has now been sent to Geneva for circulation to the members of the council.

Letter just received from Geneva states that our letter of 6th August has been communicated to Turkish Government, with an intimation that any documents which the latter may forward to secretary-general will be immediately transmitted to members of council.

Copies of correspondence with secretary-general and of British case will be sent to you by bag on 18th August.

[E 7314/7/65]

No. 19.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 629.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, August 20, 1924.*

A TELEGRAM from Geneva published in the press here to the effect that His Majesty's Government had referred on the 6th August the dispute respecting the Irak frontier to the League of Nations, for consideration at the forthcoming meeting of the council, coincided with an announcement from Angora that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had submitted fresh proposals for a solution of this question to the Council of Ministers. Other reports, which were undoubtedly incorrect, also stated that the Turkish representative in London had received instructions to communicate to you the Turkish proposals.

2. While, therefore, the action of His Majesty's Government has not passed without disparaging comment, there still appears to exist a sort of feeling that somehow reference to the League of Nations may yet be avoided and the question settled by direct negotiation between the two Governments.

3. As an example of this feeling, I may mention that the Angora telegrams published in the newspapers of the 12th instant stated definitely that, although Great Britain had referred the "Mosul question" to the League, the door had not been closed to direct negotiation.

4. The "Ileri" of the 14th instant observed that the League of Nations favoured the strong, and quoted the solution of the Corfu incident as a proof of that contention.

The same newspaper published a leading article, under the signature of Subhi Nuri Bey, on the 15th instant to the effect that the Turks were going to the League of Nations because such was the desire of the British, whose only reason for taking part in the Constantinople Conference was to make reference of the Irak-Turkish frontier question to the League unavoidable. The article continued that in these circumstances it was incumbent on the Turks (1) to endeavour to reach an understanding with the British not only on the "Mosul question," but on all outstanding questions; and (2) to carry on an active propaganda at Geneva, where they ought not to have a mere consul as their representative, but a high diplomatic functionary, if they desired the League of Nations to give a decision favourable to Turkey.

5. I should add that the Turkish press generally has attempted to connect the recent capture of the Vali of Hakkari by a Nestorian tribe to British intrigues, and to regard this incident as a British manoeuvre to discredit Turkey in the eyes of the League.

6. In the course of an interview with Nosret Bey on the 18th instant, when, in accordance with the instructions in your telegram No. 119, I informed him of the communication to the secretariat of the League of the British statement of their case, I enquired whether he had any information as to the intentions of his Government or as to the new proposals referred to above. I was, however, not surprised to be told in reply that he had no information beyond that which had appeared in the press.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

[E 7615/7/65]

No. 20.

*Extract from Minutes of 30th Session of Council of League of Nations, Geneva, August 30, 1924.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 4.)*

1265. FRONTIER of Irak.

M. BRANTING read his report (Annex 669) and proposed that the following telegram should be despatched at once to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora:—

"The Council of the League of Nations, at its meeting to-day, has taken note of your Excellency's telegram of 25th August regarding the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak, which has been placed upon the agenda of its present session. In inviting the Turkish Government to be represented on a footing of equality at its discussions on this question, the council has noted the consideration mentioned by your Excellency as being likely to delay the arrival of Turkish representatives at Geneva. The council has accordingly decided to postpone considerations of the question before it until the arrival of such representatives. In informing your Excellency of the above, I have the honour to state that the council would welcome any arrangements which the Turkish Government might be able to make with a view to hastening the moment at which the study of the question can be begun. The present session of the council will probably last until the end of September.

"I have, &c.

"M. CLAUZEL."

M. CLAUZEL said that the French Government had given the necessary notification to the Turkish delegation at Paris. On the 28th August a note had been addressed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish delegation officially notifying that the British, Italian and Japanese Governments had ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, and that the exchange and deposit of ratifications had been effected at Paris in due form. It was, therefore, to be hoped that the Turkish Government would not delay in giving effect to the wish expressed in the report of M. Branting.

LORD PARMOOR said that the British Government was anxious that the matter should be considered by the council as soon as possible. It might be anticipated from the statement made by the French representative, that the Turkish representative would be able to attend a later meeting of the council during September, and that this question would be considered and put in order for settlement.

*(The council decided to despatch the telegram.)*



No. 21.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1924.*

ACTING High Commissioner at Bagdad telegraphed on 11th September that Turkish regular forces, including cavalry division, have taken up position on administrative frontier 15 miles from Amadia. It is believed their intention is to punish Tkhuma over the border and not to invade Irak, but a small force of troops has actually been seen inside old frontier of Mosul Vilayet.

Please inform Turkish Government urgently that His Majesty's Government have received this report with astonishment, and are reluctant to believe that any movement tending to disturb *status quo* could be contemplated when the Turkish delegation has arrived at Geneva and the whole frontier question is about to be laid before the Council of the League in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. You should warn them clearly that if Turkish troops cross the frontier in such numbers as to appear intentionally to infringe the *status quo* a serious situation will arise.

Repeat your reply to British delegation, Geneva.

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 61.)

[E 8038/5711/65]

No. 22.

*Zekiai Bey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 18.)*

*Mission diplomatique turque, Londres,  
le 16 septembre 1924.*

Excellence,

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance les faits suivants :

Mr. Lloyd, inspecteur britannique à Mossoul, s'est rendu dernièrement à Tchah, où se trouvait en tournée d'inspection le Vali de Hakkari, et durant son entretien avec ce dernier, lui a déclaré avoir appris que le Gouvernement turc avait l'intention d'augmenter le nombre des services gouvernementaux installés à Tchah, et a ajouté qu'il considérerait ce fait comme une atteinte au Traité de Lausanne.

Le Gouvernement de la République m'a chargé de protester auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté contre cette intervention d'un fonctionnaire britannique dans une question turque d'ordre purement intérieur et concernant une localité où il existait de tout temps un maire turc, ainsi que contre les propos tenus par Mr. Lloyd à un fonctionnaire turc en tournée d'inspection à l'intérieur de sa circonscription administrative.

En transmettant à votre Excellence cette protestation de mon Gouvernement, j'ose exprimer l'espoir que de tels faits ne se renouvelleront plus, et vous prie, &c.

ZEKIAL.

No. 23.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 19, 1924.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 155 and 156 of 17th September: Turkish protest regarding alleged British violations of Turco-Irak frontier.

I await full text of Turkish note before deciding on reply.

Above is for your own information only.

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 66.)

No. 22A.

[E 8008/5711/65]

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 17.)*

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, September 16, 1924.*

I AM sending lengthy protest addressed to you by Ismet Pasha against British aeroplane violations of Irak frontier, and particularly flights undertaken on 9th, 12th and 14th September, in the course of which it is stated that three aeroplanes opened fire with bombs and machine guns on Turkish troops on Turkish territory near the frontier, killing three and wounding twelve soldiers.

Note recapitulates recent events, which it describes as being result of a premeditated plan, and insinuates that Nestorian attack on Hakkari Governor was encouraged by British claim at Golden Horn to portion of Hakkari Vilayet. It alleges that aeroplanes flew over the spot where attack took place, both at the time and afterwards, and explains that as a result of that incident Turkish force of soldiers and gendarmerie had to be concentrated against brigands at Chulemerek, Beit Ushab and Harboul. It was this force apparently which was attacked by British aeroplanes.

Note describes various flights of aeroplanes on dates above mentioned and asserts that on one occasion two flew as far as Chernak, 50 kilom. beyond Irak frontier. It refers to attempts of British agents to win over some of the Turkish forces sent against brigands, and quotes in this connection letter from Fettah [? H] Za [? ho] to (group undecipherable) Djesre. It regards these attempts as preparing ground for the attack of 14th September.

Note, after protesting formally to the habitable world and League of Nations against this aggression, reserves the right of Turkish Government to claim compensation for loss of life and damage done. It accuses Great Britain of ignoring stipulations in article 3 of Lausanne Treaty regarding maintenance of *status quo* on frontier and of encouraging brigands, and protests against violation of Turkish territory at the moment when League of Nations is about to discuss Irak frontier question. It asks whether His Majesty's Government still recognise *status quo* arrangement and method of settlement of this question contemplated under Lausanne Treaty, since without being reassured on these points Turkish Government can only conclude that Great Britain is aiming at creation of an accomplished fact in order to settle Irak dispute by arms.

Ismet Pasha begs for early reply, and adds that as soon as communicated His Majesty's Government's note will be published in world's press.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 38.)

[E 8009/5711/65]

No. 22B.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 17.)*

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 16, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Passages in Ismet's note are extremely tendencious. I consequently protested to Turkish representative here, who handed it to me, against the whole tone of the note as being clearly intended for propaganda and as containing obvious misrepresentations. Nuzret Bey said that he would telegraph my observations in this sense to Angora, and I undertook to telegraph summary of his protest to you, for the fact remains that it is most regrettable that an incident of so serious a nature should have occurred at this juncture.

Since seeing Nuzret I have received repetition of Bagdad telegram No. 446 to Colonial Office, which confirms fact of provincial forces, therein described as irregulars, having been machine-gunned, and mentions that further action is being contemplated against them.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 39.)



[E 8126/5711/65]

No. 24.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 693.)

Sir,

Constantinople, September 17, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the protest addressed to you direct by Ismet Pasha, which Nusret Bey handed to me yesterday and of which I telegraphed a summary to you last night in my telegram No. 155, in regard to the recent aeroplane incident on the Irak frontier near Zakho.

2. Unfortunately, I only received the Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad's telegram No. 446 of the 15th September to the Colonial Office after my interview with Nusret Bey. As it was, I was on the point of making its contents known to the latter in a private letter when I received the instructions contained in your telegram No. 137 of the 16th September. Since, owing to the departure of the King's Messenger, I could not myself go to see Nusret Bey to-day, I requested the acting first dragoman to make to him this afternoon the verbal communication, of which I enclose likewise a copy.

3. I read through Ismet Pasha's protest carefully in Nusret's presence yesterday. I told him that I recognised that the incident was a serious one, that I did not, moreover, doubt, that it had occurred, but that I took grave exception to the manner in which the alleged facts of the case were presented. The note itself struck me forcibly as being in the nature of propaganda destined for prejudiced consumption by the League of Nations at a critical moment. I thought that it would probably convey the same impression to the Council of the League and that, consequently, its publication was, apart from anything else, ill advised from the point of view of the Turks themselves. That was, however, a point which Ismet Pasha might consider for himself. My Government would, however, for their part, certainly resent the false imputations and misrepresentations contained in the note. I drew his attention to some of these and pointed out that, as I had learnt from experience during the occupation here in 1922 and 1923, there were always two views of an alleged aeroplane infringement of a line, and particularly of a frontier so vaguely defined as that of Irak.

4. Nusret Bey busily took notes of my observations and said that he would at once telegraph them to Ismet Pasha. He was himself somewhat apologetic, and laid stress on the fact that Turkish apprehensions of His Majesty's Government's intentions respecting Mosul were all the greater on account of their earnest desire for Great Britain's friendship.

5. I shall telegraph, if necessary, any comments which Nusret Bey may make on receipt of my verbal message this afternoon. I shall be surprised, however, if he says more than that he will make a communication accordingly to Angora.

6. It is difficult for me here to offer any useful observations on the conflicting versions as telegraphed from Bagdad and Angora of this most unfortunate incident. The British authorities on the spot can alone judge of the real gravity of the Turkish threat from the general strategic point of view and as to the urgency of the measures required to meet it. The Turkish account of the events which led up to it is, of course, completely tendentious and misleading, and must be firmly repudiated. On the other hand it is probable that the sole object of the concentration of Turkish troops on the frontier was for the purpose of reprisals against the Nestorians responsible for the recent attack on the Vali of Hakkari. I am most disinclined to believe without more definite evidence in any premeditated intention to violate the *status quo*. The result of that concentration has been naturally to arouse the misgivings of Irak and to lead to the necessity for the latter to take precautions by means of aeroplane reconnaissances. Apprehension begets apprehension, and the outcome has been an incident with loss of life.

7. The *dénouement* is in itself so deplorable at a moment when the whole dispute concerning this frontier is on the eve of being discussed by the Council of the League, that I do not doubt that every effort will be made on both sides to prevent any further action which may be calculated to aggravate it.

I have, &amp;c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.



Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

*Nusret Bey to Mr. Henderson.*

M. le Représentant,

*Constantinople, le 16 septembre 1924.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre, ci-joint, la note que son Excellence Ismet Pacha, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République turque, vient de me câbler pour être adressée à son Excellence Mr. MacDonald, Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique.

Je vous serai obligé de la faire parvenir à son destinataire le plus tôt possible.

Veuillez &amp;c.,

M. NUSRET.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

*Ismet Pasha to Mr. MacDonald.*

Excellence,

*Constantinople, le 16 septembre 1924.*

LES avions anglais qui, en dépit de toutes nos démarches diplomatiques et pacifiques, violent sans cesse depuis plusieurs mois notre frontière, l'ont à nouveau violée au cours des journées des 9, 12 et 14 septembre, et en outre, par une préméditation dont les conséquences sont incalculables, ont ouvert un feu de mitrailleuses et lancé des bombes contre nos troupes se trouvant sur notre territoire aux environs de la frontière.

D'après les renseignements reçus jusqu'à présent, ils ont occasionné trois morts et douze blessés. Il est utile de donner les renseignements suivants sur les derniers événements, qui constituent l'une des phases d'un plan régulier et prémédité. Nonobstant les termes exprès et l'esprit du traité, la délégation britannique avait proposé au cours de la Conférence de Stamboul une ligne passant au delà des frontières du vilayet de Mossoul, et avait de cette manière réclamé une partie importante des régions méridionales du vilayet de Hakkiari. Après l'interruption des travaux de la conférence survenue à la suite de cette exigence, il a été constaté certains changements dans la conduite des Nestoriens habitant ledit vilayet. Dans la journée du 7 août, le Vali de Hakkiari ainsi que sa suite, composée de gendarmes, ont essuyé une attaque de la part des brigands nestoriens.

Un major et trois gendarmes furent tués et cinq autres blessés. Au bout de trois jours de détention, le Vali parvint à s'échapper des mains des brigands, qui depuis lors ont donné libre cours à leurs méfaits. Au cours de cet incident et alors que le Vali se trouvait au chef-lieu de la commune de Tchah, en deçà de la frontière, un agent anglais du nom de Mr. Lloyd, venant de la zone anglaise sans être muni d'une autorisation préalable, s'est présenté chez lui, et s'est mis à des critiques à l'endroit de certains actes du Gouvernement turc dans le nord de la ligne du *statu quo*. Au moment où les brigands avaient exécuté leur attaque contre le Vali et sa suite, des avions anglais n'ont cessé de survoler le lieu de l'incident. Le Gouvernement turc, qui était obligé de sévir contre les brigands, et qui n'a jamais dépassé la ligne du *statu quo*, s'employait à réunir contre eux des forces suffisantes composées de soldats et de gendarmes dans les localités de Tchoulemerek, Boit-Uchehab et Harboul. Les avions anglais continuaient à survoler constamment notre territoire contrairement à toutes les règles internationales. En réponse à nos protestations contre ces agressions aériennes, le Foreign Office, par sa note du 23 août 1924, prétendait que des avions n'avaient pas franchi le nord des postes frontières Bersivi-Ballud-Tchakallou. Les nouvelles violations survenues après cette affirmation—qui ne correspond nullement à la réalité—sont les suivantes : Le 9 septembre, à 8 heures du matin, deux avions venant de la direction de Zaha, et suivant le cours d'eau Hazil, ont changé de direction vers le nord, et ensuite vers la zone Goyan. Le 12 septembre, à 8 heures 15 du matin, trois avions venant de la direction de Zaho, et survolant plusieurs fois le cours d'eau Hazil, passèrent vers le nord. Un autre avion venant également de la direction de Zaho, et survolant Djomada, se dirigea du côté du territoire Goyan. Le 14 septembre, à 7 heures 30 du matin, sept avions, qui sont venus de la direction de Zaho, ont survolé les zones situées entre les cours d'eau Harboul et Habour. A 8 heures du matin, trois avions, qui sont venus également de Zaho, ont lancé des bombes et ouvert un feu de mitrailleuse sur nos campements. En outre, à 7 heures du matin, et à 3 heures de l'après-midi, deux

avions ont commis une autre agression aérienne en poussant jusqu'à Chernak, localité éloignée de 50 kilom. de la frontière. Il existe des preuves qui témoignent de l'activité des agents britanniques tendant à gagner quelques éléments dans les troupes envoyées pour la répression des brigands. Entre-temps, une lettre signée de Fettah, Gouverneur Caïmakan de Zaho, qui est parvenue à l'adresse du Caïmakan de Djésré, mentionnait ceci : " On apprend qu'une force régulière turque s'approche de la frontière Imadié, et on a constaté qu'une faible force a passé la frontière de l'Irak. Si la situation reste en l'état et si on ne la prévient pas, il va s'ensuivre de graves événements. Informez le commandant du front que la force armée s'expose à une rencontre à l'intérieur de la frontière de l'Irak." Cette communication des agents britanniques qui commettent depuis des mois des agressions aériennes à l'intérieur du territoire turc, dans le nord de la ligne du *statu quo*, ne pouvait viser que la préparation du terrain pour l'agression du 14 septembre, exécutée à coup de bombes et de mitrailleuses. Je proteste de la façon la plus formelle devant l'opinion mondiale et auprès de la Société des Nations contre l'agression subie par nos soldats le 14 septembre à l'intérieur de notre territoire.

Je me réserve le droit de réclamer des dommages-intérêts pour les blessés et tués ainsi que l'indemnisation complète de toutes les dévastations commises, et d'en notifier au fur et à mesure le montant. Un point important à noter est que l'Angleterre, qui méconnaît la ligne du *statu quo*, cherche à créer un fait accompli en se servant de ses forces armées et des brigands que l'on encourage en territoire turc. L'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne mentionne expressément le maintien du *statu quo* jusqu'au règlement de la question de la frontière de l'Irak. La Turquie qui a observé la ligne du *statu quo* malgré plusieurs écarts constants jusqu'ici du côté des Anglais, voit son territoire violé au moment même où la question est soumise à l'étude de la Société des Nations. Il est nécessaire, dans ces conditions, de savoir si l'Angleterre reconnaît encore convenable le mode prévu par le traité pour le règlement du différend en suspens. C'est-à-dire, l'Angleterre reconnaît-elle une ligne de *statu quo*? Sans établir au préalable ces points, et avant que l'agression du 14 septembre ne soit réparée, on est forcé de conclure que, contrairement aux visées pacifiques du monde entier, l'Angleterre tend à créer un fait accompli pour confier à des moyens armés le règlement du différend concernant la frontière de l'Irak.

J'ai l'honneur d'ajouter que je serais très heureux d'avoir au plus tôt la réponse de cette note, qui, après qu'elle aura été remise au Gouvernement britannique, sera également communiquée à la presse mondiale.

Veuillez &amp;c.

ISMET.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

*Verbal Communication made to Nusret Bey by First Dragoman on September 17, 1924.*

EN rentrant à Yénikeuy après son entrevue avec votre Excellence hier soir, Mr. Henderson a reçu un télégramme de Bagdad au sujet de l'incident grave qui est survenu sur la frontière de l'Irak. Ce télégramme donne une version de l'incident tout autre que celle décrite dans la note adressée par son Excellence le Général Ismet Pacha à Mr. MacDonald. L'agression serait venue du côté des Turcs et les avions britanniques afin d'écarter le danger de troubles parmi les tribus en deçà de la frontière auraient été obligées de faire feu sur des irréguliers qui étaient en train de traverser la rivière d'Hizil.

En plus, Mr. Henderson vient de recevoir ce matin une dépêche télégraphique du principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères l'avertissant d'un télégramme antérieur de Bagdad daté le 11 septembre, d'après lequel des troupes régulières turques, y compris une division de cavalerie, se seraient concentrées sur la frontière administrative de l'Irak à environ 15 milles d'Amadia. Tout en anticipant que le but de cette concentration était de châtier la tribu de Tkuma en deçà de la frontière et ne prévoyant pas un envahissement de l'Irak, le Haut-Commissaire britannique faisait observer qu'un petit détachement des troupes turques avaient actuellement traversé l'ancienne frontière du vilayet de Mossul.

Mr. MacDonald a donné des instructions à Mr. Henderson de prier votre Excellence d'attirer l'attention de son Excellence le Général Ismet Pacha sur cette grave nouvelle. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique l'a reçue avec une vive surprise et hésite encore à croire que la Turquie envisage une violation du *statu quo*



au moment même que la délégation turque est arrivée à Genève afin d'y discuter devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations et en conformité avec le Traité de Lausanne toute la question concernant la frontière de l'Irak.

Il est évident, d'après le télégramme direct de Bagdad, que Mr. Henderson a reçu hier que les autorités de l'Irak se sont rendu compte que la menace contre l'Irak même était plus grave qu'elles ne le croyaient lors de l'envoi du télégramme du 11 septembre. Dans ces circonstances, il est chargé de prier votre Excellence d'attirer l'attention la plus urgente de son Excellence le Général Ismet Pacha sur la gravité que comporterait la situation au cas où les troupes turques traverseraient la frontière en tel nombre que la violation du *statu quo* n'apparaîtrait autre que l'effet d'un plan prémédité.

Constantinople, le 17 septembre 1924.

[E 8194/5711/65]

No. 25.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 23, 1924.

MY telegram No. 141 of 19th September: Turco-Irak frontier.

For your own information I may explain that Turkish protest appears to be clearly bluff to cover infringement of Irak territory, not only by irregulars, but by regular troops and gendarmerie. I do not agree that Turks have any cause whatever for complaint.

You should accordingly address following communication to Turkish Government forthwith:—

"His Majesty's Government have learned with astonishment of a direct and flagrant contravention of the undertaking given by the Turkish Government, in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier, no military or other movement should take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

"A serious warning was conveyed to the Kaimakam of Jezireh by the High Commissioner for Irak on the 12th September. On the 14th September a British air patrol discovered a small hostile force crossing the River Hazil north of Rabanki. The presence of further armed bodies was also reported near Bersiwi and Bahnunah on the tracks leading to Zakho. The British authorities, assuming that these forces were composed of irresponsible tribal elements, and apprehensive that their action, if unchecked, would result in serious trouble among the border tribes, took the necessary steps to drive some of the invaders back across the frontier by machine-gun fire from the air, which caused some casualties.

"A communication was made by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the delegate of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople on 17th September, to the effect that a serious situation would arise if Turkish troops crossed the frontier in such numbers as to appear intentionally to infringe the *status quo*. The Turkish Government will appreciate the fact that Bersiwi and Bahnunah are well within the boundary, not only of the area administered by the British authorities on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, but also within the old administrative boundary of the Mosul Vilayet. According to a report received by His Majesty's Government on the 18th September, the bodies left behind by the invaders showed that Turkish regulars formed part of the invading force. It was also reported that Turkish troops had proceeded eastwards, within the administrative frontier of Irak, and had attacked a police post and burned villages within the frontier.

"On the 20th September it was reported that Turkish troops had overpowered a detachment of Irak police at Chakalla on the Khabur, and were threatening other Irak police posts in Barwari-Bala, a few miles north-west of Amadia. It was thus clear that Turkish regular forces were definitely invading the area administered by His Majesty's Government at the date of the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, and wilfully disregarding the *status quo*.

"On the 22nd September the High Commissioner reported that detachments of the Irak police and of the local levies (an imperial force under British officers, though our information does not show that British officers were actually present) had been forced back to Amadia. Their retirement was accompanied by the flight of a mass of Assyrian Christians and Irak tribesmen, who were pouring into Amadia in large numbers.

"His Majesty's Government protest in the most solemn and formal manner against the continued and flagrant violation of a solemn undertaking given by the Turkish Government in an international instrument, which has been duly ratified, brought into force and submitted to the League of Nations for registration.

"His Majesty's Government regard the events recited above as a circumstance affecting international relations and threatening to disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. They are accordingly instructing the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations to communicate the foregoing protest to the council and assembly, and to bring to their attention, as provided for by article 11 of the covenant, the present state of affairs on the Irak frontier.

"Meanwhile, the British authorities in Irak have been authorised to take all necessary action in order to prevent invasion or infiltration by Turkish forces of a nature to entail serious unrest and bloodshed."

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 76 in R.)

[E 8194/5711/65]

No. 26.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. London (Geneva).

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 23, 1924.

MY telegram No. 143 to Mr. Lindsay of 23rd September: Turco-Irak frontier. Following for Lord Parmoor:—

"Please make communication to the council and the assembly as indicated in penultimate paragraph of above-mentioned telegram."

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 144.)

No. 27.

Mr. Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 7. Secret.)

Telegraphic.)

Damascus, September 21, 1924.

SAYYID TALIB PASHA NAKIB arrived Damascus 19th September. He called on me 20th September and he stated that he was awaiting from His Majesty's Government permission to return to Irak, which he expected to receive 1st November. Although he appears pro-British in his sentiments, to be on safe side, submit undesirable to delay him in Syria longer than absolutely essential, as he may possibly become involved in intrigues. He said whilst awaiting instructions he would rest in some quiet village outside Damascus or in Lebanon, in which case it will be impossible to keep in touch with him, which I presume is desirable. French authorities and local Moslem notables are much interested in his presence here. Please instruct me as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Beirut.)

No. 28.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, September 23, 1924.

IRAK frontier.

I have received note from Ismet addressed to you and dated to-day which has been telegraphed from Angora to delegation here.

Note states that violations of frontier are continuous, and that five have occurred since date of his note of 15th September: (1) on afternoon of 17th September



at Shiranis; (2) on morning of 18th September near Chalki; (3) on banks of Hazil; (4) against Keifa on 20th September, three aeroplanes operating at Calhti Massek on Besbin-Shiranis road; (5) on 21st September a convoy of camels belonging to private persons was attacked. Numbers killed and wounded in these affairs are given.

After repeating right to claim damages, note gives Turkish version of history of *status quo* line. Turkish Government would be justified in claiming *de facto* line at the moment of Mudros armistice. This line, which alone Turks are juridically required to recognise, gives them Mosul, Erbil, Keuy Sanjak and Suleimanieh.

General Marshal in note of 2nd November, 1918, made line run Suleimanieh, [? Keuy] Sanjak, Heriri, north-east of Amadia, and thence to Zakho. Nevertheless, British unjustly occupied Rania and Rowanduz.

Claim is then made that Foreign Office note of 23rd August defines *status quo* line between Amadia and Zakho as running through Barsiwi, Bahnuna and Chakallu. This shows further intention of His Majesty's Government to modify line to their advantage.

Note states that attacks now complained of are all to north of any of the lines defined above.

Surprise is expressed that Mr. Henderson, in his note of 17th September, should complain of crossing of Hazil, which runs at right angle to line and has nothing to do with it. Ismet regrets that His Majesty's Government appear to recognise no line, though reference to League implies existence of one and complete tranquillity on both sides of it. He regards it as inadmissible that treaty should be binding on Turkey and not on His Majesty's Government, and trusts that orders will be given to competent authorities to end a state of affairs incompatible with normal relations existing between the two countries.

Copy by bag to-morrow.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40, and Geneva, No. 2.)

No. 29.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 25.)*

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 25, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 143, first paragraph.

Fact that Turkish press has published no justification or comment on events on Irak frontier is confirmation of theory that Turks are bluffing. It is, however, also conceivable that they are seizing what territory they can with intention of holding on to it indefinitely, and trusting that His Majesty's Government will not make the considerable effort necessary to turn them out.

On balance and on general grounds I myself think Turks are bluffing, but their bluff may be pushed rather far.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 41.)

[E 8235/5711/65]

No. 30.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 1021.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 25, 1924.*

THE Turkish Minister called on me on the 23rd instant and expressed regret that he had not seen me before the Mosul question had been laid before the League of Nations, as he wished to discuss the boundary question with me first; he had hurried to London in order to be able to do this, but found that he had arrived too late.

2. I told Zekiai Bey that the military operations which were now taking place along the frontier made it difficult to negotiate on the question of the boundary; that I had received with much surprise certain statements made by the Turkish Government complaining that British aeroplanes had been in action over Turkish territory; that I could not agree that these statements correctly represented the facts, but that, on the other hand, I had received serious complaints regarding invasions by the Turks of territory that was undoubtedly regarded as forming part of Irak when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed.

3. Zekiai Bey then read me a series of cases of alleged aeroplane operations over Turkish territory, giving the dates and hours when they were stated to have taken

place. These allegations would appear to be the same as those reported in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 159 of the 23rd instant, which I have since received.

4. I informed him that I was sending our complaints immediately to our representative at Geneva for communication to the League of Nations.

5. During the conversation the Turkish Minister expressed the view that Turkey would not be bound to agree to a decision by the League of Nations, and he evidently wished to discuss the matter with me direct. At the end of an hour, however, I had to leave, and agreed that he should call upon me again.

I am, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

No. 31.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 162.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 25, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 146.

Note was sent to Adnan Bey on 17th October drawing attention to information reaching His Majesty's Government as to Turkish intention to send kaimakam to Tchal, in district of Amadia, and pointing out that His Majesty's Government would regard despatch of Turkish troops into this district as violation of article 3, relative to maintenance of *status quo*.

Turkish Government never replied.

Copies of note by post.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 42.)

[E 8309/5711/65]

No. 32.

*Zekiai Bey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 27.)*

*Mission diplomatique turque, Londres,  
le 26 septembre 1924.*

Excellence,

EN me référant à l'entretien que j'eus l'honneur d'avoir hier avec votre Excellence, je m'empresse de porter encore une fois à sa connaissance que les forces turques opérant dans le vilayet de Hakkari et dans les parties du vilayet de Mossoul qui se trouvaient de tout temps et se trouvent encore aujourd'hui sous l'administration turque ont pour seul but d'y maintenir l'ordre intérieur et que le Gouvernement de la République n'a jamais songé à créer des difficultés au moment où la question de Mossoul est en train d'être négociée.

Votre Excellence m'a de son côté assuré qu'il était loin de sa pensée de s'intéresser à une opération turque d'ordre purement intérieur. J'ai alors déclaré à votre Excellence que les avions britanniques attaquaient nos troupes, que depuis le 14 courant ces attaques étaient devenues quotidiennes, et qu'il y avait eu parmi nos soldats de nombreux tués et blessés, et j'ai prié votre Excellence de bien vouloir donner des ordres nécessaires pour la cessation de ces attaques. J'ai en outre rappelé à votre Excellence que les localités où nos troupes sont attaquées par les avions britanniques se trouvent au nord de la ligne de postes indiquée dans la note du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 23 août 1924, c'est-à-dire de la ligne Zaho-Birsiwi-Baluma-Tchakallu, et un examen de la carte confirma mon point de vue. Malgré que l'esprit comme la lettre de la note susmentionnée indiquent clairement que la ligne en question constitue une ligne d'avant-postes britanniques qui ne devrait pas être franchie par des forces britanniques, la situation qu'on essaie de créer actuellement tend à modifier une situation acceptée un mois auparavant par la Grande-Bretagne elle-même.

Ceci montre que le Gouvernement britannique approuve tous les actes commis au détriment de la Turquie et au bénéfice de l'Irak, et qui, commençant par la modification par la force de la ligne existant lors de la signature du Traité d'Armistice de Mudros le 30 octobre 1918, se continuèrent par l'occupation injustifiée de Revanduz, puis par celle de Souleimanieh, et qui maintenant tendent, comme je l'ai dit précédemment, à étendre encore plus au nord la zone d'occupation des troupes anglaises.

Pendant que j'expliquais à votre Excellence que l'occupation de Souleimanieh était contraire au texte du Traité de Lausanne et modifiait le *statu quo*, vous m'avez répondu



que ce n'était pas votre Excellence qui avait conclu ce traité, et que d'après les renseignements qui vous avaient été donnés cette occupation n'était pas contraire au traité. Je crois à cette occasion devoir citer encore une fois le dernier paragraphe de l'article 3 (2) du Traité de Lausanne par lequel "les Gouvernements turc et britannique s'engagent réciproquement à ce que, en attendant la décision à prendre au sujet de la frontière, il ne sera procédé à aucun mouvement militaire ou autre, de nature à apporter un changement quelconque dans l'état actuel des territoires dont le sort définitif dépendra de cette décision." Il résulte clairement de ce texte que la ville de Souleïmanieh qui, il y a deux mois encore, ne se trouvait pas sous l'occupation britannique et qui fait partie des territoires dont le sort définitif dépendra de la décision à prendre, n'aurait pas dû être occupée et que cette occupation est contraire au traité en question.

Aujourd'hui un fait analogue est également en train de se produire au nord de la ligne indiquée dans la note du 23 août 1924 du Foreign Office.

Je crois devoir ajouter aux assurances que j'ai données à votre Excellence quant aux intentions pacifiques du Gouvernement turc et à son vif désir d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec le Gouvernement britannique que ces mêmes intentions et desirs devraient être également nourris par la Grande-Bretagne et que des assurances devraient nous être données au sujet de la cessation des vols d'aéroplanes anglais au-dessus du territoire turc et entre autres au delà de la ligne indiquée dans la note précitée du Foreign Office. Il est évident en effet que le désir de conciliation et de bonne entente manifesté d'un seul côté ne peut suffire à assurer la tranquillité dans les régions en question et qu'il est indispensable que ces sentiments soient réciproques.

Je prie, &c.

ZEKIAI

#### No. 33.

*Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, September 27, 1924.*

DAMASCUS telegram No. 7.

As Sayed Talib cannot return to Irak until at least November, French High Commissioner has asked him to retire to Palestine or elsewhere.

(Sent to Bagdad and Damascus, No. 11.)

#### No. 34.

*British Delegation, Geneva, to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.) (Extract.)

[By Bag.]

*Geneva, September 25, 1924.*

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan:—

"The question of the Irak frontier then came before the council, and the Turkish representative was called to the table. The Swedish delegate had already circulated a report in which he put two questions: (1) How did the British and Turkish delegations understand the reference to the council provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? and (2) what was the meaning of the words 'the frontier between Turkey and Irak'?"

"Lord Parmoor made a statement in which he gave replies to these two questions. As regards the first, he declared that the British Government were prepared to accept the decision of the council, and felt themselves bound in advance to accept that decision, whatever it might be. With regard to the second question, he said that, in the opinion of the British Government, an essential preliminary was that there should be an understanding as to the basis of the question at issue. At present there was a conflict of views which arose out of the different interpretations of the language of the Treaty of Lausanne. The language of the treaty seemed to the British Government to be clear beyond doubt, but it was, of course, for the council to decide. The issue was a clear-cut one, and it appeared to the British Government to be

necessary that a decision should be taken upon it before any progress could be made towards the settlement of the frontier. When a definition of the subject-matter had been obtained, the council would retain complete freedom of action to rectify existing administrative frontiers on geographical, ethnological, administrative, &c., grounds.

"Lord Parmoor then referred to the provision in the treaty whereby the signatories undertook to observe the *status quo* pending a decision by the council. In this connection, he recalled the statement made at the last meeting by the Turkish delegate in regard to certain frontier incidents, and he then proceeded to read the text of the note to the Turkish Government which is contained in your telegram No. 143 to Constantinople, intimating that he desired, by this statement, to bring the matter formally to the notice of the council under article 11 of the covenant. A copy of this note had already been circulated to members of the council, and is being circulated also to all delegations represented in the assembly.

"Lord Parmoor asked that the council might make such provisions as they could in order to ensure that the undertaking given in the treaty in regard to the *status quo* might be observed on both sides.

"Fethi Bey made a statement in which he also replied to the two questions put by the *rapporteur*. In regard to the first, he said that the Turkish Government recognised in their entirety the powers conferred on the council by article 15 of the covenant.

"In answer to the second question, he still maintained that the words 'between Turkey and Irak' could not be interpreted as was done by the British Government, which assumed that the Vilayet of Mosul had already been allocated to Irak. He referred to the quotations made by Lord Parmoor at the last meeting from speeches made by Lord Curzon at Lausanne. The passages quoted referred to the promises made by the British Government to the people of Irak, to King Feisal, and to the League, but he observed that the Turkish Government had never renounced their right to the Vilayet of Mosul, and therefore the British Government could not have the power to promise anything to anyone in regard to its fate. Finally he stated that the Turkish Government had claimed the southern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, but they were ready to compromise in a spirit of negotiation and to accept settlement by means of a plebiscite.

"In regard to the frontier incident to which Lord Parmoor had made allusion, he reminded the council that he himself had first raised this question at the last meeting and declared that the Turkish Government would always be faithful to the engagements which they had undertaken. But it was necessary to define exactly what was the frontier referred to. He declared that the British authorities had claimed to push the frontier north of the northern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, and the Turkish Government could not recognise that this northern frontier was the frontier of the *status quo*.

"Lord Parmoor said that, having already defined his point of view on the question at issue before the council, it was unnecessary for him to say more at the present stage. The interpretation of the treaty was purely a juridical question for the solution of which the council must take what measures seemed to it best. As regards the frontier incident, it was clearly an obligation on both sides to maintain the *status quo*, and his information showed that the *status quo* frontier had been crossed from the Turkish side.

"Fethi Bey maintained the contrary view and said that his information showed that British troops had violated the *status quo* frontier.

"In summing up the debate, the Swedish delegate said that the answer to his first question seemed to be that both parties agreed to accept the award of the council. But this question was connected with the second question, on which no agreement could be reached.

"Before making any further progress, it would be necessary for the council to determine the exact nature of the question and he must beg to adjourn the further consideration of this point.

"This was agreed to."



No. 35.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul London (Geneva).*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1924.*

FOLLOWING from the High Commissioner for Irak to Colonial Office, No. 472 of 27th September, 1924:—

"Christian refugees, Amadiyah, estimated 6,000, and may increase. Of these, about 2,000 completely destitute; others have sheep or are dependent on Assyrians serving in the levies.

"It will be difficult to approach the Irak Government for maintenance of the destitute, which I fear may have to be provided throughout the winter; at all events, am temporarily using some of my secret service fund, and Irak Government has advanced 3,000 rupees.

"Will His Majesty's Government agree to bear the cost in part or the whole? Matter [?] is urgent, as the attitude of the Assyrian levies may be affected if they see the refugees in difficulty."

[E 8221/5711/65]

No. 36.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 147.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 159 of the 23rd September.

Alleged violations of frontier have been examined in light of information in possession of His Majesty's Government, and although I await full text of Turkish note you are authorised immediately to return following interim reply:—

The five places mentioned in second paragraph cannot be recognised as lying beyond frontier as it stood at date of signature of Treaty of Lausanne, for reasons given below; nor can His Majesty's Government accept the contention advanced in paragraph 3 that the Turkish Government would be juridically justified in claiming the *de facto* line at the moment of the Mudros armistice—a claim which would be irreconcilable with the undertaking given by the Turkish Government in the Treaty of Lausanne. The argument put forward in paragraph 4 does not appear to His Majesty's Government to have any bearing upon the question at issue, since article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne provides that no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the "*present state*" (*i.e.*, on 24th July, 1923) of the territories of which the final fate is under dispute. His Majesty's Government have on two occasions since 24th July, 1923, informed the Turkish Government that they regard the whole of the Mosul Vilayet as remaining in their effective occupation, and being under their *de facto* administration. These occasions were:—

December 20, 1923: Note from the British representative at Constantinople to Adnan Bey.

April 26, 1924: Note to Turkish representative in London (my despatch No. 480).

His Majesty's Government regard the *status quo* referred to in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne as comprising the following administrative and other conditions. In July 1923 the whole of the Mosul Vilayet remained in the effective occupation of His Majesty's Government and was under their *de facto* administration. The true northern boundary of the Mosul Vilayet includes the following frontier nahias:—

1. In the Kaza of Zakho, the nahias of Zakho, Sindi and Guli.
2. In the Kaza of Amadiyah, the nahias of Atraf, Shar, Barwari, Bala, Nerva and Raikan.
3. In the Kaza of Rowanduz, the nahias of Muzuri Bala, Shirwan, Baradost, Balik.

From this it will be seen that the true northern frontier of the Mosul Vilayet runs as follows:—

From the junction of the rivers Tigris and Khabur along the Khabur eastwards to its junction with the Hazil River, northwards along the Hazil River as far as the influx of the tributary from the two villages of Baijo, thence along the right bank of this tributary to its source in the Tanin Mountain. Thence north of Merga and Hadrish, and across the River Khabur to the heights above Halamun and Geramus. The boundary then turns south-east so as just to exclude Ashita and the Lizan Valley and just to include Dashtan; thence down the Zab River to a point due west of Chal; thence eastwards so as to exclude Chal, but to include the districts of Merwa and Raikan and just to exclude the village of Nervek. After crossing the Oramar (Rudbar-i-Shin) River, the boundary continues to the north-eastern end of Gavanda tableland, thence southward through Begalto until it meets the River Haji Beg a few miles north of its junction with the Baradost River; thence along the line of the Haji Beg River to the Persian frontier.

Having thus defined the true northern boundary of the Mosul Vilayet, His Majesty's Government desire to point out that to the north of that boundary there lies an area which they regard as having been at the date of signature of the Treaty of Lausanne under no effective occupation, whether Turkish or British. This area comprises the high mountain country south of Julamerk, on each side of the River Zab, and is bounded by a line which leaves the frontier described above at the point where it turns south-east on the heights above Halamun and Geramus, and runs over the crest of the Sardinan Dag and the Kaluta Dag to Chemikta on the River Zab at the confluence of that river with the River Bardzawa. Then south-east through Hani until it rejoins the frontier described above at the north-eastern end of the Gavanda tableland. This area, which forms part of the original home of the Assyrian Christian tribes of Upper and Lower Tiari and Tkhuma, remained practically uninhabited from 1916, when its inhabitants were driven out by the Turks, until 1921, when they were reinstated in their original homes by the British authorities. During this period they had been maintained in refugee camps in Irak at the expense of the British Government. While not claiming that this area falls within the boundary of the Mosul Vilayet, His Majesty's Government maintain that no effective Turkish Administration has been in force in it since the return of the Assyrian refugees, who would not have gone there except on that assumption. At the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne the area referred to was, in practice, outside the sphere of Turkish influence. His Majesty's Government, having learnt of the rumoured arrival of a mutessarif with troops at Julamerk and of his intention to post a Turkish kaimakam at Chal with troops, informed the Turkish Government through the British representative at Constantinople on 17th October, 1923, that they would regard the execution of this latter proposal as a violation of the *status quo* referred to in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne. As no reply was returned to this note and the threatened despatch of an administrative officer with troops was not carried out, His Majesty's Government assumed that the Turkish Government acquiesced in their view of the situation in this area.

Claim made in paragraph 5, that His Majesty's Government defined the *status quo* line between Amadia and Zakho in their note of 23rd August as running through the places mentioned therein, is incorrect. His Majesty's Government merely stated that aeroplanes had not flown, during the month of June, north of a line passing through these places, which will be seen from the description of frontier given above to fall within the true boundary of the Mosul Vilayet.

Last paragraph of your telegram is not fully understood. His Majesty's Government regard River Hazil as forming part of line, and not as running at right angles to it.

In the preceding paragraphs His Majesty's Government have defined the *status quo* at the time of the signature of the Lausanne Treaty as they see it. They are conscious of having been responsible for no military or other movement since that date which might modify in any way the then state of the territories of which the final fate is in dispute. Such military or other movements as they may have been compelled to authorise have been prompted solely by the desire to preserve the *status quo* as defined above. The Turkish authorities, on the other hand, have not only attempted to establish effective administrative control in an area which was outside the sphere of Turkish influence on the date of the signature of the Treaty of



Lausanne, by deputing a responsible administrative officer to visit Chal with an armed escort early in August, but have also invaded the area which was in effective British military occupation and under *de facto* British administration on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, by despatching armed forces of cavalry, infantry and artillery across the River Hazil. Such action by the Turkish Government can only be viewed by His Majesty's Government with bitter disappointment, seeing that the whole question is now actually before the Council of the League of Nations with a view to peaceful settlement. His Majesty's Government earnestly trust that the Turkish Government will therefore issue immediate orders to the Turkish local commander to withdraw all Turkish forces from the Mosul Vilayet and from the sphere outside Turkish influence defined above.

His Majesty's Government are communicating a copy of this telegram to the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations, together with a copy of your telegram under reply, with instructions to lay them both before the council at the earliest opportunity.

You should inform the Turkish Government accordingly.  
(Repeated to Geneva, No. 90, and Bagdad.)

[E 8360/5711/65]

No. 37.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 704.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from Ismet Pasha, dated the 23rd September, protesting against British military activities on Irak frontier.

(Copies to Bagdad, No. 57, and Geneva.)

Constantinople, September 24, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Ismet Pasha to Mr. MacDonald.

Excellence,

Constantinople, le 23 septembre 1924.

PAR la note que j'ai fait remettre à votre Excellence le 16 de ce mois, j'avais eu l'honneur de protester formellement contre la violation de la ligne du *statu quo* par les forces britanniques.

Or, d'après les dernières informations reçues, ces violations, loin d'avoir pris fin, se présentent d'une façon continue. Ainsi, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que, après la transmission de cette note, il y a eu encore cinq nouvelles agressions :

Des avions anglais ont attaqué, le 17 courant, à 5 heures de l'après-midi, la localité de Chirance et occasionné la mort de deux soldats et la blessure de deux autres. Le 18, dans la matinée, quatre avions ont effectué une attaque dans la zone de Tchelqui, qui a eu comme suite la mort de deux individus. Dans la soirée, une autre attaque, opérée sur les bords de la rivière Hazil, a occasionné la blessure d'un soldat. Les pertes en matériel et en bétail ne sont pas encore évaluées.

En outre, des attaques ont été dirigées contre l'endroit de Keifa. Le 20 septembre, trois avions opérant à Dehti-Massek, situé à 10 kilom. de Hazil, sur la route de Besbin-Chirani, ont causé la mort d'un officier et de six soldats.

Il y a eu également vingt-cinq blessés, dont quinze en état grave. Le 21 septembre, une autre attaque a été dirigée contre un convoi de chameaux appartenant à des particuliers. Deux chameliers ont été blessés, quarante chameaux tués et vingt autres blessés.

Je déclare itérativement que le Gouvernement de la République turque se réserve expressément le droit de réclamer des dommages pour toutes les pertes subies au cours de ces dernières attaques.

Il me paraît utile de donner à cette occasion quelques indications sur l'historique de la ligne en question. Mon Gouvernement serait fondé en droit à ne considérer d'autre ligne que celle existant de fait au moment de la signature de l'armistice de Moudros, le 30 octobre 1918.

On sait que la ligne la plus avancée des forces britanniques passait en ce moment par Kasri-Chirin, Ibrahim-Handji situé à 25 kilom. au nord de Hanikin, par 25 kilom. au nord de Kerkuk et 3 kilom. au nord d'Altin Keupru, ainsi que par la localité d'Elzavié située sur le Tigre, pour se diriger près du nord d'Elhazar, s'étendant ensuite au sud-ouest et atteignant l'Euphrate à 50 kilom. à l'est d'Ebou-Kémal. Il en résulte que la seule ligne de *statu quo* que la Turquie puisse reconnaître en droit, laissant à la Turquie Mossoul, Erbil, Keuy sandjak et Suleimanieh.

Le Général Marshall, commandant des troupes britanniques, dans un mémoire qu'il avait transmis, en date du 2 novembre 1918, au commandant des troupes turques, avait défini comme suit la ligne entre les deux armées :

Le long de la frontière persane, de Mohammerah jusqu'au point où cette frontière dépasse Dialé, près du mont Avranan, de là du Suleimanieh et Keuy sandjak y compris, de là jusqu'au coude formé par Zabi-Kébir aux environs de Harir, de là le long Duzalé à un point situé au nord-est d'Amadié et de là à Zaho.

Donc la ligne de *statu quo* que le commandant britannique avait modifiée de sa propre initiative, sans se baser sur aucune stipulation contractuelle, laissait en territoire turc Chéhir-Bazar, Ranié et Ravandiz. Malgré cela, les forces anglaises ont encore modifié cette ligne à leur avantage en occupant Ranié et Ravandiz contre toute justice.

Le Foreign Office, dans sa note du 23 août 1924, répondant à la démarche antérieure du Gouvernement turc, qui se plaignait de la violation constante de la frontière par les avions anglais, marquait la ligne du *statu quo* entre Amadié et Zaho comme passant à traverser Zaho, Bersivi, Banona, Tchakalli. Cette communication démontre la claire intention du Gouvernement britannique de modifier à nouveau à son avantage la ligne de *statu quo* en créant de la sorte un nouveau fait accompli.

Il est important de signaler que toutes les attaques aériennes mentionnées dans la présente note ont été effectuées au nord de toutes les lignes successivement données par les autorités anglaises, celle de la note du 23 août du Foreign Office y comprise.

Il est tout à fait étonnant que Mr. Henderson ait réclamé dans son mémoire du 17 septembre que l'on avait tiré sur un détachement traversant la rivière Hazil. Cette rivière entre sur le territoire turc perpendiculairement à la frontière et suit son cours vers le nord. Elle n'a aucun rapport avec la frontière. Dans ces conditions, j'ai le regret de constater que l'Angleterre n'admet même pas l'existence d'une ligne de *statu quo*. J'estime que le fait d'avoir porté le différend par-devant la Société des Nations implique la reconnaissance d'une ligne temporaire et l'existence de la plus complète tranquillité des deux côtés de cette même ligne.

D'autre part, il n'est pas admissible que les autorités anglaises considèrent le traité comme un instrument de sûreté, ayant uniquement force obligatoire pour la Turquie, et qu'elles violent continuellement le territoire turc en s'inspirant de ce point de vue. Aussi me considère-je en droit d'espérer que le Gouvernement britannique voudra bien donner des ordres catégoriques à qui de droit en vue de mettre un terme à cet état de choses incompatible avec les relations normales existant entre nos deux pays.

Veillez, &c.  
ISMET.

[E 8352/5711/65]

No. 38.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 1029.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 29, 1924.

THE Turkish Minister called on me on the 25th instant and resumed the discussion (see my despatch No. 1021) in regard to the Irak frontier and the military operations now taking place there.

2. Zekiai Bey informed me that he had been instructed by Ismet Pasha to draw my attention to my note of the 23rd August (enclosed in my despatch No. 921 of the 26th August), in which it was stated that British aeroplanes had not gone beyond a certain line during June. That line had been taken by Ismet Pasha as our recognised *status quo* frontier, apparently on the ground that we had in the note referred to police posts, which the Turkish Government regarded as frontier posts. I refused to recognise that we had had any such intention; the line mentioned in the note was

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simply a line beyond which British aircraft had not flown during June, and we had so informed the Turkish Mission in reply to a complaint regarding alleged flights over Turkish territory early in that month.

3. I pointed out to Zekiai Bey that there was a difference between the Turkish and British Governments on the question what should be the frontier of Turkey and Irak, that the whole matter had gone to arbitration by the Council of the League of Nations, and that until they gave their decision neither Government ought to undertake operations such as those which the Turks had just begun. When the decision of the council was given I proposed to accept it; and if it should then happen that we held posts or were in occupation of territory on the Turkish side of the boundary as finally decided by the council, I assured the Minister that evacuation would take place at once. He need not, therefore, have any fear that in taking up our present attitude we were moved by a desire to create a *fait accompli*.

4. The Minister reverted several times to the line mentioned in my note of the 23rd August, but I declined absolutely to regard it as being in any sense a frontier line.

5. I pressed Zekiai Bey to induce his Government to withhold all military action arising out of these frontier difficulties until a settlement had taken place. He informed me that Turkish troops had been sent across the River Hazil—into "Turkish territory"—for the purpose of pacifying the unsettled feeling which had arisen in the district. I replied that, if such had really been the intention of the Turkish Government, they should have informed His Majesty's Government before the troops were moved, so that there might be no misunderstanding. But I could not now recognise the Turkish occupation of the district as legitimate.

6. In conclusion, I requested Zekiai Bey to telegraph the gist of our conversation to Angora, and informed him that I would not be able to see him again until next week. If, however, something fresh arose in the meantime, he could see the proper officials at the Foreign Office.

7. During the interview the Minister once more expressed his desire, of which he had informed me on the 23rd instant, to come to an agreement regarding the Turco-Irak frontier without the intervention of the League of Nations.

I am, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 9587/232/65]

No. 39.

*Extract from Minutes of Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on September 27, at 3.30 P.M.—(Received September 30.)*

M. BRANTING said that as *rapporteur* he had no objection whatever to the draft instrument submitted to the council by Great Britain concerning the mandate for Irak. He asked whether any representative on the council had any observations to offer.

The council unanimously adopted the following decision:—

"The Council of the League of Nations—

"Having regard to article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923,

"Having regard to article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

"In view of the communication which has been made by the Government of His Britannic Majesty to the Council of the League of Nations on the 7th September, 1924, in the following terms:—

"Whereas the territory of Irak, which formerly constituted a part of the Turkish Empire, passed into the occupation of the military forces of His Britannic Majesty in the course of the recent war; and

"Whereas it was intended by the principal Allied Powers that the territory of Irak should, until such time as it might be able to stand alone, be entrusted to a mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of article 22 (paragraph 4) of the covenant, and that this mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty; and

"Whereas His Britannic Majesty agreed to accept the mandate for Irak; and

"Whereas His Britannic Majesty has, in view of the rapid progress of Irak, recognised an independent Government therein and has concluded with the King of Irak a treaty with protocol and subsidiary agreements, as set forth in the schedule hereto, and hereinafter referred to as the Treaty of Alliance; and

"Whereas the purpose of the said Treaty of Alliance is to ensure the complete observance and execution in Irak of the principles which the acceptance of the mandate was intended to secure;

"The Government of His Britannic Majesty is willing to agree as follows:—

"I.

"So long as the Treaty of Alliance is in force His Majesty's Government will assume towards all members of the League of Nations, who accept the provisions of this arrangement and the benefits of the said treaty, responsibility for the fulfilment by Irak of the provisions of the said Treaty of Alliance.

"II.

"During the currency of the Treaty of Alliance the Government of His Britannic Majesty, in consultation with His Majesty the King of Irak, will take such steps as may be necessary for the conclusion of special extradition agreements on behalf of Irak. Copies of all such agreements shall be communicated to the Council of the League.

"III.

"An annual report to the satisfaction of the Council of the League will be made to the council as to the measures taken in Irak during the year to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated in Irak during the year will be attached to the said report.

"IV.

"No modifications of the terms of the Treaty of Alliance will be agreed to by His Britannic Majesty's Government without the consent of the Council of the League.

"V.

"If any dispute should arise between the Government of His Britannic Majesty and that of another member of the League as to whether the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance or of the present decision are being fulfilled in Irak, or as to their interpretation or application, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League.

"VI.

"In the event of Irak being admitted to the League of Nations, the obligations hereby assumed by His Britannic Majesty's Government shall terminate.

"VII.

"On the conclusion of the period for which the Treaty of Alliance has been concluded, the Council of the League of Nations shall, if Irak has not been admitted to the League, be invited to decide what further measures are required to give effect to article 22 of the covenant:

"Accepts the undertakings of the Government of His Britannic Majesty; and

"Approves the terms of the above communication as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the covenant; and

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"Decides that the privileges and immunities, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, will not be required for the protection of foreigners in Irak so long as the Treaty of Alliance is in force."

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the secretary-general of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at Geneva, on the 27th day of September, 1924.

No. 40.

*Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY immediately preceding telegram.

The Pasha left for Alexandria to-day.

(Sent to Damascus and Bagdad.)

*Beirut, September 30, 1924.*

[E 8024/5711/65]

No. 41.

*Mr. MacDonald to Zekiai Bey.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 30, 1924.*

WITH reference to the note of the 3rd instant from the Turkish Mission concerning an alleged bombardment of Suleimanieh by British aircraft in July last, I have the honour to invite your attention to the reply, dated the 20th December, 1923, which was made by the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to a protest from the Turkish Government regarding the bombardment of that town by British aeroplanes in August 1923.

2. Mr. Henderson, in his note, of which a copy is enclosed herein for convenience of reference, informed the Turkish Government that, as was made clear to the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, His Majesty's Government regarded the whole of the Mosul Vilayet as remaining in their effective occupation and as being under their *de facto* administration; that the operation referred to did not, therefore, constitute a violation of the *status quo*, since it was simply a local administrative measure necessitated by a menace to public security in the district; and that the operation was in no way directed against any Turkish interest.

3. The same remarks apply with equal force at the present day, pending the final settlement of a frontier between Turkey and Irak, and His Majesty's Government are therefore unable to admit the contention advanced in the note of the 3rd September that the recent operations at Suleimanieh involved an infringement of article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne.

4. It has, moreover, been ascertained that there is no foundation for the report that two-thirds of the town were destroyed by an air bombardment which preceded the entry of Irak Government forces on the 19th July into Suleimanieh. These forces entered the town without opposition, and no air action was then taken. Several weeks earlier air action had been taken against the town—on the 27th and 28th May—but ample public warning had previously been given to the inhabitants on the 20th and 23rd May, with the result that there were no casualties. The number of houses damaged was between 50 and 100, out of a total of about 3,000 houses in the town, *i.e.*, between one-thirtieth and one-sixtieth of the whole. Since the entry of the Irak forces on the 19th July over 3,000 inhabitants have returned to the town.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 8309/5711/65]

No. 42.

*Mr. MacDonald to Zekiai Bey.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 1, 1924.*

IN your note of the 26th ultimo you were so good as to acquaint me with the views of your Government regarding the recent incidents on the Turco-Irak frontier in confirmation of the verbal statement which you made to me on the 25th September.

2. I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's representative at Constantinople has been instructed to reply in detail to the note of the 23rd September, which he had received from his Excellency General Ismet Pasha. In this reply His Majesty's Government set forth the reasons for which they are unable to accept the contentions of the Turkish Government in regard to the recent incidents and the *status quo* to be observed by the two Governments in accordance with article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. As regards the question of Suleimaniya, mentioned in the fourth paragraph of your note, I beg leave to invite your attention to my note of the 30th ultimo.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 8476/5711/65]

No. 43.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 1.)*

(No. 706.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter to the Turkish Government respecting Turkish military activities on the Irak frontier.

*Constantinople September 25, 1924.*

Enclosure in No. 43.

*Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey.*

M. le Représentant,

*Constantinople, September 25, 1924.*

IN accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to make to your Excellency the following communication relative to recent events on the frontier of Irak:—

"His Majesty's Government have learnt with astonishment of a direct and flagrant contravention of undertaking given by the Turkish Government in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier, no military or other movement should take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

"A serious warning was conveyed to the Kaimakam of Julamerk by the High Commissioner of Irak on the 12th September. On the 14th September a British air patrol discovered a small hostile force crossing the river Hazil north of Rabanki. The presence of further armed bodies was also reported near Bersiwi Bahnunah on the tracks leading to Zakho. The British authorities, assuming that these forces were composed of irresponsible tribal elements and apprehensive that their action, if unchecked, would result in serious trouble amongst the tribes, took the necessary steps to drive some of the invaders back across the frontier by machine-gun fire from aircraft, which caused some casualties.

"A communication was made by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the delegate of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople on the 17th September to the effect that a serious situation would arise if Turkish troops crossed the frontier in such numbers as to appear intentionally to infringe the

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*status quo.* The Turkish Government will appreciate the fact that Bersiwi and Bahnunah are not only well within the boundary of the area administered by the British authorities on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, but also within the old administrative boundary of the Mosul Vilayet. According to a report received by His Majesty's Government on the 18th September, bodies left behind by the invaders show that Turkish regulars formed part of the invading force. It was also reported that Turkish troops had proceeded eastward within the administrative frontier of Irak and had attacked a police post and burnt villages within the frontier.

"On the 20th September a patrol reported that Turkish troops had overpowered a detachment of Irak police at Chakalle, on the Khabur, and were threatening other Irak police posts in Barwari Balla, a few miles north-west of Amadia.

"It was thus clear that Turkish regular forces were definitely invading the area administered by His Majesty's Government at the date of the signature of the Lausanne Treaty and wilfully disregarding the *status quo*.

"On the 22nd September the High Commissioner reported detachments of Irak police and of local levies (an Imperial force under British officers, though our information does not show that British officers were actually present) had been forced back to Amadia. Their retirement was accompanied by the flight of masses of Assyrian Christians and Irak tribesmen, who were pouring into Amadia in large numbers.

"His Majesty's Government protest in the most solemn and formal manner against the continued and flagrant violation of a solemn undertaking given by the Turkish Government in an international instrument which has been duly ratified, brought into force and submitted to the League of Nations for registration.

"His Majesty's Government regard the events recited above as a circumstance affecting international relations and threatening to disturb the good understanding between nations, upon which peace depends. They are accordingly instructing the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations to communicate the foregoing protest to the council and assembly and to bring to their attention, as provided for by article 11 of the covenant, the present state of affairs on the Irak frontier.

"Meanwhile the British authorities in Irak have been authorised to take all necessary action in order to prevent invasion or infiltration by Turkish forces of a nature to entail serious unrest and bloodshed."

I trust that your Excellency will communicate the foregoing urgently to his Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I avail, &c.  
R. C. LINDSAY.

## No. 44.

Consul London to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, September 30, 1924.

PRELIMINARY question of scope of reference to council was satisfactorily settled by council at to-day's sitting. It was agreed that function of council is to be delimitation of frontier between Turkey and Irak. Council resolved to set up special committee of three persons to advise it. This committee is to lay before council all information and reports likely to assist it in reaching decision. Committee is to give due consideration to existing documents and to views expressed by interested parties both as to procedure and substance of questions. It shall receive all communications that parties may wish to transmit to it. It may proceed to investigations on the spot, and in that case may utilise services of assessors appointed by both parties. Committee will fix own procedure. Secretary-general will furnish staff and advance necessary funds subject to recovery in equal proportions from Governments concerned. President of the Council [?and] the *rapporteur*, viz., M. Branting, Swedish representative on council, are to appoint members of committee by common agreement. Resolution ends by taking note of undertaking by both sides to maintain *status quo* pending settlement of frontier.

Text of resolution was accepted both by Turkish representative and by myself. In intimating my acceptance I laid stress on necessity for maintaining *status quo*, and gave assurance that His Majesty's Government would abide strictly by its undertaking in this respect. Turkish delegate used similar language. Both sides agreed in advance to accept decision of council.

## No. 45.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 13.)

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) (Extract.)

Geneva, September 30, 1924.

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan:—

"The Swedish delegate then read a report on the subject of the Irak frontier, in which he said that he had ascertained with satisfaction that the divergence of views on the scope of the question was not so great as had at first appeared to him. He said that he had been in communication with both delegates. Lord Parmoor had reminded him that the effect of his declaration to the council was that the British Government accepted in advance the council's decision regarding the frontier between Turkey and Irak. He had observed that the problem before the council was to find the best possible frontier. The British Government had already indicated where, in their opinion, this should be drawn, but the undertaking referred to above to abide by the eventual decision of the council showed that the British Government fully recognised the right of the council to draw the frontier between Turkey and Irak on any line which the council might adopt, after due investigation and consideration. Fethi Bey, to whom M. Branting had communicated the results of this conversation, had informed him that the misunderstanding appeared to be dispelled and that he agreed to the question being submitted in the form indicated by Lord Parmoor. M. Branting had then asked Fethi Bey if he could, on behalf of his Government, give an undertaking to accept the council's recommendation. Fethi Bey had replied that he would be prepared to make a declaration in the sense referred to, at the same time adding that he was convinced that the council would base its decision on the wishes of the inhabitants.

"M. Branting then proposed that the council should appoint a commission to examine the question. This commission would take count of existing documents and the views expressed by the parties concerned, both in regard to the procedure and to the substance of the question.

"In conclusion, M. Branting referred to the complaints received by the council from both sides in regard to frontier incidents, which were particularly regrettable at the present moment, and he suggested that the council should urge both Governments to use all the weight of their authority in order to restore and maintain peace on both sides of the so-called *status quo* line, in accordance with the reciprocal undertaking contained in the final paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

"Lord Parmoor, in confirming the statement of the views of the British Government which had just been made by M. Branting, drew special attention to the recent frontier incidents. He expressed his apprehension at the effect that these might have, and gave a formal undertaking on behalf of the British Government that they, for their part, were determined to respect the *status quo*.

"Fethi Bey gave the declaration asked for by M. Branting to the effect that his Government would accept in advance the decision of the council in regard to the frontier line. He also gave an assurance similar to that given by Lord Parmoor to the effect that the Turkish Government were determined to respect the *status quo*.

"M. Branting then submitted a resolution embodying his proposal for the appointment of a commission. This commission would consist of three members, appointed by the president of the council and the *rapporteur* by common agreement. The council unanimously adopted the resolution."



[E 8571/5711/65]

No. 46.

*Zekiai Bey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 4.)**Légation de la Turquie, Londres,  
le 3 octobre 1924.*

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la note du Foreign Office en date du 30 septembre 1924, relative au bombardement et à l'occupation de Suleimanieh par les forces britanniques.

Je crois devoir à cette occasion faire remarquer à votre Excellence la contradiction qui existe entre les parties 2 et 4 de cette note. En effet, il est affirmé dans la partie 2 que tout le vilayet de Mossoul est considéré comme étant sous l'occupation *de facto* du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, et dans la partie 4 que la ville de Suleimanieh a été occupée le 19 juillet dernier par les forces britanniques, ce qui montre qu'elle n'était pas occupée *de facto* avant cette date.

Cela confirme la justesse du point de vue exprimé par le Gouvernement de la République à ce sujet et constitue une acceptation de la thèse turque selon laquelle la localité de Suleimanieh n'était pas sous l'occupation britannique lors de la signature du Traité de Paix. Conformément à l'article 3 (2) de ce traité celle-ci n'aurait donc pas dû être occupée le 19 juillet dernier.

Dans la partie 4 de la note précitée du Foreign Office il est déclaré que l'occupation de Suleimanieh eut lieu sans coup férir, mais que la ville fut bombardée plusieurs semaines auparavant et que le nombre d'habitations détruites fut seulement de 50 à 100.

Votre Excellence voudra bien reconnaître que le fait que le bombardement aérien ait précédé de quelques semaines l'occupation et que le nombre d'habitations détruites soit d'après les estimations britanniques inférieur à celui fourni par les estimations turques ne change en rien le fond de la question qui consiste en une infraction au Traité de Lausanne commise par les autorités britanniques de l'Irak.

Je me vois donc dans ces conditions obligé de maintenir les protestations et demandes formulées dans la note turque du 3 septembre 1924, et j'ose exprimer l'espoir que votre Excellence voudra donner les ordres nécessaires pour que Suleimanieh soit évacuée et que la situation *de facto* qui existait lors de la signature du Traité de Paix soit rétablie.

Je prie, &c.  
ZEKIAI.

No. 47.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 151.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 4, 1924.*

AIR Officer Commanding, Bagdad, reports Turks are not moving from lines of communication within boundary of Mosul Vilayet or from Ashita.

Geneva telegram No. 81 of 30th September reported undertaking by both British and Turkish delegations to maintain *status quo* pending settlement of frontier.

*Status quo* is, of course, that of time of signature of Treaty of Lausanne as given in detail in my telegram No. 147 of 27th September. In view of definite assurance given by Turkish representative at Geneva, His Majesty's Government trust Turkish Government will lose no time in ordering immediate return to *status quo ante*. Failing this, situation must inevitably become most grave.

You should make urgent representations accordingly  
(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 8638/5711/65]

No. 48.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 722.)  
Sir,

*Constantinople, October 1, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, although during the last few weeks the Turkish press has devoted considerable space to the Irak-Turkish frontier question, it has preserved a significant silence respecting the incidents which have occurred in the

northern districts of Irak, and which have formed the subject of the notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government during the past fortnight. Press comment has been based chiefly on private telegrams from Geneva to the effect that the Turkish case had been favourably received by the League of Nations, and that the Turkish proposal to hold a plebiscite to decide the fate of the territory claimed by Turkey had dismayed the British.

2. The press of the 29th September, however, reproduced an article of the Angora "Hakimiet-i-Millieh," stating that, as a result of a Turkish protest against the violation of the *status quo* on the Turco-Irak frontier, the British were accusing the Turks of fomenting trouble in the Caucasus and Morocco. The "Vakt" of yesterday noted with satisfaction that Turkish forces were exterminating the brigands implicated in "the Hakkiari outrage," by which it no doubt referred to the capture of the Turkish Vali of Julamerk by Assyrian tribesmen on the 9th August last.

3. Local newspapers were, indeed, aware that Nusret Bey had presented a note dealing with Mosul to Mr. Henderson on the 16th ultimo, but were at fault in their conjectures as to its contents. They also remained in ignorance of the notes of the 25th and 29th September addressed by me to Nusret Bey, and of Nusret Bey's second note of the 23rd September enclosing Ismet Pasha's note of the same date to you. There is little doubt that they have been intentionally kept in ignorance by the Turkish authorities, and the experience of the local correspondent of the "Times" goes to prove this. On applying yesterday morning to the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for information as to notes stated to have passed recently between this mission and the delegation respecting Mosul, Mr. Macartney was assured by Nusret Bey that there had been no exchange of notes.

4. If the Turkish Government still wish to conceal the real situation they can no longer hope to do so, owing to the disclosures made in the press of the 29th September and the publication by the "Vatan" of yesterday of the text of the note which I communicated to Nusret Bey on the 25th September, with the important omission of the last sentence of paragraph 4, which is as follows:—

"It was also reported that Turkish troops had proceeded eastward within the administrative frontier of Irak and had attacked a police post and burnt villages within the frontier."

The "Vatan" also published what purports to be, and what has every appearance of being, Lord Parmoor's letter to the secretary-general of the League of Nations, enclosing a copy of the note of the 25th September to Nusret Bey. The letter refers to article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and requests that the note may be brought without delay to the knowledge of the Council of the League.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 8640/5711/65]

No. 49.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 725.)  
Sir,

*Constantinople, October 1, 1924.*

I MUST admit to some surprise at the energy of the Turkish aggressions on the Irak frontier which have formed the subject of recent telegraphic and other correspondence between yourself and this mission. I have been, and still am, under the impression that the Turkish Government, though far from feeling any affection for His Majesty's Government, have considerable respect for their strength and are desirous of keeping on the right side of them, with a view to cultivating relations more resembling cordiality later on if and when it may be convenient. Moreover, everything tends to show that the main attention of the Turkish authorities is concentrated on internal affairs and reconstruction and that they genuinely desire to avoid serious foreign complications. And yet they appear to have launched a considerable and entirely indefensible offensive against Irak, of a nature to alienate the friendship of His Majesty's Government and to prejudice unfavourably their case before the League of Nations.

2. That the Turks do not desire their action to develop so seriously as to affect their general policy is confirmed by the absence at this critical moment of the President on tour in the remoter provinces of North Eastern Anatolia, and by the



noteworthy silence observed hitherto by the press on the subject of events on the frontier as distinguished from the fairly full reports of Fethi Bey's activities and successes at Geneva. Indeed the news that complications have arisen has only transpired from Geneva, and the Turkish delegation here was yesterday denying that anything had happened at all (see my despatch No. 722 of to-day's date).

3. Doubtless vengeance for the Hakkiari incident is the immediate purpose of the movements of Turkish forces into the Mosul Vilayet. Apart from that it is useless to seek for much consistency between Turkish action and their real political aims and desires, for the premises I have stated above in paragraph 1, and to which I still adhere, do not in the least tally with their actions. The exultation with which the "Vakt" reports how the "Hakkiari brigands" have been cut up (see my despatch quoted above) shows that this aggression will meet with popular approval. Doubtless also the Turkish authorities, with an eye to the future, especially to the future four years hence, desire to bring about a state of such uncertainty in the region north of Amadia as to make it an impossible district for Christian resettlement. Probably also there is the element of pure bluff—they seize a district in the hope that His Majesty's Government will not put forth the effort necessary to eject them. These various possible motives can, I think, be assessed better from Bagdad than from Constantinople. Purely military considerations enter into them with which I am unfamiliar.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Bagdad and Geneva.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[W 8080/7275/98]

No. 50.

*Extracts from Minutes of Thirtieth Session of the Council of the League of Nations.*

(1.)

*Extract from the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting, held at Geneva, Saturday, September 20, 1924, at 3-30 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 23.)*

#### IRAQ FRONTIER.

*Article 3 (2) of the Treaty signed at Lausanne on July 25, 1923.*

THE PRESIDENT: The council will remember that on the 30th August we heard a statement from the *rapporteur*, M. Branting, referring to the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak, which has been placed on the agenda of the present session at the request of the British Government, according to the procedure which is laid down in article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, which reads as follows:—

"The frontier between Turkey and Irak shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

"In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

"The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories, of which the final fate will depend upon that decision."

In accordance with M. Branting's proposal the council decided to postpone the discussion of the question until the arrival of the Turkish representative. A telegram was despatched to the Government of Turkey asking that Government to send a representative to take part in the examination of the question. Since then a letter has been received from his Excellency Ismet Pasha, dated the 5th September, accrediting his Excellency Fethi Bey, President of the Turkish National Assembly, to represent his Government at the council for this matter.

I invite his Excellency Fethi Bey to take his place at the council table.

(His Excellency Fethi Bey then took his place at the council table.)

The best procedure will no doubt be to hear first the representative of Great Britain, which has asked for this question to be placed on the agenda, and then Fethi Bey, representative of the Turkish Government.

LORD PARMOOR: I desire, in the first place, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to extend our thanks to the Turkish Government for having sent his Excellency Fethi Bey to assist us in our deliberations on this matter. Perhaps I may recall to his recollection that the arrangement has been made that, in dealing with this question, there is no difference between his position and that of the representative of Great Britain. We stand on equal terms, and I hope we have an equal desire to adopt conciliatory action. If the matter could be settled by conciliation, so much the better. If that process fails, then I am going to suggest, quite shortly at this stage, what I shall ask the council to do, and what appears to me to be the best method of procedure.

As is already known, and as the president has already stated, the question arises under a term of the Treaty of Lausanne, dated July 1923, and I shall refer presently to the actual terms of that treaty.

I will try to put the matter before the council in the shortest way. I shall assume that the council have studied the memoranda on this subject, which have been submitted by the British and Turkish Governments. My colleagues will see, in studying those documents, that there are points upon which, at any rate at present—whatever may be brought about in the future—there is opposition between the views of the two Governments. The British Government will be prepared at a future stage, if it becomes necessary, to reply in detail to those points on which there may still exist a difference between the Turkish Government and ourselves. My view, however, is that my colleagues would not wish me, at this stage, to go into all these matters—some of them controversial—and I do not think it is necessary to do so at the present time.

The British Government suggests that the council should, in the first instance, determine the exact scope of the question under reference; in other words, that it should define, either here or by other methods, the exact matter which, under the terms of the treaty, has been referred to us. I think that is the first point in our discussion—to be quite clear as to the area of our jurisdiction, and what it is we have to determine.

Upon this point there is a difference of opinion between the Turkish Government and the British Government. No doubt it is a *bona fide* difference of opinion, but a difference of opinion does exist. The British Government hold and express their view that the point referred to the council is the definition of the frontier line between Turkey and Irak. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, if I understand their contention (and I desire to express it quite accurately), maintain that the point in dispute is not one of a frontier line, but whether the Vilayet of Mosul as a whole shall or shall not be restored to Turkey. The Turkish memorandum quotes in support of their contention certain passages from a speech made by Lord Curzon at Lausanne in January 1923, as indicating that the British Government have, in effect, accepted the Turkish view on this point. I think the passages quoted—I only refer to this in passing—clearly show that Lord Curzon realised, as we realise now, what was the Turkish point of view. That he did not himself accept that point of view, is clearly shown by one passage which occurred later in the same speech, which I think it will be of advantage to quote at the outset, namely:—

"I have thus stated the juridical and treaty basis of the British position and interest in Irak, including the Mosul Vilayet, and I have shown to the commission that the British Government are under a threefold pledge; firstly, to the Arab nation, to whom they promised that they should not be returned to Turkish rule; secondly, to the Arab King, who has been elected by the whole country, including Mosul, and with whom we have entered into obligations; and thirdly, to the League of Nations, without whose consent we cannot abandon our mandate over a large portion of the mandated territory."

(At that time Mosul was part of the mandated territory.)

"The only point which remains undetermined is the northern frontier of Irak, which has not been fixed by any legal instrument of the Allied Powers."

I think that makes it quite clear that that was the view which Lord Curzon was holding at that time.



But apart from anything that Lord Curzon may have said—and I only quote this in order that there should be no misunderstanding as to what his attitude was—the British contention rests on the language of the treaty itself. That is what we have to deal with here, and to the British Government this language appears perfectly plain. Here, again, to prevent any doubt, I quote the words of the treaty itself which are applicable to the matter now before the council. These are the actual words:—

“The frontier between Turkey and Irak shall be laid down in a friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.”

I hope even now, as I stated before, these matters may possibly be concluded in a friendly way.

“In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.”

Now what is the dispute? In the treaty it is expressed in these terms:—

“The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.”

It appears to the British Government quite clear that that decision is to determine the frontier line.

As the council are aware, the attempt to determine the frontier by direct arrangement between the two Governments has not so far succeeded. The nine months have expired, and this question, namely, that of determining the frontier, has now come before the council for its decision. The British Government can only appreciate one interpretation of the words of the reference, and are unable to understand any interpretation in any other sense.

They accordingly invite the council to rule that the problem, as submitted to them, is to define the frontier of the State of Irak as it actually exists, and not the disposal of the Mosul Vilayet, which has been administered as part of Irak since its occupation nearly six years ago. I take the position of the council in the matter to be quite clear. It would act as an arbitrator under the clause of the treaty which I have already quoted.

If this view of the problem to be determined by the council is accepted by my colleagues, there remains the question of procedure. The Turkish memorandum proposes a plebiscite throughout the Mosul Vilayet. Perhaps it may be stated quite briefly what are, in the opinion of the British Government, the objections to this proposal. If necessary, at a later stage, we should be prepared to confer in greater detail.

Firstly, the British Government regard the definition of the frontier as not a matter that lends itself to decision by plebiscite. Indeed, they have already come under the obligation to submit it to the council itself. Secondly, the population in the vicinity of the frontier consists in the main of uneducated tribesmen, who can hardly be regarded as competent to deal with the complicated issue involved so often in boundary settlement, and of which we have had experience in other cases.

Thirdly, the holding of a plebiscite in the vicinity of the frontier would be bound to cause unrest and possibly disturbance. The difficulty of providing an adequate neutral force to maintain order during the period of uncertainty is sufficiently obvious.

It appears to the British Government that the right method of settling this dispute is as follows. The council should adopt its ordinary procedure in such cases of appointing a commission of disinterested and unbiased persons to settle the dispute after studying the documents that have already been prepared and any further evidence which they may consider necessary. It would be for the commission itself to settle its own form of procedure, and to determine whether it can decide the question in session at some European centre, or whether it should personally visit the locality concerned.

This is the solution which I submit on behalf of the British Government, as the fairest possible solution which can be arrived at in a case of this sort, and I submit a proposal of that kind for discussion by my colleagues.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY (Turkey): I wish to thank Lord Parmoor for the declaration which he has made as to the equality of treatment of Turkey in the question now before the council. Turkey has agreed from the start to bring the dispute before the Council of the League of Nations, in the conviction that she will be treated on a footing of perfect equality with Great Britain.

I have taken careful note of the statement of Lord Parmoor and reserve to myself the right to answer his observations later in greater detail, but at the moment I ask the council for permission to explain shortly the point of view of the Turkish Republic regarding the dispute which, to its great regret, causes it to hold a different view from His Britannic Majesty's Government with regard to the frontier between Turkey and Irak. This dispute should, in accordance with the terms of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, have been settled between the two parties by direct negotiations. The Turkish Government regrets that the desired agreement has not been reached in the time appointed, but it none the less rejoices at the opportunity given it to submit its case to the impartial examination of the Council of the League of Nations.

In the negotiations which have already taken place we have always contended that the Vilayet of Mosul was an integral part of Turkey, whereas the British Government has insisted on the annexation of this province to Irak.

It is my duty to draw the attention of the council to the actual nature of the dispute submitted to it for examination before touching upon the principal question.

The British Government, in its memorandum, raises the question in a form which, in the view of the Turkish Government, is far from representing the real dispute before the council. In point of fact, the British Government declares that the question submitted to the council is not whether the Vilayet of Mosul should belong to Turkey or to Irak, but rather what ought to be the northern frontier of the State of Irak.

This point of view agrees neither with the letter nor the spirit of the Lausanne instruments. The Turkish delegation consistently claimed at Lausanne that the frontier line between Turkey and Irak should pass to the south of the Vilayet of Mosul, while the British delegation insisted that this province should be annexed to Irak, and in support of its contention it has put forward arguments based on geographical, ethnical, economic, military and political considerations. Since the two delegations did not reach agreement on the fate of the Vilayet of Mosul, they adopted article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty, in order not to delay the conclusion of peace.

This article is in the following terms:—

“The frontier between Turkey and Irak shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.”

“In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.”

Consequently, the problem for settlement consists in determining whether the Vilayet of Mosul ought to remain north or south of the frontier line between Turkey and Irak. The minutes of the Lausanne Conference leave no doubt as to this point.

If the dispute does not consist in determining the fate of the Vilayet of Mosul, the Turkish Government asks—and, in its opinion, rightly—what could be the nature of the dispute which arose during the Lausanne negotiations and which is now brought to the notice of the council?

I think it my duty to say no more upon this point, which is fully dealt with in the memorandum which I have the honour to submit to the council.

This said, I return to the principal question.

The different contentions of the two Governments are based on geographical, ethnical, military, economic and political considerations.

#### 1. *Geographical Considerations.*

We maintain that the name Irak is used to describe a country inhabited by Arabs, and that the limits of that country are clearly defined geographically. Without appealing to the testimony of several authors, I will confine myself to quoting the information furnished by the “Encyclopædia Britannica” and “La



Grande Encyclopédie française." On p. 740 of volume 14 of the British Encyclopædia the frontiers of Irak are described as follows:—

"Irak is approximately the region below the Median Wall, from Opis, on the Tigris at the mouth of Shatt-el-Adhem, to the neighbourhood of Ramadiéh (Ramadiya), on the Euphrates; that is, from nearly latitude 34° to the Persian Gulf, and from the Syrian desert to the Persian mountains."

"La Grande Encyclopédie française," vol. 20, p. 938, contains the following description:—

"L'Irak Arabi correspond maintenant au vilayet de Bagdad et à une partie de celui de Bassorah."

This clearly proves that, from a geographical point of view, the Vilayet of Mosul is situated entirely outside the limits of Irak. The nature of the country, its ethnographical aspect, the usages and customs of the population in the vilayet are totally different from those pertaining in Irak, and this fact confirms the testimony of the encyclopædias which I have just quoted, and clearly establishes that this vilayet is only a prolongation of Anatolia.

## 2. Ethnical Considerations.

The two Governments have supplied statistics in which divergencies occur regarding the population of the Vilayet of Mosul. The Turkish statistics divide the population as follows:—

	Kurds.	Turks.	Arabs.	Yesidis.	Non-Mussulmans.	Total.
Sanjak of Suleimanieh .. ..	62,830	32,960	7,210	..	..	103,000
Sanjak of Kirkuk .. ..	97,000	79,000	8,000	..	..	184,000
Sanjak of Mosul .. ..	104,000	35,000	28,000	18,000	31,000	216,000
Total population of Vilayet of Mosul .. ..	263,830	146,960	43,210	18,000	31,000	503,000

The English statistics, on the other hand, give the following figures:—

Division.	Arabs.	Kurds.	Turks.	Christians.	Jews.	Total.
Mosul .. ..	17,663	179,820	14,895	57,425	9,665	432,468
Arbil .. ..	5,100	77,000	15,000	4,100	4,800	106,000
Kirkuk .. ..	10,000	45,000	35,000	600	1,400	92,000
Suleimanieh .. ..	..	152,900	1,000	100	1,000	155,000
Total .. ..	185,763	454,720	65,895	62,225	16,865	785,468

The most striking difference between the two estimates lies mainly in the difference in the figures given for the Turkish and Arab elements of the population. The Turkish statistics give the number of Turks at 146,960 and Arabs at 43,210, while the English statistics give the Turks at 65,895 and the Arabs at 185,763.

The British Government maintains that its statistics are based on information collected by British officers, and that consequently they are accurate. But the Turkish statistics, which were composed on the census carried out during the Turkish administration at a time when Turkey had nothing to gain by hiding the true proportions of the different elements of the population, should be regarded as more accurate than the British statistics.

Moreover, British officers, who found themselves at various periods in different parts of the country, were certainly unable to obtain at any given moment exact information on the number of the population scattered among the various localities. In any case, the Turkish Government is convinced that in the English statistics the numbers of the Arab element of the population are exaggerated, and that the numbers of the Turkish elements have been considerably reduced.

In the memorandum submitted to the council by the British Government the number of Turks is given as 65,895.

In pamphlet 62, however, on Mesopotamia, prepared by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office and published in 1920, the number of Turks in the region com-

prising the Vilayet of Mosul and the territory of Irak is given as 110,000, and it is stated that they are established in the neighbourhood of Touzkhourmatou, Kirkuk and Altoun Keupru, and also in the plains east of Mosul, and west of that city at Tel Afar.

This English pamphlet proves that the figures given for the Turkish population in the statistics now furnished by the British Government have been reduced by about 50,000, thus proving that the documents from British sources do not agree as to the number of Turks in question.

I do not wish to make any further comments on this difference in the statistics. Putting on one side all questions of controversy, and admitting for a moment that the British statistics are accurate, I desire to draw the proper conclusion from them.

They mean that in the Vilayet of Mosul the Arabs are in the minority, while the great majority of the population consists of Turks and Kurds. This is what Turkey has always maintained.

In these circumstances, to what country should the Turks and Kurds be allotted? Should it be to an Arab State with whom they have nothing in common, either as regards language, race or civilisation, or to Turkey, where Turks and Kurds have at length come to live on a footing of complete equality, and both enjoy the same political rights? This is the real question before you.

Consequently, from the ethnical point of view, also, the Vilayet of Mosul forms an integral part of Turkey and the incorporation of this province in the State of Irak would be nothing more nor less than a dismemberment of Turkish territory, and would become a source of perpetual dispute and friction between Turkey and Irak. The Turkish Government, in submitting these points to the just consideration by the council, claims in the name of justice and in the interests of general peace that the Vilayet of Mosul should remain within the sphere of its sovereignty.

With regard to the non-Mussulman elements of the population, especially the Assyrians, the considerations put forward by the British Government cannot be justified. These considerations, which could only result in maintaining the small Christian community in an attitude of antagonism towards their Mussulman compatriots, would not result in that general state of peace and quiet which it is, I imagine, the object of the League of Nations to see established in all countries of the world.

The refusal to recognise the rights of the great majority at the expense of a very small minority could not fail to create a feeling of hostility among the elements of the population.

We are therefore firmly convinced that the fate of the Vilayet of Mosul will be determined by taking due account of the ethnological physiognomy of the majority.

## 3. Economic Considerations.

The detailed considerations contained in our memorandum make it unnecessary for me to dwell upon this subject. The Vilayet of Mosul, situated as it is at the cross-roads of all the routes between Anatolia on the one hand and Syria and Persia on the other hand, as well as at the route between the great cities of Southern Anatolia, is incontestably important for Turkey from an economic point of view. The construction of the railway line linking Mosul to the Mediterranean ports has still further strengthened its dependence on Turkey.

The British Government endeavours to justify the annexation of the Vilayet of Mosul to Irak on the grounds that Irak will be unable to do without the products, principally wheat, of this vilayet.

The exchange of products between two countries can in no wise entail the incorporation of one country into the territory of another. Nevertheless, Irak being one of the richest countries in the world, may become self-supporting in every respect. It is true that in the Vilayet of Mosul there exist important sources of natural wealth. Nevertheless, this natural wealth cannot in any way cause the annexation of this vilayet to Irak at the expense of political considerations and of the legitimate rights of its population.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, leaving, as it did, the Vilayet of Mosul under French mandate, proves that the contention that it is impossible to separate this province from Irak does not correspond with the true facts of the case.

## 4. Military Considerations.

The British Government invokes the necessity of choosing a frontier line consisting of impassable mountain ranges. The frontiers, however, which are most



readily adapted to prevent armed conflict between nations, are incontestably those which take account of the legitimate rights of each people to their native land. A frontier which divided constituent parts of the same country, whatever the strategic advantages accruing to one or other party, could be in no way superior to a frontier which satisfied the natural desires of the inhabitants. The frontier line desired by the Turkish Government, though marking a clear and natural frontier, corresponds at the same time to all these essential conditions.

##### 5. Political Considerations.

The divergence in the views of Turkey and Great Britain is particularly important in the political field.

The British Government submits that the population of the Vilayet of Mosul desires to be united to Irak. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, maintains that the inhabitants of this province desire to remain attached to Turkey. The British Government has relied, in support of this contention, on the two referenda of 1919 and 1921. On the other hand, that Government admits that in 1919 a great part of the Vilayet of Mosul, viz., the Province of Suleimanieh, declared itself against incorporation of the province in the territory of Irak, and in 1921 the Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants of the Department of Kirkuk also refused to submit themselves to the Government of the Emir Feisal (see official Report of Irak Administration, October 1920-March 1922, pp. 12-15, and the last British memorandum). Although in this last document the Government of Great Britain maintains that it was only the Turks of the town of Kirkuk who declared themselves opposed to coming under the administration of the Government of the Emir Feisal, the official report which I have just quoted, as well as the statements of the British delegation at Lausanne, show that it was rather the Turks and Kurds of the Department of Kirkuk who were opposed to union with Irak. It is, therefore, evident that two departments out of three of the vilayet have declared themselves against the incorporation of the province in the Arab State.

The Turkish Government is convinced that all the inhabitants of the Vilayet of Mosul ardently desire to remain attached to their fatherland. The conflicting points of view of the Turkish and British Governments on this point are easy to verify. By carrying out a plebiscite under sufficient guarantees, it will be possible to find out whether the population desires union with Irak or prefers to remain under Turkish administration. A plebiscite is indispensable to end the dispute. One thing is certain, that the settlement of the dispute in one way or another will affect, in the first instance, the population of this province. It is both a just and a wise policy to give several hundred thousand men the opportunity to decide freely for themselves when it is a question of settling their destiny. In many similar cases plebiscites have decided the fate of disputed territories, and this procedure has been employed for Upper Silesia, for the Saar Basin, for East Prussia and for the districts of Slesvig and Klagenfurt, &c.

If it is proposed that the plebiscite system, which has been generally adopted in disputes concerning European nations, should not be applied in disputes concerning Eastern nations, the latter will find it very difficult to understand the reasons for applying such different treatment.

One point on which the Turkish Government fully agrees with the British Government is the vital importance to be attached to the wishes of the population in the decision regarding the Vilayet of Mosul. This, indeed, is the only factor which should be taken into consideration in settling the dispute, if the settlement is to be a just one and acceptable to all the interested parties. The Turkish Government will welcome any efforts to satisfy as closely as possible the true aspirations of the inhabitants of the vilayet by the aid of a plebiscite. It hopes, at the same time, that the British Government, which states that it is confident as to the political desires of the population, will not hesitate to allow that population to make a free choice. I feel it scarcely necessary to add that a committee of enquiry on the spot would not be able to discover the real wishes of the population. It is difficult to believe that the necessarily small number of persons with which such a committee could come into contact, would be able faithfully to interpret the general feelings of the population. Any enquiry conducted by such a committee would be necessarily incomplete, and any decision based upon its conclusions might not correspond with true justice.

The only just and equitable means of settling the dispute is, in the view of the Turkish Government, to hold a plebiscite.

Before ending, I should like to draw the council's attention to incidents which are closely connected with the question submitted for its examination.

By the terms of article 3 of the Treaty of Peace the two Governments undertook to maintain the *status quo* until a decision should be reached on the question. I am in a position to state that the Turkish Government remains, and will remain, faithfully to its engagement; but, according to the latest information which I have just received, the British authorities have disregarded the frontier established by the *status quo*, and, without awaiting the council's decision, have conducted certain military operations with the evident intention of creating a *de facto* situation north of the frontier in question. During these operations, carried out for the most part by aeroplanes, there have been Turkish casualties, both killed and wounded.

The Government of the Turkish Republic has felt obliged to send a note of protest to the British Government, a copy of which I am handing to the secretariat. It will be most regrettable if incidents of this kind should result in making still more complex the existing dispute. The Government of the Turkish Republic is firmly convinced that the wisdom and feelings of justice inspiring the council will, in time, bring about a just and impartial solution of the dispute.

LORD PARMOOR: I thank his Excellency, the representative of the Turkish Republic, for the very able and clear presentation of his case. At this stage I do not propose to go further into the matters to which he has referred, for the reasons which I stated at the outset. It appears to me that the statement of his Excellency confirms that which I made on behalf of the British Government, that there is a real difference of opinion as to the nature of the subject-matter referred for settlement to the council. As I stated before, it is necessary, in the opinion of the British Government, that this question should be first settled as a preliminary question before any progress can be made in regard to other matters to which his Excellency has referred.

My own view, therefore, is that the council will have to consider, in the first instance, the best method by which this preliminary question may be settled.

I regret that his Excellency has referred to the incidents on the Mosul frontier, because my information on the subject of the incidents which have taken place is not in accord with the information which has been supplied to his Excellency. My information is that no forces from the Irak side have been at any time across the frontier. I think, however, that this point need not be further discussed here; it has been made the subject of an official representation by the Turkish Government, to which the British Government will not fail to return a full reply. I do not think it is a matter which we need discuss or should discuss at the present time, and I therefore suggest to my colleagues that, in order to deal satisfactorily with the matter submitted to us, we must first come to a clear determination of what that matter is—whether it is a question of the frontier, as I have stated it, or whether it is a question of the future of the whole Vilayet of Mosul, as has been put forward by his Excellency, the representative of the Turkish Republic. I hope my colleagues will consider that point in the first instance.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY: The question raised by Lord Parmoor is whether the council has only been called upon to settle a frontier between Irak and Turkey irrespective of the future of the Vilayet of Mosul.

I desire to point out that, determining the frontier between Irak and Turkey, the question of the Vilayet of Mosul necessarily arises. Irak is a country of which the geographical limits are generally known; and since the question before the council is that of determining the frontier between Irak and Turkey, the council will have to decide whether that frontier should pass to the south or the north of the Vilayet of Mosul. Any question of frontiers, of course, raises a territorial question. The Turkish Government cannot, therefore, accept the point of view of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, which is that, the future of the Vilayet of Mosul having already been settled, it is merely a question of a frontier. In the Turkish Government's view, this question of a frontier is as follows:—

Should the frontier pass to the north or to the south of the Vilayet of Mosul?

M. BRANTING, after thanking the representatives of the respective Governments, moved the adjournment of the discussion to a future meeting.

(The council agreed to the proposal of M. Branting.)



*Extract from the Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, held at Geneva, Thursday, September 25, 1924, at 10.30 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 30.)*

# FRONTIER OF IRAK.

*Article 3 (2) of the Treaty signed at Lausanne on July 25, 1923.*

(His Excellency Fethi Bey (Turkish representative) took his place at the council table.)

M. BRANTING (*rapporteur*) read the following note:—

"At its last meeting the council heard the statements made by the representatives of the Governments of Great Britain and of the Turkish Republic upon the question submitted for the council's discussion. The few remarks which I propose to make to-day do not touch the main question. Before going any further it seems to me advisable to elucidate, with the help of the representatives of the two Governments concerned, certain points that are of some importance at this preliminary stage of our work.

"The matter is submitted to the council in virtue of article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne. My colleagues will doubtless agree with me that it would be interesting to hear once more the views of both delegations as to the exact meaning of this clause in the treaty.

"In the first place, how do the British and Turkish delegations understand the reference to the council provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? I believe that I am right in thinking that, according to the statements of the British delegate, his Government considers itself bound in advance by the decision of the council.

"The Turkish delegate has not, as far as I can gather, expressly indicated the views of his Government on this point. I am certain that my colleagues would be very glad to be furnished with definite information as to the attitude of the two Governments on this matter. It is obviously important that the council should know exactly the part it has to play before continuing its discussion of a matter which has been submitted to it as the result of an agreement between the two parties.

"The second question concerns the meaning of these words: 'The frontier between Turkey and Irak.' According to both the written and verbal statements of the British Government and its representatives, the Mosul Vilayet should form part of the Kingdom of Irak, and the question submitted to the council is whether the northern frontier of the kingdom shall follow, approximately, the administrative boundaries of the Mosul Vilayet, with certain changes due to ethnographical, economic or military considerations, which changes, according to the British Government, should make the frontier line run further to the north.

"On the other hand, the Turkish Government considers that the question before the council is whether the Mosul Vilayet should be recognised as belonging to Turkey or to Irak. In the former case the frontier would be formed by the southern boundary of this vilayet; in the latter case by its northern boundary.

"I think I have faithfully interpreted the opinion of the two Governments, and I will ask both delegations to be so good as to inform me of any error that I may unwittingly have made.

"The question that I wish to ask them is the following: Do both delegations accept that the duty of the council is not strictly limited to the mere choice between these two opposing conceptions, but that the council may seek any other solutions which it may consider equitable? I hope that the two delegations will be able to give a clear expression of their opinion on this point.

"For the moment I will confine myself to these preliminary questions upon which the council requires to be enlightened before deciding upon its course of action. For this reason I have made no mention of consulting the inhabitants by means of a plebiscite, as suggested by the Turkish Government, nor of establishing a commission of enquiry, as requested by the British Government. These are really questions of procedure, which will form the subject of later negotiations."

M. Branting added that the note had been sent in advance to the representatives of the two Governments, and he hoped that they would now be able to give their replies to the council.

LORD PARMOOR: Owing to the courtesy of the *rapporteur*, M. Branting, both the Turkish representative and myself have had the advantage of seeing a copy of the notes which he has just read, and therefore I hope I am in a position to give a distinct answer. I am sorry to say I shall also have to deal with one other matter which arises under the terms of the article of the treaty; I will refer to that in a moment.

To the first of the two questions which the *rapporteur* has asked, my reply is entirely in the affirmative. The British Government does regard the treaty as placing the council in the position of an arbitrator whose ultimate award must be accepted in advance by both parties. Therefore, in the most explicit terms, I desire to say that the British Government would consider itself bound by the determination of the council.

In regard to the second question, I think there is more difficulty. In the opinion of the British Government, it is an essential preliminary to the investigation that there should be a clear understanding as to the basis on which it is to be conducted, and as to the limits within which it is to be held. The British Government takes one view on this point, and the Turkish Government indicated another. The difference between them turns entirely upon the interpretation of the language used in the Treaty of Lausanne. That language seems, to the British Government, to be clear, and to support their view, but the point is one for the council to decide in such a way as they may think right to decide what is really a juridical question.

The issue is a clear-cut one between the Turkish Government and the British Government, and it appears to the British Government to be necessary that a decision should be taken upon it before any substantial progress, at any rate, can be made towards a settlement of the frontier. I do not see how any alternative solution can be found at the present stage.

When a definition of the subject-matter has been obtained, and we have an interpretation of this article in the Treaty of Lausanne, the council will retain complete freedom of action to rectify the existing frontier in any manner it may deem equitable after a full examination of local conditions—geographical, racial, administrative, political or strategic—and of the interests and aspirations of the population affected; but the subject-matter which, under the treaty, is submitted to the council, must first be clearly ascertained and defined.

In the terms of the treaty, there is one further clause to which I must call attention. By it, the Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertook that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the Turkish-Irak frontier, no military or other movement should take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate would depend upon that decision.

The council will recollect that certain complaints were made under this head by the Turkish representative at our last meeting. I have now received from the British Government the text of a note which they have addressed to the Turkish Government on this subject and which they have asked me to communicate to the council. I have already forwarded this note in writing to the secretary-general, and I will read it to the council in a moment. In desiring me to take this step, the British Government feel that they have acted in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, by which it is declared to be "the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the council any circumstance which threatens to disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." Therefore, both under the terms of the covenant and under the provisions of the treaty which I have read, circumstances have arisen which, in the opinion of the British Government, must be brought to the notice of the council in connection with this frontier question.

The British note has been presented to the Turkish Government, and is therefore within the knowledge of the Turkish representative. I will now read it to the council. I do not propose to make any comments.

Lord Parmoor then read the note (annex). He added: In accordance with instructions received from the British Government, I communicate to the council this note, and I will ask them to make such provision as they can that on both sides the undertaking in the terms of the treaty, which refers this point to the council,



shall be observed. It is for the council, of course, themselves to decide in what way an undertaking, such as is given in the treaty, can be most effectively safeguarded.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY: I should like to thank M. Branting for the questions he has asked with a view to throwing light on certain of the points in dispute. For the sake of clearness, I will repeat those questions:—

- (1.) How do the two delegations understand the reference to the council, provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? In other words, what part has the council to play in the matter which has been submitted to it as the result of an agreement between the two Governments?
- (2.) What is the meaning of the words: "The frontier between Turkey and Irak"?
- (3.) Is the duty of the council strictly limited to the mere choice between the two opposing conceptions, or may it seek any other solutions which it may consider equitable?

I shall endeavour to reply to these questions as clearly as possible.

As to the first question, the Turkish Government recognises the full powers of the council as conferred upon it by article 15 of the covenant, which is applicable to such disputes brought before the council.

As to the second question, I must say at the outset that I entirely agree with the *rapporteur's* interpretation of the Turkish Government's attitude given in the note. I do not see how the words "between Turkey and Irak" can be interpreted in the sense suggested by the British delegation.

In point of fact, the British Government's argument has no legal foundation. It assumes that the future of Mosul has already been settled in favour of Great Britain. This view, obviously, does not rest upon any international instrument. Turkey has never renounced in favour of any Power her sovereign rights over the Vilayet of Mosul. She has never ceased to assert her rights over this province, the majority of whose population consists of Turks and Kurds. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to admit the British claim that the future of the vilayet has been decided in favour of the State of Irak.

At the last meeting, Lord Parmoor quoted Lord Curzon's speech at Lausanne on the 23rd January, 1923, in justification of the annexation of the Vilayet of Mosul to Irak. He referred to the triple undertaking given by the British Government to the Arab inhabitants, to King Feisal and to the League. In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not, by any international instrument, renounced its rights over the vilayet in question, it is clear that a promise given to the Arab people or to King Feisal without the knowledge of the Turkish Government cannot constitute an argument against Turkey and in favour of the view that her rights over the territory concerned are extinguished. That would be equivalent to disposing of someone else's property in favour of a third party, without the consent of the legitimate owner.

As regards the undertaking which the British Government says it gave to the League, it is hardly necessary to explain that the boundaries of mandated territories were not fixed by the League. On the contrary, Great Britain, on her own initiative, determined the extent of the territory so far as concerned the northern limit of Irak. If she intended to include in Irak, without Turkey's consent, one of the latter's richest provinces, that is a purely unilateral act, and entirely invalid in law. The Turkish Government cannot believe that this theory of annexation in which the British Government wishes to involve the League of Nations as a party, and which is based solely on the British Government's own unilateral desire and action, will find the slightest support in the council. The League of Nations cannot represent Great Britain in a case which is under its jurisdiction. In submitting their case to the League of Nations, both Governments admitted in advance that the League could not be a party to the dispute.

Now, as to the third question. Relying upon the arguments which I have just put before the council, the Turkish Government felt itself justified in claiming the southern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul. At the same time, however, it expressed its willingness to accept any frontier based upon the wishes of the inhabitants of the vilayet. This conciliatory attitude on the part of Turkey should enable the council to find an equitable solution which would satisfy the real desires of the people.

Actually, the finding of an equitable solution would mean the complete settlement of the whole dispute. But, as I had the honour to inform the council, the Turkish Government recognises in this matter all the council's powers, as conferred upon it by article 15 of the covenant.

With reference to the question of frontier incidents which was raised by Lord Parmoor, I had the honour to draw the attention of the council to this matter at the last meeting. The Turkish Government, as I have already declared, will always observe its engagements. This frontier question, however, must be cleared up. We have what is called the administrative frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, which corresponded approximately with the *status quo* frontier. On the other hand, the British Government recently proposed, in the memorandum presented to the council, a new frontier. All the recent movements and incidents have taken place beyond the frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul; in other words, they are directed against the *status quo* which both Governments have undertaken to maintain.

I will study with the closest attention the note which Lord Parmoor was good enough to distribute to the members of the council, and I find that unfortunately the information of the two Governments does not agree on this point. If we look on the map at the districts and places mentioned in the note, we can see whether the operations referred to took place north or south of the *status quo* frontier.

LORD PARMOOR: I have only to say one or two words in answer to the representative of the Turkish Republic. I have already mentioned that the point of view of the British Government in regard to the subject-matter which has been referred to the council is different from that of the Government of Turkey. That is a juridical matter which has to be settled—the interpretation of that particular clause in the Treaty of Lausanne.

As regards the incidents which have been mentioned, I have only to say this: What has to be maintained is the *status quo*, and our view is that the frontier which has been crossed is the *status quo* frontier. The country up to that frontier has, since the armistice, been regarded as part of Irak for governmental and administrative purposes. I am, in one sense, glad to hear what the Turkish representative has said, and I sincerely hope that some steps will be taken to ensure that the *status quo* is preserved until the whole question of the frontier has been settled. Without more words, I leave the whole question to the council.

H. E. FETHI BEY: I entirely agree with Lord Parmoor as to the definition of the *status quo* frontier. It is a frontier which has been maintained since the armistice. The country to the north of that frontier was under Turkish administration and the country to the south under British administration. What we have to do now is to maintain the *status quo* frontier. The Turkish Government's instructions to me were to protest to the Council of the League of Nations and respectfully to call its attention to the fact that British aircraft were operating north of the frontier which Lord Parmoor has described.

M. BRANTING: I most sincerely thank the representatives of Great Britain and the Turkish Republic for the replies they have been good enough to give to the questions which I put to the two parties.

The replies to the first question would seem to show that the parties are both willing to recognise the council's decision, one of them through arbitration and the other under article 15 of the covenant. The first question, however, is closely bound up with the second. The replies of the two parties to my question do not agree. There is no need for me to lay stress on how important it is that the council should know exactly what is the subject of the dispute which the two countries have agreed to submit to it, and what, if any, limits are to be set to the council's powers. I think that the discussion will once more have to be adjourned to enable me to consider, in consultation with the two parties, the preliminary question of the precise duties of the council.

(The council adjourned the discussion to a later meeting.)



## Annex to (2).

## FRONTIER BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAK.

(Communication from the British Government.)

*Note by the Secretary-General.*

The following letter from Lord Parmoor, together with a note from the British Government, is circulated for the consideration of the council:—

To the Secretary-General,  
Sir,

*Geneva, September 25, 1924.*

I have the honour to communicate to you by the desire of the British Government a copy of a note which they have addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of recent incidents on the Turco-Irak frontier.

2. In desiring me to take this step, the British Government are acting in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 11 of the covenant of the League of Nations, by which it is declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the council any circumstance which threatens to disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

3. I request that you will be so good as to bring the terms of the British note to the notice of the council with the least possible delay.

PARMOOR.

*Copy of Note presented to the Turkish Government.*

His Majesty's Government have learnt with astonishment of a direct and flagrant contravention of the undertaking given by the Turkish Government in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier, no military or other movement should take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision. A serious warning was conveyed to the Kaimakam of Julamerk by the High Commissioner for Irak on the 12th September. On the 14th September a British air patrol discovered a small hostile force crossing the River Hazil north of Rabanki. The presence of further armed bodies was also reported near Bersiwi and Bahnunah on the tracks leading to Zakho. The British authorities, assuming that these forces were composed of irresponsible tribal elements, and apprehensive that their action if unchecked would result in serious trouble amongst the border tribes, took the necessary steps to drive some of the invaders back across the frontier by machine-gun fire from the air, which caused some casualties.

A communication was made by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the delegate of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople on the 17th September to the effect that a serious situation would arise if Turkish troops crossed the frontier in such numbers as to appear intentionally to infringe the *status quo*. The Turkish Government will appreciate the fact that Bersiwi and Bahnunah are well within the boundary, not only of the area administered by the British authorities on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, but also within the old administrative boundary of the Mosul Vilayet. According to a report received by His Majesty's Government on the 18th September, bodies left behind by the invaders show that Turkish regulars formed a part of the invading force. It was also reported that Turkish troops had proceeded to the eastward within the administrative frontier of Irak and had attacked a police post and that in villages within the frontier. On the 20th September it was reported that Turkish troops had overpowered a detachment of Irak police at Chagalle on the Khabur and were threatening other Irak police posts in Barwari Bala, a few miles north-west of Amadia.

It was thus clear that Turkish regular forces were definitely invading the area administered by His Majesty's Government at the date of the signature of the Lausanne Treaty and were wilfully disregarding the *status quo*.

On the 22nd September the High Commissioner reported that detachments of the Irak police and of local levies (an Imperial force under British officers, though our information does not show that British officers were actually present), had been

forced back to Amadia. Their retirement was accompanied by the flight of a mass of Assyrian Christians and Irak tribesmen, who are pouring into Amadia in large numbers.

His Majesty's Government protest in the most solemn and formal manner against the intentional and flagrant violation of a solemn undertaking given by the Turkish Government in an international instrument which has been duly ratified, brought into force and submitted to the League of Nations for registration.

His Majesty's Government regard the events recited above as a circumstance affecting international relations and threatening to disturb the good understanding of nations upon which peace depends. They are accordingly instructing the British representative on the League of Nations to communicate the foregoing protest to the council and assembly and to bring to their attention, as provided for by article 11 of the covenant, the present state of affairs on the Irak frontier.

Meanwhile, the British authorities in Irak have been authorised to take all necessary action to prevent the invasion or infiltration by Turkish forces of a nature to entail serious unrest and bloodshed.

[W 8663/7275/98]

(3.)

*Extract from the Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting, held at Geneva on September 30, 1924, at 10.30 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 6.)*

1317. *The Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Irak. Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne.*

(His Excellency Fethi Bey (Turkey) came to the council table.)

M. BRANTING read the following report:—

"After conversation with representatives of both parties concerned, I have ascertained with satisfaction that the divergence of views on the scope of the question submitted to the council is not such as had at first appeared to me.

"Lord Parmoor reminded me that the effect of his declaration to the council was that his Government accept in advance the council's decision regarding the frontier between Turkey and Irak. He observed that the problem before the council was to find the best possible frontier. The British Government have already indicated where, in their opinion, this should be drawn, but the undertaking referred to above, to abide by the eventual decision of the council, shows that the British Government fully recognise the right of the council to draw the frontier between Turkey and Irak on any line which the council may adopt, after due investigation and consideration.

"His Excellency, Fethi Bey, to whom I communicated the results of this conversation, informed me that the misunderstanding which had arisen appeared to him to be dispelled, and that he agreed to the question being submitted in the form indicated by Lord Parmoor.

"I then reminded him that the British Government had declared that they accepted, in advance, the council's decision, whereas the Turkish Government, through the medium of their delegate, had declared that they would submit to the authority of the council under the terms of article 15 of the covenant. I asked his Excellency, Fethi Bey, if he could, on behalf of his Government, now give an undertaking to accept the council's recommendation.

"His Excellency, Fethi Bey, replied that on this point there was no disagreement between his Government and the British Government, and that he would be prepared to make a declaration in the sense referred to, at the same time adding that he was convinced that the council would base its decision in the first place on the wishes of the inhabitants.

"As the doubts which might have arisen in regard to the exact definition of the question and of the rôle of the council have thus been removed, I wish to offer to my colleagues a suggestion in regard to the procedure to be followed.

"It appears essential that the investigation should be made by a commission composed of competent and impartial persons, who would collect all information regarding facts and considerations of a nature to assist the council to fulfil the mission conferred upon it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne.



"This commission would submit to the council all such information and suggestions as might assist it in taking its decision. The commission would take count of existing documents and the views expressed by the parties concerned both in regard to procedure and to the substance of the question.

"Should the council decide to constitute a commission of this nature, it would have to consider the question of its composition and the instructions it should receive.

"In conclusion, I must not omit to mention the complaints that the council has received from both parties in regard to frontier incidents, which are particularly regrettable at the present moment. Without the council expressing an opinion on the facts as alleged by one party or the other, I think that my colleagues will be in agreement with me in strongly urging both Governments to use all the weight of their authority in order to restore and maintain peace on both sides of the so-called *status quo* line, in accordance with the reciprocal undertaking contained in the final paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne."

LORD PARMOOR: I have heard with much satisfaction the suggestions contained in the report of the *rapporteur*. I gather from that report that his Excellency, Fethi Bey, is in agreement with the statement made on behalf of the British Government as to the question which will come before the commission for decision, namely, the frontier between Irak and Turkey, and I congratulate his Excellency on the statement which the *rapporteur* has been able to make, that the Turkish Government as well as the British Government, will undertake to abide by the decision which is given by the council, through the commission, upon the point which has been submitted to it under the article in the Treaty of Lausanne, as to which, I understand, we are now agreed.

Now, as part of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the article under which this reference to the council is made, we find these words, to which, I think, the *rapporteur* referred or had in mind:—

"The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision."

I am glad the *rapporteur* has emphasised the importance of this provision of article 3, because it is one of the conditions of the reference itself.

At our last meeting, I had to read a formal representation on behalf of the British Government. I do not propose to refer again to that document, but formal information has been sent to me—I do not desire to emphasise the details—to the effect that the conditions are still very grave, and that there are military and other movements taking place which might modify, or attempt to modify, the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon the decision of the council. I need hardly say that, on behalf of the British Government, I give the most absolute undertaking, in the most positive form, that as far as we are concerned that obligation will be observed; but it has to be observed on both sides, as I am sure his Excellency the representative of the Turkish Government will appreciate. I sincerely hope he will give the same expression of opinion as I, that his Government, as well as the British Government, will see that there is no possible cause even for suggesting an infringement of this very important provision in the article of the treaty. There must be no disturbance of the *status quo*; there must be no armed movements on either side. As I say, on behalf of the British Government I desire to give the most solemn undertaking I can give, as their representative, that we, at any rate, intend to abide by the spirit and the letter of the provision, which I have mentioned; and I hope that the representative of the Turkish Government will be able to make a similar statement, because it is quite obvious that, if in a case where a matter is submitted to arbitration (as this question is by the treaty) other means are resorted to in the area affected, the whole purpose of the arbitration is destroyed. I feel this very strongly, and on behalf of the British Government I am requested to make the matter quite clear.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY: Allow me to thank M. Branting for all that he has done in removing those preliminary points which prevented a study of this question. I would also thank Lord Parmoor for the congratulation which he has addressed to my Government. It is true that I stated yesterday to M. Branting

that according to the previous declaration made by the British delegate the council was not competent to consider the future of the Vilayet of Mosul. By the declarations, however, which he has just made, Lord Parmoor, in my opinion, admits that the council is competent to deal with this matter. By this declaration, the British Government does, in fact, bind itself to recognise the right of the council to draw the frontier between Turkey and Irak on any line that it thinks fit to adopt.

Under these conditions, I agree that the question should be laid before the council in the form just indicated by Lord Parmoor.

With regard to the commission which the council has in view, I would point out that the duty of this commission will consist in considering what would be the best procedure for fixing the frontier line. The first object of the investigations on the spot would therefore be to determine which of the two procedures proposed by the respective Governments, the Turkish Government and the British Government, would best reveal the real political tendencies of the inhabitants of the Vilayet of Mosul.

With regard to the frontier incidents, I note with satisfaction the declaration of Lord Parmoor in which he has stated that the English authorities will respect the *status quo* frontier line.

I have already had the honour to declare to the council that the Turkish Government has remained, and will always remain, faithful to the engagement which it has taken in the last paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne. I give once more an absolute assurance in answer to the wish expressed by the council, that the Turkish Government will do nothing to move the *status quo* frontier which has existed up till now.

LORD PARMOOR: I wish to say to his Excellency the representative of the Turkish Government that I desire, and the British Government desires, to promote conciliation, and it is in this spirit that I beg to thank his Excellency for the statement which he has made.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY: In the name of my Government I thank Lord Parmoor for his declaration. I am certain that the conciliatory spirit shown by Lord Parmoor, in the name of his Government, will find an echo in the attitude of the Turkish Government.

M. BRANTING: I am certain that all the members of the council have noted with the greatest satisfaction the conciliatory spirit shown by both parties. I beg to move the following resolution:—

"The council, having had the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and Irak referred to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the British and Turkish Governments, who undertook on behalf of their respective Governments to accept in advance the decision of the council on the question referred to it;

"With a view to collecting the facts and data which it requires to fulfil the mission entrusted to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Decides to set up a special committee of three members. This committee shall lay before the council all information and all suggestions which may be of a nature to assist it in reaching a decision. It shall give due consideration to the existing documents and to the views expressed by the interested parties, both as regards the procedure and as regards the substance of the question. It shall receive all communications which the parties may wish to transmit to it. It may proceed to investigations on the spot and in that case may avail itself of the services of advisers appointed respectively by each of the two Governments concerned.

"The committee shall fix its own procedure. The secretary-general shall furnish it with the necessary staff and shall advance it the funds which it may require, such advances to be refunded to the League in equal proportions by the Governments concerned. The council instructs its president and its *rapporteur* on this question to appoint the members of the said committee by common agreement.

"The council notes the declarations of the British and Turkish Governments to the effect that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories whose final fate will depend upon that decision."



In reply to the president, LORD PARMOOR said that he accepted the resolution.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY also accepted the resolution. He hoped that the observations he had just made would be taken into consideration.

THE PRESIDENT: It only remains for us to take note of the agreement reached between the British Government and the Turkish Government and to adopt the resolution proposed by the *rapporteur*. It has given me the greatest pleasure to see the spirit of conciliation which has been shown in the examination of this delicate question, and I hope that a satisfactory solution will be found.

(The resolution was adopted unanimously.)

(His Excellency Fethi Bey withdrew.)

# No. 51.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 165.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 5, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 147.

I have to-day made written representations supported by verbal arguments.

I should be particularly glad to learn whether Turkish delegate at Geneva was brought to admit unequivocally that Turkish Government must now observe *status quo* line of July 1923.

# No. 52.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 8.)*

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 8, 1924.*

IN apparently inspired statement Turkish press of yesterday speaks of Turkish repressive movement against Nestorians as having come to an end. The Turkish detachments are said to have reached old frontier vilayet and Kaza of Chal to have been cleared of Nestorians.

Minister of War, who has just arrived in Constantinople, has also made a statement apparently intended to emphasise character of recent punitive expedition against Nestorians as a matter of internal Turkish politics.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 44.)

# No. 53.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 8, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 5th October: Irak frontier.

Latest reports from Irak indicate not only that Turks have taken no steps to return to *status quo ante* but that Turkish activities are on the increase, and that considerable reinforcements are being brought up. His Majesty's Government cannot allow this to continue. They are astonished that Turkish Government have not seen fit to return any reply to the urgent representations made by you in accordance with instructions conveyed in my telegrams Nos. 147 of 27th September and 151 of 4th October. In view of discussions at Geneva, which culminated in definite assurance by Turkish representative there on 30th September, His Majesty's Government have not yet given full effect to measures indicated in final paragraph of my telegram No. 143 of 23rd September, but have confined local military action to repelling actual attack. They cannot, however, maintain this attitude indefinitely. They must therefore warn Turkish Government that, failing compliance with request for return to *status quo ante*, as conveyed in my telegram No. 151, His

Majesty's Government will resume complete liberty, as from midday on the 11th October, to take all necessary measures to restore situation. British military authorities in Irak have been instructed accordingly and have been authorised so to inform local Turkish commanders.

Please make most urgent communication to Turkish Government in above sense.  
(Repeated to Bagdad.)

# No. 54.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople.)*

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 8, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 5th October: Turco-Irak frontier, last paragraph. Turkish delegate at Geneva said at meeting of council on 30th September: "I give once more an absolute assurance, in answer to the wish expressed by the council, that the Turkish Government will do nothing to move the *status quo* frontier which has existed up till now." He had previously said at meeting of council on 25th September: "We have what is called the administrative frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, which has hitherto been the *status quo* frontier."

The precise definition of the *status quo* frontier given in my telegram No. 147 to Constantinople of 27th September had not, however, been communicated to the Turkish delegate when he made these statements.

# No. 55.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople.)*

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 8, 1924.*

AIR Officer Commanding, Bagdad, reports on period ending 2nd October as follows:—

"Turkish intentions remain obscure on northern frontier. At Ashita, where mountain guns fired at aircraft, main Turkish force is concentrated, estimated at 2,000 strong. In Irak territory lines of communication are still maintained and more shelters are being constructed. No enemy withdrawal has been reported, and at least one more battalion has arrived."

Above is for your information as showing that Turks have taken no steps to comply with our repeated demands for withdrawal of their troops from Irak territory.

# No. 56.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 10.)*

(No. 171.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 9, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 154.

I made written representation this morning to Turkish delegate emphasising gravity of situation and impossibility for His Majesty's Government to accept quietly these violations of Turkish engagements.

I told Nusret they could not allow themselves to be flouted in this manner.

He had no communication to make at all, but has telegraphed your communication to Angora.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 45.)



No. 57.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 10.)*(No. 172.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Constantinople, October 9, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 171.

Attitude of Turkish press continues to be quiet. Information is still withheld by delegation, and such as is printed mostly comes from abroad. Anti-British articles are of course published, but their tone is not as sharp as might be expected. It is now maintained by press and it is openly stated by Minister of War in an interview that, local tribes having been chastised, incident is at an end.

All indications that I can observe point in the same direction, viz., that Turks do not desire breach with His Majesty's Government, but hope to secure a local advantage on frontier without incurring serious consequences.

From local point of view it seems best to me that His Majesty's Government, having taken up a severe attitude, should adhere to it unflinchingly and proceed to ejection of Turkish invaders as soon as convenient.

I think that if you instructed me to proceed at once to Angora to make representations there it would be regarded only as sign of weakening, and that such instructions should therefore not be sent to me.

(Not repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 8475/13/65]

No. 58.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir E. Howard (Washington).*(No. 295.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Foreign Office, October 10, 1924.*

DISPUTE has arisen here between Anglo-American groups of Turkish Petroleum Company and Mr. Gulbenkian, a naturalised British subject of Armenian origin, who is a minority shareholder and founder of the company.

Mr. Gulbenkian claims that the working agreement arrived at between the English group (Turkish Petroleum Company) and the American group (Standard Oil Company) is very favourable to those groups, but prejudicial to his interests.

Mr. Nichols, representing the Turkish Petroleum Company, has asked the Foreign Office to put pressure on Mr. Gulbenkian to make him accept the terms offered him by the other interested parties, as otherwise Anglo-American agreement will be wrecked and succeeded by undesirable rivalry.

The American Ambassador has made oral representations to the same end, but has stated that the State Department dislike making representations on commercial matters already being dealt with direct by the parties interested.

Mr. Gulbenkian has been interviewed, but declines to accept the terms offered by the English and American groups, and his position seems to be legally and practically strong.

His Majesty's Government share the dislike of the State Department to intervene in such commercial disputes, and do not believe that they could usefully intervene on this occasion.

We are so informing United States Embassy and also Turkish Petroleum Company, who, we may hope, will be prepared to meet Mr. Gulbenkian with a view to a settlement.

Above is for your Excellency's information and guidance in any communications you may think useful to make to the State Department.

No. 59.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*(No. 175.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Constantinople, October 11, 1924.*

TURKISH reply about Mosul just received. It is long, and I am telegraphing full summary as soon as possible.

No. 60.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*(No. 176.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Constantinople, October 10, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 175.

Turkish delegate has just handed me reply, of which the following is a full summary:—

"1. Note explains delay in answering my notes of 29th September and 5th October. Former purported to be provisional answer to Turkish notes of 16th September and 22nd September, and it was natural to await complete answers.

"2. The mutual complaints of the two parties had been referred to League, who had settled divergent views in its decision of 30th September. It was natural to regard as liquidated a question settled by the League with consent of both parties.

"2A. Interpretation of League's decision given in British note of 5th October (your telegram No. 151) did not correspond with Turkish telegraphic information as to League's decision, which has only lately been received. Note gives as League's decision, in inverted commas, and in French, last paragraph of article 3 of treaty from words "en attendant" to the end, emphasising that decision speaks of "état actuel" and not of *status quo* as mentioned in my note of 5th October.

"3. Turning to my note of 29th September (your telegram No. 147), it is pointed out that at the date of signature of treaty Vilayet of Mosul was not completely in British occupation up to line defined therein. Line behind which Turks had retired was that defined by General Marshall in 1918. Beyond this line area occupied by Great Britain up to date of treaty was that of Rowanduz. Turkey had not accepted notification that whole of vilayet was under British occupation (your telegram No. 147, end of paragraph 2), but had protested since treaty against various acts of aggression. Note repeats claim that His Majesty's Government admit as *status quo* line that mentioned in your note of 23rd August as having been followed by British aeroplanes.

"4. As for territory north of line of Mosul Vilayet as defined in your telegram No. 147, note maintains that as there was no British occupation it must be Turkish. Vali at Julamerk and mayor at Chal have functioned uninterruptedly since signature of treaty. (Here follows an obscure passage endeavouring to explain away failure to reply to British note of 17th October, 1923.)

"5. At Geneva, before council, British delegate on 25th September declared *status quo* line to be observed was that fixed since armistice. Turkish delegate agreed. Council's decision laid on States who accepted it obligation of observing line of 30th September last. British contention as to line defined in your telegram No. 147 is therefore indefensible."

Continuation follows.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 46.)

No. 61.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*(No. 177.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Constantinople, October 10, 1924.*

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram.

"6. Replying to my note of 9th October (your telegram No. 154), Turkish Government deny that military activities are increasing or further concentration taking place. Turkey never concealed measures taken to repress Nestorian brigands, which on the contrary were notified in detail to His Majesty's Government in note of 16th September as also to League. Turkish forces were merely sufficient for this task, which being now completed, bulk of Turkish troops is for a week past in the course of being withdrawn to the rear. 'I hasten to declare solemnly that there is no reason to believe that any suspicious movement



or concentration is being effected and I state precisely that the line Bersiwi-Banuna-Chakallu, where there are British posts, will not be crossed. The League's decision of 30th September is scrupulously observed. If Turkish land is attacked the Republic must do its duty.' These explanations are given to show how sincerely Turkey respects pacific tendencies developed at Geneva and that she will give no pretext for creation of a situation contrary to League's decision. 'We hope they will be convincing and will dissipate misunderstandings. We desire to emphasise that if Great Britain considers it necessary we are ready to submit again to League declarations as to our way of understanding its decision of 30th September.'

"Résumé of note has been sent by Turkish Government to Geneva by telegraph and copy by post."

See my immediately following telegram.

No. 62.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, October 10, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish delegate was instructed, on handing in note, to make following verbal declaration:—

"Turkish Government had never failed to observe scrupulously their engagements, and they have kept League of Nations regularly informed of all events on frontier since question has been before it. The two Governments have agreed to accept decision of League, and Turkish Government do not understand why Great Britain should desire to create a situation in contradiction with it. It is to be noted that if this situation is aggravated responsibility will not be Turkey's. She has always shown goodwill, which would be fruitless if it remained unilateral."

Delegate also requested me to use my personal good offices with His Majesty's Government. I replied that matter was out of my hands, but I feared Turkish note, with its countless prevarications, would make a very bad impression on His Majesty's Government.

I defer comment till to-morrow.  
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 48.)

No. 63.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*

(No. 179.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 11, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegrams.

Following is my comment on Turkish communication:—

Note is result of a Cabinet meeting which lasted all Thursday night, and in the course of which President was consulted by telegraph.

Quotation given of League's decision is of greatest importance, and I draw your particular attention to it. I find it impossible to believe it is accurate.

Other innumerable inaccuracies and quibbles contained in paragraphs 1 to 5 may be somewhat discounted as they are normal stock-in-trade of Turkish diplomacy and would accompany even the most complete acquiescence in demands of His Majesty's Government.

Nevertheless the general tone of note, and especially of paragraph 6, is intended to be restrained, and I expect Turkish Government regard it as conciliatory. I am inclined to infer that Government have already telegraphed instructions to frontier troops to effect some sort of retreat from positions they have been occupying, though I do not suppose withdrawal will be what His Majesty's Government have demanded, and probably it will not be enough to afford them minimum satisfaction.

Looking at the matter solely from a diplomatic point of view, and assuming that Turkish quotations of League's decision and of British delegate's declaration are inaccurate, I would suggest that military authorities in Irak wait a very few days to see if any withdrawal now takes place and what its nature is, and that in the interval I make no communication to Turkish Government from you. If withdrawal is satisfactory, reply should be made to contentious points in note which require answering. If there be no withdrawal, forces should proceed at once to the ejection of Turks. If it is a half-and-half measure not affording solution satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, then another ultimatum similar to your telegram No. 154 should be addressed to Turkish Government and carried into effect promptly.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 49.)

[E 8846/5711/65]

No. 64.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 13.)*

(No. 731.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 29th September, 1924, respecting the Turkish military activities on Irak frontier.

*Constantinople, October 4, 1924.*

Enclosure in No. 64.

*Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey.*

M. le Représentant.

*Constantinople, September 29, 1924.*

WITH reference to the note which the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd September last, I have the honour to inform you that the allegations contained therein regarding the violations of the Turco-Irak frontier have been examined in the light of information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, and, although Mr. Ramsay MacDonald still awaits the full text of the above-mentioned note, which was forwarded to him by courier on Wednesday last, the 24th instant, he has authorised me to return at once the following provisional reply:—

2. The five places mentioned in the third and fourth paragraphs of that note cannot be recognised as lying beyond the frontier as it stood at the date of signature of the Treaty of Lausanne for the following reasons; nor can His Majesty's Government accept the contention advanced in paragraph 7 that the Turkish Government would be juridically justified in claiming as frontier *de facto* line at the moment of signature of the Mudros armistice—a claim which would be irreconcilable with the undertaking given by the Turkish Government in the Treaty of Lausanne. Thirdly, the argument put forward in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 regarding the alleged attempts to modify from time to time the *de facto* frontier does not appear to His Majesty's Government to have any bearing upon the question at issue, since article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne provides that no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the "present state" (*i.e.*, on the 24th July, 1923) of the territories of which the final fate is under dispute.

3. His Majesty's Government have on two occasions since the 24th July, 1923, informed the Turkish Government that they regard the whole of the Mosul Vilayet as remaining in their effective occupation and being under their *de facto* administration—in the first place, in a note addressed by the acting British representative at Constantinople to Adnan Bey on the 20th December, 1923; and, secondly, in a note addressed to the Turkish representative in London by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 25th April last.

4. His Majesty's Government regard the *status quo* referred to in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne as comprising the following administrative and other conditions: In July 1923 the whole of the Mosul Vilayet remained in the effective occupation of His Majesty's Government and was under their *de facto* administration. The true northern boundary of the Mosul Vilayet includes the following frontier nahias: (1) in Kaza of Zakho, Nahias of Zakho Sindi and Guli; (2) in Kaza



of Amadiyah, Nahias of Atraf, Shah, Barwari, Bala, Nerva and Raikan; (3) in Kaza of Ruwanduz, Nahias of Muzuri, Bala, Shirwan, Baradost and Balik.

5. From this it will be seen that the true northern frontier of the Mosul Vilayet runs as follows: from the junction of the rivers Tigris and Khabur along Khabur eastwards to its junction with the Hazil River, northwards along the Hazil River as far as the influx of the tributary from the two villages of Baijo, thence along the right bank of this tributary to its source in the Tanin mountain. Thence north of Merva and Hadrih and across the River Khabur to the heights above Halamun and Geramus. The boundary then turns south-east so as just to exclude Ashita and the Lizan Valley and just to include Dashtan; thence down the Zab River to a point due west of Chal, thence eastwards so as to exclude Chal, but to include the districts of Merva and Raikan and just to exclude the village of Nervak. After crossing the Oramar Rudbarishin River the boundary continues to the north-eastern end of the Gavanda tableland, thence southwards through Begalto, until it meets the River Hajbeg a few miles north of its junction with the Baradost River, thence along the line of the Hajbeg River to the Persian frontier.

6. Having thus defined the true northern boundary of the Mosul Vilayet, His Majesty's Government desire to point out that to the north of that boundary there lies an area which they regard as having been, at the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, under no effective occupation, whether Turkish or British. This area comprises the highly mountainous country south of Julamerk on each side of the River Zab, and is bounded by a line which leaves the frontier described above at a point where it turns south-east on the heights above Halamun and Geramus and runs over the crest of Sardinian Dag and Kaluta Dag to Chemikta, on the River Zab, at the confluence of that river with the River Bardzawa. It then passes south-east through Hani until it rejoins the frontier described at the north-eastern end of the Gavanda tableland. This area, which forms part of the original home of the Assyrian Christian tribes of Upper and Lower Tiari and Tkhuma, remained practically uninhabited from 1916, when its inhabitants were driven out by the Turkish authorities, until 1921, when they were reinstated in their original homes by the British authorities. During this period the Assyrians were maintained in refugee camps in Irak at the expense of the British Government.

7. While not claiming that this area falls within the boundary of the Mosul Vilayet, His Majesty's Government maintain that no effective Turkish administration has been in force in it since the return of the Assyrian refugees, who would not have gone there except on that assumption. At the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne the area referred to was in practice outside the sphere of Turkish influence. His Majesty's Government, having learnt of the rumoured arrival of a mutessarif with troops at Julamerk and of his intention to post a Turkish kaimakam with troops at Chal, informed the Turkish Government, through the British representative at Constantinople on the 17th October, 1923, that they would regard the execution of this latter proposal as a violation of the *status quo* referred to in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne.

8. As no reply was returned to this notice and the threatened despatch of an administrative officer with troops was not carried out, His Majesty's Government assumed that the Turkish Government acquiesced in the British view of the situation in this area.

9. The claim made in paragraph 12 of the Turkish note that His Majesty's Government defined the *status quo* line between Amadia Zaho in their note of the 23rd August as running through places mentioned therein is incorrect. His Majesty's Government merely stated that British aeroplanes had not flown during the month of June north of a line passing through these places, which will be seen from the description of the frontier given above to fall within the true boundary of the Mosul Vilayet.

10. His Majesty's Government do not understand the criticism of Mr. Henderson's note of the 9th September, addressed to your Excellency, which is made in paragraph 14 of the Turkish note. They regard the River Hazil as forming part of the line and not as running at right angles to it.

11. In the preceding paragraphs His Majesty's Government have defined the *status quo* at the time of the signature of the Lausanne Treaty as they see it. They are conscious of having been responsible for no military or other movement since that date which might modify in any way the then state of the territories of which the final fate is in dispute. Such military or other movements as they may have been compelled to authorise have been prompted solely by the desire to preserve the *status quo* as defined above. The Turkish authorities, on the other hand, have not

only attempted to establish effective administrative control in an area which was outside the sphere of Turkish influence on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, by deputing a responsible administrative officer to visit Chal with an armed escort early in August, but have also invaded an area which was in effective British military occupation and under *de facto* British administration on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, by despatching armed forces of cavalry, infantry and artillery across the River Hazil. Such action by the Turkish Government can only be viewed by His Majesty's Government with bitter disappointment, seeing that the whole of the question is now actually before the Council of the League of Nations with a view to peaceful settlement.

12. His Majesty's Government earnestly trust that the Turkish Government will therefore issue immediate orders to the local Turkish commander to withdraw all Turkish forces from the Mosul Vilayet and from the region outside the sphere of Turkish influence, defined above. His Majesty's Government are communicating to the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations a copy of the telegram to me which forms the basis of the present note, together with a copy of the telegram which I addressed to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and in which I gave a résumé of the contents of the note of the 23rd September from His Excellency Ismet Pasha, with instructions to lay them both before the council at the earliest opportunity.

I avail, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 65.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 182.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1924.

MY telegram No. 179.

Newspapers of last night and to-day publish official communiqués giving fully and accurately substance of recent British and Turkish notes. Press comment this morning is all in favour of resisting demands of His Majesty's Government, but is still moderate in tone.

There seems to be some excitement to-day, and many rumours are circulating.

I learn that Assembly has been convoked urgently. Obviously Government, which is unpopular, fears responsibility of taking any decision, but results must be to make it very much more difficult for Turkey to meet demands of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 50.)

No. 66.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 13, 1924.

NEWS this morning is that President is returning at once to Angora. Press is proportionately restrained and, while adopting patriotic attitude, shows no indication of warlike spirit.

Assembly can hardly meet before 18th October at the earliest, and its convocation introduces new element of uncertainty. From the point of view of domestic politics, Government is doubtless glad to call Deputies up on a patriotic issue and thus weaken opposition on internal questions. So far as frontier affair is concerned, convocation certainly increases Turkish powers of passive resistance in both diplomatic and military field and tends to facilitate delay and confusion. Probable Turkish Government could bring Deputies to vote as it wished, but responsibilities are now divided and clear decisions will be more difficult to obtain.

While drawing attention to the above considerations, I cannot emphasise too strongly the importance from British point of view of the maintenance by His Majesty's Government of the firm attitude they have taken up. Affair has assumed first rate proportions and if it is not carried out, everyday life here, already difficult, will become impossible not only for Englishmen, but for all Europeans.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52.)



No. 67.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir E. Drummond (Geneva).*(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Foreign Office, October 14, 1924.*

DISPUTE has arisen between Turkish and British Governments in regard to real intention of council in adopting last paragraph of their resolution of 30th September concerning Turco-Irak frontier. In official note handed to British representative at Constantinople on 10th October, Turks informed His Majesty's Government as follows:—

"We desire to emphasise that if Great Britain considers it necessary, we are ready to submit again to Council of League declarations as to our way of understanding its decision of 30th September."

His Majesty's Government understand that summary of Turkish note containing above passage has been telegraphed to Geneva, and that copy was sent by post.

Press now publishes full text of telegram addressed to you by Turkish Government in which mention is made of Turkish offer outlined above:—

"His Majesty's Government are informing Turkish Government that they agree to proposed reference to League and will do their utmost to secure speedy meeting of council with a view to obtaining at earliest possible moment pronouncement on point at issue. I therefore have the honour to request that you will make necessary arrangements for immediate summoning of council for the purpose indicated.—MACDONALD."

No. 68.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, October 14, 1924.*

TURCO-IRAK frontier.

The whole situation has been reviewed by His Majesty's Government in the light of your telegrams ending with your No. 183 of 13th October.

The immediate issue now centres round the real intention of the Council of the League of Nations in adopting the last paragraph of their resolution on 30th September, which reads as follows:—

"The council notes the declarations of the British and Turkish Governments to the effect that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories, whose final fate will depend upon that decision."

As to this, His Majesty's Government adhere as strong as ever to view expressed in my telegram No. 151 of 4th October, that *status quo* to be observed in accordance with above-mentioned declarations is that of time of signature of Treaty of Lausanne. Turks, however, claim that declarations bear a different meaning, and His Majesty's Government cannot entertain idea of risking actual hostilities over a mere question of interpretation, seeing that the Turkish Government have expressed their willingness, as reported in your telegram No. 177, to refer the point to the arbitration of the League. Since your telegram was received the full text of a note addressed to the League by Ismet Pasha on behalf of the Turkish Government has appeared in the press of 14th October in a Reuter telegram from Geneva. This note contains the following passage:—

"We declared, however, that we were ready to submit, if Great Britain considered it necessary, to the examination and decision of the League of Nations our manner of interpreting the decision taken by the League on 30th September. If, therefore, Great Britain, laying aside the engagement she entered into regarding the decision of the League of Nations, disturbs peace and commits acts of aggression, the responsibility is entirely hers. Turkey, therefore, claims the right to ask the Council of the League to be good enough to

adopt measures with a view to compelling respect of the decision which those concerned undertook to respect. I beg you to be good enough to bring the matter to the knowledge of the council at once."

Further reference to League appeared to His Majesty's Government to offer means of reaching peaceful solution. Accordingly, as I was absent from London, Secretary of State for Colonies and Sir W. Tyrrell saw the Turkish Minister on the 14th October, and drew his attention to passage in Turkish note quoted at the end of your telegram No. 177, and to text of Turkish note to League of Nations, as published in press. Mr. Thomas informed the Minister that, as Turks had taken initiative in referring the matter to League, His Majesty's Government were not only prepared to accept this procedure, but would do their utmost to secure speedy meeting of council with a view to obtaining at the earliest possible moment pronouncement on point at issue. Mr. Thomas added that, pending the League's decision on this point, British forces will not advance across the line where Turkish posts are at this moment, on the clear understanding that reciprocal action be taken by Turkey. Turkish Minister pointed out that assurance to this effect had already been given by his Government (see point 6 in your telegram No. 177).

His Majesty's Government are requesting secretary-general of League of Nations to take necessary action for convoking Council of League at earliest possible moment.

You should inform Turkish Government immediately of above statement by Mr. Thomas to Turkish Minister, and of action now being taken by His Majesty's Government at Geneva.

Necessary instructions are being sent to Air Officer Commanding, Irak, by Air Ministry.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1.)

No. 69.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 14, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I appreciate considerations which you mention in last paragraph of your telegram No. 183 of 13th October. On the other hand, to refuse arbitration and to run risk of war merely on a point of interpretation would be a step which public opinion here would not tolerate.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 2.)

[E 9676/5711/65]

No. 70.

*Record of a Meeting at the Colonial Office with the Turkish Minister on  
October 14, 1924.*

Mr. THOMAS: When the Prime Minister left for Scotland yesterday morning, he had a brief discussion with me with regard to the Irak situation and he, like myself, was very disturbed and indeed distressed at recent events happening in that country. He was distressed, as I was, because when the agreement was made at Geneva, it appeared to us that there could be no shadow of possible doubt as to what was meant. We could not conceive of the position being other than the boundary as defined at Lausanne and it was with that clearly in our mind, with a natural anxiety to preserve peace and above all do nothing that would precipitate a conflict, that all the instructions have been given and indeed Sir Hugh Trenchard, who was responsible for the air side, could tell you that not only have we been most careful, but the most elaborate instructions have been given by him to his officers to do nothing whatever that could in any way precipitate an outburst, and it is only fair for me to put on record and say to you quite clearly that the tolerance shown by the troops and officers out there has not only been most marked, but you yourself must appreciate it. That, therefore, was the position yesterday.

This morning's press indicates a changed position. You probably are aware of the fact that the "Times" and "Morning Post" report correspondence between



your Government and Geneva, and a clear and definite invitation to Geneva to interpret what really was meant when that decision was come to. I think it would have been better if that had been communicated to us, but at all events it was communicated direct to Geneva, and therefore I am now going to say, on behalf of the Government, that we are prepared to join, and indeed facilitate a decision on that point being given. We would deplore war in any circumstances, but it would be a double misfortune for it to take place on a misunderstanding and therefore I am to say to you, so that you can communicate to your Government, that so far as we are concerned we not only welcome your decision to appeal to Geneva on this point, but we will ourselves immediately communicate and take the necessary steps for the calling of the conference at once. But equally that decision must carry with it a certain obligation, which I am quite sure you and your Government will be the first to understand and appreciate, and it is that pending that appeal and that decision, whatever it may be, no warlike measures will be taken by your troops or your Government to either complicate or render the position more difficult than it is at the moment. I feel sure you will appreciate the action of His Majesty's Government in this connection and accept it as a further indication of our anxiety not only to avoid a dispute or a rupture, but to do what is best in the interests of both nations.

INTERPRETER: The Turkish Minister has no official news that his Government has appealed to the League. It is possible that the "Times" and "Morning Post" have either published this news on private information.

SIR W. TYRRELL: It is from Reuter.

MR. THOMAS: It is in accordance with the last note we received. I presume you have a copy of the last note.

THE TURKISH MINISTER: Yes.

MR. THOMAS: Then, that being so, you know that it was in accordance with that note, so that it could not have been from private information.

INTERPRETER: He says that he remembers that the last note which was sent by his Government to Great Britain informed them that the Turkish Government wrote to the League on the matter of the *status quo* of the frontier and the interpretation to be placed on the words "*status quo*."

(The exact interpretation is "actual state of affairs.")

It is not known that the appeal was made.

MR. THOMAS: Let us be quite clear. I asked whether you had that note?

INTERPRETER: Turkey is not going to appeal to the League of Nations, but if England finds it necessary that it should be put to the decision of the League, then they will appeal.

MR. THOMAS: No. That cannot be so, because the final paragraph says that a résumé of the note has been sent to the Turkish Government representatives at Geneva and a copy by post, so that clearly is not indicated.

I am quite sure you will appreciate that there will be no need nor justification for you and me to go into a discussion as to what "*status quo*" means. You have already been informed of our definition, but seeing the matter has now been referred to Geneva, I want to say and I am quite sure you will appreciate, as I have already intimated, that we will join with you in that appeal and go beyond it and get as speedy a decision as possible.

INTERPRETER: He agrees.

MR. THOMAS: I, therefore, propose this afternoon, so as to allay public feeling in both countries, because we do not want bad feeling engendered, and with a view to easing the situation, to issue a communiqué to the press, telling them the exact situation that I have reported to you, and, also what I feel sure you will agree to and appreciate, a hope that nothing will be done on either side to prejudice the situation pending the appeal. I am quite sure you will be pleased to associate yourself with it.

INTERPRETER: He does not really see that there is anything to issue a declaration about this afternoon, because, after all, this is a thing that has appeared in the newspapers. He does not know anything about it officially. He does not really see that any discussions have taken place, and sees nothing to issue a communiqué about.

MR. THOMAS: But does not he see that, if an offer was made officially to us in the last note, of which he has a copy and has seen, offering this means of determining the issue in dispute, and this is followed by the Reuter telegram stating that Turkey has given effect to that note by herself writing direct to the League; and now I intimate that His Majesty's Government will take that course and speed it up, does it not follow that the public ought to know that? Why should the public assume that only his Government was prepared to have an arbitration decision on this question, when, as I have intimated, His Majesty's Government are prepared to do the same, and the public in both countries are entitled to know that?

INTERPRETER: He thinks that in the note sent to you by Mr. Lindsay—i.e., the last note from the Turkish Government—it does not say that they are going to appeal, but they are going to appeal if England wants it, but if there is no necessity for it they will not do so.

MR. THOMAS: That is perfectly true. If there was no further intimation, the obvious course would be to say whether we agreed to that suggestion or not, but, seeing it is followed several days after and reported in the press this morning that the course has already been taken, I think that is the clearest possible evidence; indeed, I do not doubt for a moment this thing could not have got into the press unless it was official, but, in any case, there need be no doubt about it. We can telegraph direct to Sir Eric Drummond and get confirmation, and, if it is confirmed, I will intimate, as I have already said, and, if it is not confirmed and no communication has been received to the effect reported in the press, then we, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, will ourselves inform the League that we are prepared to take that course, and inform your Government as well, so that there need be no doubt, even if there is a misunderstanding, which I do not think there is.

INTERPRETER: Zekiai Bey said that he would explain that the Turkish note said that, if England considered it necessary, Turkey would appeal to the League. His Majesty's Government might consider that Turkey had appealed to the League, but, in any case, he would ask his Government whether they had agreed to do so or not.

He would like to know whether England was still claiming certain districts in the Hakkari Vilayet.

MR. THOMAS: I want to make it perfectly clear that we are not discussing here, and I do not propose to discuss for one moment, what the border should be. That is not my business to-day at all. The fact of an offer to ask Geneva to interpret what they meant, and our agreeing that they should so interpret, rules out of any consideration a discussion with anybody on that point at issue. As far as the British Government are concerned, we stick to our original definition, which has been made quite clear to you, but, so that there should be no dispute as to what was meant at Geneva, we are prepared to ask Geneva, as you have already done, what was meant. I certainly would not discuss it for a moment.

INTERPRETER: He agrees.

MR. THOMAS: That being so, I am quite sure you will appreciate the object I had in inviting you to meet me, so that we could talk the situation over and avoid any possible misunderstanding. That was the only object I had in inviting you here this morning, and I very much appreciate your coming.

I will also take the necessary steps so that you may receive a copy of the communiqué that I am sending to the press.

INTERPRETER: The Minister appreciates efforts to allay public opinion and put an end to misunderstanding.

He wants to know if orders have been given to the aerial and Irak troops (British) not to pass to the north of the actual frontier line on which Turkish posts are now standing.

MR. THOMAS: While orders have been given to the forces, and, of course, orders for which Sir Hugh Trenchard himself and other officers are wholly responsible, they have merely given effect to the instructions of His Majesty's Government, which are, shortly, to do nothing in the way of attack, but to be able to defend themselves. That is the situation.

The orders that will be given to-day to our troops will be not to advance across the line where the Turkish posts are at this moment, but, of course, that is, and must be, dependent upon reciprocal action on your part.



INTERPRETER: Assurances have been given by the Turkish Government to their troops not to pass the line actually occupied.

MR. THOMAS: We can summarise it in a sentence by a clear intimation to you in answer to the question you put. No, we do not intend to pass the line, always, of course, on the clear understanding that you do the same.

This is not the place to get into a discussion.

The situation is perfectly clear and as I stated it. The offer of what I will call for short "arbitration" on the point of definition having been first officially communicated to us and then, according to the press report, communicated to Geneva, I am inviting you, as I will inform your Government officially, that we accept that position and will facilitate the hearing. We hope that nothing will be done on either side to prejudice the situation and interfere with an amicable settlement being arrived at by that body.

That is to say, what was *status quo* on the 30th September.

Thank you very much for coming along, and, if there is any point that I feel I ought to communicate to you, and if an interview would help, I should not hesitate to ask you.

INTERPRETER: He would like to come and see you again.

(Meeting ended.)

[E 8956/5711/65]

No. 71.

#### FRONTIER BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAK.

(C 579/1924/VII.)

Note by the Secretary-General of the Council of the League of Nations.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 15.)

THE following telegram, dated the 10th October, from his Excellency Ismet Pasha, is communicated to the council in conformity with the desire expressed in the telegram:—

(Translation.)

"Angora, October 10, 1924.

"In the British memorandum handed to Turkey on 5th October, Great Britain declared that the Turkish and British delegates had agreed at Geneva to observe the *status quo* on the frontier of Irak, adding that the *status quo* in question was that which existed at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, and that the note dated 29th September from Great Britain to Turkey had defined the line of this *status quo*. Consequently, Great Britain hoped that, in conformity with the undertaking entered into by Fethi Bey at Geneva, the Turkish Government would order its troops to retire to the line which they occupied before the recent events, and said that, if this were not done, the situation would become extremely serious.

"In a *note verbale*, dated 9th October, Great Britain stated that she was surprised at not having received any reply to her communication of 5th October, and that to her knowledge the Turkish authorities, far from withdrawing their troops from the territory which they had occupied, had, on the contrary, displayed increased activity by carrying out further concentrations; that the British Government could not tolerate this state of affairs, and, consequently, if Turkey did not consent to withdraw to the line mentioned in the note of 29th September, Great Britain would consider herself free—as from midday on 11th October—to take military measures to re-establish the situation, and that the British authorities in Irak had received orders to this effect, and had been authorised to warn the Turkish commanders.

"2. When the Council of the League of Nations recently undertook, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, to investigate the Turco-British dispute concerning Irak, we transmitted two notes, dated 16th and 22nd September, which referred to the violation of the *status quo* by the British. At the same time, we learned that Great Britain on her side had made certain complaints and demands by two notes, dated 25th and 29th September. The Council of the League of Nations, having all these notes before it, and after investigating the question, reached its decision on 30th September. On that date it made both parties enter into an undertaking to maintain the present

situation. Whereas Turkey, in spite of her grievances and legitimate demands, is maintaining the situation fixed on 30th September by the League of Nations, Great Britain, on the contrary, is insisting on the demands which she made in her note of [?] 29th September. Great Britain is thus violating the undertaking which she gave to obey the decision of the League of Nations.

"3. In our reply to Great Britain on 10th October, we explained, after analysing and completely refuting the arguments set out in the British note of 29th September, that the information—which Great Britain communicated on 9th October, to the effect that we were carrying out fresh military movements and concentrations of troops—was devoid of all truth; that the state of affairs as fixed on 30th September was being observed by us; that the line existing on that date would not be crossed on our side; and that the greater part of the forces which had been collected to suppress brigandage, as reported to the League of Nations, had for the past week been in process of being withdrawn towards the rear. We added that Great Britain had no possible legal justification for interpreting and modifying, to the disadvantage of Turkey, a decision reached by the League of Nations; we declared, however, that we were ready once again, if Great Britain considered it necessary, to submit our interpretation of the council's decision of 30th September to the examination and decision of the League.

"4. If Great Britain, ignoring the undertaking which she gave to respect the decision of the League of Nations, disturbs the peace and commits acts of aggression, the entire responsibility rests on her. Turkey is entitled to ask that the Council of the League of Nations be so good as to take steps to ensure that the provisions of a decision which the parties concerned have undertaken to respect shall be observed.

"I request you to be good enough to inform the Council of the League of Nations of this immediately. Copies of the notes mentioned in this telegram have been despatched by post.—ISMET PASHA."

Geneva, October 11, 1924.

No. 72.

Sir E. Drummond to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair*.

Geneva, October 15, 1924.

YOUR telegram 14th instant *re* Turkish-Irak frontier.

Am at once submitting request contained therein for immediate summoning of council to president.

No. 73.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1924.

MY telegram No. 154 of 8th October: Turco-Irak frontier, penultimate sentence.

Following received by Air Ministry from Air Officer Commanding, Irak. No. X. 6581, of 12th October:—

"1. A letter was sent to the Turkish corps commander giving a notification of the boundary and demanding evacuation of the area by Turkish troops by midday 11th October. Maunsell maps for retention, showing lines detailed in Foreign Office wire No. 147 to Constantinople, were also sent. A senior staff officer took those by hand for personal delivery. The Turkish corps commander, although at first very unwilling to permit the British staff officer to cross the border, eventually allowed him through, and for the interview came down specially from Jezireh to Rubahi Kale (to hide either weakness or strength at Jezireh was presumably his motive in doing so).

"2. Jafar Taiyar tried to argue about the line of frontier, and when this was declined, he expressed a desire further to discuss separately, either with me

[13028]



personally or with the same staff officer, after reference to me, the question of the removal of his troops from the area indicated. This also was declined. A definite refusal to send any written reply to the letter was received. He also refused definitely to furnish maps showing either any line south of which he would undertake not to send troops or the line of Mosul Vilayet boundary that he was working to. He gave as his reason for the latter that no maps or line had been supplied to him by his Government, that line depended on which villages previously paid taxes to Mosul or Van, that this was still being investigated by him, and that as he did not know accurate tracing himself he could not give line on map.

"With his finger he roughly indicated his idea of the boundary which would leave the British line close to Klonun and Geramus along Develli Dag (these were the only three names he mentioned) and across to Hazil, well south of his present lines of communication.

"3. He made little argument as regards Assyrian area (probably because his troops are understood to be evacuating it after completing operations). The fact that he had been jumping a claim there, he did, however, give away; he stated rather triumphantly, referring to *status quo*, that his troops entered Ashita on 20th September, and that the date of signature of representatives of Geneva was 30th September. It was pointed out to him that the *status quo* existing at the time of signature of the Lausanne Treaty was the *status quo* to which the representatives at Geneva had signed.

"4. He finally gave for me a definite verbal reply, viz.:-

"(1.) That he was anxious to avoid war or any misunderstanding between the commanders, as the idea of war and waste of life was absurd for such a little cause.

"(2.) That the demand of the British Government for a return to the *status quo* by 11th October was received subsequent to the receipt by him of orders from his Government. These orders instructed him to hold up to the previous boundaries of the Vilayet of Mosul; these being the conditions of the *status quo* according to the Turkish Government. Therefore, it was not possible for him to evacuate the area bounded by the line shown him upon British maps and the line that he regarded as the boundary of the vilayet.

"(3.) He had ordered more troops into this area, with instructions to counter-attack if they were attacked. Should they be attacked, just west of Hazil he had further troops in reserve with which [? groups omitted] he would go so far as to make private communications to me. He stated that the attack upon the Irak police post at Birsawi was quite against his instructions, and that in order to avoid misunderstanding he had even moved his land lines of communication east of the Hazil further north. (Note.—This confirms our previous intelligence in both particulars.) In order to avoid useless bloodshed, so he said, he would even agree privately with me that all his troops, except small posts, should move out of the disputed area, and as his last word, would make them gendarmes and not regular troops. On his orders he could not go beyond this. At the end of the interview, however, he said: "If you [? group omitted] war, all right."

"6. After an interview of two hours, the staff officer realised that for the time this was final. He requested leave to depart, stating that the above would be conveyed to me; but, naturally, giving not the slightest assurance that after noon on 11th October action would not be taken.

"7. There does not seem much doubt that Jaffer Taiyar has no desire to begin war and will not stir unless he is attacked. There was the impression that if any attack did come it would be by land as well as by air. At the same time, it seemed genuine that on his present instructions he would put up a resistance, and if attacked, would counter-attack. The Turks were friendly, but quite on their guard against letting out any information; even to the extent of avoiding the introduction of officers by name. I do not believe that the Turks are in a strength beyond our previously given estimate; or, at the moment, possess any material reinforcements near by."

No. 74.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 16.)*

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, October 15, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 160.

I have to-day made communication to Turkish delegate as instructed. Copy by bag to-day.

I added verbally four points:-

1. Fact that His Majesty's Government had not replied to numerous inaccuracies and false arguments in Turkish note of 10th October did not mean that they accepted them.
2. As His Majesty's Government had ordered their troops to conform to arrangements now reached, so Turkish Government must now instruct theirs likewise so that no further incident can arise.
3. In order that Council of League may settle points at issue as soon as possible, Turkish Government should be ready with their delegation for Geneva so that delay may be avoided.
4. While both Governments are already pledged to accept League's decision, I wished to warn Turkish Government now that immediate unequivocal carrying into execution of decision when given will be necessary.

[E 9106/5711/65]

No. 75.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 755.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting Turkish military activities on the Irak frontier.

*Constantinople, October 10, 1924.*

Enclosure in No. 75.

*Note verbale communicated to Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne peut cacher son étonnement de ce qu'il n'a jusqu'ici reçu aucune réponse aux représentations qui ont été adressées par cette mission sur ses ordres au Gouvernement turc en date du 5 octobre relatif au *statu quo* sur la frontière de l'Irak. D'après les renseignements reçus, les autorités turques, loin de retirer leurs troupes des districts qu'elles viennent d'occuper, augmentent leurs activités et concentrent des troupes nouvelles. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne peut tolérer cette situation. Jusqu'ici, en vue des discussions qui ont eu lieu à Genève et en vue des assurances très définitives du délégué turc données le 30 septembre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a pas donné suite aux mesures indiquées dans l'antépénultième paragraphe de la note de cette mission en date du 25 septembre. Il ne peut, cependant, maintenir indéfiniment cette attitude, et il se trouve sous la nécessité aujourd'hui de prévenir le Gouvernement turc que si celui-ci ne vient pas à accepter le retour à la ligne du *statu quo* définie dans la note de cette mission du 29 septembre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique reprendra à partir de midi du 11 octobre toute sa liberté d'action pour prendre toutes les mesures militaires qui pourront être nécessaires pour rétablir la situation.

Les autorités militaires britanniques de l'Irak ont reçu des ordres dans ce sens et ont été autorisées à en informer les commandants des forces turques sur les lieux.

*Mission britannique, Constantinople,  
le 9 octobre 1924.*



Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 758.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting military activities on the Turco-Irak frontier.

Constantinople, October 11, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Note from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

AU moment de répondre à la note verbale du 9 octobre courant, nous croyons devoir expliquer la raison pour laquelle il n'a pas été donné de réponse aux notes du 29 septembre et du 5 octobre 1924. Il avait été précisé dans la note britannique du 29 septembre que celle-ci constituait une réponse provisionnelle aux notes que nous avions adressées en date des 16 et 22 septembre, concernant la violation du *statu quo* à la frontière de l'Irak, dont le respect est prévu par le Traité de Lausanne. Or, il était tout naturel d'attendre l'arrivée de la note qui serait considérée comme complète.

2. Les faits et les doléances qui avaient fait l'objet de nos deux notes des 16 et 22 septembre, ainsi que celles de la Grande-Bretagne datées des 25 et 29 septembre, avaient été entièrement portés devant la Société des Nations, qui avait pris connaissance de toutes ces doléances, et avait résolu la divergence à laquelle elles avaient donné lieu dans la décision du 30 septembre 1924. Il est naturel de considérer comme liquidée une question qui a été résolue par le conseil, du consentement des deux parties.

2 bis. Il a été constaté que l'aide-mémoire daté du 5 octobre donnait une interprétation de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Il était nécessaire de comparer cette manière de voir qui ne correspondait pas aux renseignements reçus par télégramme, avec le texte de la décision du conseil, qui n'a été reçu que dernièrement. La partie de la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations du 30 septembre concernant la frontière est ainsi conçue : "Le conseil prend acte des déclarations des Gouvernements britannique et turque. En attendant la décision à prendre au sujet de la frontière, il ne sera procédé à aucun mouvement militaire ou autre de nature à apporter un changement quelconque dans l'état actuel des territoires, dont le sort définitif dépendra de cette décision." On voit bien que le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est servi du terme "état actuel," et non de celui de *statu quo*, mentionné dans la note anglaise du 5 octobre.

3. Quant aux arguments de la note britannique du 29 septembre concernant la frontière dont le respect est obligatoire, on doit faire observer que, au moment de la signature du Traité de Lausanne, le vilayet de Mossoul ne se trouvait pas complètement sous l'occupation effective de l'Angleterre jusqu'à la frontière du nord, mentionné dans le paragraphe 5. La ligne derrière laquelle l'administration turque s'était effectivement retirée était celle que le commandant anglais, le Général Marshall, avait notifié au commandement turc en date du 2 novembre 1918. En dehors de cette ligne, la zone passée sous l'occupation effective de l'Angleterre jusqu'à la date du 24 juillet 1923 est celle de Revandiz. Il n'y a pas moyen de prétendre que nous ayons accepté la notification mentionnée dans le paragraphe 3, comme quoi tout le vilayet est considéré sous l'occupation de l'Angleterre. Au contraire, la Turquie a, après le 24 juillet 1923, protesté les faits tels que l'occupation de Suleimanieh, l'envoi des Députés de Mossoul au Parlement de l'Irak, les agressions des avions anglais. A nos démarches concernant les agressions d'avions, l'Angleterre a répondu, le 23 août 1924, en indiquant la ligne de ses postes, qu'elle déclarait n'avoir pas été franchie. Nonobstant la manière de voir soutenue dans le paragraphe 9, ces déclarations expliquent clairement une ligne de *statu quo* que l'Angleterre admet.

4. Les arguments avancés dans les paragraphes 6, 7 et 8 de la note en question, pour les territoires en dehors du vilayet de Mossoul, sont inadmissibles. Le Gouvernement anglais précise dans cette note qu'au mois de juillet 1923, ces régions

ne se trouvaient pas sous son occupation effective, et qu'elle n'en demande pas l'incorporation dans les limites du vilayet de Mossoul. Il est naturel qu'un territoire qui ne se trouve pas sous l'occupation effective de l'envahisseur appartient au possesseur légitime. Point n'est besoin de chercher et de vérifier s'il y a des agents ou des troupes turques dans une localité, où il n'y a pas d'occupation effective de l'Angleterre, pour savoir qu'elle appartient à la Turquie. Il n'est pas avéré que la Turquie se soit abstenue d'envoyer dans cette région de Gouverneurs, d'agents ou de soldats, sur une protestation anglaise. Le Vali de Hakkiari à Cheulemerk et un maire à Tchalt ont, depuis la signature du Traité de Lausanne, gouverné sans discontinuité dans ces endroits. Quant aux réponses à donner aux notes relatant ces faits, nous estimons qu'il n'en est nullement besoin, vu qu'il a été question de l'agression d'avions anglais dans les lignes sises plus au sud, et que des garanties comme celles indiquées dans la note britannique du 23 août ont été obtenues concernant une ligne située plus au sud. Il est à noter que la Turquie a exposé, à la Conférence de Constantinople, son point de vue qu'il n'existait pas de question en dehors de celle du vilayet de Mossoul.

5. En dernier lieu, la divergence relative au vilayet de Mossoul a récemment été soumise, de par le traité, à la Société des Nations. Les doléances soutenues de notre part, ainsi que de la part des Anglais, quant aux violations de la ligne du *statu quo*, ont été étudiées par le conseil; le délégué anglais a, dans la séance du 25 septembre 1924, déclaré à propos de la ligne de *statu quo* à observer que ladite ligne était celle fixée depuis l'armistice. Notre délégué s'est rallié à ce point de vue. De notre part, nous avions soutenu que, juridiquement, l'on devait remonter à l'époque de l'armistice pour chercher l'origine du *statu quo*. A la fin le conseil, après avoir pris connaissance de toutes ces doléances ainsi que des notes anglaises des 25 et 29 septembre, y comprises les régions mentionnées dans ces notes, et dont l'évacuation était demandée par les Anglais, a rendu sa décision à laquelle les deux Etats intéressés ont déclaré se rallier. Par cette décision on s'est engagé à observer l'état actuel, c'est-à-dire la situation existant à la date du 30 septembre. Il est au point de vue juridique impossible que l'Angleterre prétende, par sa note du 5 octobre, que l'expression d'état actuel mentionné dans la décision de la Société des Nations se rapportait à la ligne mentionnée dans la note anglaise du 29 septembre. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations n'a pas adopté de résolution tendant à donner à l'autre partie le droit d'interpréter et de modifier contre la Turquie ses propres décisions.

6. Après avoir donné les explications ci-dessus mentionnées, quant aux deux notes du 29 septembre et du 5 octobre, nous répandons ci-après en nous basant sur ces mêmes explications à la note verbale du 9 octobre. Nous avons mentionné dans le paragraphe 1 que le retard apporté à la réponse de la note du 5 octobre provenait de la nécessité d'attendre le texte de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Il est dénué de fondement que les troupes turques déploient d'avantage leur activité, et que l'on procède à de nouvelles concentrations de troupes. La Turquie n'a pas caché qu'elle avait adopté des mesures militaires en vue de réprimer les brigands nestoriens, et qu'elle avait, dans ce but, concentré des troupes ainsi que des gendarmes. Au contraire, elle l'a, dans sa note du 16 septembre, notifié en détail à l'Angleterre ainsi qu'à la Société des Nations; et le représentant intérimaire anglais admettait préalablement, dans sa note du 17 septembre, que notre mouvement militaire tendait à réprimer les Nestoriens de Takhoma. Les forces militaires réunies étaient donc en nombre et en mesure uniquement nécessaires pour réprimer les coupables. A ce point que la répression ayant été terminée dernièrement, il n'a pas été nécessaire de maintenir en entier lesdites mesures militaires et que le gros de force est, depuis une semaine, déjà en train d'être transporté vers les derrières. Dans ces conditions, je m'empresse de déclarer solennellement qu'il n'y a aucune raison de croire que l'on effectue sur les frontières un mouvement ou une concentration suspecte. Et je précise que l'on ne dépassera pas au sud de la ligne Borsivi-Banuno-Chacallou mentionnée dans la note anglaise du 23 août, et où se trouvent les postes anglais. La décision acceptée par la Société des Nations, en date du 30 septembre, est observée minutieusement. Si la patrie turque est attaquée, le Gouvernement de la République serait obligé d'accomplir son devoir. Ces explications sont données avec l'intention sincère et évidente de démontrer jusqu'à quel point la Turquie respecte soit les tendances pacifiques développées dans la Société des Nations par les délégués des deux parties, soit les décisions adoptées par la Société des Nations, et qu'elle ne donnera pas de prétexte à une situation contraire aux décisions de la Société des Nations. Nous espérons que ces explications seront convaincantes, et qu'elles suffiront à dissiper les malentendus. Nous tenons à noter ce point que si l'Angleterre le juge nécessaire,



nous sommes prêts à soumettre de nouveau à l'étude et à la décision de la Société des Nations, les déclarations quant à notre manière de comprendre sa décision du 30 septembre.

Un résumé télégraphique de cette note a été donné à la Société des Nations, et une copie *in extenso* en a été adressée à la Société par la poste.

Constantinople, le 10 octobre 1924.

(Seal.)

No. 77.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, October 16, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Ismet has sent message through delegation to say that he will reply to my note of yesterday as soon as he receives text; that Turkish frontier troops have been ordered to make no move which could be regarded as an aggression, and that they are anxious for an early meeting of Council of League.

No. 78.

Mr. Lindsay to MacDonald.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, October 18, 1924.

MY telegram No. 187.

I have received note from Turkish delegate dated to-day.

It says that Turkish Government accepted decision of 30th September, although line so prescribed lies to the north of true line of *status quo* of July 1923. If resolution of 30th September meant Lausanne *status quo*, Turkish Government would therefore accept it willingly and *a fortiori*. As, however, the two Governments disagree as to where Lausanne *status quo* line runs, it is important to decide its real position, and Turkish Government will conform to League's decision in this respect.

Turkish troops have been instructed not to cross British lines.  
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 54.)

[E 9110/5711/65]

No. 79.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 762.)

Sir,

Constantinople, October 14, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a full English translation of an article of the Angora newspaper, "Hakimiet-i-Millieh," as telegraphed here by the semi-official Anatolian Agency and published in the local press of the 10th instant, respecting "the publications of the English press regarding Turkish violation of the *status quo* at Mosul." The article is of interest in that it gives a statement of the Turkish point of view at the time of my communicating your message of the 8th October to the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Translation of the Turkish Text of the Communiqué of the Anatolian Agency published in the Constantinople Press of October 10, 1924.

Angora, October 9. (A.A.)—The newspaper "Hakimiet-i-Millieh" gives the following information in connection with the publications of the English press regarding our violation of the *status quo* at Mosul:—

At the time when the discussions on the Mosul question were about to open, a party of Nestorians, who had been armed by the British to replace the troops released

following the armistice, penetrated the Vilayet of Hekkari with their arms and munitions, and thereby aroused the misgivings of our tribes and disturbed their tranquillity. The fact that Hadji Reshid Bey, of Perwari, who had been elected and sent to Bagdad as Deputy for Amadia, had submitted to the Irak Chamber of Deputies a memorial, published in the newspaper "El Alem-el-Terbi," complaining that, owing to the British having handed over arms and ammunition at the time of their demobilisation from British military service to Nestorians living in the neighbourhood of Julamerk, the Nestorians, thanks to this increase in their arms, were continually disturbing the Moslem tribes of Perwari and elsewhere, and that these arms and munitions had been illegally given to them, adequately shows how well founded were the complaints and petitions which our tribes submitted to the Republican Government in this connection. While the Nestorians, armed, as is established by this document, by British Irak officials in the south, were sent and returned to the interior of Hekkari, British officials, having entered this zone of ours, were conversing with Ulia Bey, Mudir of Chal.

At this time rumours of a startling nature were again circulated from the south to the effect that Nestorians from the south, in co-operation with others from Persian territory, would attack Shimdinan and Julamerk, and our tribes repeated their applications for support. The rumours of these movements having been circulated on the eve of the Golden Horn Conference, the Republican Government, desirous of not prejudicing the discussions in any way, did not modify the local military situation in the slightest degree, and confined itself to pacifying the tribes and giving them assurances regarding these movements and this terrorising propaganda. In this connection, Khalil Rifaat Bey, Vali of Van, accompanied by twenty gendarmes, left Julamerk on the 7th August, 1340 (1924), for Chal to inspect and enquire into the situation in the vilayet. When the party was passing through a deep valley near Khan Ghedik, in the zone of the Nahsub Nestorians, the Nestorians opened fire. The gendarmerie commander and four men of the escort were killed and the Vali and five men wounded. When Khalil Rifaat Bey, having escaped from the hands of the brigands, arrived at the centre of the nahieh of Chal, he learnt that, immediately after the incident, Ulia Bey, Mudir of Chal, had taken refuge with the British, who had arrived to interview him some days before the incident. The return of the Nestorians armed, the memorial of Hadji Reshid Bey criticising this action, the situation and rumours leading up to the incident, the demands at the Golden Horn Conference, the flight of British aeroplanes over the locality at the moment of the capture of the Vali of Hekkari, the nahieh mudir's taking refuge after the incident with the British who had come to see him before the incident, and the coming to Chal after the incident of a British official named Mr. Lloyd and his incitement of the Nestorians against us—all this clearly shows that in this matter the British officials were following an artificial object and aim.

It was necessary to pursue and hand over to the law the agents who, under the influence of instigations from the south, went so far as to make an attempt on the Vali of the vilayet. It was therefore decided, as the gendarmerie strength of the vilayet was judged inadequate, and in virtue of the law on the general administration of the vilayets, to despatch a detachment of soldiers. While the united forces were being assembled in the vicinity of Bint-el-Shebab, we had evidence of a further and last proof of the incitements and instigations of the British Irak officials. Four of our officers, named Ihsan, Tefik, Rassim and Khurshid, who belonged to the forces which were to take part in the movement, left their quarters with the men under their command on the plea that the movement had begun. The men, becoming aware on the following day of this treason of their officers, left the latter and rejoined their units. Khurshid, one of the officers, proceeded to Ahub and joined the British officials, in accordance with instructions which he had evidently previously received. On the 16th September, 1924, our necessary forces were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Jezreh, Bint-el-Shebab and Julamerk. Before the movement was begun, a proclamation was issued by the commander of the forces announcing that the object of the movement was to chastise and hand over to justice the Nahsub Nestorian brigands, who had used arms against the officers and officials of the Government, and that the tribes and people who were obedient and submissive to the Government could continue their everyday work in perfect tranquillity and be assured of the clemency and equity of the Government. Our assembled forces then commenced to move in the direction of Nahsub. When our troops from Jezreh had crossed the Jezil Su, which is to the north of the boundary line shown in 1918 by General Marshal, the British commander in Irak, and were pursuing their task within our territory, they were exposed to an attack from British aeroplanes. One



of our officers and some of our men were killed or wounded, and a number of our animals were also lost. The British Irak authorities claimed, and, contrary to the truth, so informed the British Government, that this attack had been directed against irregular Turkish detachments which had crossed the Jezil Su and violated the *status quo* frontier, and, finally, that our troop concentrations had caused excitement at Zakho and Amadia, whereas the British aeroplanes had, as a matter of fact, opened fire on our regular military forces, who had not only not violated the *status quo* line, but had not even violated the British *status quo* line nor passed the line of outposts which is to the north of that line. The sole object of the aeroplane attack of the British Irak authorities was to prevent or render difficult the punishment awaiting the Nestorians from our detachments operating parallel to the *status quo* line on territory within our boundaries. In accordance with orders received, and in spite of British aeroplane attacks, which resulted in the death of a number of innocent persons and the destruction of many villages, our troops, as soon as they entered the zone of the rebellious Nestorians, issued a second proclamation, again announcing that their object was to hand over to justice only those who had been guilty of acting against the Government, whereupon they proceeded to exterminate the rebels, who had everywhere hoisted the black flag as a sign of war, and who had actually started to use arms, showing justice and clemency to those who had submitted, and thus completing with the utmost calm and speed their duty, which was to re-establish peace and order in the country.

[E 9119/5711/65]

No. 80.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 774.)

Sir,

Constantinople, October 14, 1924.

IT is not too much to say that the emergence four days ago of the Irak frontier crisis took the Turkish press and public opinion completely by surprise. During the three previous weeks the local newspapers, obviously groping in the dark, had from time to time reported that notes dealing with the Mosul question had been handed by myself to Nusret Bey, and had been the subject of consideration by the Angora Cabinet, but all the efforts of the correspondents to obtain information from the official sources had ended in failure, Nusret Bey even having gone so far as to deny that there had been any exchange of notes whatsoever.

2. The information that the Turkish Government had despatched a force to deal with the Nestorians responsible for the kidnapping of the Vali of Hikkari in August was of course common property, and when, on the morning of the 10th instant, the local press reproduced from the Angora "Hakimiet-i-Millie" the report, of which a textual translation is enclosed in my despatch No. 762 of to-day's date, on the successful conclusion of the work of the punitive force, it was generally assumed that the question of the frontier incidents was dead. The "Vakt" even stated that for this reason it considered it unnecessary to publish the report *in extenso*. The only other information given by the press on that day was contained in late Angora telegrams, published in only a few of the newspapers, to the effect that the Cabinet was preparing its reply to the last British note.

3. Even on the 11th, the day on which the British ultimatum was due to expire, the gravity of the situation was not generally realised. Late on the previous night, however, the Government had issued through the semi-official Anatolian Agency a communiqué summarising the contents of the various notes exchanged, including those of my *note verbale* of the 9th October to Nusret Bey, and of the Turkish Government's reply of the following day. This communiqué was, however, issued too late to give time for editorial comment, and in fact most of the papers go to press so early that the full text of the communiqué was only published in two out of the seven morning newspapers, one of which, the "Ileri," by a strange coincidence devoted its leading article to a long eulogy of the British Constitution and of the freedom of British political life, and went on to urge that, though Turkey might for long be an object of British enmity, she should do everything possible to cultivate British friendship, even while fully conscious of that enmity. Moreover, as the Bourse and all the banks were closed on the occasion of the double anniversary of the Prophet's birthday, and of the proclamation of national sovereignty, the exchange crisis which might have been expected was, for the time being, averted.

4. It was therefore only on the morning of the 12th instant that anything in the nature of reasoned comment became possible, and it was at once clear that the

crisis was being faced with the utmost calmness, even though its seriousness was realised. A certain nervousness was of course apparent, but the tone of the press was restrained. The terms of the Turkish Government's reply were universally approved, and, though it was regarded as certain that all Turks would, if necessary, at once rally to the defence of the fatherland, the hope was expressed that, with a spirit of conciliation on both sides, a peaceful solution might be reached. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that the dispute was one which should, in the first instance, be examined by the League of Nations. The responsibility for the opening of hostilities would, it was stated, lie with the British, but the Turks were confident that, with right and justice on their side, their cause must ultimately prevail, even against powerful Britain, whose deep-laid imperialistic designs were at last unmasked. The "Tevhid" carried this argument a little further by warning the British that they had to face a lucky commander in Ismet Pasha, who had driven the Greeks from Anatolia and brought General Harington to his knees at Mudania. However, the fact that telegrams from the Irak frontier, instead of bringing the expected news of the outbreak of hostilities, reported that there had been an exchange of letters between the British and Turkish commanders had a considerable steadying influence.

5. The further absence on the 12th instant of disturbing reports from the frontier resulted in the press of the 13th showing an increased confidence, which was not seriously affected by the news that, in view of the gravity of the situation, the President of the Republic was returning to Angora, and that he had ordered the immediate meeting of the Assembly. Rather did the latter report furnish the press with an opportunity, which has for so long been lacking, of unanimously approving an action of the Government. The probability of an immediate resort to hostilities was heavily discounted, a report from Athens that the British fleet was proceeding to Turkish waters excited little concern, and it was assumed that, in view of the conciliatory nature of the Turkish Government's reply, His Majesty's Government would content themselves for the time being with answering in a written note the points raised in that reply. Moreover, such political personages as the press correspondents had been able to interview fostered the growing feeling of optimism, as, without exception, they expressed themselves as hopeful of a peaceful solution, while Fethi Bey, after his experience at Geneva, from which he returned on the 10th October, expressed his conviction that the League of Nations was absolutely impartial and entirely outside the influence of foreign Powers such as Britain. In substance, such leading articles of the day as dealt with the Irak question, in reflecting the growing spirit of optimism, inclined more to regard the British ultimatum as a bluff made for electioneering purposes at home or else with the object of damaging Turkish prestige in the eyes of the frontier tribes and thereby improving the prospects for the success of the British case before the commission of enquiry to be sent there by the League of Nations.

6. The press of to-day has again shown a further access of confidence, and it is apparently now believed that all real danger is for the moment over. The fact that the Turkish £ weathered yesterday without serious depreciation is referred to with satisfaction, though some surprise is expressed at the absence of any step taken by His Majesty's Government which would have for its effect the clearing up of the situation. It is, however, assumed that this will quickly follow and that the expected British note will be of a nature to undo some of the damage caused by the previous peremptory British demand.

7. One interesting feature of to-day's press comment is a tendency to criticise the Government for its inaction in the Mosul and other questions. The first expression of this criticism, since the crisis arose, was made in the "Ileri" of yesterday, but it has been carried further to-day by the pan-Islamic and anti-British "Tevhid," which has of late become increasingly hostile towards the Government, and by the "Tanin," which has for long been more or less openly identified with the Reouf-Refet and other opposition groups. The article of the former is interesting in that, after blaming the Government for its slackness in handling the Mosul question, it, for the first time, expresses doubt whether Mosul will not finally be lost to Turkey. The criticism of the "Tanin" is, however, the more important of the two, not only because of its outspokenness, but also because its article of to-day is the first comment that it has so far published on the crisis. After referring to the confusing nature of the Anatolian Agency's communication, the writer complains that time is being wasted in waiting for the meeting of the Assembly, while no steps are being taken to enlighten public opinion regarding the real facts of the dispute.



"The country," writes Hussein Jahid Bey, "is ready to unite in the defence of its rights and interests, but it must know what rights and interests are menaced . . . . It is not enough for the Cabinet to say that the country is in danger . . . . Before national unity can be attained, the country must have a Cabinet enjoying universal confidence. The present Cabinet does not possess, and is not worthy of, that confidence, and," Jahid Bey concludes, "the only remedy for the situation is the disappearance of that Cabinet and its replacement by one which, through its enjoyment of public confidence, would be capable of uniting the Turkish nation for peace or war." The significance of this article in a leading Turkish newspaper at the present time is, I think, so obvious that I refrain from comment.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 9120/5711/65]

No. 81.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 776.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the Irak frontier dispute.

Constantinople, October 15, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 81.

*Mr. Lindsay to Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

*Mission britannique, Constantinople,  
le 15 octobre 1924.*

M. le Délégué,

JE n'ai pas manqué de communiquer par télégramme à mon Gouvernement le contenu de la note de votre Excellence du 10 octobre relative à la situation sur la frontière de l'Irak. En ce qui concerne la question de l'interprétation de la décision de la Société des Nations en date du 30 septembre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique maintient toujours l'avis que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous exposer; cependant, il a relevé les dernières phrases de votre note ci-dessus citée, dans lesquelles le Gouvernement turc se déclare prêt à soumettre de nouveau à la Société des Nations cette question d'interprétation. Il a en même temps pris connaissance par la presse du texte de la note turque à la Société des Nations, par laquelle le Gouvernement de la République invoque les bons offices du Conseil de la Société des Nations dans cette matière.

2. Agissant selon les instructions reçues aujourd'hui de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que Mr. Ramsay MacDonald a fait dire hier à son Excellence Zekiai Bey que, vu l'initiative prise par le Gouvernement turc auprès de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté accepte la procédure proposée. Son acceptation, toutefois, est subordonnée à la condition formelle que, jusqu'à ce qu'une décision sur la question d'interprétation soit intervenue, pendant que les troupes britanniques ne traverseront pas la ligne où se trouvent en ce moment des troupes turques, celles-ci agiront de même et réciproquement.

3. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique fera des efforts pour que le Conseil de la Société des Nations se réunisse aussitôt que possible afin de statuer sur le point en litige. Il vient d'inviter le secrétaire général de la Société des Nations de prendre immédiatement les mesures nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de cet objet.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 9134/5711/65]

No. 82.

*Mr. MacDonald to Zekiai Bey.*

*Foreign Office, October 20, 1924.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the 16th instant, in which you brought to my attention the bombardment of Sheranis on the Turco-Irak frontier by British aircraft on the 14th October.

2. At the time when this incident took place the British forces in Irak had orders not to take hostile action unless attacked, and the Turkish Government were informed accordingly, by His Majesty's representative at Constantinople, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, in a note dated the 9th October. This information was also conveyed to you by Sir William Tyrrell, as mentioned in your note under reply, on the 13th instant.

3. On the following evening (the 14th October), after your interview with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a telegram was despatched to the British military authorities in Irak directing them to give effect to the agreement reached at that meeting, namely, that pending the decision of the question now referred to the Council of the League of Nations, neither side would advance their forces beyond the lines now occupied.

4. His Majesty's Government have now learnt that on the 14th October, at a time when the British military authorities had not received the further orders mentioned in the preceding paragraph, British aircraft were fired at by Turkish machine guns at Sheranis. It is thus abundantly clear that the British air forces were acting in strict accordance with the orders which they had then received, and were fully justified in replying to the Turkish fire opened upon them at a time prior to the receipt of the fresh orders issued on the 14th October.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 9134/5711/65]

No. 83.

*Zekiai Bey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)*

Excellence,

*Légation turque, Londres, le 16 octobre 1924.*

DANS la conversation que j'avais eu l'honneur d'avoir avec lui le 13 courant, Sir William Tyrrell, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, avait bien voulu me donner l'assurance que les forces britanniques tant aériennes que de terre avaient reçu l'ordre de ne pas attaquer les Turcs; il m'avait, en outre, formellement affirmé que les informations transmises par mon Gouvernement au sujet d'attaques aériennes récentes devaient être basées sur des renseignements erronés.

Lorsque, le lendemain 14 octobre, M. le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Colonies me fit, en votre absence, l'honneur de me recevoir, il voulut bien, sur la demande que je lui fis, me renouveler d'une façon catégorique les assurances qui m'avaient été données la veille par Sir William Tyrrell, et le communiqué issu du Foreign Office le 14 octobre au soir déclarait textuellement: "In the meantime, it is distinctly understood that neither side will advance their forces beyond the lines now occupied."

Or, durant cette même journée du 14 octobre, deux avions britanniques ont bombardé la localité de Shérani située au nord de la ligne Zaho-Birsiwi-Baluma-Tchacallu, et les bombes qu'ils y ont lancées ont blessé deux femmes.

En me communiquant ce fait, mon Gouvernement me charge de protester auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté contre cette attaque.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence si elle voulait bien me mettre à même de pouvoir éclairer mon Gouvernement au sujet des causes de cette attaque, qui est en contradiction flagrante avec les assurances qui m'ont été données officiellement; j'espère, en outre, que votre Excellence voudra bien renouveler les ordres précédemment donnés afin d'éviter le retour d'incidents de cette nature qui pourraient avoir des conséquences regrettables.

En présentant à votre Excellence mes remerciements anticipés pour tout ce qu'elle voudra bien faire dans ce but, je la prie, &c.

ZEKIAI.



No. 84.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels).*

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, October 20, 1924.*

PLEASE inform Minister for Foreign Affairs urgently that His Majesty's Government accept his proposal to convoke Council of League of Nations at Brussels on 27th October to discuss Turco-Irak frontier.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 166.)

No. 85.

*Sir E. Drummond to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)*(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Geneva, October 20, 1924.*

TURCO-IRAK frontier.

Following received from Ismet Pasha:—

(Translation.)

"I have had the honour to receive your two telegrams of 16th October. The Turkish Government also agree to submit to the decision of the council the definition of the exact meaning of the resolution of 30th September regarding the observance of the 'present state.' They understand by these terms the situation existing at that date. They note with satisfaction that the new difference of opinion will shortly be examined by the council with a view to indicating and defining the line to be observed in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne in such manner as to exclude all possibility of conflict pending the final decision on the main question. The positions of 30th September have been accepted by the Turkish Government as the line of the *status quo* out of deference towards the council and in order to demonstrate their pacific sentiments, although that line is well to the north of the true line of the *status quo* of [? 24th] July, 1923. Consequently the Turkish Government would also willingly accept the *status quo* line of 1923, but, in view of the pacific spirit which has brought about the fresh recourse to the council, in that case the council would have to define a line corresponding to the limit of the July 1923 *status quo*. The Turkish Government will conform to the decision of the council in this respect. The Turkish delegation awaits (telegram inviting Turkish representative to attend council meeting Brussels, 27th October, despatched Saturday, 18th) the invitation of the council, and will be able to present itself at Geneva within six days after receipt of notification to this effect."

No. 86.

*Sir E. Drummond to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 21.)*(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Geneva, October 21, 1924.*

QUESTION frontier between Turkey and Irak.

Beg to communicate that president, Council League, considers highly important to have at the Brussels council meeting detailed information from both parties on *de facto* territorial situation at various dates.

No. 87.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir E. Drummond (Geneva).*(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Foreign Office, October 21, 1924.*

TURCO-IRAK frontier.

Your telegram of 20th October quoting text of telegram received by you from Ismet Pasha.

Telegram does not, in view of His Majesty's Government, accurately state point which council will have to decide, but they are willing to leave council to deal with this aspect of question when it meets.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 167.)

No. 88.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 22.)*

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 22, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 189.

Fethi Bey and delegation leave to-night for Brussels.

Though indications are of the slightest, I incline to think Fethi, when at Brussels, may make an effort to reach a direct and final settlement with His Majesty's Government of the whole frontier question. I rather interpret Turkish note of 18th October as a plea for such method of procedure, and it is quite certain that everybody here, both Government and public, would gladly avoid possibility of another jolt such as they received the week before last. I have nothing definite to go on, but think that British delegation to Brussels might be on the look-out for some such development.

No. 89.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 22.)*

(No. 194.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 22, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Rather unexpectedly I saw Fethi this afternoon. He admitted quite frankly that League's decision referred to *status quo* line of the Treaty of Lausanne, and I do not think he will contest point at Brussels, but he mentioned also divergent views of the two Governments as to where that line runs.

He seemed to hope that council would give a precise definition of it which would be observed by both parties pending final decision.

He gave no indication of any desire to settle whole question of frontier at once out of court or otherwise.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 57.)

[E 9250/5711/65]

No. 90.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 780.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, Constantinople, respecting the Irak frontier dispute.

*Constantinople, October 18, 1924.*

Enclosure in No. 90.

*Nusret Bey to Mr. Lindsay.*

M. le Représentant,

*Constantinople, le 18 octobre 1924.*

JE n'avais pas manqué de transmettre au Général Ismet Pacha la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 15 octobre 1924. D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir ce qui suit :

Par sa note du 10 octobre 1924, le Gouvernement turc avait déclaré que la décision du 30 septembre 1924 adoptée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations comporte l'engagement des deux parties d'observer l'état actuel, c'est-à-dire la situation existant à la date du 30 septembre 1924, que ladite décision ne pourrait avoir aucun rapport avec la ligne mentionnée dans la note anglaise du 29 septembre, et que la Turquie est prête à soumettre à l'étude et à la décision de la Société des Nations sa manière de comprendre la résolution dont il s'agit.



Selon la note ci-dessus visée du 15 octobre, le Gouvernement britannique accepte la procédure ainsi proposée à la condition que les troupes de chacune des deux parties ne traversent pas la ligne où se trouvent actuellement les troupes de l'autre partie.

Le secrétariat général de la Société des Nations vient de son côté informer le Gouvernement turc que la demande britannique au sujet de la convocation du conseil vient d'être soumise à M. le président. Le Gouvernement turc constate avec satisfaction que le litige surgi sur le sens de la ligne de *statu quo* serait examiné à bref délai par le conseil en vue d'indiquer et de préciser la ligne dont l'observation est due en vertu du Traité de Paix, de manière à exclure toute possibilité de conflit jusqu'à ce qu'une décision soit intervenue sur la question principale.

Le Gouvernement turc croit utile de relever à cette occasion qu'il a accepté les propositions du 30 septembre, tant par déférence pour le Conseil de la Société des Nations que sous l'impulsion des sentiments hautement pacifiques, comme ligne de *statu quo*, malgré que cette ligne soit située au nord de la ligne du véritable *statu quo* du 24 juillet 1923, date du Traité de Lausanne. Il va sans dire que, si la résolution du 30 septembre vise à la ligne du *statu quo* du 24 juillet 1923, il l'acceptera volontiers et à plus forte raison.

Cependant, les points de vue des deux Gouvernements étant divergents quant à la ligne de *statu quo* de 1923, point n'est besoin de dire qu'il importerait, vu l'esprit pacifique qui a provoqué le nouveau recours à la Société des Nations, de définir dans ce cas la ligne correspondant à la limite de *statu quo* du 24 juillet 1923. Le Gouvernement turc se conformera à la décision qui sera rendue à cet égard par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Les troupes turques ont déjà reçu des ordres de ne pas traverser la ligne où se trouvent actuellement les troupes britanniques. En vous priant de transmettre ce qui précède à votre Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur, &c.

M. NOUSRET.

[E 9330/5711/65]

No. 91.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 791.)  
Sir,

Constantinople, October 21, 1924.

AS I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 774, the Turkish press, even on the 14th instant, regarded the Irak frontier crisis as practically over and merely awaited the delivery of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the Turkish Government's note of the 10th October before viewing the situation with complete complacency. The fact that one more day passed without incident before the news of the receipt of the British reply could be reported further tended to allay such doubts and fears as remained, with the result that the news of my having handed my note of the 15th instant to Nusret Bey attracted considerably less attention than might otherwise have been expected.

2. The fact that the morning press of the 15th October were able to publish telegrams from London and Paris to the effect that His Majesty's Government would accept the Turkish proposal to refer the dispute to the League Council was taken as sufficient reason for the again increased optimism which was evidenced on that day. Although surprise was expressed that the British reply was so much delayed, this was generally attributed to the political situation at home, and relief was expressed that a peaceful solution was in sight. The news that Refet Pasha had, in view of the situation, decided to withdraw the resignation of his deputyship, which he tendered in May last, and a statement by the President of the Republic at Caesarea that the whole nation would rise to defend even 1 inch of Turkish territory, were of course reproduced in leaded type, but otherwise the comment of the press was marked by the same restraint as had characterised it during the preceding days. The "Tevhid," it is true, ascribed the *détente* partly to the resolute stand made by the Turkish Government and partly to the timidity of the British, "who only take drastic action when they feel confident of success," but nothing less could have been expected from this Anglophobe organ. The "Tanin," on the other hand, continued to inveigh against the Government's foreign policy, which had suddenly brought the country face to face with a grave crisis, regarding the facts of which even the most influential persons were in complete ignorance, while the "Ileri," not yet entirely free from nervousness, once more asked whether, at a time when Turkey wanted nothing but peace, it was not possible to reach an agreement with Britain, the greatest Power of all. The Turks, said the "Ileri," had failed to reap the fruits of victory. After the fall of Smyrna all

the Powers, including Britain, had been ready to adopt a friendly attitude towards Turkey, the then arbiter of the Orient. Now, however, when Greece was defeating Turkey in exchange and other questions, why should Britain be afraid of Turkey, which was incapable of dealing even with the Greeks? The country would therefore, concluded the "Ileri," be well advised to keep a watchful eye on the Government's foreign policy, for in the last resort it would be the nation's blood and treasure which would be sacrificed.

3. In view of the previously existing *détente* and of the already voiced criticism, it was not altogether surprising that the press of the 16th instant in commenting on the delivery of the British note chiefly concentrated on a discussion of the probable effect of the British answer on the emergency meeting of the Assembly which had been called specially to deal with the crisis. Certain papers held the view that, with the risk of a conflict definitely eliminated, there was no longer any necessity for the meeting of the Assembly, which, it was thought, would be postponed, particularly as it was announced the President of the Republic would cease to hurry back to Angora. The majority, however, held the view that the meeting would be held as arranged, if only to enable the Government to ask for the vote of confidence, which it had already been announced would be an essential part of the first day's proceedings. These papers, however, were at no pains to conceal their warning to the Government that such a vote should no longer be asked for on an external issue which was no longer grave, the "Vatan," hitherto a lukewarm supporter of the Government, stating that such a step would deal a shattering blow to national unity, while the "Tevhid," with more directness, accused the Government of trying to exploit the crisis to its own advantage by diverting the attention of the Deputies from the internal questions, in which there was so much to criticise, to external questions, in which they could hardly fail to support the Government.

4. When, on the 18th instant, the Assembly did meet, no such vote of confidence was, in fact, asked for by the Government. The meeting was carefully staged, the President, Latife Hanum and the high officials of the Government filling the seats reserved for spectators. A long statement was made by Ismet Pasha, of which I have the honour to enclose a summary herewith. Apparently then there ensued some kind of tacit approval of the Government's conduct of affairs, but no vote, though the "Tanin" of the next day recorded the fact that a certain number of Deputies had abstained from voting. It is quite likely that in fact there was no quorum present, and that nothing but a facile interpretation of the rules of procedure enabled the sitting to be held at all. The proceedings then terminated. Two days later a meeting of the Popular party was held to discuss the question of whether Fethi Bey, as President of the Assembly, could also act as the Government's representative to the meeting of the Council of the League at Brussels on the 27th instant, in view of the article of the Constitution prohibiting Deputies from holding other offices. The decision, as reported in the press, seems to have been that he could not so act, but that, in view of the delicacy of the situation, he should nevertheless proceed and that the law should be changed.

5. So far as Turkey is concerned, the crisis, though sharp, has been short, lasting, indeed, only three or four days, and it is therefore hard to see whether any of its effects which can now be observed have more than a mere evanescent effect. In general it is thought that all risk is over; there is no thought given to the possibility of a decision by the League unfavourable to Turkey, and no suggestion that in such a case a fresh crisis, whether national or international in character, may arise over the carrying into execution of such a decision. In general, Turks consider they have won a victory and that the ship is once more in smooth waters.

6. This feeling is doubtless due partly to relief at the passing of a period of acute danger, for it is pretty clear that everyone, both the public and Government circles, have had a very severe fright. Nothing else can adequately account for the noteworthy restraint and moderation of the press. In such circumstances as have just been witnessed, the press of most countries, and more particularly of one like Turkey, might have indulged in expressions of self-satisfaction and boasting, and only six months ago the tone of the papers was far more strident against Italy over the ridiculous Rhodes episode than it has been in these days against Great Britain. It is abundantly clear that everyone was most reluctant to face the possibility of extremities with His Majesty's Government, and it is probable that if hostilities had opened on the Irak frontier, the support given to the Government would have been of a half-hearted nature only.

7. Very likely this state of mind is due in large measure to the undoubted



unpopularity of the present Government, and yet I think that, for the moment at any rate, the position of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet has been strengthened. It seems to me also that the possibility of forming in the Assembly an opposition party of some sort, slight though it may have been, has, as a result of the last few days' events, become slighter yet.

8. A good result of the crisis is the increased prestige which the League of Nations has gained. The oriental is always prone to accept the privilege and to reject the corresponding obligation in any situation, and just now the League appears to the Turk as a refuge and strength and a very present help in trouble; but apart from this, Fethi Bey returned from Geneva pleased with his reception, gratified at having been placed on precisely the same footing with Lord Parmoor, and impressed by the impartiality of the tribunal before whom he pleaded. He has given voice to his feelings, and the press and public have been favourably impressed. The acid test may perhaps come later, but I think we may hope that this result of the crisis may perhaps have a character less evanescent than that which I am inclined to attribute to those others which I have suggested to you in preceding paragraphs.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 91.

*Ismet Pasha's Statement.*

AFTER a short speech by Fethi Bey, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, who stated that there was a quorum, and expressed regret at the death of four members of the Assembly during the recess, Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked leave of the Assembly to discuss forthwith the question of Mosul, which had rendered necessary the convocation of the Assembly. Ismet Pasha explained that at the Conference of the Golden Horn the British delegation had refused to treat the question of Mosul, and had talked about territory in the Hekkiari Vilayet, with the result that the dispute had to be submitted to the League of Nations. He gave a summary of the proceedings before the League, which had agreed to discuss the fate of the Vilayet of Mosul, expressed his confidence in the commission which had been formed to study the question and in the neutrality and equity of the League. After an allusion to frontier incidents which had taken place during the discussions before the League of Nations, he stated that after every British attack the Turkish Government had furnished details to the League, and read out to the Assembly the notes exchanged between the Turkish and British Governments. He emphasised the sincere efforts of the republic to avoid a misunderstanding, and stated that the Government had thought that as a result of the resolution of the League of Nations of the 30th September, all danger of misunderstandings would have been removed, but British attacks had continued from the 1st to the 4th October. Ismet Pasha then read my note of the 9th October, observing that the Turks must be extremely sensitive to any movement, great or small, which threatened the prestige and dignity of the Government of the Republic. This observation was greeted with applause. He went on to say that the victim of an aggression must be convinced that he had right on his side. The Government had examined the situation from that point of view, and had acquired the conviction that they were in the right. In these circumstances there seemed to be only one means of settling the question in a friendly manner, and that means had been adopted: the question had been referred to the League of Nations. Ismet Pasha then read his message to the League, adding that if British attacks continued, the Government would do its duty. (Applause). After referring in flattering terms to the activities of Zekiai Bey, the Turkish representative in London, with a view to arriving at a settlement of the difficulty, he read my note of the 15th instant, announcing the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the Turkish suggestion. He concluded his speech by expressing the hope that the present undefined situation on the frontier would be cleared up and that Mosul would be restored to Turkey.

[E 9393/5711/65]

No. 92.

*Sir H. Dering to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 526. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bucharest, October 24, 1924.*

I RECEIVED to-day a visit from the Swedish Minister, M. C. E. de Wirsén, with whom I am on very good terms, who stated that he wished to inform me in strict confidence that M. Branting had asked him by telegraph to accept the post of one of the three arbitrators in the Mosul dispute which had been submitted to the League of Nations by His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government.

Feeling that he was insufficiently acquainted with the question from all points of view—geographical, ethnographic, historical, &c.—he had replied submitting that he did not feel properly qualified to accept. M. Branting, however, had again urged him to act, saying that, on the contrary, he was particularly indicated, and he now felt that he could no longer refuse, so had accepted. M. de Wirsén told me that he was military attaché at Constantinople during the war, but that he had never visited Mosul or the neighbourhood. Although he spoke Turkish, he knew no Arabic, which might be a drawback when the arbitrators had to inspect the frontier, as they would undoubtedly have to do after deliberating at Geneva.

He understood that the other arbitrators would be an Hungarian, probably Count Teleky, a former Prime Minister, and a Belgian, name as yet unknown, and that the Turkish Government had declined to accept as arbitrator some Norwegian, on the ground that he had formerly been in British employment in Egypt.

M. de Wirsén begged that I would not divulge here that he had told me of his selection. Djavad Bey, the Turkish Minister, had recently asked him whether he knew about a certain Swedish official who had and still has the rank of secretary-general, having heard that he would be selected as arbitrator in the Mosul question. He asked if the gentleman in question was *honnête*. The Swedish Minister had not informed him of his own nomination, but had replied that all Swedish officials were *honnête*. Further discussion followed, when Djavad Bey asked M. de Wirsén if he thought that, supposing the award were contrary to the British, His Majesty's Government would be willing to accept it. He had replied that he was sure of it, and countered by enquiring whether, should the award be against Turkey, the Turkish Government would be equally ready to acquiesce and submit. Djavad Bey had observed that he was not so sure. He felt convinced that the Turkish case was good and that the British Government were really prepared to give way. Neither nation, however, desired to fight over the matter.

I pointed out to my Swedish colleague that Great Britain had an excellent case, and, as he would see when it was submitted to the arbitrators, based themselves on treaties and not on national ambitions like the Turks. M. de Wirsén seemed to be of opinion that before the arbitration commenced the Turkish troops should be summoned to withdraw from the territory which they had now encroached upon over the frontier. Djavad Bey had in the course of discussion declared that the Turkish troops ought to remain where they were. M. de Wirsén told me he thought this was incorrect procedure. A German history which he possessed, obviously written before the war, even laid down that the frontier of Mosul was to the north of the frontier now claimed by Great Britain. It had been written by a German, presumably pro-Turk.

I mention these desultory observations to show that M. de Wirsén will enter upon his duties animated by the friendliest spirit towards Great Britain. He has been long enough in Turkey to know what Turkish bluff means. He is somewhat diffident, like his countrymen sometimes are, as to his ability to deal satisfactorily with so intricate and thorny a question, but of one thing we may, I think, rest assured—we shall get honest dealing from him. I told him that I was certain he would find, when the British case was submitted to him, that it had been prepared very clearly, and would give undeniable arguments, supported by treaty, in favour of the contentions of the mandatory Power. It appeared to me that the Turkish Government were endeavouring to interpret their treaty obligations merely to suit themselves.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING.



No. 93.

*Mr. Millington Drake to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 28.)*(No. 156.)  
(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

*Brussels, October 27, 1924.*

THE Belgian press shows comparatively little interest in the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations which takes place here this afternoon to consider the question of the Irak frontier.

Several leading newspapers contain press articles summarising the facts of the Anglo-Turkish conflict on this question, and, though expressing the hope that the council will succeed in its task, yet are on the whole sceptical and do not appear to believe that a definite settlement will result.

The head of the Turkish delegation, Fethy Bey, in an interview to the "Etoile belge," expresses confidence in the equity of the League, and states that Turkey will shortly request to be admitted to it.

In reply to a question, he stated that he had only heard on his journey here of Greece's appeal to the League regarding the expulsion of Greeks from Constantinople. He was therefore without any instructions on the matter and must refuse to discuss it.

No. 94.

*Mr. Millington Drake to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 28.)*(No. 157.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Brussels, October 27, 1924.*

FOLLOWING from Lord Parmoor:—

"Council met this afternoon, under the presidency of M. Hymans, to consider Irak frontier.

"British case was stated by Lord Parmoor, who took point of view that council's resolution of 30th September imposed on both sides obligation to respect *status quo* existing in July 1923. He proceeded to define latter according to view of His Majesty's Government, and he demonstrated with the aid of maps how Turkish Government, by incursion of their troops into area which at that date was undoubtedly in effective British occupation, had violated the *status quo*. He made it clear that all these troops ought to be withdrawn to the stations occupied by Turkish forces before July 1923. A continuance of the present state of affairs involved danger of disturbances and bloodshed.

"Fethi Bey said that, as both sides had undertaken to maintain *status quo*, and as each accused the other of violating it, it was clear that there was a difference of opinion as to what exactly was the *status quo*. He then gave an irrelevant history of what he alleged to be the successive encroachments of British Government from armistice until British note of 29th September. He declared himself quite unable to admit that the line defined in that note represented the *status quo* of July 1923. In his opinion, the council had only to choose between situation as it was on 30th September and situation of July 1923. He himself at Geneva admitted that the *status quo* to be maintained might be described as the northern boundary of the Vilayet of Mosul, and his Government were prepared to abide by this, but he claimed that this boundary should be drawn, as in Treaty of Sevres, so as to leave Amadiéh in Turkey. He would not admit that the absence of Turkish troops from debatable area could be held to imply that Turkish Government had no rights of administration there. For the rest his Government were prepared to submit to the decision of council.

"The *rapporteur*, M. Branting, then asked that meeting might be adjourned in order to give him time to study the documents and prepare his report. He accepted Lord Parmoor's offer in the meantime to hear evidence of British officials connected with the administration of Irak who are now in Geneva, and a private meeting with them has been arranged for to-morrow morning.

"The council will not consider Irak frontier to-morrow, and no definite time can be fixed for its next meeting on this question until M. Branting has made further progress with his enquiries."

No. 95.

[E 9432/5711/65]

*Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received October 29.)*

(Secret.)

THE Director of Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward herewith a copy of a letter from the Air Officer Commanding, Irak, dated the 16th October, 1924, together with a copy of "Report of visit to Turkish VIIth Army Corps Headquarters on the 10th-11th October, 1924."

Similar letters have been addressed to the Colonial Office and War Office.

*Air Ministry, Kingsway, October 29, 1924.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

*Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Irak to Air Ministry.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Air Headquarters, Irak, October 16, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for information, one copy of "Report of visit to Turkish VIIth Army Corps Headquarters on the 10th-11th October, 1924."

I have, &c.  
(For Air Vice-Marshal).

Colonel, Air Staff.

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

*Report on a Visit to the Turkish VIIth Army Corps Headquarters on October 10-11, 1924.*

*Narrative up to Arrival at Corps Headquarters.*

COLONEL DENT, S.O. 1, Intelligence Air Headquarters, and Lieutenant Coghill, officer interpreter in Turkish, left Bagdad by air at 5.45 local time on the 10th October, arriving Mosul at 8.15. Letter was handed to Colonel Commandant Dobbin, and situation on frontier discussed with him, Wing-Commander Primrose and Captain Jeffreys, S.S.O. Wing-Commander Primrose and Squadron-Leader Corballis accompanied us to Zakho, where we arrived about 10 A.M.

At Zakho we found that the promised Turkish message regarding permission to cross the frontier had not yet been received. This came to hand about 10.30 A.M., saying that British staff officer was not to cross, and that a Turkish staff officer had been sent down to take over the A.O.C.'s letter. This officer on enquiry proved to be a captain, by name Akram Effendi.

Information was sent by telephone to say that officer concerned was a colonel on A.H.Q. staff, and had the A.O.C.'s orders to deliver his letter personally to the Turkish commander; further, that he was going down to opposite Kurkit Post at once.

We then went down by car to opposite Kurkit Post, followed by two horses lent by the police and with baggage, which was taken down to the river ready. Wing-Commander Primrose, Captain Coffey, Squadron-Leader Corballis and Flight-Lieutenant Drew, S.S.O., also came down to the river bank.

Here we found Captain Akram (cavalry) sitting on the Irak bank of the river. Request to cross was repeated, but Captain Akram stated that his orders were to take over the letter. After some argument, he was requested to cross again and telephone to the Turkish corps commander, reiterating request previously telephoned to him. He had previously said that the telephone was out of order, but eventually agreed to go and communicate; returning, after a short delay, he said that the G.O.C. corps had no wish that we should be troubled, that the road was impracticable for a motor-car, and that he requested that the letter be handed over, and that any message from the A.O.C. should be communicated verbally to Akram Effendi, who he authorised to receive it on his behalf. More argument followed, and eventually Akram Effendi agreed to cross over again and telephone in the first place that we

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demanding leave to go through escorted on horseback, starting at once, or, if this permission could not be granted, at least to cross over and telephone to the corps commander from the Turkish post. After some delay, he recrossed and stated that we could cross the river and telephone. Though the position of corps headquarters was not mentioned, it became more or less clear that they were back at Jezireh by references to route and distance.

We then crossed the river and got on to the telephone to Jafar Taiyar Pasha. His staff officer, however, said that he did not talk French, so did the telephoning for us in Turkish, Lieutenant Coghill checking. A long argument, lasting between twenty minutes and half-an-hour, ensued, the pasha being obviously very anxious that we should not go through, and producing every variety of excuse. Every argument was used in turn as regards the establishment of better understanding by personal interview between respective commanders, urgency of the subject of the letter and necessity for explanation with it, the discourtesy of refusing to receive a senior officer sent specially by the A.O.C. when there was no state of war existing between the two countries, and so forth and so on. No clue was given to the contents of the letter or as to the nature of any personal verbal communication to be made, though the fact that there was such a verbal communication for no ear but his own was stressed. The pasha actually left the telephone once, but returned again. Just when it seemed hopeless, and every argument had been put two or three times in different forms, he suddenly gave in, and said that he would receive us and that we could go through.

We then recrossed, picked up the horses and baggage and came into Kurkit post. We were informed that it was impossible to go further than Gund-i-Hadid that day, as it was unsafe to travel by night and there was no halting place between Gund-i-Hadid and Jezireh; both these latter statements ultimately proved untrue. However, as the ice was rather thin, it seemed better to accept that we could get no further than Gund-i-Hadid that evening, as they were quite positive on this point. We accordingly rested for an hour at the post and finally left about 3.30, riding slowly, as the Turkish staff officer's horse was tired. We found out afterwards that he had left Jezireh at midnight and ridden straight through to Kurkit, arriving there about 8 o'clock.

At about 5.30 p.m. we arrived at Gund-i-Hadid. Very few soldiers were to be seen, and we were politely hurried through to a branch-roofed sitting-out place in a garden away from the troops. We had an officer with us practically all the time, and with coffee, washing, an early dinner and suggested early bed were kept more or less anchored.

Gund-i-Hadid is a dirty little village of about fifty houses. We dined at about half-past 6, and at about 7 Akram Effendi came and announced what he said was a good piece of news, to the effect that the corps commander was coming down-river to carry out a small inspection at a place only a short ride distant from Gund-i-Hadid and that he would see us there in the morning. It was impossible to make any demur to this, and it was therefore not practicable for us to get through to Jezireh, so the only course was to receive the news with suitable pleasure.

The air was very fresh and cool, food very rough, but good, consisting of chicken, bulghur (a preparation of wheat not dissimilar to rice), yahut (sour milk, not much different to Devonshire cream), stewed beans, rough bread and fruit.

We turned in at 8.30, shortly before which hour an officer came down to Gund-i-Hadid from corps headquarters. At about 6 next morning Akram Effendi informed us that the corps commander had telephoned that he would see us at 9 o'clock. We started accordingly at about 7.15 and arrived at 8.30, the corps commander receiving us immediately.

He was living on his shaktur, a small raft on two iron pontoons with a branch roof, propelled by oars. The spot where he was anchored was near a small grove of fruit trees and poplars on the river bank, and thick with undergrowth and numerous blackberry bushes, and clearly marked by a small, square stone building on a small hill rising out of it.

He gave us a cheerful welcome, and, after mumbled introductions to his staff and interchange of compliments, he asked that the letter should be handed over, and the business interview began.

#### *Interview with Turkish Corps Commander.*

Jafar Taiyar Pasha read the letter through twice very slowly and carefully. In answer to the offer of the map to illustrate while he read, he stated that he would

look at it afterwards and that he knew the area and places concerned very well. He then took the map and said that we could now start discussion.

As he appeared to talk French only fairly it seemed advisable to let the conversation be in Turkish, Lieutenant Coghill interpreting. The acting chief staff officer and Captain Akram Effendi were the only others present.

*Note.*—It proved subsequently, that the pasha talked French very fairly indeed, thus giving the complete lie to Akram Effendi's statement of the preceding day.

The pasha wished to discuss the line of frontier on the map, but this was declined, it being represented to him that any argument regarding the line was a matter for diplomatists, but the line given on the map was that communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the A.O.C. and also their representative at Geneva, and that the point at present was that the A.O.C. in any action that he might be compelled to take would be working on that line.

He was further informed that it was to prevent any misunderstanding such as, more or less, had obviously been existing up to the present that the A.O.C. had sent a staff officer up to present this map to him, and to explain the situation from his point of view and the orders he had received from His Britannic Majesty's Government. The pasha then stated that the line in its western portion was certainly not the Mosul Vilayet boundary, and said that the trace of this boundary depended upon which villages previously paid taxes to Mosul and Van respectively. He said he was still occupied with enquiries on this subject, and found it very hard to get the information required. Asked to show what was the boundary he acknowledged he said that he could not give it on the map, but roughly indicated it with his finger as leaving the British line close to Alamun and Geramus along the Develli Dagh (these were the only three names he mentioned) and across the Hazil well south of his present line of communications. When pressed on this point two or three times during the interview he repeated his finger indication, in each case apparently slightly differently, but in each case his finger fetched up at the Hazil, only a couple of miles or so from its junction with the Khabur.

As regards the line east of Alamun and Geramus, he objected in the first case (as was to be expected) to the line bounding the Assyrian country. Though he made no remark, the first point he made an obvious mental note of was that Ashita was on the Turkish side of the inner line. He then made the natural objection to this area as clearly outside the Mosul Vilayet. The British Government's point of view that no effective Turkish administration had been in operation in this area at the time of signature of the Lausanne Treaty or since was reiterated verbally, and stress laid on the fact that the entry of troops into that area was therefore a change of the *status quo*. Rather curiously he made practically no answer to this, and almost the whole of the subsequent conversation was about the area west of Alamun and Geramus. Lieutenant Coghill understood him to make a remark indicating that there was no particular difficulty about the Assyrian area being demilitarised, i.e., that the troops of neither Power should enter it, but this is not quite certain. His lack of interest could reasonably be attributed to the fact that according to our information his troops were already evacuating the area on completion of their operations.

Turning again to the western section he said, that as far as he was concerned the *status quo* involved his holding up to what he understood to be the Mosul Vilayet boundary. At this time he again refused to define this line. This being so, it was again pointed out to him that line, so far as the A.O.C. was concerned, was that shown on the map, that the position was somewhat serious and that the military point was the removal of his troops from that area. He replied that this was impossible, as it would be contrary to the orders of his Government, which were to hold up to the Mosul Vilayet line. On this point he was quite definite and obdurate. It was then suggested to him that if this was the case, and granted that he could not put his idea of this line on the map, he could at least, in return for the map sent him by the A.O.C., lay down a line south of which his troops would not cross. He replied that he could not do this either.

It was pointed out that by moving troops into that area he had, from A.O.C.'s standpoint, crossed right through Irak territory, and had also changed the *status quo* by crossing troops into an area they had not entered since the Lausanne Treaty.

He then said that there were two points, (1) that of the *status quo* and (2) that of the removal of troops. As to the first, points of view were different, and it was an affair for the diplomats; the point of the removal of the troops he was willing to



discuss further with the A.O.C. He was politely reminded that in less than two hours' time it would be midday, the 11th October, that the A.O.C.'s orders were categorical and that further discussion and delay could not be considered in the circumstances.

He then said that he was entirely opposed to starting a war and that it seemed futile to shed blood for such a trivial matter, but that as a soldier he must obey the orders of his Government. He emphasised, however, that he did not wish for war or for any unfortunate incident arising out of misunderstanding between the two military commanders, who were both obeying the orders of their Governments. He was for the preservation of peace and friendly relations and thought that some arrangement between the military commanders concerned so as to avoid useless bloodshed should be practicable.

As this seemed a favourable juncture the pasha was told that there was a personal message to him from the A.O.C. which was for his ear only, and was asked if the other officers might withdraw. To this request he readily acceded, and the remaining conversation was conducted in French between him and the British staff officer alone.

I then told him that in the present serious situation the A.O.C. wished strongly that there should be no unnecessary misunderstanding, and that I had been charged by him, if I should meet the corps commander personally, but not in any other case, to express for his private ear the A.O.C.'s regret for any unfortunate incidents or misunderstandings which had taken place in the last three weeks or so.

It was then explained to him that his concentration on the Hazil previous to the 14th September was roughly known to the A.O.C., and that it being, from his point of view, indisputably Irak territory, the crossing and primary dispositions had been taken as foreshadowing an immediate advance on Zakho. The pasha laughed, and said that no such idea had ever occurred to him; but he did not deny, when explained to him, that his move could have been so interpreted from the other side of the frontier.

He then became more friendly and confidential, and said that previous to crossing the Hazil he had studied with his staff the line of the Mosul Vilayet as they understood it, and carefully arranged his line of communications to run well north of that line. He had given specific orders that Irak police posts were not to be interfered with, and much regretted that these orders had been broken in the case of Birsawi. He was told that the attack on Birsawi had naturally been taken as a definite sign of hostile intentions.

Continuing he said, that though he considered his first lines of communication well inside his territory he understood, from action taken, that it was interpreted otherwise by the A.O.C., and to avoid trouble he ordered it to be removed northwards.

*Note.*—Both these points confirm intelligence previously received.

After some more amicable conversation we returned to the question of the removal of troops. The pasha said that he would be willing to remove the bulk of his troops from the area in question to avoid unnecessary trouble. He would go so far even as to leave only small posts and to withdraw all others west of the Hazil. It was pointed out to him that even this would not fulfil the conditions required, as there would still be troops in the area. Could he not go a step further and remove all his troops without prejudice to the question of the Mosul Vilayet boundary, which was the affair of diplomats. If he could do this the question between the two military commanders was settled, and there would be no premature war. He replied that on his orders this was quite impossible, but that he was so anxious to meet the A.O.C. in the matter that he would make the small posts he would leave, which he referred to as five or six men only, gendarmes instead of regular troops. "Further than this I cannot go on the orders I hold from my Government," he announced, very definitely.

He then proposed that the British staff officer should return in his car to Zakho, telephone to the A.O.C. what he had said and either arrange for a later meeting between the commanders for discussion or return with the A.O.C.'s reply. He was informed that further discussion at this stage could not be considered and the A.O.C.'s orders were quite definite; in even less than two hours' time it would be midday the 11th October.

His humour then changed again. He said that it was futile, and that if it was a case of war he was ready to accept it. As his tenses had been rather mixed he was then asked definitely whether he had recently despatched troops into the area concerned, and replied in the affirmative.

He then stated for the first time during the interview that his orders from his Government to hold up to the Mosul Vilayet boundary had been sent to him subsequent to their receipt of the British note regarding the 11th October. He was then pressed to give his reply to the A.O.C. on paper, but he would not listen to any argument or expostulation on the subject, saying it was quite impossible and that all he could do was to give him a verbal reply.

He was pressed again for some sort of line on the map in response to that sent him by the A.O.C., but he refused, admitting that his Government had given him no line on the map at all and that he could not lay it down. Pressed again for a line south of which his troops would not go, he said this was impossible to give also, as his orders were to hold up to a line which, to be frank, he did not know definitely and could not put on the map, and he could not commit himself not to send troops south of any particular village.

Further discussion then seemed unprofitable and the staff officer asked for his horses, saying that he must get back at once and communicate the corps commander's reply to the A.O.C.

He then gave definite verbal reply for the A.O.C. as follows:—

- (a.) That, as the idea of war and waste of life over such little cause was absurd, he was anxious to avoid war or any misunderstanding between the commanders.
- (b.) That subsequent to the receipt by the Turkish Government of the demand from His Britannic Majesty's Government for the return to *status quo* by the 11th October, he had received orders from his Government. These orders were to the effect that he was to continue to hold up to the previous boundary of the Mosul Vilayet and that, according to his Government, these were the conditions of the *status quo*. This being the case, he was unable to evacuate the area between the line he considered as the boundary of the Mosul Vilayet and the line given him on the British map.
- (c.) That more troops had been sent by him into this area and that they had been instructed if attacked to counter-attack; that he had further troops in reserve just west of the Hazil with which he would reinforce in the event of being attacked.

The offer regarding the gendarme posts was for private communication.

He seemed rather taken aback by the closing of the interview, but did not make any effort to continue conversation. "I have been at war for twenty-two years," he said, "but if there must be more of it, let it be so. It is all quite futile, and if we do start war and get men killed on both sides it will be stopped by the League of Nations in a week or two; the question will be settled by arbitration and lives will have been lost uselessly."

Before our departure and almost his last remark when the staff officer got up to go was to say with a cheerful laugh: "If you want war, all right."

*Comment.*—A fairly clear impression was gathered that the corps commander does not want to initiate hostilities, and that he will not make any move unless he is attacked. He gave the impression that if there should be an attack he expected it not only by air, but also by land; naturally nothing was said to disabuse him of this.

His attitude seemed genuine, and he showed no sign of weakening; it should be taken that, on his present orders, if he is attacked, he would resist and attack in turn to the best of his ability.

He made no reference to his operation in the Ashita area, and gave no idea that his move through Irak territory had any political object, with one rather important exception. In a reference to the *status quo* question in the Assyrian area, the meeting of the representatives at Geneva was referred to. Led on by a vague reference to the date of agreement at Geneva, he announced rather triumphantly that Ashita was entered by his troops on the 20th September and that agreement was signed at Geneva by the representatives on the 30th September. It was then pointed out to him that the *status quo* signed at Geneva was that existing at the time of signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. To this he had no reply.

It was noticeable that he made no reference whatever to the frontier east of the Gavanda Plateau to the Persian frontier. Nor did he refer to Suleimanieh or the question of our action in the Rowanduz area in 1923.



This was so peculiar in the circumstances, that it would seem to have been done purposely. It is a reasonable deduction, taken in conjunction with other factors which point to the Rowanduz area as his best objective, that he avoided this area and spent almost all his attention on the western sector on purpose to divert notice from the Rowanduz sector, where it was his intention to make his offensive effort if it came to war. It will be remembered that latest news from several sources confirms the southward move of appreciable reinforcements on the Van-Neri line.

The pasha certainly wished to gain time. Apart from normal Oriental procrastination, I think he desired this in order to inform his Government of his receipt of letter and map; that he was bound by his orders to reply as he had, but disliked the responsibility of starting a war for what he felt was a futile cause; that he thought action on our part was genuinely imminent and wished to obtain either some relaxation in his orders or more definite confirmation of them in the circumstances.

#### *Narrative of Return from Turkish Army Headquarters to Bagdad.*

As there were two police horses to return to Zakho, we refused Jafar Taiyar Pasha's final offer of his car to Kurkit and left his camp at 10.30 A.M. We halted for ten minutes at Gund-i-Hadid to water and feed the horses and to see whether there had been any arrivals or departures. Nothing new was noticed. We reached Kurkit at 1.15 P.M., and there said good-bye to Captain Akram Effendi. We then crossed the river and were met by Flight-Lieutenant Drew, reaching Zakho aerodrome by car at 2.10 P.M.

Available fragments of military information were given to Flight-Lieutenant Drew, and both he and Captain Coffey were informed as to the present situation and told to keep a close look-out, especially if any action was taken from our side against Turkish troops.

Leaving Zakho at 2.30 in Bristols we landed at Mosul at 3.15, where we were met by Wing-Commander Primrose, to whom again the situation was briefly explained and who undertook delivery of a note to Colonel-Commandant Dobbin.

Leaving the ground again in D.H.9A's at 3.25, we landed at Bagdad at 5.40 P.M.

#### *Fragments of Military Information gathered during Visit.*

*Attitude of Turkish Officers.*—Jafar Taiyar Pasha was very courteous, genial and good-humoured. Outside this, his attitude could be best described as correct and in agreement with the situation, his orders and his views expressed above.

Other Turkish officers were friendly, very anxious to do all they could for our comfort, &c. They were, however, obviously on their guard against giving us facilities for gathering information. We were hurried away politely on one side whenever we arrived anywhere, and care was taken that we had no opportunity of talking for more than a few minutes alone with any one. Our request to dine with our hosts at Gund-i-Hadid was refused, and contrary to custom, officers did not introduce themselves by name. In one case, where we actually asked for an introduction, the officer concerned merely shook his head and made no response.

On their part they asked very few questions and gave practically no information. The impression that they gave was that they were very anxious about the outcome of our visit, that they did not want to fight and wanted to be friendly, but felt that their attitude was dependent upon the above outcome. They did, however, go so far as to actually ask Lieutenant Coghill to come and shoot in the hills and to write as soon as he found an opportunity to come.

References by several officers to kurds were nearly always contemptuous, the word "animals" being used several times. The attitude of the staff officer accompanying us when he saw what he thought were a band of kurds approaching seemed to indicate that they were by no means on good terms with the local inhabitants and completely distrustful.

The battery commander at Gund-i-Hadid seemed particularly sulky. The soldiers we saw as we entered the village had expressions to match. It seemed possible from this and the fact that one gun wheel seemed to be broken that this battery might have moved to Gund-i-Hadid from east of the Hazil after being bombed there. Lieutenant Coghill found out that they had only been at Gund-i-Hadid some four or five days.

*Topography.*—The track from Kurkit to Rubahi Kale was passable for motor-cars though there are some bad nullahs. The country is undulating plain,

quite open, surface fairly soft with loose stones in parts and short dead grass on it, passable for all arms up to Rubahi Kale. There were very sparse signs of cultivation and few villages; no tribal encampments were visible at all. According to the corps commander and other officers, the track from Rubahi Kale to Jezireh is very bad and impassable for motor-cars. The corps commander's car was at Rubahi Kale, but it may have come down by raft. No other villages were entered.

The Tigris was invisible until we reached Rubahi.

*Telephones.*—There were telephones at Kurkit and Gund-i-Hadid and an uninsulated wire on bare poles from Kurkit to east of Rubahi Kale, which must obviously go on to Jezireh. There was a telephone officer at Gund-i-Hadid, and one of the officers said that there had been considerable activity in laying lines lately.

*Troops and signs of Troops.*—There were apparently some eight men at Kurkit post, where there was normally no officer. Although an officer had been specially requested to make arrangements for any message coming through, the non-commissioned officer in charge apparently refused to take any action when Special Service Officer Zakho tried to get through on the morning of the 11th October.

There were some 20 yards of trench with a single traverse close to the post and a mud sentry box. The sentry on duty some 30 yards away was under a small branch-roofed cover. A few huts of inhabitants adjoined the post.

At Gund-i-Hadid was a mountain battery with some fifty to sixty animals and apparently six, but certainly four, guns, one, as noted above, having a wheel damaged. The battery had been there four or five days only. The O.C. was Captain Faik Effendi. The area is commanded by Yuzbashi Ali Effendi of the frontier battalion, who, together with Yuzbashi Shakir Effendi, also met us at Kurkit post. Yuzbashi Ali Effendi did the honours at Gund-i-Hadid. Shakir Effendi disappeared rather mysteriously. After asking leave to go on in front some half an hour before our departure from Kurkit he did not put in an appearance in the evening. Request was made to see him any say good-bye on the morning of the 11th October, but his reply was that he was busy. He had probably either gone through to corps headquarters on the evening of the 10th or else was suspected of having been too friendly to us. An officer came down from corps headquarters to Gund-i-Hadid late in the evening of the 10th. This we knew, as his orderly did not know his way into the camp, which struck us as peculiar.

In addition to the mountain battery animals we saw about 100 mules and horses in the distance, apparently mostly mules. Whether they represented another battery, cavalry or only transport we could gather no clue.

Other officers seen at the post were 1 cavalry lieutenant, 1 cavalry second lieutenant, 1 telephonist second lieutenant and 1 lieutenant or captain without badges, and with stockings, jamimas and spars, probably artillery.

Men kept to their buildings at Gund-i-Hadid, only a few being seen hanging about. There were three red flags in the village, apparently marking billets, excluding two with crescent and star, which apparently marked area headquarters and the civil headquarters. We met the mudir; his name was Abdul Mutallib; he spoke Arabic and Kurdish as well as Turkish and was a native of Jezireh. He seemed inclined to be talkative, and probably on this account was more or less hustled away by one of the officers. His name is on record as belonging to the Kurdish Nationalist organisation.

About a mile east-north-east of Gund-i-Hadid there were apparently some more troops, and we could distinguish a small village with a red flag on it, and saw three loaded mules going off on the track in that direction on the morning of the 11th.

Some 3 miles further on in the same direction some way up in the foot-hills smoke indicated the possible position of another camp. We met no troops on the road except two solitary officers and a few transport mules.

At Rubahi what appeared to be one squadron was watering, but we could not arrange to get very close to it. We could, however, distinguish three piles of lances with red pennants, apparently about fifty in all. On the hills sloping down to the river were two considerable groups of animals, apparently mostly horses, which might have been the other two squadrons of a regiment, though we could see no camp or signs of men. The officer accompanying us, knowing that we had seen the lances, made some reference to the G.O.C.'s escort. This may have been so, but we saw no sign near his camp of any lancer orderlies, and he himself came down by raft, nominally, according to their account, to inspect the troops at Rubahi.

There were two tents near the water's edge where the squadron was watering, and there may have been a dump there, but we were not near enough to distinguish.



We saw no trace of a wheel track anywhere, so it seems very improbable that any field artillery had moved down within the last month or so.

Except for the staff officers and their three or four orderlies there was no sign of any military personnel at the G.O.C.'s camp.

On the return journey two tents were observed on the north-west side of a village west of Kasarke, and smoke of what might have been camp fires was seen in the Kuzaf direction, it being about the time of the midday meal.

*Corps Commander's Move to Rubahi Kale.*—This was said to be to carry out an inspection, but was obviously to prevent our getting into Jezireh, whether to hide weakness or strength or aeroplanes or merely on general grounds we naturally could not discover. The acting Chief of Staff admitted to Lieutenant Coghill that he (the corps commander) had come down specially to save us trouble.

*Corps Headquarters Staff.*—Acting Chief of Staff Bimbashi Fahmi Bey, looking very seedy from malaria, acting for the Chief of Staff, who is in bed with malaria in Jezireh. Speaks French, German and Russian.

Yuzbashi Sidki, cavalry tabs, apparently a staff officer; had a cypher message sticking out of his pocket.

Two infantry lieutenants, one of whom was probably the aide-de-camp.

Yuzbashi Akram Rajab, the officer who met us at Kurkit and accompanied us to corps headquarters and back. He wore cavalry collar tabs. Age 39. Knows French and German and has travelled in Europe. Due for promotion to Bimbashi in three months. Son of Marshal Rajab Pasha, who was once Governor of Bagdad; commanded a squadron of the Sultan's guard and accompanied the Heir Apparent to the funeral of King Edward.

*Personnel.*—No officer of any striking personality was seen except the corps commander himself. All men seen seemed to be very young.

*Dress.*—The rank and file were as usual more or less dressed in rags. No numbers or badges and nothing to distinguish their arm or unit except that the cavalrymen wore spurs. The four cavalrymen who accompanied us had useful rough ponies.

The G.O.C. was smartly dressed in khaki coat and breeches and black boots. He and his staff officers wore hats rather similar to the French kapi. The G.O.C. had red collar tabs and band round his hat, three gold stripes and star in each case. His hat badge consisted of a star, two sprays of oak leaves and a crescent and star. Only the acting Chief of Staff had collar tabs staff colour, but it was obvious that Yuzbashi Sidki and the two infantry lieutenants were staff officers from their clean dress and hats.

As regards collar tabs, cavalry colour is light grey blue, infantry dark green, telephonist officer a lighter green and the staff crimson.

Jafar Taiyar Pasha is a native of Monastir, and half Albanian. A solidly-built little man of about 5 feet 6 inches, with largish head and face. Appears quick in manner and brain, though he repeats himself often in discussion. Very genial and laughs freely; gives an impression of energy and practical capacity. His ideas of the situation from his point of view seemed sensible enough. Appeared likely to have both enterprise and character. Was quite decided in his manner when he stated what action he would take if attacked. Has capacity for being serious without heaviness while preserving a genial and apparently light-hearted manner.

*Snow in Hills.*—Two officers stated and Jafar Taiyar confirmed that the first snow had fallen in the hills near Julamerk.

*Note.*—Conditions of our visit made it impossible to risk any unpleasantness in trying to get information. Lieutenant Coghill, who performed his duties, both as interpreter and in this respect, very well, made the most of the few opportunities he got or was able to make to see or gather what little was possible.

No. 96.

*Sir G. Grahame to Mr. MacDonald.*—(Received October 30.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 159.)

Brussels, October 28, 1924.

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan:—

"The council met in private session this afternoon under the presidency of M. Hymans (Belgium). There were also present: Lord Parmoor (British Empire), M. Briand (France), M. Orsini Barone (Italy), Viscount Ishii (Japan), M. Quinones de León (Spain), M. Mello Franco (Brazil), M. Guani (Uruguay), M. Branting (Sweden) and M. Girsu (Czechoslovakia).

"A telegram had been received from the Greek Government explaining that there are from 1,000 to 1,500 Greek Moslems whose repatriation to Turkey had been arranged, under the Convention for the Exchange of Populations, before the meeting of the council on 30th September last. The Greek Government enquired what should be done as regards these individuals, since, in the opinion of the Greek Government, a decision must be taken before the council meeting in December.

"The *rapporteur*, M. Quinones de León, pointed out that the council, when it passed its resolution of 30th September, was not aware of the position of these 1,500 persons ready for departure, and he therefore suggested that the council might declare that there was no objection to their being transported to Turkey under the responsibility of the Mixed Commission. This was agreed to.

"The council then considered several minor questions, such as the composition of a jury of architects for the conference hall, the composition of a building committee to supervise the work and the nature of the international competition for a design for the conference hall. In regard to this latter point there was some discussion as to whether the competition should be open to nationals of all countries or whether it should be restricted to nationals of countries members of the League. The council eventually decided on the latter alternative.

"The president of the council then read a statement reminding the council that at its meeting of 3rd October it had been decided that the president could appoint a committee of five jurists to draft the amendments to the covenant provided for in the Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. M. Hymans suggested that all States which were permanent members of the council should be represented on this committee and that he might be authorised to consult the representatives of those four States in regard to the jurists whose names they might wish to put forward. As candidate for the fifth place he proposed the name of M. Fernandes, who represented Brazil on the First Committee of the last assembly. He further proposed that a jurist belonging to one of the States non-signatory of the Treaty of Versailles should also be appointed, and he submitted the name of M. Unden (Sweden). The council intimated their approval of these proposals, and, on the suggestion of M. Branting, agreed that should M. Unden be unable to serve, his place might be taken by M. Leofgren, who was also a member of the Swedish delegation at the assembly.

"The secretary-general raised the question of the date at which the jurists' committee should meet, and he suggested that this must depend on the progress made by the committee of the council which, as at present arranged, would meet on 17th November.

"Lord Parmoor said that, in his opinion, it was not urgently necessary that the jurists' committee should meet in the immediate future. As regards the November meeting, it would be very difficult, in view of the present political situation in England, to appoint a representative or to take any effective part. He hoped, therefore, that it might be possible to postpone this meeting, which would involve also the postponement of the meeting of the jurists' committee, as the two were closely connected.

"M. Briand pointed out that the main task of the December council meeting would have been to consider the report which the committee of the council would have drawn up at their November meeting and the report of the jurists' committee. If both these questions were postponed there would be little left for the council to do in December. M. Hymans suggested that if it was impossible



for the council committee to meet in November, the council itself might undertake the work at its meeting in December in Rome, when it could give to the various League organs the necessary instructions for the preparatory work for the Conference on Disarmament, which is due to take place next year. This was finally agreed to, and it was further resolved that the date of the meeting of the jurists' committee would be fixed at the council meeting in December.

"The council next agreed to adopt the amendment proposed by His Majesty's Government to paragraph (a), Chapter IV, of the scheme of investigation in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, which was adopted by the council on 27th September (see War Office letter of 15th October).

"On the request of the Italian delegate, the council adjourned until its next meeting the question of the choice of a country bordering on Bulgaria to be represented on the Investigation Commission."

[E 9448/5711/65]

No. 97.

*Minutes of the First Meeting (Public) of the 31st Session of the Council of the League of Nations, held at the Palais des Académies, Brussels, on Monday, October 27, 1924, at 3-30 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 30.)*

*Present:* All the representatives of the members of the council, and the secretary-general.

1338. *Frontier between Turkey and Irak. Interpretation of the Council's Resolution of September 30, 1924.*

HIS Excellency Fethy Bey took his place at the council table.

LORD PARMOOR (Great Britain): The matter which was before the council at Geneva has been settled, and no question immediately arises. The question was the appointment of a commission to advise the council as to the frontier line between Irak and Turkey. There was also in the clause of the Treaty of Lausanne (I will refer in a moment to the actual words) a provision that the conditions then existing should be maintained until a final decision had been come to as to the frontier line. I do not think that on that point either any question, or any question of much difficulty, will arise between his Excellency Fethy Bey and myself. But a third point has emerged which was not discussed at Geneva, and, indeed, I think it would have been premature really to attempt to discuss it at that stage. That is: What was the condition at the date of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne which is to be maintained, I think with the assent of both parties, until the final decision has been given? The words of the treaty were quoted several times at Geneva, both by his Excellency Fethy Bey and myself. The words of the treaty are: "Pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories, of which the final fate will depend upon that decision." This is the language in which the undertaking is embodied in the Treaty of Lausanne (article 3 (2)), and is was repeated verbatim in the undertaking given at Geneva on the 30th September.

The council has accepted the task of fixing the frontier between Turkey and Irak, and has decided, for this purpose, on the appointment of a commission to investigate the whole question, and, if thought necessary, to make such enquiries upon the spot as may be required.

This commission cannot properly fulfil the duties imposed upon it and make the necessary examination of the problem unless the situation which it finds in the regions through which the frontier must pass is the same as that which existed in 1923, at the date when the two parties agreed to refer the fixing of the frontier to the Council of the League of Nations.

His Majesty's Government regard the undertaking given at Geneva on the 30th September as a repetition of the undertaking given in the Treaty of Lausanne, and as involving on the part of Turkey an obligation to abstain from any movement which would modify the state of the territories in question as existing on the 24th July, 1923. This is borne out by the minutes of the council meeting on the 30th September. The final paragraph of M. Branting's report of that date says: "In conclusion, I must not omit to mention the complaints that the council has received from both parties in regard to frontier incidents, which are particularly regrettable at the present moment. Without the council expressing an opinion on

the facts as alleged by one party or the other, I think that my colleagues will be in agreement with me in strongly urging both Governments to use all the weight of their authority in order to restore and maintain peace on both sides of the so-called *status quo* line, in accordance with the reciprocal undertaking contained in the final paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne." The desired undertakings were then given by the British and Turkish representatives.

His Majesty's Government were led by the terms of the undertaking given by the Turkish representative on the 30th September to assume that the Turkish forces which had penetrated into an area in which no Turkish forces existed and no Turkish occupation or administration was in being in July 1923, would be withdrawn and the *status quo* of that date restored. His Majesty's Government have been disappointed in this hope. Instead of being withdrawn, the Turkish forces are still occupying the area into which they advanced in September of this year, and appear now to be making still further encroachments.

It is, therefore, necessary for His Majesty's Government to ask the council to determine what exactly is involved in the undertakings reciprocally entered into by the Turkish and British Governments by the final paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and to take such measures as may be deemed appropriate to secure compliance with that undertaking.

Lord Parmoor then handed a map to the council (annex).\*

In July 1923 the present state of the territories, of which the final fate will depend upon the fixing of the frontier between Turkey and Irak by the Council of the League, was as follows:—

Northwards of the line described below, the area was substantially under Turkish administration, and in that area His Majesty's Government would not claim that any "military or other movement" by the Turkish Government would violate the undertaking entered into at Lausanne. For the same reason they regard themselves as pledged to abstain from any such movement within it.

At the western end the line starts at the meeting point of the Tigris and the Khabur Rivers. After running along the Khabur and Hazil Rivers it stretches eastwards to the headwaters of the Rud-bar-i-Haji Beg, near the Gadir Pass. It is indicated on the map (of which copies have been supplied to the council) by the broken red line. This broken red line is in part coincident with the continuous red line referred to below and in such parts cannot be distinguished from it.

It will be noticed that on the map there is a broken blue line to the north of the broken red line. This broken blue line constitutes the line which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the council ought to adopt when fixing the frontier. The arguments in favour of it are ethnological, economic and strategical, and will in due course be laid before the commission appointed by the council. This line has, however, nothing to do with the question now before the council, as it does not bear upon the problem of the maintenance of the *status quo*. It may, therefore, be disregarded for the present.

The continuous red line is the line southwards of which in July 1923 the administration was in the hands of the Irak authorities. Up to that line the area was under the control of forces maintained by His Majesty as the party to whom the League has committed the defence of Irak. Throughout the area to the south of the red line His Majesty's Government maintain that any "military or other movement" by the Turkish Government constitutes a violation of the Lausanne undertaking.

It will be noticed that in the centre of the map there is a space bounded on the north by the broken red line and on the south by the continuous red line. This area was in July 1923 not under the occupation or administration of either Turkish or Irak authorities. It constituted a no-man's-land. Through it passes the upper valley of the Greater Zab, and this valley had been the headquarters of a large number of Assyrian Nestorian Christians. In 1916 they fled from their homes into Irak and were maintained by the British Government as refugees. In 1921, there being then no Turkish administration of this area, these Assyrians were resettled in the valley of the Zab, and remained there until recently. At Chal, on the southern edge of this no-man's-land, there was a Kurdish chief named Ulia Beg, who exercised some authority over the Kurds in his immediate vicinity, but not over the Christians. He is described in the Turkish notes as a Turkish mudir, but was not, so far as His Majesty's Government can ascertain, under any effective Turkish control.

In this area between the broken and the continuous red lines His Majesty's Government claim that in July 1923 there was neither Turkish nor Irak administra-

\* Not reproduced.



tion or control, and consequently that neither party is at liberty to make any movement which would modify in any way the status of the territories.

On the 14th September of this year considerable parties of Turkish forces began to cross into the area to the south of the continuous red line on the map. This is the movement of which mention was made to the council in the note read by me at the meeting of the council at Geneva on the 25th September. The places where these forces crossed the River Hazil and passed into the area occupied by the British forces and administered by the Irak authorities are towards the western end of the continuous red line. These points are indicated on the map by blue arrows. The Turkish forces occupied various villages, such as Bersiwi and Bahnuneh, well within that line, and worked their way eastwards, forcing back upon Amadia the small detachments of Irak police and of local levies. The Assyrians in the valley of the Greater Zab fled from their villages, which were destroyed by the Turkish forces, and poured into Amadia in large numbers. Instead of withdrawing to the area to the north-west of the red line, as His Majesty's Government had expected after the undertaking given by Fethi Bey at Geneva on the 30th September, Turkish forces have remained on the Irak side of the line, and the latest information received by His Majesty's Government shows that these forces appear to be making further advances and have occupied Demka and Bosel.

Vigorous representations have been made at Constantinople by His Majesty's representative against the failure of the Turkish Government to withdraw its forces, and a warning was given on the 9th October that unless the *status quo* was restored and withdrawal effected by the 11th October, His Majesty's Government must resume complete liberty of action. In view, however, of the further meeting of the Council of the League for the purpose of removing any doubt as to the meaning of the undertakings given by either party at Geneva on the 30th September, His Majesty's Government instructed the British forces in Irak to refrain from attacking or driving back the Turkish forces. Nevertheless, in various cases, British aircraft on patrol duty within the area to the south of the continuous red line have been fired upon by the Turks and have been compelled to retaliate in order to defend themselves. Both the presence of, and the action taken by, the Turkish forces to the south of the continuous red line is held by His Majesty's Government to constitute a violation of the undertakings given at Lausanne and Geneva, and His Majesty's Government claim that all these forces should be withdrawn to the north of that line and to the stations which Turkish forces occupied before July 1923.

Incidents which had taken place before the movement of the Turkish troops described above had given His Majesty's Government just cause for complaint, as they indicated an intention on the part of the Turkish Government to take action which would modify the state of the territories. For instance, in September 1923 the Irak authorities learned that the Turks intended to post a subordinate official at Chal with troops in the area described above as a no-man's-land. To the note of protest which was then sent the Turkish Government made no reply. His Majesty's Government assumed from this and from the fact that the project was not proceeded with that the Turkish Government acquiesced in the British view that such action was not permissible in the area referred to.

In August 1924 the Vali of Julamerk actually set out with an armed escort to visit Chal on an administrative tour, but the Assyrians in the valley of the Zab, fearing that this indicated an intention to establish Turkish control in the district, waylaid the Vali and captured him. He was subsequently released by the chief into whose hands he fell, and an interview was arranged at Chal between the Vali and one of the officials of the Irak Government, at which the latter warned the Vali that the undertaking given at the Lausanne Conference excluded any attempt to establish Turkish control in this area.

The entry of the Turkish forces into the territory to the south of the continuous red line, as described above, is alleged by the Turkish Government to have taken place for the purpose of punishing the Assyrians who participated in the capture of the Vali of Julamerk.

From December 1923 onwards the Turkish Government have constantly protested that British aircraft have made flights over territory in Turkish occupation. These complaints have all been investigated at the time and have formed the subject of notes which have passed between the two Governments. In general it has been found that the facts alleged by the Turkish Government were inaccurate. The aeroplane patrols maintained by the British forces confine themselves to the area to the south of the continuous red line.

More recently Turkish protests have been received against British aeroplane reconnaissances over the area occupied by the Turkish forces to the south of the continuous red line; but in this area His Majesty's Government maintain that they have every right to carry out such reconnaissance work as they may consider necessary anywhere to the south of the continuous red line. They certainly should not be called upon to refrain from observing the action of the Turkish forces which have invaded the area. If in making such reconnaissances the British aircraft are attacked by the Turkish forces, they have every right to defend themselves.

It is now more than six weeks since the Turkish forces invaded the areas in which there were no Turkish forces and no Turkish occupation in July 1923. They have even invaded the area which was under effective Irak control at that date.

Relying upon the undertaking given by his Excellency Fethi Bey at Geneva on the 30th September, His Majesty's Government have refrained from any action to restore the *status quo*, but the council will readily understand that the present situation produces a most deplorable effect upon the tranquillity of the inhabitants of the area in question, and that if it continues there will be grave danger of disturbances and possible bloodshed.

For the credit of the League of Nations and for the proper accomplishment of the local enquiries which must precede the fixing of the frontier by the Council of the League, it is essential that loyal compliance with the undertakings given on either side in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne and repeated at Geneva on the 30th September should be secured.

I hope that the council will succeed in determining the question, and that both sides will co-operate to obtain a final decision through the council, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY (Turkey): I regret that circumstances which the Government of the Turkish Republic did not desire and which are beyond its control should have made it necessary for you to interrupt your work and to hold this extraordinary session so short a time after the meetings at Geneva. The present meeting is, however, of the greatest importance in the opinion of the Turkish Government, since its object is to re-establish peace in districts where Turkish and British forces are facing one another.

The object aimed at by the two parties in submitting to the decision of the council the settlement of the dispute on the frontier between Turkey and Irak requires that the present dispute regarding the line of the *status quo* should also be submitted to the consideration of that body.

I desire at the outset to draw the attention of the council to the fact that the districts to which the obligation undertaken by both parties to maintain the *status quo* under the terms of article 3 (2) of the Peace Treaty applies are the very districts the fate of which is to be decided by the Council of the League of Nations.

Now, it is a fact that at Lausanne the Turkish delegation had requested that the territory of the Vilayet of Mosul should remain under Turkish sovereignty, while the British delegation put forward certain arguments claiming the incorporation of that vilayet in the State of Irak. The minutes of the Peace Conference show beyond question that, with the exception of the Vilayet of Mosul, no territory gave rise to a dispute of any kind between the two delegations. I must emphasise this point, which is of capital importance, and to which I will refer again later.

The present dispute arose from the fact that both Governments, while formally stating that they were respecting the *status quo* laid down by the treaty, maintained that the other party was violating the obligations entered into in regard to this matter.

How is it possible that, in spite of the declarations of both parties that they are faithfully observing the *status quo*, such a fundamental difference of opinion should have arisen?

Perhaps the council will permit me to give a few explanations in order to throw light on this problem. The Government of the Turkish Republic is under the impression that the British authorities in Irak have a very peculiar conception of the meaning of the *status quo*. A brief account of the ever-increasing claims put forward by the British Government will help to show what this conception is. You will remember that the Government of the Ottoman Empire had agreed to put a stop to hostilities in virtue of the Armistice Convention signed on the 30th October, 1918, at Mudros. At the time when this convention, which was to put a stop to hostilities, was signed, the British forces occupied a line which left Mosul, Erbil, Keuy-Sanjak and Suleimanieh outside their zone of occupation. We were justified in thinking that at the moment of the cessation of hostilities the British forces would



stop on the line which I have indicated. This, however, was not the case.

General Marshall, commanding the British troops, in defining in a letter dated the 2nd November, 1918, the line between the two armies, laid down that it should follow the Persian frontier from Mohammerah up to the point where the frontier passes Diale near Mount Avranan, from there to Suleimanieh and Keuy-Sanjak (inclusive), from there to the bend formed by Zabi-Kebir in the neighbourhood of Harir, from there along the Zab to a point situated north-east of Amadie and from there to Zako. The British commander endeavoured, therefore, to include in his zone of occupation, without any real justification and in spite of the Armistice Convention, a large district which had not been occupied up to the date of the cessation of hostilities, and which included important places such as Mosul, Keuy-Sanjak, Erbil and Suleimanieh. The Ottoman Government had to yield to force, and could only lodge a formal protest against this unjustifiable occupation.

The supposition that the line fixed by General Marshall on his own responsibility would form the maximum of the British claims was also not realised. Great Britain was not satisfied even with this second line, and wished to place it even further north. Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Sèvres, lays down that the frontier between Turkey and Irak should be the northern boundary of the Vilayet of Mosul, modified so as to pass south of Amadie.

The Treaty of Sèvres, against which Turkey has always most vigorously protested, might be considered to give full satisfaction to the most extreme demands of Great Britain. The northern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, as then fixed by the British Government, is clearly defined in map No. 2 annexed to that treaty.

The Sèvres line also did not long remain intact, but was pushed further and further north. The view of the British Government concerning the boundaries of the Vilayet of Mosul had changed again, and the line laid down in the note addressed by the British Government to the Turkish Government on the 29th September, 1924, as the true northern boundary of that vilayet, was pushed a great deal further north than the Sèvres line.

I have been compelled to give this account of the events which have taken place since the armistice in order to show that the point of view of the British Government with regard to the extent of the territory of the Mosul Vilayet is far from stable, that it is continually changing, and that this is where the cause of the present conflict should be sought.

As regards the legal aspect of the question, I need hardly say that none of the scheme or claims, beginning with those put forward by General Marshall and ending with those laid down in the note of the 29th September last, are accepted by Turkey, and that none of them have legal force; there can be no doubt, however, that the maintenance of the *status quo* of the 24th July, 1923, is binding on both parties. On the latter date Suleimanieh was not occupied by British forces. The latter had only just occupied Rowanduz. There were also a few British detachments at Zako and Amadie.

It is true that the British Government, in its notes of the 20th December, 1923, and the 26th April, 1924, had stated that it considered the whole of the Vilayet of Mosul as under its occupation. The Treaty of Peace, however, authorised neither party to notify the other that it considered any given part of the Vilayet of Mosul as being in theory under its occupation in order subsequently to occupy it in fact; that would obviously be a direct negation of the *status quo*. It might even be thought that these two notes proved that the British Government intended to violate the *status quo*. The Turkish Government has formally rejected these claims in the notes addressed to the British representative at Constantinople and to the British Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in January and August 1924 respectively. In any case, it cannot be denied that Suleimanieh was not under British occupation on the 24th July, 1923. In support, I may quote Air-Marshal Sir John Salmond's report dated the 23rd June, 1923, which was published as a supplement to the "London Gazette" of the 11th June, 1924. In paragraph No. 38 of that report it is stated that orders had been issued for the withdrawal of the troops on Kirkuk in three detachments, the last of which left Suleimanieh on the 19th June, 1923. The British authorities only occupied Suleimanieh on the 19th July, 1924, that is to say, nearly a year after the signature of the Treaty of Peace. The "Times" of the 24th July, 1924, gives the following information received from its Bagdad correspondent on the 20th July, 1924, under the title "Suleimanieh Recovered":—

"Irak cavalry, assisted by Kurdish recruits, occupied Suleimanieh on Saturday without meeting with any resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

Sheikh Mahmoud, with a small following, is wandering in the mountains along the Persian frontier. Sheikh Mahmoud, the Governor of Suleimanieh, had instituted an independent Kurd Government in that town after the withdrawal of the British troops in 1922. He entered into communication with the Turkish troops which had occupied Rowanduz. After Rowanduz had been retaken by the Government of Irak in the spring of 1923, the territory, subject to the authority of Sheikh Mahmoud, became more and more reduced. The occupation of the capital will put an end to his pretention."

It is clear, therefore, that, contrary to article 3 of the Treaty of Peace, the British forces undertook military operations against Suleimanieh, which was not occupied at the date of the signature of that treaty, and that they occupied that town on the 19th July, 1924, that is to say, a year after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

I think there is no need for me to dwell on this point in order to show that this occupation constitutes an infringement of the obligations entered into regarding the maintenance of the *status quo*, and therefore of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne. After the signature of the Treaty of Peace, the Government of the Turkish Republic was forced on several occasions to lodge formal protests against the action of the British authorities in Irak violating the *status quo*; on the 19th August, 1923, regarding the bombardment of Suleimanieh by aircraft; on the 3rd April, 1924, on the occasion of the admission of so-called Deputies of the Vilayet of Mosul to the Assembly of Irak; on the 1st July, 1924, regarding the flying of British aircraft over the territory of the Vilayet of Hakkari; on the 3rd September concerning the attack of British land and air forces against Suleimanieh, involving the complete destruction of two-thirds of the town; further, regarding the attack against Derbend, near Djem-Djemel, followed by the massacre of the inhabitants; and, finally, on the same date, regarding the flying of aircraft over the territory of the Vilayet of Hakkari at the place and at the time when the Turkish Governor-General was attacked by Nestorian brigands.

It is established that the territory in dispute between the two delegations at Lausanne was solely the Vilayet of Mosul. The question of the *status quo* can therefore only refer to the territory in dispute. Any change in the military or political situation in that territory would therefore be contrary to article 3 (2). In spite of this, the British Government has put forward the opinion that the admission of Deputies from the Vilayet of Mosul to the Assembly of Irak does not constitute any modification of the *status quo*, although it is obvious that the participation of representatives of a foreign territory in the legislative organisation of a State is tantamount to annexing that territory, and fundamentally modifies its *status quo*.

As regards the violation of Turkish territory by aircraft, the British Government declared, in its note dated the 23rd August, 1924, that it had not gone beyond the British posts on the line Zako-Bersivi-Baluna-Tchakalli, which, according to this note from the Foreign Office, constituted the furthest limit of the occupied zone.

In subsequent notes, copies of which have been communicated to the League of Nations, the Turkish Government protested against the outrages committed on the 9th, 12th and 14th September by British aircraft, which opened machine-gun fire and threw bombs on the troops called up to repress the Nestorian bandits at Julemerk, Beik-ul-Chebab and Kharbul in the Vilayet of Hakkari, and far beyond any of the lines successively laid down by the British authorities as the northernmost limit of the Vilayet of Mosul. Further attacks were made on the 17th, 18th, 20th and 21st of September on the Turkish villages of Tchelkui and Decti Massek, also situated outside the occupied zone defined in the British note of the 23rd August, which I have just quoted. Protests against these aggressions were sent by Turkey to the British Government in a note dated the 23rd September, of which a copy has been communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

The British Government was not able to deny these facts, and in its note dated the 25th September, alleged that the line indicated in its note of the 23rd August also was not the *status quo* line, although the latter note clearly implied that if the British aircraft had crossed this line, the Turkish Government would have been justified in considering it an infringement of the *status quo* line.

In its note of the 29th September the British Government, on its own initiative, laid down a new line which goes far beyond either the Sèvres line or the administrative frontier of the Mosul Vilayet, adding that it should be the true limit



of the vilayet, although it is well to the north of the northernmost limit marked on the map attached to the Sèvres Treaty.

In the same note the delimitation of an extensive zone in the Hakkari Vilayet is laid down, and the surprising theory is put forward that this zone is outside the Turkish sphere of influence, on the ground that it had not been effectively occupied by Turkish troops, and that no Turkish administration was instituted there at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. This zone, beyond doubt, forms part of the Hakkari Vilayet. The British statement that no Turkish Administration was in existence in this part of the Vilayet of Hakkari is not in accordance with the facts. This vilayet has always been administered by the Turkish authorities.

I need not point out the inadmissibility of the theory that the absence of troops in any given part of a territory is a sufficient justification for considering that territory as outside the sphere of influence of the sovereign State. The Hakkari Vilayet has always belonged to Turkey, and the Turkish State, like any other State, has no need to send troops to occupy every inch of its territory in order to convince its neighbours that all these districts are subject to its authority.

It is a fact, as I have already explained, that no discussions have taken place and no claims have been put forward at the Lausanne Conference with regard to any territory north of the northern boundary of the Vilayet of Mosul; article 3 (2) only applies to the Vilayet of Mosul. The *status quo* to be maintained is undoubtedly that of this vilayet. Under these circumstances no distinction can be drawn as concerns article 3 of the Treaty of Peace between that portion of the Vilayet of Hakkari and any other portion of any other Turkish vilayet.

The same note is also interesting from another point of view. Since the British Government cannot conceal the numerous military operations which it has conducted in the Vilayet of Mosul since the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and under the eyes of the whole world, it is obliged to put forward an argument which is absolutely destructive to any conception of a *status quo*.

It states that "any military or other movements which it may have been obliged to authorise were occasioned solely by the desire to maintain the *status quo* as defined above."

If this principle were recognised, it would be equally permissible for Turkey, without laying itself open to the accusation that it had infringed its obligations, to undertake military operations in the Vilayet of Mosul on the plea that it also was actuated by the desire to maintain the *status quo*. It is not difficult to imagine where such a procedure would lead to, nor what would become of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which definitely forbids any military movement which might modify in any way the present state of the territories, of which the final fate will depend upon the decision of the council.

To justify the British theory one might even go further and maintain that the military movements undertaken since July 1923, with the evident object of changing the political, racial and administrative aspect of the Vilayet of Mosul, and especially the operations against Suleimanieh, which resulted in the occupation of that town by the British forces, have not changed the state of that province as it existed in 1923. I leave the council to decide whether it is possible to maintain a theory which is so absolutely contrary to all evidence.

In spite of the flagrant incompatibility of the British attitude and claims with the clear and explicit terms of article 3, and in spite of the fact that the Turkish Government has done nothing which might be considered in any way as an infraction of its undertakings, the latter was confronted on the 9th October, 1924, with an ultimatum from the British Government.

In the memorandum dated the 5th October, 1924, the representative of the British Government at Constantinople, referring to the statements made at Geneva by myself and by his Excellency Lord Parmoor, had already endeavoured to identify the arbitrary line laid down in the British note dated the 29th September with the true *status quo* line, which is well to the south of the arbitrary line, and which does not include the district of Suleimanieh or the other places occupied by the British authorities in Irak subsequent to the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

The members of the council will no doubt remember that at the meeting on the 25th September, 1924, the delegate of the British Government referred to the *status quo* line as a line which had been in existence since the armistice—a point on which we were in agreement. Apart from this reference, no accurate and detailed definition of this line was given during the recent meeting at Geneva.

I also referred to the administrative frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul as corresponding approximately to the *status quo* frontier, explaining that these two

lines did not absolutely coincide, since in certain places the line of British occupation was much further south. It is obvious that the British Government's assertion that the line, which at the meeting of the 30th September both parties had solemnly undertaken to respect, was the same as the line arbitrarily laid down by the British Government in its note of the 29th September is absolutely inaccurate.

The statements made by the two delegations could only refer to one or the other of the two following alternatives: either the situation as it existed on the 30th September, 1924, or as it existed on the 24th July, 1923.

In deference to the council, and believing that it was only a question of a temporary state of affairs which would necessarily come to an end as soon as the council had given a decision on the main problem, the Government of the Turkish Republic did not hesitate to choose from the two alternatives the easier for the opposing party. If the line of the 24th July, 1923, were adopted, all the places occupied in the Vilayet of Mosul by the British authorities in Irak after that date would immediately have to be evacuated.

Being desirous more than any other Power of maintaining peace, and being, nevertheless, resolved to defend her legitimate rights, Turkey offered, in a note dated the 10th October, to submit this question to the impartial consideration of the council.

If the line of the 30th September, 1924, is not adopted, Turkey would even more gladly accept the line of the 24th July, 1923, marked at that date by the British-Irak outposts in the Vilayet of Mosul. In the latter case, the conditions existing on that date should be re-established.

I venture to hope that the explanations which I have just given will be of assistance in the settlement of the present dispute.

In the opinion of the Government of the Turkish Republic, it is essential that the line which is to be scrupulously respected by both parties should be accurately defined in order to avoid any possible conflict until the council is able to give a decision on the main question based on the report which will be submitted to it by the commission.

In conclusion, I have the honour to state that the line which will be fixed, taking into consideration all the factors of the problem, will be faithfully respected by Turkey.

LORD PARMOOR: I think that the explanation given by his Excellency Fethi Bey may be of assistance in the determination of this question, and I welcome what he has said, namely, that on behalf of the Turkish Republic he is willing to abide by the decision of the council.

Also, I think he has not seriously called into question what I consider to be quite clear, namely, that the decision come to by the council at Geneva, referred to the *status quo* at the date of the Treaty of Lausanne, the 24th July, 1923.

I do not think that at this stage the council is called upon to consider the claims which will undoubtedly be made by both sides when the commission meets as regards the definite line of the ultimate frontier. I understand from his Excellency that there is a distinct difference between the Turkish Republic and His Majesty's Government upon that point, and therefore it does not appear to me material at the present time to refer to Suleimanieh, which is about 100 miles south of the point at which the events we are now bringing before the council have occurred. The only point which I think the *rapporteur* and the council have to consider is, what was the actual condition on the 24th July, 1923, in the districts where differences have arisen? I have stated on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, on that date and in the portions of the frontier where these difficulties have arisen, the British Government were, in fact, and in truth, both administratively and in a military sense, in effective occupation of the whole of the country south of the continuous red line. If there is any doubt upon that point when the *rapporteur* comes to consider what his decision is to be, His Britannic Majesty's Government are willing to place at his disposal the resident officer who was in control of this district and who will be able to state what the facts were at the critical date. Although his Excellency Fethi Bey and myself may have different views as to what the conditions were on the 24th July, 1923, the only question is, whether his view is right, or the view I am stating on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government. When that matter has once been settled, His Britannic Majesty's Government undertakes to accept the decision of the council. That undertaking has already been given by his Excellency Fethi Bey.



HIS EXCELLENCY FETHI BEY: I thank Lord Parmoor for his declaration, which will, I hope, contribute to the attainment of a friendly settlement of this dispute.

As regards the conditions of the *status quo*, as I said in the declaration which I have just made, the Government of the Turkish Republic agrees absolutely to observe the *status quo* of the 24th July, 1923. A difference exists concerning the two frontiers of the Vilayet of Mosul, which have been presented successively by the British Government. One frontier for the Vilayet of Mosul, which is practically correct, was presented by the British Government at the moment when the Treaty of Sèvres was drafted, and a tracing of that frontier was annexed to the treaty.

Another frontier for the Vilayet of Mosul is now suggested, which does not correspond in the least with the reality and which is not the true frontier of that vilayet. The line suggested is further to the north of the real frontier. On this point the Government of the Turkish Republic and the British Government are not in agreement.

As regards the question of Suleimanieh, it is true that this locality is to the south of the northern frontier of the Mosul Vilayet. But in the Treaty of Peace it is clearly stated that no military or other movement should be carried out, which might change the *status quo* of the territories, the final fate of which will be decided by the Council of the League of Nations. If any movements effecting the *status quo* have taken place, the occupation of Suleimanieh is a case in point. So that it is the British Government which has modified the *status quo*.

Lord Parmoor has declared that the territories situated to the south of the red line have always been administered by the British authorities. I must declare in the name of the Turkish Republic that, apart from the territories effectively occupied belonging to the Vilayet of Mosul, no territory is, or can be, administered by the British authorities.

If the territory marked by the red line which I have not yet examined belongs to unoccupied territories in the Vilayet of Mosul, it has never been administered by the British authorities. Accordingly, in order to observe the *status quo*, it is necessary to define clearly what is the true *status quo* line in the Vilayet of Mosul.

In the opinion of the Turkish Government, the frontier suggested by the British Government in the Treaty of Sèvres is the true northern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul.

THE PRESIDENT asked M. Branting (*rapporteur*) whether he had any observations to make.

M. BRANTING said that he was glad to have heard the explanations furnished by the two parties, but he asked for a little time in order to prepare his report.

LORD PARMOOR said that he would like to bring before the *rapporteur*, if the latter agreed, the evidence which he had indicated on the conditions on the 24th July, 1923, in connection with the red line.

The council decided to adjourn until M. Branting was ready to submit his report.

[E 9449/5711/65]

No. 98.

Interview between M. Branting and the British Experts, October 28, 1924.—  
(Communicated by British Delegation at Meeting of Council of League of Nations; Received October 30.)

AT the invitation of M. Branting, the *rapporteur* to the council on the Irak frontier question, Sir Cecil Hurst, accompanied by members of the British delegation, went to M. Branting's room at the Hôtel Britannique on the morning of the 28th October in order to place all possible information at M. Branting's disposal. M. Branting had co-opted for the purpose of this interview the Spanish and Uruguayan members of the council, Señor Quinones de León and Señor Guani. Various officials of the League secretariat were also present, including M. Avenol, M. Mantoux and Captain Abraham.

Sir Cecil Hurst started by enquiring whether M. Branting wished him to make a statement or whether there were any particular points upon which he would like to ask

for information. M. Branting replied that he wished to know what, in the opinion of the British Government, was the exact state of affairs south of the continuous red line on the 24th July, 1923.

Sir Cecil Hurst prefaced his explanation by a short statement on the subject of what had passed at Lausanne. He said that he wished at the outset to correct the impression which had been given by the repeated statements of the Turkish delegation, culminating with Fethi Bey's statement of the previous day before the council, that the fate of the Mosul Vilayet was the only question which had ever been discussed at Lausanne. He pointed out that Lord Curzon had repeatedly endeavoured to bring the discussion on to what the British Government considered the correct basis, namely, what should be the frontier between Irak and Turkey, and in support of his contention he read a passage from Lord Curzon's speech of the 23rd January, 1923, which is recorded in the third paragraph on p. 399 of Command Paper 1814 of 1923. He agreed that a large part of the proceedings of that conference was devoted by Lord Curzon to repudiating the claims of the Turkish Government for the restoration of the whole Mosul Vilayet to Turkey, but he said that he wished to make it quite clear that in devoting so much time to answering this claim Lord Curzon was in no way departing from the British point of view that the question at issue was solely that of defining the Turkey-Irak frontier. He proceeded to deal with the Turkish allegation that His Majesty's Government had been making continual advances towards the north since the armistice of Mudros, and read passages from General Marshall's letter of the 7th November, 1918, to Ali Ihsan Pasha, in which he demanded the evacuation by the Turkish forces of the whole of the Mosul Vilayet. This demand was complied with within the next two or three weeks, and, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the letter in question, the administration of the whole vilayet was immediately taken over by the British political authorities. Sir Cecil Hurst then invited Mr. Jardine to explain to M. Branting the exact system of administrative control which was in force south of the continuous red line on the 24th July, 1923. A map which had been specially prepared to show the administrative divisions along the frontier was laid on the table, and Mr. Jardine gave a full account of the *status quo* as it stood on the 24th July, 1923, showing which were the administrative headquarters and what military and police posts were on that date in the occupation of the British and Irak authorities. In reply to a question as to the length of time previous to the 24th July during which this state of affairs had existed, he said that on the section of the frontier from its western extremity to the Nerva Raikan nahiya inclusive this state of affairs had existed since the armistice, with the exception of a period of five or six months, during which British administrative control had been temporarily relaxed in the immediate neighbourhood of the town of Amadia, though British forces had remained in occupation of Amadia Kadha.

Sir Cecil Hurst then pointed out on the map the exact line of advance of the Turkish troops which had invaded the area south of the red line on and after the 14th September, 1924, and pointed out that, though there were indications at one time of withdrawal of some of these troops, the latest information showed that they were again advancing.

The discussion then turned upon the position in the area between the continuous and the dotted red lines on the 24th July, 1923. Sir Cecil Hurst explained how the Assyrian Christians, whose homes were in this region, had been driven out by the Turks in 1916, had been supported by the British Government for four or five years in Irak and had been resettled in 1921 by the British authorities. He made the point that if there had at that time been any question of Turkish administration in this region, the Assyrians would never have agreed to go back there. He then described the action of the Turkish forces after their penetration through the north-western corner of the Mosul Vilayet into this region on and after the 14th September, 1924. The British Government claimed that this also constituted a disturbance of the *status quo*, which, though it differed in degree, was none the less an infringement of the undertaking given by the Turkish Government in the Treaty of Lausanne. In reply to an enquiry whether the route through the north-west corner of the Mosul Vilayet was the only means of access to this region, it was pointed out that there were two other possible lines of approach along both of which Turkish columns were understood to have proceeded, but that the route through the Sindi Guli nahiya, being the most direct and the easiest, had been mainly used.

Sir Cecil Hurst also dealt briefly with the reference made by Fethi Bey on the previous day to the frontier put forward by the Allied Powers in the Treaty of Sèvres.



He explained that that instrument had contemplated the establishment of an independent régime for both Kurds and Assyrians to the north of Irak, and pointed out that what might have been considered a satisfactory frontier between Irak and an independent Kurdish State was by no means necessarily the most satisfactory frontier between Irak and Turkey.

Various questions on points of detail, such as the strength of the Turkish forces, the proportion of Kurds to Assyrians in the "no-man's-land," whether these tribes were sedentary or nomad, what was the radius of control of the various administrative and police posts, and the present position of the British and Turkish forces, were then asked and answered. Sir Cecil Hurst also explained that the incursion of a large number of Assyrian refugees, whose homes had been burned by the Turkish troops, was proving a source of considerable embarrassment to the British and Irak authorities.

He then referred to the question of Suleimanieh, which had been raised by Fethi Bey at the previous day's session of the council. He pointed out that Suleimanieh was as far south of the region through which the frontier must finally pass as Van was to the north of it, and deprecated any serious attention being paid to this attempt by the Turkish delegate to confuse the main issue before the council. At the same time he thought it desirable to explain briefly the circumstances in which the alleged reoccupation of Suleimanieh, of which so much had been made by Fethi Bey at the previous day's session, had been rendered necessary.

In conclusion, Sir Cecil Hurst drew Mr. Branting's attention to the fact that the continued occupation of the invaded area by Turkish troops constituted a grave danger of local disturbances and bloodshed. He reminded him that His Majesty's Government had on the 7th October addressed a very serious warning to the Turkish Government, and had informed them that, if the Turkish troops showed no signs of withdrawing by the 11th October, measures would be necessary to expel them. His Majesty's Government had stayed their hand merely in deference to the Council of the League, to whom the Turkish Government had again referred the question, but there was a limit beyond which they could not reasonably be expected to acquiesce in the present state of affairs.

No. 99.

*Sir G. Grahame to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 30.)*

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Brussels, October 29, 1924.*

FOLLOWING from Sir C. Hurst:—

"Council discussed Irak frontier question again to-day and unanimously passed resolution providing that the extreme limit of territories which may be occupied or administered by either party until a final frontier has been determined shall follow a line, of which detailed description will follow, but which may be described roughly as our continuous red line modified in Sindi Guli Nahiya so as to run over crests of Mehri Nar and Bilakish through Rusi between Alamun and Khanik. Remainder of line is substantially identical with continuous red line on our map, but with slight local adjustments. Any area which is at present occupied by or administered by Turkish authorities south of this line or by British authorities north of it is to be evacuated not later than 15th November, 1924.

"As from that date this provisional line shall in fact constitute extreme limit which may under no circumstances be passed by civil or military authorities of either party.

"British representative offered to depute a British officer to meet Turkish officer on the spot and agree as to precise local effect of above line. Turkish representative said that he would report this offer to his Government, who would, he hoped, accept it. It was clearly understood that British and Turkish authorities respectively reserved full right of administration and military occupation up to line on their own side of it.

"Please inform Colonial Office and Air Ministry urgently.

"Experts on Irak frontier will return by first train to-morrow, arriving at 4-30, and will bring full particulars."

(Repeated to Constantinople and Bagdad.)

No. 100.

*Sir G. Grahame to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 30.)*

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, October 29, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following from Sir C. Hurst:—

"In view of definite fixing of date in council's resolutions for withdrawal to line set out therein of all civil and military administration, I did not think it necessary to ask council to authorise British forces to drive out Turkish forces if they failed to comply with terms of resolutions. Interval between date for completion of withdrawal and next meeting of council is so short that I was afraid that if I made such an application council might refuse on the ground that they could deal with any complaints respecting non-compliance at their next meeting. I did not wish to risk a rebuff."

[E 9561/7/65]

No. 101.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 1157.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 31, 1924.*

I SAW the Turkish Minister to-day at 2 o'clock, my intention being to discuss the differences between our Governments regarding the Irak frontier.

2. I began by explaining to him that since I had arranged the appointment, political changes had taken place of which he was aware, which made it rather difficult for me to say anything officially, and that he would have to take any observations I made with that fact in mind.

3. I assured him that it had always been the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain the most friendly relations with Turkey, and that I deplored a failure to come to an agreement on this subject. He explained to me how anxious the Turkish Government had been to meet us and went over certain dates relating to the delay in our recognising him and in his being seen, to show that he was not to blame. He had come at an unfortunate time when we were disputing our respective rights to occupy certain territory under the *status quo* agreement made at Lausanne. These preliminaries over, I asked him whether the Turkish Government would accept the Council of the League of Nations as an arbitrator, or whether they would only consider, retaining to themselves the right to reject, any proposals made by the council.

4. He stated that it was quite impossible for them to commit themselves beforehand in view of Turkish opinion, which was very definite that at any rate a large part of the Mosul Vilayet, including Mosul itself, Kirkuk and Suliemanian should belong to Turkey. He said that the Turkish representative at Geneva made that reserve clear by accepting the offices of the Council of the League under paragraph 15 of the League constitution.

5. I pointed out to him that that would be a very bad frontier both strategically and economically for Irak; that I could not negotiate it with him, but that what I had in mind was an exchange of opinion which might be followed on our part by communications to the Irak Government, and, if everything went well, an agreement which could be communicated to the League of Nations and become the subject of an official settlement.

6. He said that the Turkish Government wished something of that kind, followed by a treaty with Irak, as they had no desire to bring Arabs back into the Turkish State. He expressed the desire of his Government to come to a commercial agreement with us regarding the products of the area which Turkey claimed. I told him, however, that I could not discuss that, although it would have been my desire to have embodied the friendship between the two States in such an agreement. My duty was primarily to Irak, for which I was acting as custodian, and I emphasised that before I could consider purely English interests I had to pay my debt of conscience to the Irak State.

7. At this point I asked Mr. Thomas to join in the conversation, and we went over some of the ground again. I pointed out to him, in addition, the areas coloured green on the map we were using, showing Christian populations, and said that it would be very difficult to let those go back to Turkey. We also pointed out that the



Turkish proposal meant the secession of the granary districts to Turkey, and went over some of the other points used by Lord Curzon at Lausanne and embodied in a memorandum on the subject circulated at the time.

8. The Turkish Minister asked me whether it was not possible for me to carry the matter further and try and come to an agreement. I replied that I had many regrets owing to the present situation which made me leave so much of my work unfinished, and that this was one.

9. I told him that if I felt any good could be served by a further interview I would see him again before I left.

I am, &c.

J. RAMSAY MacDONALD.

[E 9529/5711/65]

No. 102.

*Minutes of the Third Meeting (Public) of the League of Nations Council, 31st Session, held at the Palais des Académies, Brussels, on Wednesday, October 29, 1924, at 6 P.M.*

Present: All the representatives of the members of the council and the secretary-general.

1352. *Frontier between Turkey and Irak. Provisional Boundary between the Territories occupied and administered by the two Governments concerned.*

HIS Excellency Fethi Bey came to the council table.

M. BRANTING (*rapporteur*) read the following report:—The question submitted for the consideration of the council is the definition of the position on the borders between Irak and Turkey which the British and Turkish Governments have undertaken to observe.

This reciprocal undertaking is laid down in the last paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne. It was confirmed in the presence of the council on the 30th September last by the representatives of Great Britain and of Turkey, and the council in its resolution of the same date took note of this declaration. The only point on which some uncertainty still exists, therefore, concerns a question of fact. What was the territorial position in the area under consideration at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne?

On this point there exists a difference of opinion between the parties concerned. The explanations furnished by the delegates and experts of the two Governments, however, as well as the maps submitted by them have made it possible for the *rapporteur*, with the assistance of the representatives of Spain and of Uruguay, to establish that the real difference between the two points of view is not very great. It would be impossible without an enquiry on the spot, which does not seem practicable, to come to a decision on the differences which still exist regarding the position on the 24th July, 1923. But we have thought it possible to propose a line, which only differs very slightly from the suggestions made by the two parties, and which may succeed in putting an end to the uncertainty out of which the present difficulties have arisen.

A description of this line is given in the draft resolution which I have the honour to submit to you.

This line would mark the extreme limit which, until the final frontier between Turkey and Irak has been fixed, must be respected by both parties, both from the military and from the administrative point of view.

The two parties, in a desire for peace, to which my colleagues and I pay tribute, have undertaken to conform to the decision of the council. The council, if it approves the present report, will request both parties to take all the necessary measures to carry out the resolution in every respect at an early date; this date might be the 15th November. Any area at present either occupied or administered in contravention of the terms of this resolution should therefore be evacuated not later than the 15th November next. As from that date the provisional limit laid down should not under any circumstances be passed by the civil or military authorities of either party.

It must be clearly understood—and I feel certain that the council is particularly desirous that there should be no doubt on this point—that the object of

this decision is merely to regulate a provisional situation so that order and peace may be maintained during an interim period. Neither the solution of the problem of the final frontier between Turkey and Irak nor the procedure by which the solution is to be reached should be in any way affected thereby. I would propose that the special commission which is to report to the council on the main question should be given explicit instructions on this point.

The council hopes to be able to announce, before the end of the present session, the names of the members of the special commission which is to furnish it with the information required for reaching a decision on the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak. In this event the commission might immediately begin its work, so as to hasten the final settlement of the question.

#### "Resolution.

"The council,

"In view of the provisions of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, by which the British and Turkish Governments have reciprocally undertaken to respect the *status quo* existing at the time of the signature of that treaty, pending the final delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and Irak;

"Whereas at the last meeting of the council on the 30th September, 1924, and during the present session, the representatives of the two Governments have formally confirmed this undertaking;

"In view of the difficulties which have arisen in regard to the definition of the *status quo* on the date of the signature of the treaty;

"And whereas the representatives of the two Governments concerned have declared that the latter are prepared to accept the decision of the council;

"Decides:

"That the extreme limit of the territories, which may be occupied or administered by either party until the final frontier between Turkey and Irak has been determined, shall be as follows:—

"From the junction of the River Tigris and the River Khabur, along the River Khabur in mid-stream, up to its junction with the River Hazil; in mid-stream along the River Hazil to a point 3 kilom. upstream of the junction of that river with the side-stream, which passes by Sirnez. From this point in a direct line eastwards to the northern crest of the valley of the side-stream which passes by Sirnez. The northern crest bordering this valley up to Mount Bilakiah, and in a straight line from this point to the source of the tributary of the Baijo at Robozak. Along this tributary to its junction, south of Robozak, with a river coming down from point 6834 east-south-east of Robozak, then following a straight line to the hill north-north-east of point 6834. Along the small river in mid-stream which comes down in an easterly direction from this hill to its junction with the River Khabur. The River Khabur downstream for about 1½ kilom. to its junction with the river coming from the Arush and Geramus district. Along this river (leaving to the north the river coming from Kashura) to the junction of its two large branches, the first coming from Geramus and the second from Arush. From this junction along the bottom of a valley eastwards to point 6571 on the watershed between the two branches mentioned above. Following this watershed to point 9063 east of point 6571, then along the crest bordering the valley of the tributary, which passes by Geramus up to its junction with the crest on the south side of the valley of the Lizan. From the latter along the crest on the north side of the valley of the tributary of the River Zab, which comes down from Ora, then up to a point west-north-west of Duskia and about 2½ kilom. from that place. A straight line from this point to the source of the tributary of the Zab, a little north-east of Duskia—the course of this tributary to the River Zab—downstream along the River Zab to a point 1 kilom. south of Baishuka—a straight line eastwards up to the southern crest of the river valley which runs south of Bayhi and north of Chal—along the southern crest of the valley of the tributary of the Zab which passes by Berijan, up to the point nearest to the source of the Ave Marek west-south-west of Shiluk—a straight line to this source—the western arm of the Ave Marek from this source—to the junction of the small river which comes down from the pass between Kasrik and Nervek—along this small river up to its source—following a straight line between this source and



the tributary of the eastern arm of the Ave Marek, which flows into the Ave Marek north of Nervek—along this tributary to its junction—following a straight line from this junction to the watershed between the Ave Marek and the Rudbar-i-Shin—along this watershed to the nearest point to the source of the tributary of the Rudbar-i-Shin which flows into that river just north of Sheikh Momar—in a straight line up to the source of that river—following this tributary and down the Rudbar-i-Shin to the mouth of the river which flows just south of Deh—along this river to its source—in a straight line from the source of that river to the watershed between the Rudbar-i-Shin and the tributary of the Shemsdinan Su, which flows just east of Herki—in a straight line thence to the side-stream nearest to this tributary—along this side-stream and then along the tributary to the Shemsdinan Su—in a direct line from the junction of these two streams to the southern crest of the valley of the Shemsdinan Su—along this crest to the point where it meets the watershed between the rivers Haji Beg and its tributary which runs just east of Upah—along the line of this watershed direct to the River Haji Beg—up the River Haji Beg to the Persian frontier.

"And that any area which at present is occupied or administered in contravention of the terms of the present resolution shall be evacuated not later than the 15th November, 1924. As from that date the provisional limit described above shall in fact constitute the extreme limit, which under no circumstances may be passed by the civil or military authorities of either party."

M. Branting continued: The description of the line has been taken from the British staff map 1/250,000, sheets J. 38/M, J. 38/N and J. 38/O (Jezireh-Ibn-Omar, Amadia and Diza-Gawar). A copy of this map with the tracing of the line will be handed to each of the interested parties. A third copy will be kept at the secretariat of the League of Nations; this map will alone be valid for interpreting the description contained in the resolution of the council.

SIR CECIL HURST (Great Britain): M. le Président, I need scarcely assure you and your colleagues on the council that, so far as concerns the Government which I represent at this moment, this decision of the Council of the League will not only be accepted, but will be loyally complied with.

During the few moments that preceded the meeting of the council I myself had an opportunity of examining with care the description of the line that has been laid down in the report of his Excellency M. Branting. We realise that the dominating purpose with which this line has been adopted is to ensure, as far as is humanly possible, that there shall be peace and contentment upon this frontier, and an absence of any quarrelling during the interval that must necessarily precede the ultimate and final fixing of this frontier. It is in the realisation of that fact that you will forgive me if there is one small point to which I want to draw attention. The frontier has been admirably described in words and admirably translated into a line fixed upon the map; but there is one small case in which, by reason, no doubt, of the necessity for the line being indicated with some breadth, it passes through two villages which, from the description of the frontier, I think it is clear are intended to remain upon the Irak side of the line. I refer to the two villages the names of which are Dotaza and Nerva. Perhaps his Excellency M. Branting will allow me at the conclusion of this meeting to draw his attention to that point, and I have no doubt that his Excellency Fethi Bey, if he is in agreement with me, will be in a position to confirm what I think is the clear intention of the wording of the report, namely, that those two villages do remain on the Irak side of the line.

I said just now that we realise on our side that the primary purpose with which this line has been fixed is to ensure peace and, I trust, contentment, upon the frontier and in the frontier region. I take it that that is the intention of the paragraph on p. 2 of the report, which reads as follows: "This line would mark the extreme limit which, until the final frontier between Turkey and Irak has been fixed, must be respected by both parties both from the military and from the administrative point of view."

It is the intention that up to that line the authorities on either side will be entitled to exercise all necessary measures of administrative control. What is intended by that paragraph is that there shall be no attempt to exercise authority beyond the line; but it does give authority to exercise full administrative control up to that line. That is my understanding of the paragraph.

I can only, therefore, undertake, so far as concerns His Britannic Majesty's Government, that such necessary patrol work as we have to carry out will be strictly limited to the Irak side of the line.

There is one point in reference to which I would like, if I may, to make an offer to his Excellency the Turkish representative. I am sure that he will be embued, as we are on our side, by the desire to secure the absence of all further wrangling upon this frontier. The time-limit which is indicated, by which certain measures have to be complied with, is near, and if it would be of any assistance to ensure the proper carrying out of this report that some military officer on the British side and some military officer on the Turkish side should meet and agree as to the precise and exact local effect of this line, we, on our side, are quite willing to depute the necessary officer for the purpose.

May I ask for one further assurance? By those who study this line in detail it will be seen that there are certain villages as to which we had thought and believed that the administrative control up till now had been in the hands of the Irak authorities. I refer, for instance, to villages such as that which I find on the map called Shivzeran, which have been hitherto occupied by Christian inhabitants, who are now refugees in the territory of Irak, and who will no doubt remain in Irak territory up till the moment when the frontier is finally determined. I think that I am entitled to ask that there shall be no attempt to penalise them in their absence up till such time as the frontier is finally determined.

I think that perhaps in conclusion, M. le Président, it will be desirable that I should formally undertake in the words of the report that, so far as His Britannic Majesty's Government are concerned, all necessary measures will be taken to carry out this report, which we accept.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHY BEY (Turkey): M. le Président and Gentlemen, I have just read the report of M. Branting. In the course of my previous declarations I showed that Turkey had not, in any way whatever, acted contrary to article 3 of the Treaty of Peace. At the same time, the council has, I hope, been convinced that the taking of Suleimanieh by the British forces nearly a year after the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne (a fact which was not contested by the representative of the British Government at the last meeting) constitutes an act which is clearly contrary to the letter and to the spirit of that article. As, however, we are dealing with a state of things which is purely provisional, and as the line now proposed in no way prejudices the main question, and as, moreover, the rights of the Turkish Government on the main question are reserved, I shall not insist on this point.

I declare, in the name of the Turkish Government, that I accept the resolution proposed by M. Branting, and I declare further that this resolution will be executed loyally and completely by the Government of the Turkish Republic.

Allow me now, Gentlemen, to reply in a few words to the observations of Sir Cecil Hurst.

The honourable representative of the British Government spoke of two villages which can be studied on the map. I am entirely at the disposal of the *rapporteur* for the purpose of seeing whether there is any change to be made in the report on this point.

As regards the proposal that delegates of the two Governments should meet for the purpose of executing the resolution, I consider that proposal entirely reasonable and of value, and I shall certainly suggest it to my Government, which will, I hope agree, and send a delegate to meet a British delegate on the spot to execute strictly the resolution proposed.

The British representative spoke of the inhabitants of certain villages which have remained in Turkish territory. It is hardly necessary for me to say that there are hundreds of thousands of Christians living in Turkey who are good citizens of that country. They are properly treated and there is no difference between the treatment of Christians and of Moslems. It is therefore superfluous to make a declaration on this subject or to state that no differential treatment will be applied to the inhabitants of the two villages in question. These inhabitants will be treated exactly like citizens of the Turkish Republic.

In order to ensure peace and tranquillity in the neighbourhood of the frontier, the Government of the Turkish Republic will make it its duty to execute energetically and strictly the resolution adopted by the council.

M. BRANTING (*rapporteur*) said that Sir Cecil Hurst had dealt in his observations in the first place with a little village called Nerva. According to the map, which was authentic, this village lay to the south of the provisional frontier line.



The other village, called Dotaza, was shown on the map as being situated on the frontier line itself. But as this village was on the headwaters of a stream flowing south, it would be natural to conclude that the line should pass to the north of that village.

THE PRESIDENT said that they had heard M. Branting's report which had been prepared after a thorough and impartial consideration of the question. They had heard the explanations given by the *rapporteur*, which solved the question raised by Sir Cecil Hurst in regard to the two villages of Nerva and Dotaza.

They had also noted the declarations made by the representatives of the two parties accepting on behalf of their respective Governments the decision which had been suggested to them.

He submitted the resolution for the council's approval.

(The resolution was unanimously adopted.)

THE PRESIDENT said that the council felt convinced that the promises made to them by the representatives of the two Governments regarding the re-establishment of peace in that part of the world would be fulfilled, and that the measures laid down by the Council of the League of Nations would be strictly carried out.

M. BRANTING added that he desired to tender his own thanks and those of his colleagues to the Belgian cartographer, who had been placed at their disposal and whose assistance had been of the greatest value.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the *rapporteur* for the tribute he had paid to a distinguished officer of the Belgian army.

SIR CECIL HURST, on behalf of his Government, thanked the *rapporteur* and the members of the council for the efforts they had made to bring about the settlement which they had just adopted.

HIS EXCELLENCY FETHY BEY associated himself with Sir Cecil Hurst in tendering on behalf of the Turkish Government his thanks to M. Branting, the *rapporteur*, who had taken infinite trouble to arrive at a conclusion acceptable to both parties.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was voicing the sentiments of the council in tendering his own thanks to M. Branting for the efforts he had made to arrive at a satisfactory solution of this difficult problem.

#### No. 103.

*High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—*  
(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 5.)

(No. 564.)

November 4, 1924.

A COLLISION occurred between Irak police and small party of Turks at Challek on 30th October. It appears that the police of Chakalla post were engaged in investigating a tribal affray north of that post and came upon a party of eighteen Turks with mails near Challek, which was on the line of the Turkish communication through Sindi Guli country.

Turks, when called to halt, opened fire, and the police replied; one Turk was killed, eight captured. About ten Turks escaped with the mails. Irak police were at fault in going so close to Challek, which is beyond the line of our posts, and I am taking steps to provide against any forward movement by Irak police beyond the old line before 15th November. Forward Turkish movement reported in my telegram No. 536 (No. 229 S to Constantinople) seems to have been primarily responsible for the incident.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 247 S. Addressed to Secretary of State for the Colonies.)

#### No. 104.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 176.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 5, 1924.*

FOLLOWING sent to-day by Chief of Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, Bagdad:—

"With reference to Brussels telegram No. 160 to Foreign Office, I conclude you are prepared to send an officer to discuss with the Turkish commander the effect of the proposed line. You should bear in mind that no discussions of details should be allowed in any way to affect the withdrawal of all Turkish troops behind the line by 15th November. It is of the utmost importance that nothing should be done to allow the Turks to delay their withdrawal by saying that we are discussing this point.

"We deprecate any forward movement of your troops from their present positions.

"Inform us broadly, after consultation with the High Commissioner, what military, police and administrative posts you propose to hold after completion of Turkish withdrawal."

Above is for your information only.

#### No. 105.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 177.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 5, 1924.*

FOLLOWING sent to-day by Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Bagdad, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 564, repeated to you No. 247 S:—

"I presume Turkish prisoners have been released. If not this should be done at once. I count upon you to take all possible steps to prevent recurrence of similar incidents, diplomatic effect of which, as you will realise, cannot but be most unfortunate in existing circumstances."

Above is for your information only.

#### No. 106.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 9.)*

(No. 198.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, November 8, 1924.*

NOTE from Turkish delegation of 8th November notifies me that Turkish Government and, in consequence, local officials were late in receiving detailed definition of Brussels provisional frontier line between Irak and Turkey. While officials have now received necessary instructions Turkish Government fear that work of applying agreed *tracé* on the spot may not be finished by 15th November.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 59.)

[E 9736/5711/65]

#### No. 107.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 10.)*

(No. 815.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, November 4, 1924.*

THE news of the decision by the Council of the League of Nations at Brussels about the Irak frontier question was announced in the Turkish press on the morning of the 30th October, but, perhaps because the news agencies had so much to telegraph about the British elections, only the barest details were given, to the effect that His Majesty's Government's contention as to the *status quo* line to be observed had been upheld. Constantinople had to wait till the arrival of the European newspapers



before finding out exactly what had been decided, and no serious comment appeared till to-day. The "Gazette" did, indeed, print an article of violent protest (it said: "Nous avons l'amertume de constater que la thèse de M. Branting a prévalu"), but no other paper had any observations to make, and for three days almost complete silence reigned on the subject.

2. In his speech opening the Grand Assembly on the 1st November the President made two references to the subject. The first was in that part of his address dealing with internal affairs, and after stating that these were proceeding in a satisfactory manner, he said: "There have, it is true, been misdeeds committed by Nestorians in the interior of our Vilayet of Hakkari, but, thanks to the measures taken, the affair has been settled expeditiously and with decision in accordance with the wishes of the public and the dignity of the republic." The other mention of the question is in the part of the speech dealing with foreign affairs: "We await the decision on the subject of the Vilayet of Mosul, hoping that it will be in conformity with justice and law. The dispute which has recently arisen over the *status quo* has been provisionally settled by the League of Nations." Thus, in a typically Turkish manner, the President, inferentially, at any rate, maintains the official point of view that the Turkish incursions of September were a purely internal affair (see official communiqué reported in my telegram No. 170 of the 8th October), from which all question of the line of the frontier is removed. I imagine that His Majesty's Government will not desire to object to this elaborate hair-splitting about the Hakkari territory, and that they will be content if the Turks conform to the League's decision and evacuate the Sindi Guli district without delay.

3. Full details are now published of what the League's decision really was. The descriptions of the provisional line are accurately given, but without large scale maps they do not convey much information. However, the papers make it quite clear to their readers that the League considers the Turks to have been wrong in crossing the Hezil River and that the line now fixed is purely provisional. Comment is rather varied in quality and scanty in amount. The point that arouses most disappointment is that the British have not been made to evacuate Suleimanieh. On the general issue, some of the papers profess satisfaction at the decision and some find that the British have got the best of it. There is little or no recrimination and nothing to be complained of from our point of view.

4. Seeing Nusret Bey to-day, I thought it well to make no representation to him as to necessity of withdrawing the Turkish troops at once behind the newly-drawn provisional line, but I asked him if the Turkish Government had accepted the proposal to depute British and Turkish officers to mark on the spot where the line should run. Nusret had no information on this subject, and, indeed, I gathered that he knew no more about the League's decision than he had read in the press.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 108.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 13.)*

(No. 203.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 180.

*Constantinople, November 12, 1924.*

I handed note to Nusret to-day in the sense of your instructions, emphasising importance of withdrawing troops from behind agreed line by 15th November. He said that he thought Turkish troops had already received orders in this sense, but was not sure.

I also saw Fethi this afternoon and made the same point to him.

He told me that while in Paris he had received telegram from Adnan forwarded to him from Brussels asking for further details of provisional line. I think he was speaking the truth, and that, whether delay was justifiable or not, Adnan did not get details of line till lately.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 63.)

[E 9708/5711/65]

No. 107A.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 180.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, November 11, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 198 of 8th November: Turco-Irak frontier.

There is no justification for any delay in notifying Turkish local officials. Detailed description of line was received by Turkish and British delegations at Brussels simultaneously on 29th October, and was telegraphed by us verbatim to Constantinople and Bagdad on 30th October. Turkish delegation could easily have done likewise. We cannot therefore admit that Turkish delay affords any valid reason for not finishing work of applying agreed *tracé* on the spot by date laid down by Council of League, i.e., 15th November. Even if any delay occurs in connection with small details on the spot there is not the slightest reason why this should in any way interfere with the withdrawal of the Turkish posts to places behind the agreed line.

Please inform Turkish Government accordingly in such form as you think best.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8.)



No. 109.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Acting Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).*(Telegraphic) *En clair.**Foreign Office, November 15, 1924.*

KINDLY communicate following to Irak Frontier Commission:—

"We are not yet aware what plans commission may be making, but in case they contemplate visiting regions in dispute they may like to know at once that, after December, climatic conditions in mountainous districts in the north are extremely severe and many places inaccessible. Commission may therefore wish to proceed to Irak without delay, in which case we will gladly arrange all possible facilities and give advice regarding equipment, &c. We venture to send this telegram as we desire to place all available information at disposal of commission, who will doubtless be anxious to eliminate any avoidable delay in accomplishment of their task."

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 181, and to Bagdad, No. 9, in (R).)

No. 110.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 15.)*

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, November 15, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 203.

Turkish delegate has sent me message to say that all Turkish troops and authorities will be behind provisional line by to-night.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 65.)

[E 10061/7/65]

No. 111.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 1215.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 17, 1924.*

THE Turkish Minister took the opportunity of our first official meeting to express the hope that the questions between us in dispute as to Mosul might be expeditiously arranged, and indicated the possibility of coming to an agreement without waiting for a decision by the League of Nations. In this connection he alluded to conversations begun with the late Government, of which I had no knowledge.

I said that I would look into the position and see whether they could be fruitfully carried further.

I am, &amp;c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 10056/232/65]

No. 112.

*Secretary-General, League of Nations, to Foreign Office.—(Received November 19.)*

Sir,

*Geneva, November 17, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a certified copy of the following document:—

Decision of the Council of the League of Nations relating to the application of the principles of article 22 of the covenant to Irak.

In execution of the final provision of this decision, certified copies of this instrument are being forwarded to all the members of the League of Nations.

I have, &amp;c.

ERIC DRUMMOND,

*Secretary-General.*



Enclosure in No. 112.

*Decision of the Council of the League of Nations relating to the Application of the Principles of Article 22 of the Covenant to Irak.*

THE Council of the League of Nations:

Having regard to article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923;

Having regard to article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

In view of the communication which has been made by the Government of His Britannic Majesty to the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, in the following terms:

"Whereas the territory of Irak, which formerly constituted a part of the Turkish Empire passed into the occupation of the military forces of His Britannic Majesty in the course of the recent war; and

"Whereas it was intended by the Principal Allied Powers that the territory of Irak should until such time as it might be able to stand alone be entrusted to a mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of article 22 (paragraph 4) of the covenant, and that this mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty; and

"Whereas His Britannic Majesty agreed to accept the mandate for Irak; and

"Whereas His Britannic Majesty has, in view of the rapid progress of Irak, recognised an independent Government therein and has concluded with the King of Irak a treaty with protocol and subsidiary agreements, as set forth in the schedule hereto, and hereinafter referred to as the Treaty of Alliance; and

"Whereas the purpose of the said Treaty of Alliance is to ensure the complete observance and execution in Irak of the principles which the acceptance of the mandate was intended to secure:

"The Government of His Britannic Majesty is willing to agree as follows:

"I.

"So long as the Treaty of Alliance is in force, His Majesty's Government will assume, towards all members of the League of Nations who accept the provisions of this arrangement and the benefits of the said treaty, responsibility for the fulfilment by Irak of the provisions of the said Treaty of Alliance

"II.

"During the currency of the Treaty of Alliance, the Government of His Britannic Majesty, in consultation with His Majesty the King of Irak, will take such steps as may be necessary for the conclusion of special extradition agreements on behalf of Irak. Copies of all such agreements shall be communicated to the Council of the League.

"III.

"An annual report, to the satisfaction of the Council of the League, will be made to the council as to the measures taken in Irak during the year to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated in Irak during the year will be attached to the said report.

"IV.

"No modifications of the terms of the Treaty of Alliance will be agreed to by His Britannic Majesty's Government without the consent of the Council of the League.

"V.

"If any dispute should arise between the Government of His Britannic Majesty and that of another member of the League as to whether the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance or of the present decision are being fulfilled in Irak, or as to their interpretation or application, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League.

"VI.

"In the event of Irak being admitted to the League of Nations, the obligations hereby assumed by His Britannic Majesty's Government shall terminate.

"VII.

"On the conclusion of the period for which the Treaty of Alliance has been concluded, the Council of the League of Nations shall, if Irak has not been admitted to the League, be invited to decide what further measures are required to give effect to article 22 of the covenant."

Accepts the undertakings of the Government of His Britannic Majesty; and Approves the terms of the above communication as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the covenant; and

Decides that the privileges and immunities, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, will not be required for the protection of foreigners in Irak so long as the Treaty of Alliance is in force.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at Geneva, on the 27th day of September, 1924.

[E 10282/7/65]

No. 113.

*M. de Wirsén to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 25.)*

M. le Ministre,

Genève, le 22 novembre 1924.

EN ma qualité de président de la commission chargée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations d'étudier la question de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que, après avoir étudié avec mes collègues les documents et le matériel qui nous ont été fournis par le secrétariat de la Société des Nations et qui proviennent en grande partie des Gouvernements intéressés, nous nous sommes posé certaines questions qui sont formulées dans les feuilles annexées à la présente.

Je vous serais fort obligé de bien vouloir prendre connaissance de ce questionnaire et de faire préparer les réponses écrites que votre Gouvernement voudrait éventuellement bien y faire. Je me permets de vous soumettre notre souhait de prendre connaissance de ces réponses lors de notre visite à Londres. Quant à celles qui exigeraient un travail plus long, nous vous saurions gré de bien vouloir nous les faire parvenir à Bagdad par l'entremise de votre Haut-Commissaire.

Veuillez, &c.

E. DE WIRSÉN.

Enclosure in No. 113.

QUESTIONNAIRE POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE.

*Tableau des Populations de Mossoul par Religions et par Races.*

LA commission désire savoir de quelle façon ont été établies les statistiques (ou recensements), et désire recevoir communication des tableaux détaillés par localités ou par circonscriptions administratives qui, par addition, ont permis de fixer les chiffres globaux de chacune des races et de chacune des religions. A quelles époques de l'année ont été établies les statistiques de 1919 et de 1921 et par qui?

2. D'après le memorandum britannique, les différences existant entre les deux tableaux statistiques sont dues:

(a.) Au retour après la guerre d'un grand nombre d'habitants. La commission désire savoir de quelle catégorie d'habitants il s'agit: sont-ce des sédentaires, des nomades, des ouvriers temporaires?

[13028]

N



(b.) Quels villages avaient été abandonnés avant l'occupation britannique par suite de la famine provoquée par la guerre; où s'était réfugiée la population?

3. La commission désire savoir sur quels principes les autorités britanniques se sont basées pour déterminer la carte ethnographique de la région. Il conviendrait de préciser si les régions ethnographiques sont renseignées par majorité de la race qui les occupe, ou par l'unanimité de cette race. Les nomades arabes sur la rive droite du Tigre sont-ils compris parmi les populations renseignées par la carte ethnographique?

Dans le cas où il aurait été tenu compte de ces populations nomades, prière de faire savoir à quelle époque de l'année correspond cette carte ethnographique.

4. Les documents remis à la commission par le Gouvernement britannique renseignent quatre sandjaks dans le vilayet de Mossoul, tandis que les documents remis par le Gouvernement turc ne renseignent que trois sandjaks. La commission demande s'il est possible de lui fournir une carte de la région avec les divisions administratives des sandjaks, leurs populations par races et, si possible, par religions.

5. Dans la détermination de la frontière entre l'Irak et la Syrie, il est constaté que cette ligne frontière divise en deux parties sensiblement égales l'habitat des Yézidis du Djébel Sindjar (carte ethnographique). Y a-t-il eu des raisons particulières pour que la frontière fût ainsi tracée?

6. Page 4 du mémorandum britannique, alinéa 5: Suivant quelles considérations et d'après quels documents est basée la différenciation établie entre les Kurdes sédentaires et les Kurdes nomades qui sont établis des deux côtés de la frontière nord proposée actuellement par le Gouvernement britannique?

7. La commission désire être renseignée:

- Sur les voies de migration des nomades kurdes descendant à certaines époques des montagnes du nord vers la Mésopotamie et retournant ensuite dans leurs villages. Il serait désirable d'avoir ces renseignements par tribus ou par villages;
- Sur les centres commerciaux et d'approvisionnement des Kurdes et des Arabes sédentaires et des Kurdes et des Arabes nomades de la région du nord des territoires contestés;
- Sur les voies de communications commerciales entre la région de Mossoul et les parties non contestées de la Turquie.

8. Le mémorandum turc signale que, lors de l'occupation anglaise du vilayet de Mossoul, les proclamations y ont été faites en langue turque et non en langue arabe. Cette affirmation est-elle contestée par le Gouvernement britannique et, dans la négative, pour quelle raison cette langue turque a-t-elle été utilisée?

9. Le mémorandum anglais renseigne dans la région contestée des Arabes purs. Certains auteurs (Guinet) certifient que dans le vilayet de Mossoul les Arabes se divisent en *Syriens arabes* et en *Arabes nomades*. Une pareille distinction a-t-elle été constatée par les autorités britanniques?

10. La commission désire avoir un récit détaillé du déplacement vers l'Irak des populations chrétiennes (nombre total des émigrés, dates d'émigration auxquelles elles sont rentrées dans leurs territoires; s'agissait-il de troupes armées ou de populations entières?

11. La commission désire connaître l'avis du Gouvernement britannique sur la personnalité du Général Agha Petros qui semble avoir commandé pendant la guerre des forces assyro-chaldéennes, et qui s'intitule à présent Président du "National Executive Committee" de la Délégation assyro-chaldéenne (?).

12. Prière au Gouvernement britannique de fournir à la commission le "Report on Irak Administration" d'avril 1923 à mars 1924. Si ce document n'a pas encore été publié, il est désirable que la minute en soit communiquée à la commission à son arrivée à Bagdad (si possible en quatre exemplaires).

13. Lord Curzon a déclaré à Lausanne qu'il ressort des statistiques douanières du Gouvernement de l'Irak que le Royaume de l'Irak et, à un degré moindre, la Syrie constituent le débouché et la voie de passage du commerce d'exportation en provenance du vilayet de Mossoul. La commission, possédant les rapports pour les années 1921 et 1922 (Department of Customs and Excise—Administration Reports), s'informe auprès du Gouvernement britannique s'il possède d'autres documents au sujet des statistiques douanières. Dans l'affirmative, il est désirable que des copies en soient remises à la commission.

14. La commission désire savoir du Gouvernement britannique s'il possède des documents concernant le commerce intérieur entre les différentes parties de l'Irak (territoire actuel et territoire contesté). Il est souhaitable que ces renseignements puissent être détaillés par sandjaks et localités. Le Gouvernement britannique possède-t-il des documents renseignant l'état des relations commerciales entre l'Irak et le Kurdistan?

15. Le mémorandum britannique renseigne que l'Irak central et méridional ne peuvent se passer des produits de la région septentrionale. A l'appui de sa thèse, il signale que pendant la guerre il a été très difficile de nourrir une population qui était ainsi coupée des plaines à blé du nord.

A cette époque, l'Irak méridional était occupé par de nombreuses troupes dont la subsistance était assurément difficile; le Gouvernement britannique estime-t-il qu'en temps normal, les productions de la région septentrionale sont indispensables aux régions centrales et méridionales? Le Gouvernement britannique pourrait-il fournir des statistiques renseignant les productions en blé des différentes parties de l'Irak (y compris la région contestée)?

16. La commission désire être renseignée sur le lieu d'origine des cotonnades et produits d'épicerie destinés au pays de Mossoul, ou passant en transit par Mossoul, à destination de la Turquie. Dans la situation normale, ces marchandises à destination ou passant par Mossoul, viennent-elles par la Méditerranée ou par le golfe Persique?

17. Dans le mémorandum britannique (p. 9: Cas des Assyriens), il est dit que cette peuplade est disposée à faire preuve de loyalisme envers l'Irak en échange d'un traitement favorable de la part de ce Gouvernement. Y a-t-il une autorité reconnue par l'ensemble des tribus assyriennes, autorité avec laquelle le Gouvernement de l'Irak a pu échanger des vues? Quelles sont éventuellement les conditions posées par ces populations assyriennes pour se mettre sous la dépendance du Gouvernement de l'Irak; ce Gouvernement a-t-il fait des promesses à ces populations quant au sort qu'il leur réservera?

18. Des objections ont été soulevées par le Gouvernement britannique contre un plébiscite de la population à l'effet de déterminer les aspirations nationales de cette population; la commission désire être renseignée sur le processus suivi par le Gouvernement britannique pour faire les référenda destinés à:

- Déterminer si les trois vilayets voulaient être réunis en communauté;
- Donner leur avis au sujet de l'accession de l'Émir Faïçal au trône de l'Irak.

Il est désirable que la commission soit renseignée de façon détaillée sur le processus suivi et reçoive communication des résultats locaux relatifs non seulement à chacun des sandjaks, mais également à chacune des localités. Comment le droit de vote s'est-il exercé; fut-il secret ou non; fut-il individuel ou collectif?

19. La commission prie le Gouvernement britannique de vouloir bien lui communiquer le "Blue Book of Turkey, No. 1 (1923)".

20. Le Gouvernement turc relève, dans son mémorandum, p. 5, certaines contradictions entre les documents fournis par la délégation britannique et le "Report on Irak Administration" d'octobre 1920 à mars 1922, p. 2. La commission voudrait savoir si l'interprétation suivante du mémorandum turc est acceptée par le Gouvernement britannique:

"Il serait juste d'inférer que le sandjak de Souleïmanieh n'a non seulement pas voté en faveur d'une union avec l'Irak, mais bien plutôt il s'est opposé à toute sorte d'incorporation à ce dernier, tandis que le sandjak de Kirkouk a nettement refusé de se soumettre au Gouvernement de l'Émir Faïçal."

La commission désire être renseignée sur les faits suivants:

- La population de Souleïmanieh a-t-elle ou n'a-t-elle pas refusé de prendre part au vote pour la réunion à l'Irak?
- A-t-on demandé à la population de Souleïmanieh de voter pour ou contre l'Émir Faïçal, ou bien cette demande ne lui a-t-elle pas été adressée? Si cette population a voté, combien d'habitants ont pris part au vote? Et parmi ceux qui ont pris part au vote, quel est le nombre de ceux qui ont voté pour l'Émir Faïçal et de ceux qui ont voté contre l'Émir Faïçal?
- Au sujet du vote, s'agit-il de la ville de Souleïmanieh ou du liwa (département de Souleïmanieh)? Mêmes questions que ci-dessus pour ce qui concerne la ville ou le liwa de Kirkouk.



21. La page 7, paragraphe 2, du mémorandum turc renseigne 223 (146 plus 77) localités du vilayet de Mossoul dont, d'après lui, la population est composée en grande majorité de Turcs. Le Gouvernement britannique peut-il nous fournir les documents originaux concernant les referenda dans ces localités et plus particulièrement dans les localités citées nominativement dans cet alinéa du mémorandum turc.

22. A la conférence de Constantinople (juin 1924), le Gouvernement britannique a proposé une frontière située plus au nord de celle proposée par lui en 1923. La commission désire être fixée sur les questions suivantes :

- (1.) Le Gouvernement britannique entend-il englober dans le gouvernement de l'Irak les territoires situés entre ces deux frontières ?
- (2.) Dans l'affirmative, se base-t-il sur une démarche des habitants ? (Si cela est, la commission désire avoir copie de ce document.)
- (3.) Quel est le nombre d'habitants entre les deux frontières proposées ? Ce renseignement devrait être fourni pour différentes époques de l'année et établi par villages, par races, par religions. Y a-t-il parmi ces populations des nomades, et quelles sont, dans ce cas, leurs voies de migration ?

23. Page 9, alinéa 8, du mémorandum turc : Le mémorandum turc relève l'importance que présentent la ville et le vilayet de Mossoul pour les communications entre la Turquie et la Perse ; dans le cas où Mossoul serait attribué à l'Irak, comment le Gouvernement britannique envisage-t-il les communications commerciales entre ces deux pays musulmans ?

24. Le Gouvernement britannique peut-il indiquer à la commission quels sont les effectifs de troupes d'occupation existant actuellement dans la région contestée ? Elle voudrait être fixée notamment sur :

- (1.) Le nombre d'officiers européens ;
- (2.) Le nombre d'officiers indigènes qui ne sont pas de la région contestée ;
- (3.) Le nombre d'officiers indigènes qui sont de la région contestée. Idem en ce qui concerne les gradés et les soldats. Il est désirable qu'une différenciation soit établie entre les officiers gradés et soldats natifs de la région contestée (race turque, kurde, arabe) et leur religion.

25. Le Gouvernement de l'Irak ayant, depuis juin 1921, ouvert des centres de recrutement de volontaires pour l'armée, la commission désire être renseignée sur la situation géographique et ethnographique de ces centres de recrutement. Il est souhaitable que le Gouvernement britannique puisse lui fournir des renseignements sur la façon dont se font ces recrutements ainsi que sur le nombre de volontaires ainsi recrutés dans chaque centre, en les différenciant par races.

26. Le Gouvernement britannique peut-il répondre à la question suivante :

Suivant l'usage et la coutume, les jardins, les terres labourées, les territoires de pacage, les forêts, appartiennent-ils à des individus, à des familles patriarcales, ou appartiennent-ils à la collectivité d'une tribu ou d'un village ?

La commission désirerait être renseignée sur ce point pour les différentes races de la région.

Dans le cas où la frontière nord réclamée par le Gouvernement britannique serait attribuée à l'Irak, il entre dans les intentions de ce Gouvernement d'installer des populations chrétiennes au sud de cette frontière. Le Gouvernement britannique ne craint-il pas que des difficultés pourraient surgir du fait que ces populations occuperaient des territoires immédiatement voisins de ceux qu'ils occupaient précédemment au delà de la frontière projetée ?

No. 114.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 213.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, November 27, 1924.

DELEGATION of Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me, according to military report of 11th November, Nestorians have been reinstalled by force in villages round Bervari and have pillaged other villages inhabited by refugees, such as Alamun and Geramus, which are situated north of line fixed by League of Nations. It is stated that these Nestorians are persons who have escaped from

Turkish jurisdiction, and that if they stay where they are reprisals are bound to follow.

Vali of Hakkari also reports on 15th November that Nestorians advanced as far as Upper Tiari region, which is in Turkish territory, and, having attacked Kelke, which was occupied by Kurds, came to blows with latter and had one gendarme wounded in the arm. Eventually the neighbouring tribes came to the assistance of the Kurds.

Another complaint from military authorities is that Nestorian bands have advanced northwards along left bank of the Zab and searched the villages.

Turkish Government ask that, in order to avoid incidents, Nestorians should not be allowed to settle near boundary line. They request that stolen goods should be returned.

Delegation explained delay in giving this information by internal crisis at Angora. They have only just received instructions.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 67.)

[E 10538/7/65]

No. 115.

Questionnaire for the British Government, with Answers.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 29.)

I. Question.—*Tables of Mosul populations by religions and races. The Commission wishes to know in what manner the statistics (or census returns) were made out, and also to have laid before them the detailed tables by localities or by administrative districts from the addition of which the round figures for each race and religion were fixed. At what season of the year were the statistics of 1919 and 1921 made out and by whom?*

Answer.—(a.) The statistics are contained in two official statements set out in tables 1 and 2 of Part 1 of the British memorandum. These two tables are estimates made in 1919 and 1921 in the following manner :—

The British political officers toured their districts and ascertained from the people themselves the numbers of each race and religion. The estimates were then sent to headquarters and totals published as an official notification. This was done in 1919. In 1921 the figures for the Mosul division were checked and the estimate was increased by some 80,000. Though no corrected estimate was taken for the other divisions, and the 1921 figures therefore remained the same, there was, in fact, an increase in those divisions also.

(b.) The detailed tables are not available in London.

(c.) The estimate of 1919 was taken in the winter. The corrections for the Mosul district incorporated in the revised estimate for 1921 resulted from enquiries carried out over the past two years.

The figures for each division include such nomads as spend the greater part of the year in that division. The discrepancy between the British and Turkish figures is referred to in the detailed reply to the Turkish rejoinder, which is being laid before the Commission separately.

II. Question.—*According to the British memorandum, the differences between the two statistical tables are due to the return after the war of a large number of the inhabitants. The Commission wishes to know—*

(a.) *What category of inhabitants is referred to? Are they sedentary, nomads or casual labourers?*

(b.) *What villages had been abandoned before the British occupation in consequence of the famine arising out of the war? Where had the population of these villages taken refuge?*

Answer.—(a.) As has been pointed out in the answer to question I, no addition appears in the table except for the Mosul division, though there were increases in the other divisions. The increase was due to the return of the inhabitants in the following categories, all of them being sedentary :—

- (i.) Turkish prisoners of war from India.
- (ii.) Turkish soldiers demobilised from the Turkish army.
- (iii.) Deserters from the Turkish army.



(iv.) A number of Christians who had been driven by the Turks from their homes.

(v.) Refugees from the villages referred to below who had fled to the Bagdad Vilayet, after the British occupation of Bagdad, for food during the war and had not returned to the Mosul division till 1919.

(b.) A list of the villages referred to is not available in London, but could, no doubt, be produced in Irak if required. A certain number of inhabitants of these villages fled for refuge to the nearest town both for security and in the hope of food, but those whose absence in 1919 and subsequent return caused the increase in the second table left the Mosul division altogether and took refuge in the neighbourhood of Bagdad when Bagdad was first occupied by the British forces, who instituted a system of poor relief.

III. Question.—*The Commission desires to know what principles have been followed by the British authorities in making out the ethnographical map of the area. It would be convenient to state if the ethnographic areas represent a majority of the race which is shown as occupying them or exclusive occupation by that race. Are the nomad Arabs on the right bank of the Tigris included among the populations represented in the ethnographic map? If so, the Commission desire to know what season of the year is represented by the ethnographic map.*

Answer.—The areas in the ethnographic map are only coloured where the population represented by that colour, including nomads who spend the greater part of the year in the area, is more than 80 per cent. of the total population of the area concerned. In areas where no one population represents a proportion of 80 per cent. no colour is inserted in the map. The nomad Arabs on the right bank of the Tigris are included among the populations represented. The season of the year does not affect the question, since the distribution of races shown by the colours would not be altered by the movements of the nomad Arabs referred to.

(The Commission does not enquire about the movements of nomads on the left bank of the Tigris, but it is well to point out that the movement of Kurdish nomads at certain seasons of the year may slightly affect one of the small areas represented as being inhabited by people 80 per cent. of whom are Yezidis.)

IV. Question.—*The documents submitted to the Commission by the British Government represent that there are four sanjaks in the Mosul Vilayet, while the documents submitted by the Turkish Government represent that there are only three. The Commission enquire whether it is possible for them to be furnished with a map of these areas showing the administrative boundaries of the sanjaks and their population by race and, if possible, by religion.*

Answer.—The British authorities have readjusted the Turkish administrative divisions and, broadly speaking, have divided the Kirkuk Sanjak into two divisions, one of Kirkuk and one of Arbil. It is regretted that no map is available in London showing the Turkish administrative divisions, but the Commission will, no doubt, be able to obtain this from the Turkish Government. A map, showing the boundaries of the divisions into which the area has been divided by the British authorities, will be procurable in Bagdad.

V. Question.—*From the boundary marked on the ethnographic map between Irak and Syria, it appears that this boundary divides into two practically equal parts the habitat of the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar. Were there any particular reasons for this boundary being traced in this manner?*

Answer.—A copy of the Anglo-French Convention by which this frontier was determined is submitted herewith\* for the information of the Commission. It will be noticed that there is a provision for the frontier to be delimited on the ground by a boundary commission. This has not yet been done. It has been found in practice that the line defined in the convention does, as the Commission pointed out, divide in half the natural habitat of the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar. The line has not been exactly observed in practice.

\* Appendix A.

VI. Question.—*Page 4 of the British memorandum, paragraph 5: Following what considerations and based upon what documents is the differentiation established between the sedentary Kurds and nomad Kurds who were established on both sides of the northern frontier now proposed by the British Government?*

Answer.—It is presumed that the fifth paragraph of page 7 is referred to.

By sedentary Kurds the British Government mean Kurds who do not actually move their homes. Such Kurds as during the hot weather merely move out into tents near their own homes are not treated as nomads. The nomads, on the other hand, are those who move their homes and household goods a distance of several days' journey.

VII. Question.—*The Commission desires to be informed (a) on the routes of migration of the nomad Kurds, who descend at certain seasons of the year from the mountains in the north towards Irak and subsequently return to their villages. It is desirable to have this information by tribes or by villages. (b) On the centres of commerce and the supply of the sedentary Kurds and Arabs, and of the nomad Kurds and Arabs of the northern region of the contested area. (c) On the commercial lines of communication between the Mosul district and the uncontested parts of Turkey.*

Answer.—As the Commission expressed a desire that the reply to this question should be accompanied by maps, which will take some time to prepare, the reply will be transmitted to them as soon as possible.

VIII. Question.—*The Turkish memorandum states that after the British occupation of the Mosul Vilayet proclamations were made there in Turkish and not in Arabic. Is this statement contested by the British Government? If not, for what reason was Turkish employed?*

Answer.—It is not the case that proclamations in the Mosul Vilayet have been made in Turkish since the British occupation. They have been made in Arabic in every case; it is only in Kirkuk and possibly in Arbil that they have been published in Turkish. In Mosul town it is just possible that the very earliest proclamations were also made in Turkish, since they were intended to be read chiefly by the official class, for whom, under the Turkish administration, Turkish was naturally the official language. So far as the British Government is aware no proclamations have been made in Turkish in Mosul town since 1919.

IX. Question.—*The British memorandum talks of pure Arabs in the contested area. Certain authors (Cuinet) record that the Arabs in the Mosul Vilayet are divided into Syrian Arabs and nomad Arabs. Have the British authorities found that such a distinction exists?*

Answer.—Though there is undoubtedly a difference in appearance between nomad Arabs and town Arabs, it is impossible to argue from this that they have not a common origin. In any case, whatever their origin may be, the whole population, which is described as Arab in the British memorandum, shares the same traditions and political views. They all alike claim the independence of the Arabs and share the Arab ideals, and the use of Arabic as their mother-tongue.

X. Question.—*The Commission asks to be furnished with a detailed account of the movement towards Irak of Christian populations, giving the total number of the migrants and the date on which they returned to occupy their own territory. Was the movement a movement of armed forces or of entire populations?*

Answer.—Detailed accounts of these movements are contained in two reports\* on the refugee camps in Irak which refer to the period prior to the end of 1920, and in the administrative reports of 1920-22 and 1922-23. Except in one case, the whole population moved together. The exception referred to is the expedition of Agha Petros at the end of 1920, described on pages 104 and 105 of the administrative report for 1920-22. A detailed précis will be furnished to the Commission as soon as possible.

\* Appendix B.



XI. Question.—*The Commission desires to know the opinion of the British Government on the personality of General Agha Petros, who seems to have commanded some Assyro-Chaldean forces since the war, and who styles himself at present President of the National Executive Committee of the Assyro-Chaldean Delegation.*

Answer.—A separate memorandum will be furnished in reply to this question.

XII. Question.—*The Commission requests the British Government to furnish it with the report on the Irak administration from April 1923 to March 1924. If this document has not yet been published, it is desirable that the draft of it may be communicated to the Commission on its arrival at Bagdad (if possible in four copies).*

Answer.—The report referred to has not yet been published. The request of the Commission has been referred to the High Commissioner for Irak for necessary action when the Commission arrive in Bagdad.

XIII. Question.—*Lord Curzon declared at Lausanne that it is evident from the Customs statistics of the Government of Irak that the Kingdom of Irak and, in a less degree, Syria form the outlet and the route for the export commerce originating from the Mosul Vilayet. The Commission possesses the reports of the Department of Customs and Excise for the year 1921-22, but asks the British Government if there are available other documents on the subject of customs statistics. If so, it would be desirable that such copies should be put before the Commission.*

Answer.—The Commission have since been furnished with the British consular reports for 1911 and 1912, which give details as to export traffic from the Mosul Vilayet to the other vilayets of Irak, which would not normally be available from Turkish export figures. As requested by the Commission, His Majesty's Government are making enquiries what other European Powers have published consular reports for the area in question, and will communicate the result of their enquiries as soon as possible. With regard to customs statistics subsequent to 1922, it is suggested that these will be more readily available in Bagdad.

XIV. Question.—*The Commission desires to know if the British Government possesses documents regarding the internal commerce between the different parts of Irak (both the disputed area and the remainder). It is possible such information would be set out by sanjaks and localities. Has the British Government in its possession documents showing the state of the commercial relationship between Irak and Kurdistan?*

Answer.—With regard to internal commerce before the war, please see reply to question XIII above. For statistics of commerce since the war, it is suggested that the Commission should make further enquiries on arrival in Bagdad.

XV. Question.—*It is stated in the British memorandum that Central and Southern Irak cannot dispense with the produce of the northern region. In support of this contention it is stated that during the war it was exceedingly difficult to feed the population which was thus cut off from the grain-producing areas of the north. Southern Irak was at this time occupied by large numbers of troops whose maintenance must have been difficult. Does the British Government consider that in normal times the produce of the north is indispensable to the central and southern areas? Can the British Government furnish statistics of grain production for the different districts of Irak, including the area under dispute?*

Answer.—It is true that there were large numbers of troops in Southern Irak during the war, but owing to the Mosul Vilayet being cut off, supplies of wheat had to be imported for the population, in addition to what was required by the troops. As has been already said in the memorandum the British Government considers that in normal times the wheat produce of the northern area is indispensable to the central and southern areas. Statistics in support of this can readily be obtained in Bagdad.

XVI. Question.—*The Commission desires to be informed as to the place of origin of piece-goods and groceries destined for the Mosul area or passing through that district in transit to destinations in Turkey. In normal circumstances would such merchandise destined for or passing through Mosul be imported from the Mediterranean or from the Persian Gulf?*

Answer.—The whole of the imports of piece-goods and groceries which reach Mosul, either as their final destination or in transit to Turkey, enter from the Persian Gulf through the Port of Basra, as will be seen from the reports of the Department of Excise and Customs for the years 1921-22, which the Commission possess, and from the pre-war consular reports which have now been laid before them.

XVII. Question.—*In the British memorandum (page 9, the case of the Assyrians), it is stated that this people is disposed to prove its loyalty towards Irak in exchange for considerate treatment by the Irak Government. Is there one recognised authority for the whole collection of Assyrian tribes, an authority with whom the Irak Government has been in a position to discuss this question? What are the conditions which these Assyrian populations demand should be fulfilled before placing themselves finally in subjection to the Government of Irak? Has the latter Government made any promises to these populations as to the treatment which it will guarantee to them?*

Answer.—As will be read in the reports referred to in the answer to question X concerning the previous history of the Assyrians, the authority recognised by the Turkish Government before the war was that of the Patriarch, called Mar Shimun, of the Assyrian nation. Although this authority has inevitably been impaired by the life of the nation in refugee camps, it still exists, and it is this authority, acting in council with the Assyrian tribal leaders, that is recognised by the British and Irak Governments as the only channel through which the wishes of the Assyrian community can be authoritatively expressed.

The Assyrians, whose former habitat was outside the frontier now claimed by the British Government, would be prepared to settle permanently in Irak provided that they could be given permanent titles to Government land in suitable places. They also wish that steps should be taken to reduce the risk of malaria, which is prevalent in the area where they desire to settle. The Assyrians from regions within the frontier now claimed by the British Government have declared that if the frontier were drawn in such a way as to leave their homes in Turkey they would not return there. In this case they would desire that land should be given to them in Irak in the same way as the Assyrians from the other side of the frontier. If, on the other hand, the frontier that is now claimed by the British Government is accepted by the League of Nations, they wish to be interfered with as little as possible. They would be prepared to accept an arrangement providing for them to live under a very loose form of control similar to that formerly exercised over them by the Turks, who allowed them to choose their own headmen and to arrange for the collection and payment of their taxes. They would, however, be grateful for supplies of ammunition with which to defend themselves against possible attack.

These requirements were ascertained by the High Commissioner, who consulted the late Irak Government on the whole question of the treatment of the Assyrians. The Irak Government of the day agreed to assign vacant Government lands to the north of Dohuk and in Amadia and the northern highlands, upon which the Assyrians from beyond the proposed frontier could be permanently settled. This assignment would be free of charge and on favourable terms provided that no loss was caused to other Irakians. They also expressed their readiness to accord to the Assyrians both in this area and in the Tiari, Tkhuma, Baz and Jelu country, if this were secured for Irak, a general measure of liberty in the management of their own purely local affairs such as the choice of their own village headmen and the making of adequate arrangements in each village for the collection and payment, subject to supervision by the Irak Government, of such taxes as that Government might fix.

The above decision of the Irak Government was recorded in a resolution of the Council of Ministers passed on Wednesday, the 30th April, 1924. The present Irak Government have, so far as is known in London, not yet expressed any formal opinion on this point, but the Commission will be able to ascertain, on arrival in Bagdad, whether they adhere to the decision recorded by their predecessors.



XVIII. Question.—*The British Government have raised objections to the holding of a plebiscite of the population with the intention of finding out their national aspirations. The Commission desire to be informed what procedure was adopted by the British Government in making the referenda to determine the following questions:—*

- (a) *Whether the three vilayets wished to be united in one community, and*
- (b) *To ascertain the general opinion on the subject of the accession of the Emir Feisal to the Throne of Irak.*

*It is desirable that the Commission should be informed in detail what procedure was adopted and should be acquainted with the local results, referring not only to each sanjak but to each locality. How was the right of voting exercised? Was it secret or not? Was it individual or collective?*

Answer.—In both these referenda the procedure followed was, generally speaking, to collect together the notables, tribal sheikhs, and the representatives of communities, &c., and to ascertain their views. There was no individual voting. In the case of the first referendum the notables and others were collected by kadhas, and were asked three questions which had been previously notified to them, namely:—

1. *Whether they wished to be incorporated in a State containing the three vilayets, Basra, Bagdad and Mosul.*
2. *Whether they considered the State should be under an Emir.*
3. *If so, who should be chosen as Emir.*

As regards the first question, those consulted were unanimous in saying that they wished to belong to a State consisting of the three vilayets.

As regards the second and third questions there were conflicting replies.

There is a record of these replies which can be furnished to the Commission if required.

In the case of the second referendum as to the accession of the Emir Feisal, the notables and important persons were collected in localities, and on this occasion were invited to pronounce upon the specific question whether they were in favour of his candidature or not.

In neither case was there individual voting or secret voting. The representative people, whether notables, sheikhs of tribes, or others, were asked for their opinions on behalf of the communities which they represented, and a declaration was drawn up and signed by them.

As regards the number of those who voted for King Feisal, the detailed figures are not available in London, but the Commission will probably be able to obtain these when they reach Bagdad.

XIX. Question.—*The Commission begs the British Government to be so good as to communicate to it the Blue Book of Turkey, No. 1, 1923.*

Answer.—The Commission have since informed the British Government that they are already in possession of this publication.

XX. Question.—*The Turkish Government draws attention on page 5 of its memorandum to certain contradictions between the documents furnished by the British Delegation in the Report of the Irak Administration, from October 1920 to March 1922, page 12. The Commission would be glad to know whether the British Government accept the following interpretation put forward in the Turkish memorandum:—*

*"It would be reasonable to infer that the Sanjak of Suleimanieh not only did not vote for union with Irak, but even went so far as to oppose 'any form of inclusion' with Irak, whilst the Sanjak of Kirkuk absolutely refused to submit to the Emir Feisal Government?"*

*The Commission desire to be informed on the following:—*

- (a) *Did Suleimanieh refuse to take part in the voting for union with Irak or not?*
- (b) *Were the population of Suleimanieh asked to vote for or against the Emir Feisal, or was this demand not addressed to them? If this population voted, how many of the inhabitants took part in the*

*vote? Among those who took part in the voting, how many voted for the Emir Feisal and how many against him?*

- (c) *On this question of voting, is the town of Suleimanieh in question, or the liwa (district of Suleimanieh)? The same questions as above are asked in connection with the town and district of Kirkuk.*

Answer.—The Commission have already requested that the whole paragraph of the Turkish memorandum from which this sentence is taken, and upon which these enquiries appear to be based, should be considered and replied to in full. The British Government proposes to lay before the Commission a full reply to the Turkish rejoinder, in which this contention, among others, will be dealt with.

XXI. Question.—*Page 7, paragraph 2, of the Turkish memorandum mentions 223 (144 plus 77) localities in the Vilayet of Mosul, of which the population is stated to consist of a large majority of Turks. Can the British Government furnish the original documents relating to the referenda in these localities, and more especially in the localities quoted by name in this paragraph of the Turkish memorandum?*

Answer.—The figures for the second referendum will no doubt be available in Bagdad. His Majesty's Government contend that the Turkish figures are entirely erroneous, there being no Turkomans whatever in either of the two localities referred to by name. This point will be fully dealt with in the British reply to the Turkish rejoinder, and it is hoped that the Commission will visit the localities referred to and satisfy themselves by personal investigation.

XXII. Question.—*At the Constantinople Conference (June 1924) the British Government proposed a frontier situated further to the north than that proposed by it in 1923. The Commission desires to be informed on the following points:—*

- (i) *Does the British Government intend to include under the Government of Irak the territories situated between these two frontiers?*
- (ii) *If so, does it base its case upon any expression of the wishes of the inhabitants? (In this case the Commission wishes to be placed in possession of a copy of the document.)*
- (iii) *What is the number of inhabitants between the two frontiers proposed? This information should be furnished for different seasons of the year by villages, races and religions. Are there any nomads among these populations and if so what are their migration routes?*

Answer.—The British Government wish to make it clear at the outset, as was explained by Sir Cecil Hurst to M. Branting at Brussels, that Lord Curzon never actually proposed a northern frontier for Irak at the Lausanne Conference in 1923. When the question of the northern frontier of Irak came up for discussion, the Turkish delegation put in a memorandum claiming the retrocession of the whole Mosul Vilayet to Turkey. Considerable time was spent in rebutting this claim, but the British Government never stated that the old boundary of the Turkish Vilayet of Mosul would form the most suitable frontier between Turkey and Irak. The British Government have, in fact, never since the Treaty of Sèvres, in which the possibility of an autonomous Kurdistan was contemplated, made any definite proposal for the northern frontier of Irak, other than that put forward by them at the Constantinople Conference:—

- (i) *The British Government certainly contemplate the inclusion under the Government of Irak of all the territories situated to the south of the frontier line claimed by them at Constantinople, subject to special arrangements for limited local autonomy.*
- (ii) *It bases its contention upon the various arguments which are set out in detail in the British memorandum.*
- (iii) *In view of the general explanation given at the commencement of this answer His Majesty's Government find difficulty in replying to the third part of the question. Any further information as to the inhabitants of all the districts immediately south of the frontier now claimed by them, beyond that already provided and in preparation (see answer to question VII) can best be obtained by the Commission on the spot.*



XXIII. Question.—Page 9, paragraph 8 of the Turkish memorandum: The Turkish memorandum calls attention to the importance of the Town and Vilayet of Mosul for communications between Turkey and Persia. If Mosul were allotted to Irak, how does the British Government consider that the commercial communications between these two Moslem countries would be affected?

Answer.—In the first place, the necessity of crossing a portion of Irak would not materially affect commercial communications between Turkey and Persia, because the Irak Government is subject to the Barcelona Convention on Freedom of Transit, and the Turks can thus secure freedom of transit through Irak. No customs duties could be imposed on goods passing from Turkey to Persia and all facilities of transport would have to be accorded. In the second place, the line of commercial communications between Turkey and Central and Southern Persia would, in any case, pass through Irak territory, as that line of communication passes through Bagdad and along the railway from Bagdad to Khanikin. As regards the line of commercial communication between Turkey and Northern Persia, it is true that the line through Mosul, Arbil and Rowanduz would run through Irak territory if Mosul is allotted to Irak; but this line of communications is, in any case, of secondary importance, the main connection between Turkey and Northern Persia passing along the two alternative lines through Van and Erzeroum respectively.

XXIV. Question.—Can the British Government indicate to the Commission the strength of the forces of occupation actually stationed in the contested area? They wish particularly to know (i) the number of European officers; (ii) the number of native officers who are not natives of the contested area; (iii) the number of native officers who are natives of the contested area. The same information is required for non-commissioned officers and men. It is desirable that a distinction should be made between non-commissioned officers and men from the contested area, showing whether they are Turks, Kurds or Arabs by race, and what is their religion.

Answer.—

(a.) Troops in the Mosul Area on October 31, 1924 (approximate), 5,500.

They are made up as follows:—

R.A.F. (1 squadron, 1 armoured car company)	290
Indian army	946
Levies: Assyrians, Kurds and Turkomans	2,330
Irak army: Arabs	1,955

In addition, police posts under civil administration are situated along frontier.

(b.) The Troops in the whole Mosul Vilayet on October 31, 1924 (approximate), 8,500.

The police are not included in the above, but they are mainly local people.

1. The number of British officers in the Mosul Vilayet on the 31st October, 1924 (approximate), 145, made up as follows:—

R.A.F.	66
Levies	69
Indian army	10

Police officers not included: figures can be obtained in Irak.

2. The number of native officers, not natives of the area under dispute (approximate), 16.

3. The number of native officers who are natives of the area under dispute (approximate), 212. (These 212 are all Irak, but it is not known how many belong to the Northern Area. Figures could be obtained in Irak.)

The numbers of non-commissioned officers and men are as follows:—

British	495	Approximate figures on October 31, 1924.
Indian (Mahometan)	920	
Assyrians (Christians)	3,000	
Kurds and Turkomans (Mahometans)	700	
Arabs (Mahometan)	3,200	

Yezidis (Devil worshippers), few; exact number not known.

XXV. Question.—The Irak Government having since June 1921 opened recruiting centres for volunteers for the army, the Commission desires to be informed as to the geographical and ethnographic situation of these centres. The British Government may possibly be able to furnish information as to the method of recruitment and the number of volunteers thus recruited in each centre, with their racial distribution.

Answer.—Recruiting takes place in all areas, but detailed particulars can best be obtained by the Commission when it visits Irak.

The recruits are all volunteers. The total number of volunteers since 1921 cannot be given, as many men have been recruited and discharged, but details of figures and method of recruiting since 1921 should be available in Irak. The numbers of men actually serving are given in the reply to question XXIV, paragraph 3.

XXVI. Question.—Can the British Government answer the following questions? According to usage and custom do gardens, cultivated lands, grazing grounds and forests belong to individuals, to patriarchal families or collectively to tribes or villages? The Commission would like to be informed upon this point for the different races in the area. If the northern frontier claimed by the British Government were accepted for Irak, the British Government intends to settle Christian populations south of this frontier. Does not the British Government fear that difficulties might arise from the fact that these populations would occupy territories immediately adjoining those which they previously occupied on the other side of the proposed frontier?

Answer.—Gardens and cultivated lands are held by individual ownership: grazing grounds and forests are held collectively by tribal villages and communities. The above applies to Arabs, Kurds, Christians and Yezidis alike. With regard to the second part of the question, the British Government anticipates that less difficulty would arise if a sufficient area were allotted to Irak for all the Christians concerned to be settled to the south of the frontier, than if these people were divided between Irak and Turkey. It has not been possible, for strategic, geographical and other reasons, to claim that all the original homes of these Christians should be included in Irak. In view of the fact that they are unanimous in declaring that they will never consent to be under Turkish rule, His Majesty's Government have claimed a frontier which would, in their opinion, enable the communities concerned to be settled permanently in suitable areas outside Turkish jurisdiction. The British Government are fully alive to the danger foreseen by the Commission, and it is with the object of reducing it to a minimum that they have made their own proposal.

[E 10845/7/65]

No. 116.

(1.)

Minutes of the Meeting of Committee of Investigation on the Irak Boundary, held on Tuesday, November 25, 1924, at 3 P.M.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, December 3.)

Present:

M. C. E. T. af Wirsén.  
Count Paul Teleki.  
Colonel Paulis.

Mr. Davidson.  
Major Young.  
Group-Captain Burnett.  
Mr. Jardine.

MR. DAVIDSON said that the purpose of this meeting was really to settle the lines on which the representative of His Majesty's Government would proceed in laying before the meeting the facts that the Commission desire to know. He would like to say how much they welcomed the appointment of this Commission. On general grounds it had always been the British point of view that the proper way to settle this question was by a commission to investigate the facts and not by means of a plebiscite. He wished to refer quite shortly to the decision of the Council of the League and to the discussions which had led up to this decision.

At Geneva the British representative had dealt with two preliminary points: (1) whether the question which had to be settled was the detachment of the Mosul



Vilayet from what has hitherto been administered by Irak or a settlement of the frontier between Turkey and Irak; and (2) the method of procedure to be adopted.

(Here Mr. Davidson read extracts from the Minutes of the Geneva Meetings of the Council of the League of Nations.)

He said that it was unnecessary for him to deal with the first of these points since the Council had decided that the question before it was that of the settlement of the frontier, as laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne. With regard to the method of procedure, he pointed out that the issue between the appointment of a commission and a plebiscite was clearly stated by Lord Parmoor, the British representative, and by M. Branting, the *rappporteur*, and that M. Branting's draft resolution in favour of the British proposal that a commission should be appointed was adopted by the Council. His Majesty's Government regarded this as a decision in favour of a commission of investigation as opposed to the holding of a plebiscite.

Mr. Davidson further pointed out that, by appointing his Excellency Count Teleki, a well-known authority on ethnological questions, to sit on this Commission, the Council had had in mind the lines which the British Government had suggested, namely, the study of the actual facts concerning the races affected by the frontier and their traditional tendencies and political interests.

He understood from the letter received by His Majesty's Government from the Secretariat-General of the League that the Commission wished to have laid before it such documents as the British Government might think fit to submit, and the fullest information as to the British point of view.

The British point of view, which was summarised in the memorandum presented by the British representative to the Council of the League at Geneva, had already been formulated by Lord Curzon at Lausanne and further developed in the course of the discussions at Geneva. This British memorandum was replied to by a Turkish memorandum, also in the possession of the Commission. As far as the arguments in the Turkish memorandum were concerned, these had been dealt with by the Council in rejecting the Turkish suggestion of a plebiscite.

Mr. Davidson said that, in the view of the British Government, the Turkish memorandum was a mass of inaccuracies and mis-statements of fact and also of misquotations from certain documents. The British Government would like to have an opportunity of answering that memorandum in detail in order to show what their contention was as to the actual facts which had been put forward by the Turkish representatives, and also to correct misquotations which had been made from such books as the "Encyclopædia Britannica."

After the Commissioners had held a short consultation, COUNT TELEKI pointed out that the Commissioners had carefully examined the British and Turkish memoranda and other relevant documents, such as the Treaty of Lausanne, various League of Nations documents, &c. They had then drawn up a questionnaire which they had presented to both the Turkish and British Governments.

Before going any further, the Commission, he said, would like to point out that the Council, in setting up this Commission, had in no way restricted its liberty of action, i.e., if necessary, the Commission would be at liberty to recommend the holding of a plebiscite, or any other mode of procedure which it should consider opportune.

MR. DAVIDSON thanked Count Teleki for his explanation. The British Government had no objection to putting forward again the reasons why they were averse from a plebiscite. It was not because they did not want the wishes of the people to be ascertained, but because they did not believe it possible to ascertain them in that way. They considered that the only way to ascertain their wishes was to find out facts as to their race, political traditions, &c. He wished it to be recorded that the British Government had formed the opinion that their objections to a plebiscite were *prima facie* endorsed by the Council, and that they had already been accepted by the Turks themselves in the Treaty of Lausanne, where the same issue had been raised by Lord Curzon, between a plebiscite and reference to the League. He then suggested that to assist His Majesty's Government in preparing a full reply to the questionnaire it might be convenient to go through it orally in order to ensure that the points on which the Commission desired information were fully understood. This proposal was accepted, and the meeting then passed to the consideration of the questionnaire.

#### Question 1.

MR. DAVIDSON pointed out that these statistics were based upon no actual census. An estimate had been made out by British political officers, who toured the districts and saw the people. These reports were then sent in to headquarters, and the totals were published as an official statement. Mr. Jardine, who was one of the political officers who actually went to this part, would give them an account of the procedure followed, and when the Commissioners arrived in Irak there would be officers there, who had taken part in the administration at that time, who could give them further information.

He wished to make one particular point: this estimate was based on religions and races. So far as the British Government were aware, the Turkish census was based only on religions, as it had been made for the purpose of conscription. This census, therefore, did not give a proper basis for arriving at the racial distribution.

COLONEL PAULIS asked if there was a difference between Turks and Turkomans.

MR. DAVIDSON replied that there was a distinct difference. The only connection was that they came from a common origin.

COLONEL PAULIS asked at what time of year the census had been taken.

MR. JARDINE explained that a census had not been taken in order to arrive at these figures, though one had been taken later. The particular estimate to which they were referring was originally made towards the end of 1919 in the Mosul Vilayet. The vilayet was divided into four divisions. Each division had one political officer, under whom there were from two to ten assistant political officers. Each assistant political officer had a small district in which he visited as many villages as he could, questioned the people, counted the houses and consulted what Turkish records he could find, &c. These assistant political officers sent their results to the political officer of the division. The estimates from the whole vilayet were then sent to Bagdad. In reply to a question by Colonel Paulis, Mr. Jardine said that these enquiries were made at the end of the year.

COLONEL PAULIS asked if there were any nomads in the vilayet at that time.

MR. JARDINE replied that some of the Arab nomads would be out of the district, but that they were included in the estimate from previous enquiries and from enquiries made in their absence.

MR. DAVIDSON pointed out that the Turkish figures applied only to settled populations, as the Turks themselves admitted in Part II, section 1, of their memorandum, although in their further arguments they dealt with them as if they were the total of the whole population.

#### Question 2.

MR. JARDINE explained that these people were settled. The reason for the increase in numbers between 1919 and 1921 was as follows. Some had been taken to India as prisoners of war and returned during that time. Others had been demobilised from the Turkish army. Others had deserted, and a great number of Christians who had been driven by the Turks from their homes had returned to Mosul. Mr. Davidson pointed out that the increase was, of course, a pure estimate. The Commissioners would notice that it referred only to the Mosul district. Although increases had probably occurred in other districts, this information had not been secured.

#### Question 3.

MR. JARDINE said that he could not give a list of villages which had been abandoned and from which the inhabitants had fled. In general, they were very small villages, and the inhabitants had fled to the larger towns. Firstly, because defence was easier, and, secondly, because food was cheaper in the large towns. Even in the large towns the populations were decimated. Those that were left were starving.

#### Question 4.

Replies to this question could be obtained in Bagdad.



## Question 5.

MAJOR YOUNG replied to this question by reference to a map. He explained that the line had never been delimited on the ground, and that the British Government had always hoped that when the time came to delimit it they would be able to induce the French Government to agree to some slight modification. In practice, this line had never been exactly observed.

## Questions 6 and 7.

To be answered in written reply.

## Question 8.

MR. DAVIDSON replied that from 1919 all proclamations had been published in Arabic, although in some cases they may have also been published in Turkish.

MR. JARDINE pointed out that there is a possibility that the first proclamation may have been published in Turkish only, as it referred possibly to Turkish officials.

## Question 9.

MR. DAVIDSON said that whether there was a distinction in origin or not, the traditions and the political views of all these Arabs were exactly the same; they were all equally inclined to Arab independence, to attachment to an Arab kingdom, to the use of Arabic as their language, &c.

## Question 10.

MAJOR YOUNG promised that official reports on the subject of refugees should be given to the Commission.

## Question 11.

MAJOR YOUNG promised to furnish a memorandum on the personality of Agha Petros. The British Government had always been prepared to allow his return if his countrymen had desired it.

## Question 12.

MR. DAVIDSON said that when he left Bagdad about five weeks ago the political part of the report had been ready for some time, but there were certain of the technical reports and a financial report, which had not yet been made up and the complete report was not therefore ready. The political report would be at the service of the Commission when it reached Bagdad.

## Question 13.

MR. DAVIDSON thought it would be wiser for the Commission to get information on this subject from Bagdad, where they could see the actual reports and consult officials.

## Question 14.

MR. DAVIDSON felt sure that the statistics would be available when the Commission reached Bagdad.

## Question 15.

After some discussion, MR. DAVIDSON said that since the war there had been nothing to prevent grain from coming in, but in fact it had not come in. Full statistics would no doubt be available in Bagdad.

## Question 16.

MR. JARDINE pointed out that, as the Commission would see from statistics when it reached Bagdad, since the Lausanne Treaty there had been a huge increase in the Mosul export trade with Turkey, particularly of piece goods and other manufactured articles imported either from the United Kingdom or India through Basra.

## Question 17.

MR. JARDINE explained that the Assyrian people had their own patriarch, Mar Shimun, who was recognised as the religious authority.

MR. DAVIDSON said that as this question raised a good many rather difficult issues, he would prefer to give a full reply in writing.

It was decided to hold the next meeting on Wednesday, the 26th November, at 10.30 A.M.

(The meeting rose at 4.45 P.M.)

## (2.)

*Minutes of Meeting of Commission of Investigation into the Irak Boundary  
Question, held on Wednesday, November 26, at 10.30 A.M.*

THE meeting continued the discussion on the questionnaire drawn up by the Commissioners.

## Question 18.

With regard to the first part of this question, MR. DAVIDSON explained that the procedure followed was, generally speaking, to collect the notables and important people in the various communities together and to ask them three questions:—

- (1.) Whether they wished to be incorporated in a State containing the three vilayets—Basra, Bagdad and Mosul;
- (2.) Whether they considered the State should be under an Amir;
- (3.) If so, who should be chosen as Amir.

As regards the first question, those consulted were unanimous in saying that they wished to belong to a State consisting of the three vilayets.

As regards questions 2 and 3 there were conflicting replies.

In reply to a question by COLONEL PAULIS,

MR. DAVIDSON explained that no general vote of individuals was taken, only the vote of notables and representatives of each community.

COLONEL PAULIS asked whether in the Suleimanieh and Kirkuk districts the people were asked to vote.

MR. DAVIDSON replied that in the Kirkuk district they were asked to vote, but that in Suleimanieh they were not asked to do so. There was no record of the fact that they wished to be asked to do so, and it had not been thought desirable at the time that they should vote.

In reply to a question by COLONEL PAULIS,

MR. DAVIDSON explained that between the words "referendum" and "plebiscite" there was not much real difference. He wished, however, to make it quite clear that in the case of the 1919 referendum, it was not a referendum in the sense of asking every person what his individual views were. The representative people, whether notables, sheikhs of tribes, &c., were asked for their opinions on behalf of the communities, and a declaration signed by the responsible people was drawn up.

COUNT TELEKI asked whether the Mahometans had at that time ecclesiastical courts.

MR. DAVIDSON replied that all through the country there were religious courts, in which the questions of personal status, marriage, inheritance, &c., were dealt with. There would be no record of births kept by these religious courts. Such registers were kept by the health authorities.

With regard to the second part of the question, MR. Davidson told the Commissioners that the referendum concerning King Feisal was taken in the same way as that referred to in the first part of this question, except that it was taken in smaller districts. The voting was not in secret. MR. Davidson here pointed out that secret voting in a country of that kind was obviously impossible. The object of secret voting was in order that the people might vote without fear of the consequences. In a country of that kind, whether they voted in secret or not, it would certainly be assumed that they had voted in accordance with their political tendencies. This was one reason why the British Government objected to a plebiscite.

As regards the number of those who had voted for King Feisal, MR. Davidson regretted that he had no figures available, but the Commissioners would probably be able to obtain these when they reached Bagdad.



*Question 19.*

The Commissioners found that they were already in possession of the Blue Book referred to in this question.

*Question 20.*

In response to a request by the Commissioners, Mr. DAVIDSON undertook that a full reply to the points raised in this question should be submitted in writing.

*Question 21.*

As regards the first part of this question, Mr. DAVIDSON pointed out that, excluding Telafar, there were no Turkomans, and never had been any, in the 223 villages referred to. A complete explanation of this would be given in the written reply.

With regard to the second part of the question, the Commission would be furnished with the original documents and details concerning the referenda on their arrival in Bagdad.

*Question 22.*

It was explained to the Commission that the British Government did not propose a definite frontier in 1923. It should not be assumed, as was pointed out to M. Branting by Sir C. Hurst at Brussels, that, in rebutting the Turkish claim for the retrocession of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey, His Majesty's Government were claiming the northern frontier of that vilayet as the Turco-Irak frontier.

*Question 23.*

Mr. DAVIDSON pointed out that the Irak Government was subject to the Barcelona Convention on Freedom of Transit, and that the Turks would thus have freedom of transit through Irak, like any other Power signatory to the convention.

The possession of Mosul by Turkey would, in fact, make no appreciable difference with regard to her communications with Persia, for reasons which would be fully stated in the written reply.

*Question 24.*

GROUP-CAPTAIN BURNETT informed the Commission that there were roughly—

- (i.) 3,000 troops on the Mosul frontier;
- (ii.) 8,400 troops in the whole Mosul area.

Captain Burnett read a list of numbers and distribution of troops which would be given in the written reply.

*Question 25.*

Mr. DAVIDSON informed the Commission that the local troops were voluntarily recruited. The Commission would obtain further details in connection with this question more easily on the spot.

*Question 26.*

As regards grazing grounds and forests, these belonged to tribal villages or communities.

As regards gardens and cultivated lands, they were owned individually.

With regard to the second part of the question, Mr. DAVIDSON pointed out that, once it was known where the frontier was and that there were Turks on the other side of it, there was not the slightest chance of Christians going back, and we should therefore be obliged to settle them. The same remark also answered the latter part of the question, as to whether difficulties would arise; it was because the British Government wished to avoid difficulties in that connection that they had suggested the proposed line.

Mr. Davidson said that he would now like to have a short time in which to prepare the written reply to the questionnaire. He would like to put forward at the same time the reply of His Majesty's Government to the Turkish memorandum.

It was decided to hold the next meeting on Friday, the 28th November, at 3 P.M.

(The meeting rose at 12.5 P.M.)

(3.)

*Minutes of Meeting of Commission of Investigation into Turco-Irak Frontier, held on Saturday, November 29, 1924, at 11 A.M.*

Mr. DAVIDSON called attention to an alteration which the Commission desired to make in the minutes of the last meeting. He said that this alteration would be embodied in the official printed copy of the minutes, of which each Commissioner would receive a copy.

With reference to the reply to the Commission's questionnaire, Mr. Davidson regretted that there had been such a short time to answer the questions, but more information could probably be obtained on the spot. If there were any further questions arising out of the reply, the British Government would be pleased to prepare answers and send them afterwards to the Commissioners.

COUNT TELEKI, speaking on behalf of the Commissioners, stated that there had been only sufficient time to read through the reply, for which he thanked the British Government. He felt sure it would be very helpful to the Commission. They would prefer to study it carefully before deciding whether any further questions were required. If so, they would submit them to the British Government through the Ambassador at Constantinople.

Mr. DAVIDSON said that the appendices to the reply would be annexed to the printed copy.

MAJOR YOUNG informed the Commission that the official answer would be in the form of a letter from the Foreign Office in reply to that of M. de Wirsén.

In reply to a question by Mr. DAVIDSON,

THE COMMISSIONERS said that they would not meet at Geneva before proceeding to Constantinople.

The Commissioners enquired how far the reply to the questionnaire and relevant documents should be considered confidential.

Mr. DAVIDSON replied that, with the exception of the documents relating to military dispositions, there was nothing in the reply of a confidential character.

COLONEL PAULIS remarked that the military dispositions did not concern the Commission, but Mr. Davidson replied that it would be as well for the Commission to keep the military documents. They showed how all the races were serving voluntarily in the levies and in the army of the Irak Government. Recent proposals had been made to bring in neutral officers to command the forces. The military statements showed how difficult it would be to do this.

Mr. DAVIDSON then turned to the question of an assessor accompanying the Commission to Angora, a matter which appeared to be contemplated in the letter from the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations.

COUNT TELEKI replied that the Commission would require a British assessor only at Mosul and on journeys which would be made after leaving Mosul. If there were two assessors, one British and one Turkish, the Commission would be able to have assistance on both sides. It would not be desirable for the British assessor to accompany them to Angora and the arrangements by which the Turkish assessor should reach the Commission in Irak could be settled later.

In reply to a question by COLONEL PAULIS,

MAJOR YOUNG stated that there would be no difficulty over the presence of a Turkish assessor in Irak.

Mr. DAVIDSON then referred to certain maps for which the Commission had asked. They had been roughly made out by Mr. Jardine, who explained them to the Commission.

COLONEL PAULIS then asked how much had been done by the Turkish Government in connection with schools, hospitals and similar institutions in Mosul.

Mr. DAVIDSON explained that, whereas the British and Irak Administration did a great deal in this way, the Turkish Government had done practically nothing, as the Commission would find on enquiry in Mosul.

Mr. Davidson then referred to the British Government's reply to the Turkish memorandum. The Commission had invited the British Government to deal



with that particular section of the Turkish memorandum relating to Sulaimaniya and other points. As to that, the reply was nearly finished, but a few things still required checking. The reply would not be ready before the Commission left London, but it would be sent to Constantinople.

COUNT TELEKI suggested that, as this was an important matter, a copy of the reply should be sent to each Commissioner through His Britannic Majesty's representative at Budapest, Bucharest and Brussels respectively.

MR. DAVIDSON referred to questions asked by the Commission relating to pre-war conditions in Kurdistan. As to that, the British Government would try get copies of books and reports for the pre-war period.

MAJOR YOUNG told the Commission that everything that could be made ready in time would be sent to the Commissioners direct, and if ready later than the 11th December to Constantinople. He then referred to a telegram from the High Commissioner, in which it was stated that Christmas week was the time when most officials were taking holidays, and would therefore be an inconvenient time for enquiries to be commenced. It was agreed that the Commissioners would be unlikely to reach Bagdad before the end of the year.

(The meeting rose at 12 noon.)

[E 10845/7/65]

No. 117.

*Rejoinder to the Memorandum submitted by the Turkish Government to the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva (C. 494, 1924, vii).—(Communicated by Colonial Office, December 3.)*

THE commission having invited consideration of certain statements in the above-mentioned Turkish memorandum, His Britannic Majesty's Government welcome this opportunity of replying to it in detail and of correcting the many misstatements of fact and misquotations which it contains. The decision of the council to accept the arguments as to procedure put forward by the British representative and to appoint a committee to investigate the facts and data has led His Britannic Majesty's Government to believe that the council formed its own opinion of the Turkish contentions and adopted the procedure proposed by the British in preference to that of a plebiscite suggested by the Turks. His Britannic Majesty's Government, while recognising the importance of reaching a solution in accordance with the wishes and interests of the population, has always maintained that the practical difficulties of a plebiscite to settle the frontier between Turkey and Irak are insuperable, and that an attempt to adopt this procedure would involve grave risk to public security and the subsequent oppression of such elements in the population as would be presumed to have opposed inclusion in the State to which they had been allotted. His Britannic Majesty's Government therefore regard with satisfaction the decision of the council, arrived at after the presentation of the Turkish memorandum under reply, in favour of the procedure of investigation of the facts by a commission.

The commission has, however, been good enough to inform the British representatives that as the resolution of the council leaves the commission free to fix its own method of procedure, it is still open to it to consider the practicability and expedience of a plebiscite. His Britannic Majesty's Government have therefore deemed it necessary to deal again with this question in their reply to the Turkish memorandum.

2. In the first section of Part I of the Turkish memorandum it is argued that, since Lord Curzon spent much of his time at Lausanne in refuting the claims put forward by Ismet Pasha for the retrocession to Turkey of that part of Irak which was formerly in the old Mosul Vilayet, the matter left for reference to the Council of the League was therefore limited to the question whether that portion of Irak should remain in Irak or be ceded to Turkey. In support of this view certain passages from a speech made by Lord Curzon on the 23rd January, 1923, have been quoted. Even divorced from their context these passages do little to support the Turkish contention, but when read as a whole it is abundantly clear that Lord Curzon's speech does not admit of the inference drawn by the Turkish Government.

The following quotation from a later passage in the same speech clearly illustrates this:—

"I have thus stated the juridical and treaty basis of the British position and interest in Irak, including the Mosul Vilayet, and I have shown to the commission that the British Government are under a three-fold pledge: firstly, to the Arab nation to whom they promised that they should not be returned to Turkish rule; secondly, to the Arab King, who has been elected by the whole country, including Mosul, and with whom we have entered into obligations; and thirdly, to the League of Nations, without whose consent we cannot abandon our mandate over a large portion of the mandated territory. The only point which remains undetermined is the northern frontier of Irak, which has not yet been fixed by any legal instrument of the Allied Powers."

In the course of a speech made later on the same day Lord Curzon said:—

"I will now deal with the final position adopted by Ismet Pasha. His Excellency strongly argued that the question raised in regard to Mosul should be settled by a plebiscite; that if you can elect a ruler or a king by a plebiscite you can also determine the fate of a country by the same means. Will his Excellency allow me to remind him that this is not the question now before us? The question is not what is to be the ultimate destiny of Mosul, but where the line is to be drawn between the Turkish possessions and the mandated Arab State of Irak—an entirely different question, and of all questions the least suitable for decision by a plebiscite."

It will thus be seen that, although Lord Curzon found it necessary to repudiate the Turkish Government's claim for the rendition of the Mosul Vilayet, he made it quite clear that in devoting so much time to this he was in no way departing from the point of view of the British Government that the question at issue was solely that of the frontier between Irak and Turkey. The efforts of the British Government have been directed throughout to finding the most suitable natural frontier which shall follow approximately the northern boundary of the Mosul Vilayet. Instead of endeavouring to meet the British Government in their attempt to find such a frontier, the Turkish Government have persisted in reiterating their original claim to the whole of the vilayet. Had the British Government followed a similar course, it would have been open to them, and with abundant reason, to claim for the Irak State a very large portion of the Hakkari Vilayet. They could then have argued with equal justice that the question at issue was the determination of the future destiny of the Hakkari Vilayet. The British Government, however, far from attempting to claim the maximum possible extent of territory for the Irak State, have confined themselves to an attempt to arrive at an agreement upon a sound natural frontier. They have been obliged to discuss in detail the question of the whole of the Mosul Vilayet, not because that is, in their opinion, the point at issue, but because it is the only issue which the Turkish Government have thought fit to argue. Had the Turkish point of view been accepted by the British delegation at Lausanne, or by the conference as a whole, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Lausanne would have been worded differently. The wording of the treaty is clear and unmistakable. It is as follows:—

"The frontier between Turkey and Irak shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations."

That was the text finally agreed upon, signed and ratified. That is the basis on which the reference to the Council of the League has been made. Any discussions which may have led up to the acceptance of that text or any communications which may previously have passed between the two delegations at Lausanne cannot be held to affect the provisions of the treaty. That the Council of the League have recognised the position is evident from the terms of their resolution of the 30th September, wherein it was stated:—

"That the council, having had the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and Irak referred to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, . . . decides to set up a special committee of three members . . ."

[13028]



3. The remainder of Part I of the Turkish memorandum is concerned with the proposal that resort should be had to a plebiscite in order to settle the frontier between Turkey and Irak. For the reasons set forth below, the British Government are convinced that this proposal is wholly impracticable.

Except in the case of highly educated, highly civilised and highly organised communities, the result of a plebiscite must be influenced in the main by considerations of a purely political and ethnological character, or by temporary and local influences such as a land dispute, the incidence of a new tax, or misleading propaganda which there would be no time or opportunity of counteracting. A decision to have recourse to a plebiscite to decide the Turco-Irak frontier would mean that insufficient weight would be given by the uninstructed voter to strategical, geographical, economic or administrative considerations. It is in view of these latter considerations that the British Government have refrained from claiming a frontier line considerably to the north of that which they have actually proposed. Should, therefore, the plebiscite be accepted as a suitable means of arriving at a solution, it will be necessary for the British Government to disregard the reasons which have led them to exclude from the Irak State a considerable tract of country which lies to the north of the Mosul Vilayet, and to request that the plebiscite should be applied in this tract also. The tract referred to comprises the larger portion of the original habitat of the Assyrians, and would also include the area inhabited by certain Kurdish tribes who have made overtures to the Irak Government and by certain Arab tribes who live beyond the frontier line proposed by the British Government. Of the Assyrians who used to inhabit the area referred to, a number are now settled in Irak, but a very considerable number are at the present moment scattered over the world in Russia, the Caucasus, and elsewhere. It would presumably be necessary to endeavour to ascertain their wishes. It would clearly be inequitable in any case to adopt the Turkish suggestion that the operation of the plebiscite should be confined to the Mosul Vilayet, and the onus lies on those who propose a plebiscite to put forward some just and practicable method of fixing the area in which the plebiscite can be taken.

Assuming for the moment that a coherent result could be obtained from a plebiscite held throughout the whole of such an area, it is obvious that, if a genuine vote is to be obtained, it would be necessary to remove from the area concerned all forces, whether Turkish, Iraki or British, which are now responsible for the maintenance of security therein. The suggestion on p. 5 of the Turkish memorandum that the local forces could be placed under neutral officers and used to maintain order and preserve an impartial atmosphere is quite impracticable. The commission will have an opportunity of forming their own opinion on this suggestion. The present forces would have to be replaced by some entirely neutral force. It would be difficult enough to find a neutral force that could maintain security in such a mountainous and difficult area even in ordinary times. The inception of a plebiscite would undoubtedly be accompanied by energetic Turkish propaganda. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to restrain the Irak Government from indulging in counter-propaganda. The resulting excitement can easily be imagined. The maintenance of order would require a very large neutral force; and however numerous and efficient the force, however watchful in attempting to check intimidation, it is doubtful whether a true expression of their wishes could now be obtained from those tribes on the northern confines of Irak, who, as recently as last September, met the full force of Turkish "punitive measures," and who, their relatives killed, their homes and possessions destroyed by the invading Turkish forces, know well the dangers attendant upon voting against inclusion in Turkey.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the evil consequences that flow from a frontier settlement by plebiscite. They are a matter, not of theory, but of actual experience. The minority inevitably find themselves in an unhappy position when the verdict goes against them. They are exposed to reprisals and to persecution. Their loyalty to the State in which they have been incorporated against their will is suspect. Their relations with their neighbours, who have voted the other way, are seriously compromised. It is a matter of common knowledge that all this has happened, and is happening at the present moment, in European States whose frontiers have been determined by the League of Nations by means of a plebiscite. If the danger exists in Europe, and experience has proved that it does exist, it will be far greater in a remote region such as the Irak frontier, where the restraints of general public opinion are necessarily less operative.

It need hardly be pointed out that a secret ballot, even if it were practicable amongst illiterate tribesmen, which it is not, would be of no effect in counteracting the evils detailed above for the simple reason that the voters would always be assumed to have voted according to their well-known political and racial predilections.

Four main objections to the plebiscite proposal have been stated above, viz.:-

- (1.) Disregard of strategical, geographical, economic and administrative considerations;
- (2.) The difficulty of defining the area in which the plebiscite is to be held;
- (3.) The difficulty of maintaining order during its progress; and
- (4.) The risk or fear of reprisals against those who vote with the minority.

There is a fifth objection. A plebiscite is a practical solution only of such problems as can be stated in the form of simple questions, which admit only of a few alternative replies. Clearly a frontier problem is not susceptible of being so stated. This fact alone disposes of the Turkish argument that, as certain questions have already been referred to the popular vote in Irak, the British Government are debarred from arguing that a plebiscite would be inappropriate in the present instance. The problems dealt with on the previous occasions could be and were stated in the simple form indicated above.

There is another reason, apart from the different nature of the subject matter involved, why a plebiscite is not a logical corollary of the two previous referenda. In both previous cases an answer was desired not only to simple questions but to questions about which the wishes of no section of the people concerned were clearly known. Further, in both cases for reasons which will be stated in a later paragraph, the Kurdish population of the Sulaimaniya Liwa was omitted from the referendum. In the present instance the wishes of a large section of the population, not indeed as regards the actual frontier line but as regards the problem as the Turks conceive it, namely, the future destiny of the Mosul Vilayet, are perfectly well known. One half the population of the Mosul Vilayet consists of Kurds. Of the other half, three-sixths are Arabs. That these Arabs desire to remain in the Irak State will scarcely be disputed. Two-sixths are composed of the non-Moslem minority, viz: the Yezidis, the Jews and the Christians. The Yezidis have repeatedly expressed their desire to remain in Irak and the same is the case with the Jews and the Chaldean Christians. The Nestorian Assyrians, it is true, would prefer to be included neither in Turkey nor in Irak; but the strongest expression of their wishes has been their determination in no circumstances to return to Turkish rule, of which they retain a most lively recollection, entirely at variance with the statements of the Turkish memorandum. That they would prefer, given suitable safeguards, to remain under a State which will enjoy, for a time at any rate, a considerable measure of British advice and protection, is not open to question. The remaining one-sixth consists of Turkomans. They are contented and prosperous under the rule of the Irak State and there is every reason to believe that they would remain so. Let it be assumed, however, purely for the purpose of the present argument, that they are unanimously desirous of a return to Turkish rule. Thus the position is that the wishes of one-half of the population of the Mosul Vilayet are well-known and that in their case, the plebiscite is completely unnecessary. The other half is composed of Kurds, the great majority of whom are rough tribesmen from whom no coherent expression of opinion could be obtained.

Put briefly, then, the Turkish proposal amounts to this. In order to decide upon the exact allocation of the frontier between Turkey and Irak, the people inhabiting a tract of country which has been under the administration of Irak for the last six years, are to be asked whether they desire to remain in Irak or to return to Turkey. The wishes of half of these people on the point are well-known. The wishes of the other half are not ascertainable by means of a plebiscite. It appears only necessary to state the Turkish proposal in this form to demonstrate how completely impracticable it is.

4. The commission has called special attention in Question XX of their questionnaire to section 4 of Part I of the Turkish memorandum under reply. In particular they have asked whether His Britannic Majesty's Government accept the following interpretation which the Turks have attempted to put on various statements made on different occasions by the British authorities:-

"It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the Sanjak of Suleimanieh not only did not vote for a union with Irak, but even went so far as



to oppose any form of inclusion with Irak, while the Sanjak of Kirkuk absolutely refused to submit to the Emir Feisal's Government."

Except for the statement that the people of the Sulaimaniya Liwa did not vote in either referendum for a union with Irak, His Britannic Majesty's Government do not accept this interpretation, which is contrary to the facts and is a misrepresentation of the statements on which it is supposed to be based.

As regards Sulaimaniya the British memorandum on p. 6 clearly stated that, for the reasons there given, the Liwa of Sulaimaniya was excluded from both the referenda. In the case of the first referendum an additional reason was the fact that at a period so soon after the armistice this district was in purely military occupation and the administrative Government had not been sufficiently reorganised to furnish the necessary machinery. It is known, however, that even at this time the people of Sulaimaniya sent a deputation requesting to be administered from Bagdad, and the civil commissioner deputed an officer to organise the administration. Evidence of this can be obtained by the commission at Bagdad. By the time of the second referendum the administration of the Sulaimaniya district had reached a more advanced stage of development. But the situation was governed at the moment by article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres, which contemplated in certain contingencies the creation of an independent Kurdish State. In these circumstances it was considered most appropriate to exclude from the referendum the one wholly Kurdish Liwa in Irak.

It is to subsequent events in connection with this latter proposal that the quotation from p. 12 on the Report on Irak Administration, 1920-22, refers. If the commission will refer to Appendix VII at the end of the report in question, it will be seen that the High Commissioner took steps to ascertain the wishes of the population, and, while the Kurdish districts of the two other Liwas accepted the terms suggested for their inclusion in Irak, the wholly Kurdish Liwa of Sulaimaniya was inspired by the hope of complete Kurdish autonomy, and would at the time accept nothing less. The issue between inclusion in Irak and inclusion in any other existing State did not arise, and consequently it is wholly misleading to cite this phase of Sulaimaniya opinion as a rejection in any contingency of union with the Irak State.

5. As regards Kirkuk, the facts, which can be verified at Bagdad, are as stated in the British memorandum, namely, that the whole Liwa declared in the first referendum for inclusion in the Irak State, and in the second, with the exception of the town of Kirkuk, for allegiance to King Feisal.

6. In the second part of the Turkish memorandum, under the heading of Ethnographical Considerations, the Turkish Government have reproduced the racial statistics of the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet which their delegation put forward at the Lausanne Conference. These statistics were not referred to during the recent conferences at Constantinople, and it was therefore assumed that the Turkish Government had themselves realised their inaccuracy. As, however, they have now reproduced them, it is necessary for the British Government to repeat that no reliance can be placed upon them. A substantially correct statement of racial statistics will be found in the British memorandum. The method by which these statistics were compiled is described in the answer to question I of the commission's questionnaire. The discrepancy between the figures put forward by the two Governments may partly be explained by the fact that in the area in question Turkish authority, at least in so far as the taking of an accurate census was concerned, never extended beyond certain towns and villages. In the second line of section 1 of Part II of the Turkish memorandum it is in fact admitted that the Turkish figures refer only to the settled population, though for the purposes of subsequent argument the Turkish figures are employed as if they referred to the entire population of the Mosul Vilayet. (See for examples his Excellency Fethi Bey's reference at Geneva to the discrepancy between the British and the Turkish figures for Turks and Arabs and the statement in the Turkish memorandum that the British figure for Arabs is "four times higher than is consistent with truth.")

It is true that the Turkish memorandum gives a rough estimate of 170,000 for "the nomad tribes—Kurds, Turks, and Arabs." No details are given of the proportion of each race, and this is not surprising, since there are, in fact, no Turkish nomads in the Mosul Vilayet. The commission will no doubt enquire from the Turkish Government how the figure of 170,000 was arrived at. It is assumed that the commission are aware that Turkish census figures are habitually made out upon a religious and not upon a racial basis. This no doubt accounts not

only for no attempt having been made to classify the nomads referred to above, but also for the inaccuracies in the Turkish figures for racial distribution of the settled populations, which can easily be verified on the spot. The fear of conscription (which was always associated in the minds of Turkish subjects with the taking of a census) will also explain the Turkish under-estimate of Kurds, Arabs, Yezidis and Christians.

7. The large number of Turks shown in the Turkish Government's statistics may be explained by the not unnatural wish of certain inhabitants of the vilayet, while under the Turkish régime, to ingratiate themselves with the Government by registering themselves as Turks. Possibly also certain minorities, such as the Shabak and Sarli\* and others, may have been erroneously registered as Turks. No statement has, however, been made as to the date of the Turkish statistics or the manner in which the various racial totals were compiled. These points, and particularly that of the date, are of vital importance. The commission will no doubt wish to enquire into them at Angora. The figures appear to have been based upon the very slightest knowledge of the localities concerned. The statement that there are 32,960 Turks and 7,210 Arabs in the Sanjak of Sulaimaniya is itself sufficient to condemn them, and it is hoped that the commission will take an early opportunity of forming their own opinion of the general comparative reliability of the two sets of figures by satisfying themselves on this particular discrepancy. The list of Turkish settlements which is given in the Turkish Government's memorandum does not contain the name of a single place in the Sulaimaniya Sanjak, for the excellent reason that no such settlement exists, with the possible exception of a few Turkomans in the town itself. The British Government are convinced of the substantial accuracy of the figures in the British memorandum, and they welcome the prospect of an independent enquiry into the accuracy of these figures.

8. The Turkish Government state that the Arab population of Irak is settled almost exclusively to the south of the Gayara-Sinjar line and on the right bank of the Tigris, and that, with the exception of the narrow strip from Fatha to Kirkuk, the region on the left bank of the Tigris is almost entirely populated by Kurds and Turks. This statement is wholly erroneous. Along the left bank of the Tigris the Arabs extend to the point where the mountains rise from the plains 30 miles north of Mosul; on the right bank still further north—in fact, considerably north of the Franco-Turkish frontier. Nor is the suggestion in the Turkish memorandum that it is the custom in Mosul to issue official proclamations in Turkish any better founded. As was pointed out in the answer to question VIII of the commission's questionnaire, such proclamations are invariably issued in the Arabic language. In this connection the following passage, which appears on the first page of the published report of the British consul, Mosul, for the year 1912 (a copy of which has been handed to the commission), is of interest.

"Languages.—French and Arabic are the most useful languages."

9. The attention of the commission is particularly invited to the following further instance of Turkish inaccuracy. In the British memorandum it was stated that the town of Tel Afar and the neighbouring Turkoman villages were populated by Turkomans who speak a form of Turkish, and that there were a few scattered Turkoman villages in the Mosul Plain. The Turkish memorandum refers to this statement as follows:—

"The British Government admits that Tel Afar, situated to the west of the town of Mosul, is a Turkish town and that there are a number of Turkish villages round Mosul. In actual fact the nahias of Chehian (*Shaikhan*) and Achairi Seba (*Ashair Saba*) attached to Mosul and comprising 146 localities are entirely populated by Turks, and the nahia which is dependent upon Mosul, and comprises 77 localities, has a population of which the Turks constitute by far the greater majority."

The British Government consider that this is an excellent test case of the reliability of statements made by the Turkish Government. If the commission were to visit the interesting nahia of Shaikhan, so called from the title of the head of

\* The Shabak and Sarli are curious races whose religion is unknown and who, in addition to Kurdish, speak a gipsy language of their own. They are apparently of Persian origin, and their political sentiments are those of the non-Moslem minorities.



the Devil Worshipers, they would find it the headquarters of the Yazidis and the ancestral home of their chief. Of 42 villages which comprise the nahia, 23 are inhabited by the Yazidis or Devil Worshipers, 11 by the Arab Hadidiyin tribe, 6 by a mixture of Yazidis and Hadidiyin Arabs, and 2 by Kurds. The nahia contains neither Turks nor Turkomans of any description. The nahia of Ashair Saba, which contains 73 villages, is so called (Ashair = tribes, Saba = seven) because its inhabitants are the descendants of seven Kurdish tribes, which came for the most part from the *Soran* (Arbil-Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya) area about a century ago. They are now, of course, much intermixed, and many have forgotten to which particular tribe they originally belonged. They have also migrated from time to time into the neighbouring nahias. The names of the seven Kurdish tribes are these: Zangana, Gezh, Shaikh Bizaini (well-known Kurdish tribes, the remainder of which are to be found in their original homes near Kifri), the Rezkerrî, or Rashkerî (said to hail from Ruwandiz), the Gomar, Sharik and Khiderî. The Rezkerrî, or Rashkerî, 30, and the Gezh, 19, have the majority of the total of the 73 villages; this total includes 20 deserted villages, and several in which Assyrians have been settled. In this nahia there are also to be found Bot or Bhot Kurds, said to come from Zakho, Surehi Kurds from the neighbouring nahia, and the ubiquitous Hadidiyin Arabs, who are the caravanjis and shepherds of the plains. It will be seen that the total number of inhabited villages in the Shaikhan and Ashair Saba nahias is  $42 + 53 = 95$ , and not 146 as stated in the Turkish memorandum. The neighbouring nahia of Alkosh, parts of which may possibly have been confused by the Turks with parts of the Shaikhan nahia, contains 38 villages, of which 19 are Yazidi, 6 Christian and 13 Arab (mostly Hadidiyin and Jubur).

It is thus obvious that the Turkish Government are wrong in asserting that these nahias are entirely populated by Turks. The exact converse is the case. There are no Turks in them.

10. The Turkish memorandum states that there are seventy-seven "localities" in the nahia dependent upon Mosul. The Mosul nahia in fact contains only twenty-nine villages, inhabited as follows:—

Arab	....	....	....	....	....	10
Completely Turkoman	....	....	....	....	....	0
Mixed Turkoman and Arab	....	....	....	....	....	8
Mixed Arab and Shabak	....	....	....	....	....	4
Deserted	....	....	....	....	....	7

It appears desirable here to give a list of the remaining nahias in the Mosul plain. On the east of the Mosul nahia, and between it and the Ashair Saba and Shaikhan nahias, referred to above, are the Tel Kaif, Tel Usqof, Bartulla, Bashiqa, Maqlub, Qaraqosh nahias, and south and west of the Mosul nahia lie the Humaidat, Hamam Alil, Shora and Shargat nahias. In the appendix will be found a table giving the racial distribution of villages in these nahias, from which it will be seen that out of a total of 399 inhabited villages, only 10 are purely Turkoman and 3 are mixed Turkoman and Arab.

11. On p. 7 of their memorandum, in an endeavour to establish some bond of common origin between Turks and Kurds, the Turkish Government have quoted from an article contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" by Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson. The compliment is a dubious one, as the Turkish Government have not only shown a complete disregard for context, but have so abbreviated the quotation as to attribute to the authority quoted a view almost diametrically opposed to that which is developed in his article. The passage quoted continues from the point at which it is interrupted in the Turkish memorandum as follows:—

"After the fall of Nineveh they (*viz.*, the *Gutu*) coalesced with the Medes, and in common with all the nations inhabiting the high plateaux of Asia Minor, Armenia and Persia, became gradually Aryanised, owing to the immigration at this period of history of tribes in overwhelming numbers, which, from whatever quarter they may have sprung, belonged certainly to the Aryan family."

It will be seen that this passage, taken as a whole, so far from supporting the Turkish claim that the present-day Kurds are of Turanian stock, actually refutes it. While on this subject it might be well to point out, in connection with the alleged derivation of the word "Kurd" from "Gardu" or "Kardu," that these

latter terms connote in Assyrian "mountain dweller." It therefore appears probable that the Aryan Kurds, when they came to the mountainous district of Kurdistan, inherited this name from the previous inhabitants.

12. The Yazidis are described in the Turkish memorandum as Moslem Kurds of a different sect. The British memorandum has given an accurate description of the Yazidis and has not exaggerated their dread of a return to Turkish domination. So far from considering themselves Moslem Kurds, they actually regard the whole Moslem religion as anathema.

13. Under the heading "Political Reasons" the Turkish Government have stated that there is little to say with regard to the non-Moslem minorities in the Mosul Vilayet. They have indeed little to say. It is impossible for them to deny that the Assyrian peoples as a whole are determined to migrate, or to die in defence of their homes, rather than once more be placed under Turkish rule. The Turkish Government in the same section ascribe to the British Government the desire "to assemble in a compact mass on the frontier between Turkey and Irak those Assyrians, Persian or other, who, according to the official report quoted above, '... only desire to return to their own country'—that is to say, to Persia and elsewhere." The Turkish memorandum is so worded as to give the impression that the Persian Assyrians in the Mosul Vilayet constitute a large proportion of the whole Assyrian body. The fact is that their number is negligible—less than 500 souls in all—and that the British Government are doing all that is possible to secure their safe return to their ancient habitations in Persia. With regard to the remainder of the Assyrians, the one desire of the British Government and of the Assyrians themselves, as was made clear in the British memorandum, is to secure their return to their original homes, provided that these are not placed once more under Turkish authority.

14. In the same section the Turkish Government assert that the separation from Turkey of an important part of Kurdistan would create an implacable irredentism, thus conveying the impression that the bond of union between the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet and their northern brethren of Anatolia is a desire to live under Turkish authority. In fact, the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet are, for the most part, more in sympathy with their Persian than with their Turkish co-nationalists, and the only sympathy which they have with the latter is based upon the desire, so far as such a desire exists at all, for the creation of an independent Kurdish State.

15. The third section of this part of the Turkish memorandum deals with historical, geographical and economical considerations. Arguments from history are obviously misleading as applied to a dispute of this nature, since by selection of a particular period it would be possible, in dealing with an area which has suffered so many changes of Government as has the Mosul Vilayet, to produce arguments in favour of almost any conceivable territorial redistribution. If, however, any weight is to be attached to Turkish arguments based on historical grounds, the commission are requested to refer to pp. 368, 384 and 385 of Blue Book "Turkey No. 1 (1923)." It may also be pointed out that the Turkish contention that "for eleven centuries Mosul and the country extending to the northern frontier of Bagdad have uninterruptedly belonged to the Turks" is contrary to the facts established by such authorities as Cuinet, who says:—

"Ces mêmes pays [the Mosul vilayet] au 17<sup>e</sup> siècle tombaient au pouvoir des Kalifes de Bagdad; à la fin du onzième siècle les Turcs seldjoukides y établirent leur autorité; puis, de leurs mains, ils passèrent successivement à celles des Mongols, des Turcomans, et revinrent à la Perse vers le commencement du seizième siècle, sous la dynastie des Sofis. Enfin, deux conquêtes successives, en 1516 et en 1638, les ont définitivement incorporés à l'Empire ottoman, auquel ils appartiennent depuis lors."

Whatever may have been the period of Turkish authority over these regions, the commission will have no difficulty in satisfying themselves that more progress has been made under the British and Irak administrations during the past six years in matters of education, sanitation, health, communications and civilisation generally than had been accomplished by the Turkish Government throughout their occupation.

16. The Turkish Government have reproduced an argument already put forward by them in a previous memorandum, to the effect that the climatic conditions of the Vilayet of Mosul are identical with those of Anatolia. The commission is referred to p. 385 of Blue Book, "Turkey No. 1 (1923)."



17. On p. 9 of the Turkish memorandum there is a further quotation from the "Encyclopædia Britannica," the object being to show that the term "Irak Araby" usually signifies the Bagdad and Basra Vilayets. It should be pointed out, however, that the modern word "Irak" is derived from the two terms "Irak Ajaimi" and "Irak Arabi," which were in use in the latter part of the 11th century and of which the former comprised a considerable part of modern Persia and a part of the Mosul Vilayet. The passage quoted is therefore irrelevant to the point at issue. Although arguments based upon the usual application of the name are of little value in this connection, it may perhaps be of interest to refer to a Turkish Tapu circular, dated the 5th Safar, 1310 (corresponding to the 16th October, 1908), which definitely states that the term "Irak" includes the Shahr Zor. The Turkish administrative division which used to be known as Shahr Zor contained the districts of Kirkuk, Rania, Arbil, Ruwandiz, Koi and Kifri, all of which are in the Mosul Vilayet. A translation of the circular in question will be found in Appendix II. The commission may also be interested to learn that in the map laid before the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission by the Ottoman commissioner at Erzerum in 1843, Ruwandiz, Arbil and Sulaimaniya are shown as in the Bagdad Vilayet, which then marched with the Vilayet of Van.

18. The Turkish Government have not seriously attempted to refute the economic arguments adduced in the British memorandum. The British Government did not, as is implied in the Turkish memorandum, state that the timber for building purposes comes from Turkey and not from Irak. The timber comes from the Mosul Vilayet, except that used for rafts floated from Diarbekir to Mosul. This is naturally not returned, but is sold in Irak. Since the signature of the Lausanne Treaty there has been nothing to prevent the importation of grain into Mosul from Diarbekir; yet such imports, so far as the British Government is aware, have been of a wholly insignificant character. Again, the Turkish Government state that, "if reference is made to pre-war statistics, it will be found that the movement of trade from Mosul is chiefly towards Diarbekir." The published reports of the British consul at Mosul for the years 1911 and 1912 do not support this view. From these reports (which contain statistics for the years 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912) it appears that of the total annual exports from Mosul, averaging approximately £487,000, exports to Great Britain and India accounted for some £195,000, exports to other foreign countries for some £51,000, and exports to other parts of Turkey for the remaining £241,000. Of the latter more than one-half consisted of wheat exports to Bagdad and a third of sheep sent to Syria. The total imports averaged annually about £150,000, and of this over £120,000 came from the United Kingdom, India and Central Europe, and the remainder came from Bagdad (chiefly dates and cloaks), from Aleppo (soap, rope, &c.), and from Diarbekir (dried fruits and small pulses). This shows that the bulk of the trade at Mosul was to and through Bagdad, as stated in the British memorandum. Copies of the consular reports in question have been communicated to the commission.

19. The Turkish Government claim that, "as a result of the construction of the railway connecting Mosul with the Mediterranean ports, the town became very much more closely connected with Anatolia." Ras-al-Ain, which is the eastern extremity of the operative portion of the so-called Bagdad Railway, is some 200 miles away from Mosul, with which it is not connected by any good road. On the other hand, connection with the Irak railhead at Shargat is simple; the distance is only some 70 miles of well-kept road, and mechanical and other transport is readily available. The Turkish memorandum, in referring only to the town of Mosul, wisely ignores the remainder of the Mosul Vilayet. Such towns as Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya are still further removed from communication with Turkey, while the Bagdad-Kifri Railway, which is in process of extension to Kirkuk, links them still more closely with Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.

20. In the fourth section of this part of the Turkish memorandum it is stated that the Turkish Government does not wish to enter into discussion of the so-called strategical advantages of the frontier. His Britannic Majesty's Government would deprecate any suggestion that little weight should be given to strategical considerations. In the first place, as has elsewhere been stated, they have refrained, largely on strategical grounds, from claiming a line of frontier further to the north which they might well have claimed on racial grounds. In the second place, they are responsible to the League of Nations for the military security of Irak, and when Irak is admitted to the League, the League itself will be deeply interested in that security. Lastly, recent events have shown how essential it is that the frontier should present a strong natural barrier if local disorder is to be

prevented and if the present and future peace and security of the neighbouring inhabitants and of the States to which they belong are to be duly safeguarded. For this reason His Britannic Majesty's Government have thought it right to deal with strategical considerations in the following paragraphs at somewhat greater length than hitherto.

21. The Turkish Government have never, either at Lausanne or elsewhere, set forth the strategical considerations, from the point of view of either State, which have guided them in proposing a frontier line situated in the plain country, and along the low hills of the Jabal Hamrin, 70 miles north of Bagdad. They have dismissed its disadvantages to Irak by denying that they would ever contemplate an attempt to subjugate a country of which the population is of Arab race. But it must be remembered that they do in fact claim the right to govern the Arabs (as well as the Kurds and other non-Turkish elements) of the Mosul Vilayet, an area whose population are all but one-twelfth of different race from the Turks. The history of the Turkish Government in Kurdistan and other areas inhabited by non-Turkish populations both before and since the war is one of repeated military expeditions to subjugate these non-Turkish populations to Turkish rule. The whole future existence of the young State of Irak depends upon her being given a frontier which shall inspire her with confidence, and in fact enable her with the limited resources at her disposal to maintain her integrity, with such assistance from His Majesty's Government, or, later, from the League of Nations, as will be available to her. For this purpose a frontier with every possible strategic facility of defence is vitally necessary to Irak. The frontier proposed by Turkey contains almost every possible feature of strategic danger. It constitutes no natural barrier of geographical separation. It is the longest possible frontier that could be chosen for Irak to defend. It gives the Northern Power ample space in which to concentrate and manœuvre. The river, upon which rafts carrying stores and munitions could be floated down, affords a cheap and easy line of advance to a possible invader. In addition, there would be another means of advance along the good road connecting Bagdad with Mosul, via Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri, Kara Tepe, Deli Abbas, along the whole of which it is probable that a railway will eventually run. The Northern Power would have its base in the middle of the Mosul and Arbil wheat fields, upon which Bagdad depends for food. With such a frontier Turkey, if solely from the military point of view, would be a constant menace to Bagdad. From other than the military point of view, the proximity of the foreign Power, and its domination over the Arab communities separated by an arbitrary frontier from their compatriots, would rob Irak of all hope of peaceful development. Irak is never in the least likely to be in a position to threaten the integrity of Turkey. She will always be a country militarily weaker than Turkey, and her future stability depends upon Turkey being separated from her by a frontier which will make invasion by regular or irregular forces and the infiltration of propaganda as difficult as possible. The frontier proposed by His Britannic Majesty's Government has been selected with this end in view.

22.—(a.) The frontier proposed is 160 miles in length, some four-fifths (120 miles) of it being composed of inaccessible mountains with few passes, some of which are closed in winter. Only one-fifth (approximately 40 miles) is plain country, with one or two difficult valleys, which are suitable only for pack transport for short periods during the year.

(b.) The Turkish territory north of the 120 miles of mountain country is difficult for the concentration and maintenance of troops, and any advance of such troops would of necessity be confined to the following main routes, with consequent military disadvantage to an invading Power:—

(i.)	Neri-Zini-a-Berdi	.....	.....	Practicable, but difficult, for large bodies of troops.
(ii.)	Shernakh-Beit Shebab-Geramus	.....	.....	Impracticable for large bodies of regular troops.
(iii.)	Mervana-Geramus	.....	.....	
(iv.)	Mervana-Lewin	.....	.....	
(v.)	Mervana-Zab Gorge	.....	.....	
(vi.)	Julamerk-Zab Gorge	.....	.....	
(vii.)	Julamerk-Khani-Zab	.....	.....	
(viii.)	Diza-Oramar-Nervek	.....	.....	
(ix.)	Diza-Oramar-Rudbar-i-Shin	.....	.....	



(c.) In view, therefore, of the difficulty which the northern Power would experience in attempting to invade Irak across the mountainous part of the proposed frontier, and as any such invasion would be limited to known routes, it would be possible for Irak to guard against such invasion by means of comparatively small forces in this area, thereby enabling her to dispose the bulk of her defence forces to protect the 40 miles of plain frontier in the west, which would be the most probable point of aggression and the most vulnerable point on the proposed frontier.

(d.) The few and difficult routes by which the mountainous part of the proposed frontier could be crossed by invading troops are denied lateral communication on account of the impossible country intervening. When, however, these routes reach as far south as the present provisional frontier, lateral communication becomes possible, and roads southwards increase until in the Jezireh-Amadia-Greater Zab-Ruwandiz valley lateral communication is very easy and there are a large number of roads running southwards from it at convenient intervals.

(e.) Should the frontier be so located as to allow Turkey a large area of plain country where troops could be maintained and moved at any time of the year, and whence an advance could be made in practically any direction, Irak—the weaker country—must always be at the mercy of her stronger neighbour, and must, therefore, always give way in any minor disputes such as are bound to arise. It is inevitable that such a state of affairs would lead to friction sooner or latter. The frontier line proposed by the British Government opposes a natural and difficult military obstacle to a threat of this nature, whereas should the frontier follow the line proposed by Turkey south of the Mosul Vilayet, not only would the length of the frontier be increased some 80 miles—a distinct military disadvantage to the weaker country, Irak—but there would be absolutely no natural military barrier against aggression.

(f.) The British line takes off from the junction of the Tigris and Khabur Rivers where the Turko-Syrian frontier in fact ends. From this point it is traced along the Khabur and Hazil Rivers, the crossing of which it is essential that Irak should hold, since hostile penetration of this sector would outflank and thus destroy the strategical value of the remainder of the frontier.

(g.) On the right bank of the Tigris protection is, of course, afforded by the strip of Syrian territory lying between the frontier laid down in the Anglo-French Convention of 1920, of which a copy has been communicated to the commission, and the Turko-Syrian frontier laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne.

(h.) The Turkish Government in their memorandum comment on the British argument that the frontier proposed in the British memorandum will form a natural barrier, running as it does along almost inaccessible mountain ranges. They contend that this argument is inconsistent with the well-known strategic principle that invading armies do not select a line of advance which is difficult to cross, but more often follow valleys and plains. This is, indeed, the very argument on which His Britannic Majesty's Government rely in supporting the frontier claimed by them on strategical grounds. It is difficult to understand why, after having emphasised this point, the Turkish Government should then proceed to claim a frontier passing through uninterrupted plain country.

(i.) The Turkish Government further point to the advantage which a frontier such as that proposed by the British Government would give to a foreign State possessing this mountainous region for the purpose of provoking disturbances among neighbouring populations. It is clear that this criticism is groundless, since, if the frontier follows the tops of almost impassable mountains, both of the countries concerned would be denied a transmontane base from which to launch operations or to disseminate hostile propaganda.

23. The wall of high mountains—especially in the eastern portion of the proposed frontier—forms the line of economical and ethnological divisions between the regions dependent upon Irak and those which incline to the north. The security of Irak must always to some extent be dependent upon the northern tribes remaining settled. A frontier line south of that proposed would be less well defined, and would in some cases divide tribal communities which would be difficult to control, and would on this account become a source of continual unrest. The adoption of the natural mountain barrier proposed would minimise restlessness which is apt to affect the frontier communities of rival States separated by indefinite features. It would also include in Irak a large section of the Assyrians who give their services to the Irak Government and look to Irak for protection.

The experience of the difficulties of administration in the Liwas of Suleimanieh, Kirkuk, Arbil and Mosul during the time that a number of Turkish irregulars were occupying Ruwandiz proved convincingly that this place is strategically indispensable to Irak. Experience on the north-western frontier has similarly proved the strategic indispensability of the towns of Zakho and Amadia. They both lie along a great valley which opens on one end to the Turkish frontier town of Jezireh-bin-Omar, and is closed at the other end by the mountains immediately surrounding Ruwandiz. The occupation or administration by Turkey of the region immediately on the Irak side of the proposed frontier would be ineffective, as the snows in winter close the few passes to the north, and lateral communication is difficult. On the other hand, good roads have been made by the British and Irak Administrations from Mosul to Zakho, Amadia and Ruwandiz; the climate is less vigorous, and communication with Mosul is nearly always possible.

24. For the above reason His Britannic Majesty's Government maintain, on strategic no less than on other grounds, that the true natural frontier between Turkey and Irak lies in the mountain barrier along which they have traced their proposed line.

25. The British Government have the less hesitation in thus exposing the inaccuracies and fallacious reasoning employed in the presentation of the Turkish case, in that the majority of the points at issue concern questions of fact which, it is hoped, the commission will shortly be able to put to the test by investigations on the spot.

His Britannic Majesty's Government are convinced that the line recommended by them would alone provide a frontier which would not only satisfy immediate needs, but would also stand the supreme test of time. They are confident that the commission, having once viewed the almost uninterrupted chain of mountains which His Britannic Majesty's Government have, after the most careful consideration, proposed as the frontier between Turkey and the young State of Irak, will not hesitate to recommend that frontier for adoption by the Council of the League of Nations.

#### APPENDIX I.

Name of Nahia.	Total Villages Inhabited.	Yazidi, Shabak and Sarli.	Arab.	Christian.	Christian and Yazidi.	Kurd.	Absolutely Turkoman.	Arabs and Turkomans.
Tel Usqof ..	26	5*	10	5*	..	6	0	0
Qaraqosh ..	53	7	38	1*	..	..	6	1
Tel Kaif ..	37	1	32	1*	..	..	3	0
Maqlub ..	44	..	14	1	..	29	0	0
Bashiga ..	33	8	4	1	4*	15	1	0
Bartulla ..	45	10	12	2*	..	19	..	2
Humaidat ..	40	..	40	..	..	..	..	..
Shora ..	46	..	46	..	..	..	..	..
Hamam Alil ..	36	..	36	..	..	..	..	..
Shargat ..	39	..	39	..	..	..	..	..
	399							

\* Figures marked with an asterisk include very large Christian or Yazidi towns, some of which are larger in population than the remainder of the nahia.



## APPENDIX II.

*Circular, dated the 5th Safar, 1310 (16th October, 1308), from the Ministry of Tapu to Local Tapu Offices.*

SINCE the greater part of the lands of Irak are Miri lands and are leased out annually for cultivation, and since, according to the provisions of the Land Code, no right of occupancy can exist in such lands, and since alienation of Miri lands in Irak, whether by sale at the market price or by auction, has been forbidden by an Imperial Iradah, accordingly enquiry has been made concerning the rights of occupancy in such lands, and a reply has been received, that an Imperial Iradah has been issued after a decision of the Council of State and the Representative Assembly to the effect that, until such time as permission may be given for the alienation of Miri lands in Irak by sale at the market price or by auction, no right of occupancy shall accrue in such lands in Irak as are held on various forms of tenure (that is, which are Miri lands and which are leased for cultivation), and that if any claim to such a right be made, it shall be rejected by the courts. Provided that since the term Irak includes Shar-i-Zor and other tracts which are not subject to this form of tenure, claims to rights of occupancy may be made in such tracts.

Special attention shall be paid to legal and local rights in cases where villages have been deserted by their population and the lands have escheated to Miri. With a view especially to safeguarding legal and local rights in such cases, it is ordered that claims to a right of occupancy in lands in Irak leased out for cultivation shall not be considered.

I am directed by the Ministry of Tapu to communicate these facts to you and to request that the said Imperial iradah may be acted upon.

MINISTER OF TAPU.

(NOTE.—A copy of the Imperial iradah referred to is available and can be placed before the commission.)

[E 10809/5711/65]

No. 118.

*High Commissioner for Irak to Mr. Amery.—(Communicated by Colonial Office; Received at Foreign Office, December 3.)*

(No. 628.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, December 1, 1924.*

REFERENCE Constantinople telegram No. 67 to Foreign Office, 27th November. Before declaration of *status quo* line few Assyrians reported to have slipped back to the neighbourhood of Lizan (*vide* my telegram No. 590, repeated to Constantinople as No. 262 S, 12th November) to gather their crops and to have had slight collision with Turks about 1st November. Apart from this Amadia authorities know of no incidents such as described and all Assyrians were strictly forbidden to cross the new line. If Turks, as implied in the telegram, assigned the desert village of Assyrians to Kurds it is possible that some Assyrian may have disregarded the prohibition and attempted to save their property, but nothing is known of this. It would be impossible to move large numbers of Assyrian refugees from the neighbourhood of Amadia as their subsistence cannot be arranged elsewhere. Renewed orders have been issued to them to stay within Irak.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 10864/5711/65]

No. 119.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 4.)*

(No. 874.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of note from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting the activities of Nestorians on the Irak provisional frontier.

*Constantinople, November 28, 1924.*



Enclosure in No. 119.

*Turkish Delegation at Constantinople to Mr. Lindsay.**Constantinople, le 27 novembre 1924.*

IL résulte des informations fournies par les autorités locales au Gouvernement de la République turque :

1. Que des Nestoriens ont de nouveau été installés à main armée dans les villages de Drichki, de Bide et autres situés à Bervari, et qu'ils ont pillé, en enlevant tous les troupeaux de moutons, les villages habités par des émigrés, et sis à 3 kilom. du côté sud-est d'Alamon, de Tchelki, d'Oray et de Kéramos (rapport des autorités militaires en date du 11 courant);

2. Que, le 15 courant, de bon matin, des bandes nestoriennes ont poussé leur incursion, jusqu'aux villages de Haut-Tayyari, et qu'ayant attaqué les villages de Kelké, où se trouvaient une troupe de gendarmes et une cinquantaine de Kurdes, arrivés pour chercher leurs effets, ils ont provoqué des rencontres au cours desquelles un gendarme a été blessé au bras, et qu'enfin les tribus campées aux environs, ont cru devoir courir au secours et riposter (rapport du Vali de Hakkari);

3. Que des bandes également nestoriennes se sont avancées vers le nord par la rive gauche de Zab, et ont fait des recherches dans les villages (rapport des autorités militaires d'Achita).

Les villages d'Alamon et de Kéramos cités dans le paragraphe 1 sont situés au nord de la ligne de démarcation, dernièrement fixée par la Société des Nations.

De même, l'incident relaté dans le paragraphe 2 est survenu dans la région de Haut-Tayyari, où sont postés des gendarmes turcs et qui restent dans les limites du territoire turcs.

Quant aux Nestoriens armés qui sont installés dans les villages de Bervari, tout près de la frontière, il est à remarquer que ce sont des gens ayant échappé aux poursuites des autorités turques. S'ils sont maintenus là, il en suivrait des troubles donnant lieu à des mesures de représailles à n'en plus finir, aussi bien aujourd'hui qu'à l'avenir.

Le Gouvernement de la République turque se plaint à présumer que le Gouvernement britannique n'aimerait point à voir se produire des incidents regrettables de ce genre. Or, il est indispensable, pour les empêcher, de s'abstenir d'installer des Nestoriens aux environs de la ligne de démarcation.

Nousret Bey serait obligé à son Excellence M. le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique de bien vouloir aviser au nécessaire pour prévenir le retour des incidents ci-haut exposés, et assurer la restitution aux propriétaires des biens qui leur ont été enlevés.

[E 11032/5711/65]

No. 120.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 8.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, December 8, 1924.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th November, forwarding a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's representative at Constantinople on the subject of certain incidents on the provisional frontier between Turkey and Irak, and, in reply, to invite reference to Colonial Office letter of the 3rd December, in which was enclosed a copy of a telegram on the subject from the High Commissioner for Irak.

I am, &amp;c.

H. YOUNG.

[E 11032/5711/65]

No. 120A.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 194.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, December 12, 1924.*

YOUR despatch No. 874 of 28th November: Turkish protest against alleged Nestorian raids over Branting line.

If it has not already been done a reply should be sent to the Turkish Government based on Bagdad telegram of 1st December repeated to you.



No. 121.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 13.)*

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 213.

*Constantinople, December 12, 1924.*

Turkish Government complain of another attack at Kemani about 23rd November by Nestorians upon Turkish detachment serving as liaison between posts at Chal and Ashuta. Nestorians are said to have been driven back towards Vechtan. Turks disclaim responsibility for possible reprisals.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 68.)

[E 11032/5711/65]

No. 122.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 13, 1924.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant, regarding the protest lodged by the Turkish Government against alleged raids by Nestorian Assyrians in Turkish territory, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the accompanying copy of a telegram (No. 194) on this subject which he has addressed to His Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

2. The alleged raids are reported to have taken place before the declaration of the *status quo* line defined by the Council of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the fact that the Irak Government admits that they occurred, at any rate in part, as reported by the Turkish authorities, seems to show that the control exercised by the authorities in charge of the concentration camps near Amadia must be somewhat lax. Mr. Chamberlain has every sympathy with the lot of the unfortunate refugees, driven from their homes by a wholly indefensible attack by the Turks, but he considers that such incidents cannot fail to react prejudicially on the British case and thus militate against the eventual return of the Assyrians to the property of which they have been dispossessed. He hopes therefore that His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad may be instructed to take all possible measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents and to ensure that the orders given to the refugees are properly respected. It is certain that restrictive measures of this sort cannot be interpreted as undue deference to the Turks and that a proper observance of the *status quo* is the surest guarantee that the claims of His Majesty's Government will be justly considered by the League of Nations Commission.

I am, &amp;c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 11276/7/65]

No. 123.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 15.)*

(No. 903.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, December 9, 1924.*

I NOTICE from your despatch No. 1215 of the 17th November that the Turkish Minister in London has again raised the question of a direct settlement of the Turco-Irak frontier, a suggestion tentatively touched on by your predecessor in office as set forth in his despatch No. 1157 of the 31st October. As it may not yet be too late for His Majesty's Government to attempt either form of procedure, viz., direct settlement with Turkey, or decision by the League of Nations, a few observations on these alternatives may be useful. I will first deal with the latter, viz., leaving the question of the League's arbitration.

2. The League's special commission has now been nominated and set to work, and we may expect that within a measurable space of time it will report to the council,

who will render a decision. It is noticeable that the Turkish Government have never yet pledged themselves to accept the League's decision, whatever it may be; they have never gone further than affirm their conviction that the decision will be just and equitable, and will therefore clear the way for more cordial Anglo-Turkish relations. This attitude is consistent with the uncommunicative and umbrageous character of the Turks and causes me no surprise; at the same time, it does not mean that they are preparing to reject a decision by the League which they may think falls short of their minimum requirements. On the contrary, I believe they will accept—with grumbling no doubt, and perhaps with the intention of making trouble later—any decision which I can imagine that the League is likely to give, and for several reasons. In the first place, they can accept a rebuff from an international and neutral body which their pride will not allow them to accept easily from any foreign Power. Next, by rejecting the League's decision, they would expose themselves to strong pressure from His Majesty's Government in an affair where their own case would be peculiarly weak and that of His Majesty's Government peculiarly strong. Thereby, apart from alienating all Great Britain's sympathy, they would themselves have to descend from that plane of foreign policy which they now desire to remain on, where they are equally friendly or hostile with all Powers, and yet able, as they think, to descend at any moment on any side and make friends with that Power whose support at a critical moment they may most desire. Lastly, rejection of the League's decision would mortally offend the League itself. I think that just now the Turkish Government are genuinely anxious to join the League. The Prime Minister has had personal experience of its methods and has appreciated its courtesy and fairness. Mustafa Kemal, when he opened the Assembly on the 1st November, praised it strongly; Fethi Bey, when reading the programme of the new Government, openly advocated the despatch of Turkish representatives to Geneva; only last October the League enabled Turkey to withdraw without too much loss of face from a serious difficulty with His Majesty's Government; and, lastly, the Turks have before their eyes at this moment the spectacle of Egypt struggling against overwhelming pressure and unable, as they think, to find a helping hand anywhere, simply because she is not a member of the League.

3. I conclude that by leaving the question to the League, a definite decision, perfectly good in law, will be reached in the near future. It is too much to expect that this decision will finally settle the whole question of Turco-Irak relations; doubtless there will be much frontier intrigue; but I hope at least that the arbitral line will be something to carry on with, and I expect that local relations across it will reflect the character of the wider relations between Turkey and Great Britain. The frontier question, instead of being a sore capable of poisoning the whole body of international relations, would assume secondary importance and become a mere symptom that the body was unhealthy at the moment.

4. To turn now to the method of procedure by direct negotiation, I recognise that this presents great potential advantages. If success were attained at all we might well hope that it would be final in character and that the sore would be definitely healed. Doubtless the Turks would willingly launch into direct negotiations, but not so much from a desire for a permanent settlement, as from the argument that they could always fall back on the League, and meanwhile, though there might be something to gain there could be nothing to lose but some unimportant time. His Majesty's Government should, however, ask themselves if there is any prospect of a direct negotiation succeeding, and my own view is distinctly in the negative. Both in the National Pact, in public utterances and in the press Turkish claims have been put very high, and to abate from them in a treaty requires a high degree of moral courage; but the present Government is weak and is not likely to be replaced by one strong enough to defy the criticism of opponents and to face the inevitable odium of alienating territory. I do not think there is any line between Julamerk and Bagdad which both parties could bring themselves to accept. The negotiations would be spun out indefinitely, the League's work would be interrupted, and His Majesty's Government would suddenly discover that they had fallen between two stools.

I have, &amp;c.

R. C. LINDSAY.



[E 11359/7/65]

No. 124.

*Further\* Answers to the Questionnaire submitted to His Majesty's Government by the League of Nations Irak Frontier Commission.—(Communicated by Colonial Office; Received at Foreign Office, December 17.)*

*Further Answer to Question VII of the Questionnaire for the British Government.*

(Confidential.)

Question: *The Commission desires to be informed—*

- (a.) *On the routes of migration of the nomad Kurds, who descend at certain seasons of the year from the mountains in the north towards Irak, and subsequently return to their villages. It is desirable to have this information by tribes or by villages.*
- (b.) *On the centres of commerce and supply of the sedentary Kurds and Arabs, and of the nomad Kurds and Arabs of the northern region of the contested area.*
- (c.) *On the commercial lines of communication between the Mosul district and the uncontested parts of Turkey.*

*Answer:* The British Government desire in the first place to point out to the Commission that the Kurdish nomads regard as their more permanent home the place in which they spend the winter, and the greater part of the year. That is to say, their migrations are merely movements to the cool pasturages of the higher altitudes for which they abandon the plains and valleys during the months of May, June, July and August. They do not, like the Arab nomads of the desert, wander about irregularly in search of pasturage, and they differ from the sedentary people merely in that they have two fixed homes, one the villages and localities in the plains and valleys in which they settle down between September and April, and the other the mountain pasture grounds which each tribe annually visits, for the health of the sheep, during the short summer period. Many of the sections of these tribes are, with the encouragement given them by the Irak Government to cultivate, settling down in the places in which they live for the winter, and have purchased land and built villages in the southern homes. Certain sections spend the summer months in the high altitudes within the proposed frontier, and others visit pasturages on the Turkish side of that frontier, and over the Persian frontier. Generally speaking, of those that cross the proposed frontier and the Persian frontier for the summer months, those that winter west of the Greater Zab go to the Turkish side, and those that winter east of that river visit Persia. A reason for this is partly the impassible nature of the mountains between Julamerk and the Persian frontier.

The Commission will observe that, although the proposed frontier is drawn along a barrier of mountains which separates the peoples who depend economically upon the south, from those who incline to the north, the line is crossed in one part by nomads who graze their flocks every year upon the highlands, which lean like a penthouse roof against the northern side of the frontier. The fact that the frontier is thus crossed need be no source of trouble to either Turkey or Irak; in the settlement of the Turco-Persian boundary, where a similar mountain barrier was chosen by the Boundary Commission, a special clause was inserted in the Protocol to meet the case of nomads who cross the mountain barrier every year to graze their flocks upon the slopes of the Persian side. This clause runs as follows:—

*"Il est entendu que les tribus turques qui ont l'habitude de passer l'été dans lesdites vallées aux sources de Gadyr et de Lavène resteront en jouissance de leurs pâturages aux mêmes conditions que par le passé."*

Kurdish nomads, who, as has been described above, visit the same grazing grounds by the same passes every year, form an easier subject for settlement of disputes than do the Arab nomads, who rarely settle in the same place in successive years, and whose movements in the desert are difficult for the Governments to follow closely. The difficulties of a frontier in an Arab desert, however clearly marked on the map, have been the source of much troublesome experience in the case of the Irak-Syria boundary, on both sides of which the nomad Shammar wander irregularly. The line proposed by the Turks, which would cut through an area

\* See No. 115

over which the Arab tribes wander, is for this reason alone an impracticable one. The passes by which the Kurdish nomads ascend to their summer pasturages are so few, and so well known, that it would be a simple matter to prevent misbehaviour of nomads becoming so serious as to jeopardise the peace of the frontier. The grazing grounds which they visit for a short period in every year are in economically undesirable and almost inaccessible country, which neither Turkey nor Irak could have any wish to develop.

(a.)—(1.) *Tribes which winter west of the Greater Zab, and some of which cross the proposed frontier into Turkey.*

These tribes are mostly limited to sections of the "Artoshi," a confederation of Kurds, partly sedentary and settled upon and about the proposed frontier and in the Mosul Liwa, and partly nomad, living for the greater part of the year in the plains and lower valleys where they own property, and visiting for the four summer months the higher altitudes of the Mosul Liwa, and the grazing grounds upon and just north of the proposed frontier. The following is a list of the sections, with a brief description, in each case, of their winter and summer homes and routes of migration.

*The Artoshi Confederation: Nomad Sections.*

*The Sharifan.*—These own considerable property in the plain west of Dohuk (50 miles within the proposed frontier), and their chief, Muhammad Haji Agha, who has almost a paramount influence over the whole Artoshi confederation, takes a prominent part in the local councils and administrative affairs of the Dohuk district. In the four summer months, while their cultivators remain in the plains, their shepherds, with the sheep of the tribe as well as those of Mosul owners entrusted to them, visit the grazing grounds at Farashin; they take the route Dohuk, Kani Bilav, Geli Bibi, Geramus, Deri a Zir (on the proposed frontier) and Farashin (15 miles beyond the proposed frontier).

*The Zaidak.*—These are similar to the Sharifan, but own property near Shaikh Adi, the shrine of the Yezidis (60 miles within the proposed frontier), where they dwell during the greater part of the year, visiting the highlands just north of the proposed frontier, by the route of Amadia, Ora, Ashita, Geramus, Deri a Zer.

*The Gaedan.*—In winter live near the Sharifan, and take the same route north, but live for the summer near Bait us Shabab.

The *Artoshi* and *Mahmedan* sub-sections are attached to the Sharifan and use the same route of migration.

The *Sidan*, *Geravi*, *Zhirki*, and *Kashuri* winter about the south-eastern reaches of the Khabur river, about 20 miles south of the proposed frontier, and visit for the summer the highlands on the proposed frontier near Deri a Zer, and, in the case of the *Geravi*, further north and east.

The *Hajan* own property in the same plain as the Sharifan, and visit for the four summer months the highland area near the summer quarters of the Sharifan, but by the different route of Zakho, Shernakh, Bait us Shabab, thus avoiding the passes at Geli Bibi and Deri a Zer.

In addition to the above nomad sections, there are sedentary sections living as follows:—

*Zhirki, Kashuri, Gaedan, Mamkhoran.* On both banks of the Khabur where the proposed frontier crosses this river: *Sidan* at the south-eastern corner of the Khabur river: *Artoshi* near Alqosh, south of Dohuk, some 60 miles south of the proposed frontier.

Sometimes, owing to tribal conflicts, certain sections are forced to avoid the Deri a Zer route, and take a different route through the Tkhuma country, crossing the Zab again just south of Julamerk.

In the Mosul division there are, in addition to the Artoshi, several small sections, such as the *Qulian* and *Elki*, who summer in the highlands near the proposed frontier and winter in the plains between Mosul and the Mountains. Certain, also, of the sedentary tribes, such as the *Doski Muzuri*, who live in the lower hills near Mosul, and visit annually small sections of the same tribe domiciled in the high mountains about the proposed frontier.

The *Aqra* district, east of Mosul, but west of the Greater Zab, is sometimes visited by sections of the *Herki*, a tribe which generally migrates between Persia and the plains north of Arbil.



(a)-(2.) *Tribes which winter east of the Greater Zab.*

These consist of two great Nomad tribes: the *Herki*, who winter between Arbil and Ruwanduz, about 60 miles south of the proposed frontier, and the *Jaf*, who winter west of Kifri. The greater part of both these tribes spend a short summer in Persian territory. There are, in addition, a number of smaller nomad tribes who winter in the Liwas of Arbil, Kirkuk or Sulaimania, and spend a short summer either in higher altitudes within those divisions or in Persia.

The *Herki* migrate in the summer through Ruwanduz, thence by Sidekan, Kherena to the Gadir Pass, by which they cross the Persian frontier to Tergawar. A small proportion of the *Herki* winters in the Agra district, and migrates either to Persia by the route described above, or to the mountains on the proposed frontier, by a route crossing the Zab at Harik, and moving on through Raikan. There is a small sedentary section of the *Herki* just east of the Raikan district. Besides the *Herki*, there winters in the Arbil Liwa, a nomad tribe called the *Khailani*, who spend the summer in the Spirez mountain on the Persian frontier. The shepherds of the sedentary tribes of the *Surchi* and *Balekian* move up to the Persian frontier every year, and nearly all the sedentary villages of the Ruwanduz districts move out every year into tents pitched on neighbouring mountains.

In the Kirkuk district winter the Great *Jaf* tribe, who spend the summer in the Persian districts of Senna and Sakiz, whither they go annually from Kifri, by various routes, but through Penjvin on the Persian frontier. Sections of the tribe are sedentary in the Shahr i Zor district east of Sulaimania.

In the Rania and Qala Diza districts there are nomad sections of the *Piran*, *Pizhder*, *Ako*, *Ismail Uzairi*, and of the *Bilbas* confederation. All of these spend the summer upon, and over the Persian frontier. The *Piran* and *Ako* cross the Persian border by the Rayat pass; a section of the *Ako*, called the *Boli*, winters in the Koi Sanjaq district. They spend the summer in the Lahjan plain of Persia. The *Ismail Uzairi* winter near Sulaimania and spend the summer in the Sharbazar district. The *Pizhder* are now hardly nomadic and very few of them migrate into Persia. The *Chingini* migrate between the Rania and Sulaimania districts. The *Bilbas* confederation use the Vasma route over the Persian frontier.

(b.) *Centres of commerce and supply of the sedentary and nomad inhabitants of the northern portion of the contested area.*

The following answer to this part of the question is illustrated by a map showing the radius of each centre of commerce and supply and how each centre is connected to the main heads of commercial routes upon which it depends. Details of the Turkish and Kurdish areas in the Diarbekr and Van districts, with which Mosul has little commercial relation, will no doubt be furnished by the Turkish Government. The three great centres of commerce and supply are Mosul, Arbil and Kirkuk, all of which incline economically to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, with which they are connected by two railways. The head of one of these railways is at Shergat, 70 miles south of Mosul, and about the same distance south-west of Erbil; with both of these places Shergat is connected by good motor roads. The other rail head is approaching Kirkuk, the line having already been laid past Kifri. Besides the commerce of Kirkuk, this latter line is already the outlet for the Sulaimaniya traffic. In addition to the railway, Mosul, Arbil and Altun Kupri have, for purposes of transport southwards, the two Zab rivers and the Tigris.

Mosul is connected by motor roads to Tel Afar and Balad Sinjar on the west, and to Zakho, Dobuk, Ain Sipri, Agra and Arbil on the north and east. To the first four named comes the commerce of the Kurds who dwell between these places and the proposed frontier. Arbil is connected to Ruwandiz by a good road, which enables the Kurds south of the eastern portion of the proposed frontier to trade with the south. The Arabs, nomad and settled, of the plains on each bank of the Tigris have easy access, to Arbil to purchase grain, to Mosul for grain, groceries and piece-goods, and to Shergat and Samarra for dates brought up by rail from either Baqubah or Basra.

(c.) *Routes of Commercial Communication between the Mosul Vilayet and Turkey.*

(The routes will be found marked upon the map which illustrates also the centres of supply in the Mosul vilayet.)

There is so little commerce exchanged between Mosul and Turkey that, except for the river for southward transport only from Diarbekr, there really exists no important highway of commerce between Irak and Turkey. On the other hand, there

exist routes by which the inhabitants of the districts on the Irak side of the proposed frontier, who depend economically upon Mosul, can bring thither their produce. Good motor roads run from Mosul to the Kurdish headquarters of Zakho, Agra and Dohuk and the latter place is connected to Amadia by a military pack-transport road.

The routes may be divided into two categories:—

1. Those on the right bank of the Tigris, all of which must of necessity pass through French Syria.
2. The routes on the left bank of the Tigris, all of which lead direct to Turkey over the frontier now proposed.

Under the first category Mosul is connected to Nisibin and Ras al Ain and thence to Mardin, Diarbekr, Urfa and Anatolia, by two routes. One of these passes through Hogen, Tel Awainat, to Nisibin, whence roads bifurcate to Mardin, Diarbekr, or Ras al Ain; the other route passes through Tel Afar, Balad Sinjar and thence across the valley of the Western Khabur to Ras al Ain.

Neither of these routes is at present, or ever has been, very much used, since the nomad Arabs, through whose camps the road passes, and who have never been brought under proper police control, exact blackmail as the price of the security of the convoy. Further, both roads, though they lead over flat and easy country, have never been prepared for swift moving transport, and can with difficulty be used by the hardest form of country cart or military type of motor lorry or armoured car.

Of the routes on the left bank, that is to say, those that lead direct over the frontier proposed, only one is fit for commercial transport, the others being all mountain tracks which are closed in some places for half the year, and which when open can only be used by mules and donkeys accustomed to them.

The route from Mosul to Jazirah-ibn-Umar and thence to Urfa, Mardin, Diarbekr, Sairt and Bitlis may be divided into two parts.

Between Mosul and Zakho there is a good road, constantly used by mechanical transport.

Between Zakho and Jazirah the road could be used by strong carts were it not for the fact that there are one or two unbridged rivers. Between Jazirah and Urfa, Mardin and Diarbekr the routes are understood to be fit for country carts, but those to Sairt and Bitlis for pack transport only.

For southward communication an easy and cheap form of transport is that of rafts floated down the Tigris from Diarbekr or Jazirah to Irak.

The remaining routes are hardly used for commercial communication between Irak and Turkey, and are merely the tracks by which the nomads ascend to the high grounds for their summer pasturages, or by which the Kurds and Assyrians of the mountain belt upon which the proposed frontier runs bring their tobacco, raisins, fruits and nuts to Mosul to exchange for groceries and piece-goods.

Besides the routes used by the nomads, there is a difficult track through Oramar by which Amadia is connected to Gavar, and an easier road by the Zini-a-Berdi pass, by which Ruwandiz is connected to Neri: both of these routes are closed in winter, and are little used for commerce between Irak and Turkey. The remaining mountain routes are too difficult and too unimportant to mention.

*Further Answer to Question X of the Questionnaire for the British Government.*

(Confidential.)

THE subject described in the two reports mentioned in the answer to Question X is covered by the publication called "Memoranda on the Armenian and Assyrian Refugees," a copy of which is appended. The following note is intended as a guide to the reading of this publication and of the later administrative reports.

In the midsummer of 1918 some 40,000 Christian refugees arrived in Irak. The reasons why these people came to Irak are described in pages 1, 2, 3 of the 1919 Memorandum on the Armenian and Assyrian refugees. The oppression of the Turks and the promises made to them by the Russians, who advanced to Julamerk in 1915, decided the Assyrians to revolt. They were attacked from the Mosul side by a mixed force of regular Turkish troops and Kurdish lashkars and were driven out of the mountain country about the Zab, and in 1916 reached North-Western Persia, where they assisted the Russians until the *débacle* of 1917. In 1918 they were driven from the Urmieh plains to take refuge in Irak. Their flight is described on page 4 and the arrangements made to house and feed them on page 5 of



the 1919 Memoranda referred to. Pages 6 to 12 describe the life of the Refugees in the Camps and the various discussions concerning their eventual disposal. Pages 13 and 14 describe the desires expressed by the Assyrians for their future. The appendices describe the manners and customs of the Armenians and Assyrians and give various tables of financial, vital and ethnological statistics.

The remaining history of the Assyrians is fully described in page 102 and following pages of the 1920-22 and page 50 of the 1922-23 Administration Report, from which it will be seen that the Refugee Camp near Mosul was broken up at the beginning of 1921, and the Assyrians who had formerly lived in the mountains about the upper waters of the Zab, which are in or near the Mosul vilayet-border, were allowed to return either to their own homes, or to temporary settlements in the lower hills, until they could reach their own homes. It was a movement of the entire population, though the various tribes and sections left the camp by instalments.

The population referred to is substantially that referred to under A (Mountaineer Assyrians from Kurdistan) in the table on page 36 of the Memoranda on the Refugees. It will be seen that the total of the mountaineers is over 14,000 persons. There were in addition very few from B (Urumia Assyrians), most of whom either stayed in Baghdad, or tried to make their own way back to Persia.

By the time of the Lausanne Treaty all of the Tiari, Upper and Lower, all the Berwari, most of the Tkhuma, and some of the Jelo and Baz had regained their own homes; they were driven out of them again in September last by the Turks. The remainder of the Tkhuma, Jelo, Baz and the members of the other sections, such as the Shamsdinan, Lewin, Upper Berwer, Diz, &c., had settled in Colonies round Dohuk and Zakho.

*Memorandum on the Subject of Agha Petros (submitted in Reply to Question XI of the Questionnaire for the British Government).*

(Confidential.)

AGHA PETROS is a Nestorian from Baz. He was accused of a murder a number of years before the war and on that account left his native district. He settled in Urmiah, where he entered the American school and remained for a number of years, ultimately becoming one of the most influential men in the district. Later, he embarked on a begging tour round the world. This enterprise ended in Canada, where, travelling under the pseudonym of Dr. Day, he got into difficulties with the local Police, and was forced to leave the country. From Canada he proceeded to London and thence to Persia where for some time he did business under the name of Peter Elbow and Company. Later he travelled to Rome and for some reason unknown to His Majesty's Government was decorated by the Pope.

He returned in 1906 to Urmiah where he married and settled down to business, being appointed Turkish consul in the following year. Upon the outbreak of the Persian revolution he deposed the Persian Governor and ruled Urmiah in the name of the Turkish Government. On the arrival of the Russians in 1908 he abandoned his Turkish connection and became a clerk in the Russian Consulate, and afterwards an Intelligence Agent. He was subsequently sent on a mission to Petrograd, accompanying the Russian Archimandrite in the capacity of representative of Mar Shimun, the Assyrian Patriarch.

Early in 1918, after the murder of Mar Shimun by Simko Agha (a Kurdish Chief), he organised the Assyrians against the Turks, and as their leader fought fourteen successful engagements on behalf of the Allies. Owing to the Russian retirement and faced with overwhelming Turkish forces he was eventually compelled to retreat into Irak, with the object of joining forces with the British. On his arrival at Hamadan, accompanied by some thirty-five thousand of his compatriots, an attempt was made to utilize his services in connection with the formation of Assyrian units under British officers. For various reasons, principally his inveterate tendency to intrigue and general untrustworthiness, he was found to be unsuitable for this work and was transferred to the refugee camp at Baqubah. Here again he indulged in intrigue and as his presence in the camp was unsettling his fellow refugees and was operating against the success of the scheme for the enrolment of Assyrian battalions, he was sent to live in Baghdad. In March 1920 he came forward with a scheme for the repatriation *en bloc* of the Assyrian refugees in the lower hill district on the Turko-Persian frontier. A full account of the failure of this scheme, which was not in fact undertaken until October of that year, will be found on pages 103, 104 and 105 of the Report on Irak Administration (October 1920-March 1922) copies

of which have already been communicated to the Commission. On the collapse of this scheme which was largely due to Agha Petros' incapacity to control his people and indeed his failure to show any of the requisite qualities of leadership, it was decided to proceed with the repatriation of the Assyrians by a process of gradual infiltration. Agha Petros was violently opposed to this and exerted all his influence to dissuade his followers from participating; and as his constant intrigues and continued opposition to the British Government's repatriation scheme were jeopardizing its success, it was felt that it was inadvisable to allow him to remain in the country. Accordingly in the summer of 1921 at the request of the British authorities Agha Petros left Irak for France, whence he proceeded to England to lay his case before the British Government. For this he was given every opportunity and was accorded numerous interviews with the interested Departments of His Majesty's Government. He eventually formulated a detailed scheme for the establishment of an autonomous Assyrian State under the aegis of Great Britain. This scheme, after being fully considered by the British Government, was found to be impracticable. Moreover, it was felt that Agha Petros no longer had any real following among his compatriots and that his character and antecedents were such as to prevent him contributing anything of value to the solution of the question of their future. However, at his request he was given permission in 1923 to return to Irak. He has not yet availed himself of this permission and since that date has spent his time perambulating Europe, and representing himself as the accepted leader of the Assyrians and from time to time attending (uninvited) at international conferences to present his own views as to the correct solution of the Assyrian problem.

*Note on Customs and Revenue Statistics to Supplement Answer to Question XIII of the Questionnaire for the British Government.*

(Confidential.)

CUSTOMS statistics are appended showing in detail exports and imports between Mosul and Turkey during the last four years. It will be seen that the total volume of trade is comparatively insignificant. According to a statement received from the Customs Department, the import trade for 1922-23 was 1.1 per cent. and the export trade 2.8 per cent. of the whole import and export trade of Irak. Corresponding figures for 1923-24 are 1.5 per cent. for both import and export. These figures include trade with both Syria and Turkey.

The statement of imports shows that, as stated in the British Memorandum, the heaviest item is timber. Next to this comes livestock, but it will be observed that the number of animals exported to Syria is nearly double the number imported from Turkey. It may, therefore, safely be assumed that nearly all animals imported from Turkey are re-exported to Syria. Fruit and tanning materials are, as indicated in the British Memorandum, among the larger items of import. Cordage, however, which was mentioned in the British Memorandum as also being among the larger items, has, of late years, been insignificant. In regard to grain, the figures show the total value of the imports of grain, pulse and flour as amounting to approximately Rs. 125,000 in four years. A further statement is appended showing Customs figures for various classes of articles exported from the Mosul district to Baghdad during the last four years. This statement has been compiled from passes issued in Mosul to cover produce coming to Baghdad, the purpose of the arrangement being identification of articles to show either that customs import duty has been paid on entry into Irak from Turkey or Syria or that duty is not payable because the articles are the produce of Irak. The figures for similar trade movements from Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimania, the other districts of the Mosul Wilayet, are not available. The figures are, however, sufficient to show clearly that Ismet Pasha's statement that the majority of grain coming from Mosul to Baghdad originally emanates from Diarbekr is without foundation. It will be seen that the total value of wheat alone coming from the Mosul district alone to Baghdad in the last four years is 87,210 Rupees; the figure for 1924 being exceptionally small owing to the destruction of the wheat harvest by locusts this year. As has been stated, the import of grain of all kinds from Turkey during this same four years was approximately Rs. 125,000 in value, but a comparatively small portion of this is wheat, the majority consisting of smaller grains and pulses. It is unfortunate that similar figures of internal trade from Arbil and Kirkuk and not available, as these two districts produce more wheat than the



Mosul district, while their internal consumption is presumably less as the population of the Mosul district is approximately half the population of the whole wilayet.

Certain revenue statistics for the current year are of interest as showing the truth of the statement that the wheat-producing plains of the Mosul Wilayet are the granaries of Irak. An approximate calculation from the area estimated as under wheat and barley cultivation shows that the normal produce of the Mosul Wilayet for this year would have been about 406,000 tons of wheat and 343,000 tons of barley as compared with 160,000 tons of wheat and 252,000 tons of barley for the rest of Irak. The corresponding population figures according to the 1920 census are, Mosul Wilayet 703,378 and the remainder of Irak 2,145,904. It will be seen, therefore, that while the population of the Mosul Wilayet is only one-quarter of the total population of the country, that wilayet produces approximately five-sevenths of the total amount of wheat grown in the country. A further comparison between the total amount of wheat and barley produced in the country and the total amount of grain of all kinds imported from Turkey may be of interest. According to the approximate Revenue figures quoted above, the value of a normal crop from the area under wheat and barley cultivation this year would, at the current conversion rates, have been approximately Rs. 100,000,000, while the value of the average annual import from Turkey for the last four years was under Rs. 32,000 or approximately .3 per mille.

Although complete figures as to the amount of grain imported from the Mosul Wilayet to the rest of Irak are not available, it is quite clear from all the figures mentioned above that the amount must be very large and out of all proportion to the small amount of grain imported from Turkey to Mosul.

Reference was made in the British Memorandum to the trade in tobacco between the Mosul Wilayet and Baghdad. In order that the volume of this trade may be appreciated, a statement is enclosed showing in kilos, the quantity of tobacco brought to the Customs House at Baghdad from the Kurdish districts during 1923 and the first nine months of 1924. It will be noted from the general statement of imports and exports that no tobacco is exported to Turkey and that the amount imported from Turkey is inconsiderable.

STATEMENT Showing Quantities of Tetun in Kilos. brought to the Baghdad Customs Khan in 1923 and 1924.

Months.	Tetun Khurda.		Tetun Shawir.		Tetun Asfar.		Tetun Aswad.	
	1923.	1924.	1923.	1924.	1923.	1924.	1923.	1924.
January ..	447,076	294,062	16,095	6,584	18,223	6,737	..	..
February ..	253,301	348,209	25,766	6,084	6,844	6,920	368	..
March ..	129,277	119,525	22,779	4,814	23,568	10,399	921	..
April ..	44,597	197,419	11,925	2,042	27,678	5,392	..	46
May ..	28,654	155,926	9,038	13,513	9,593	9,305	2,142	..
June ..	53,006	141,671	11,484	10,004	10,025	18,434	..	5,663
July ..	383,650	189,734	8,937	8,024	4,771	11,542	..	1,418
August ..	61,746	70,157	6,884	7,804	..	335	..	..
September ..	137,824	101,729	3,859	1,399	..	3,847	..	524
October ..	143,296	..	12,777	..	..	..	..	..
November ..	236,543	..	828	..	2,659	..	70	..
December ..	330,087	..	9,136	..	8,273	..	302	..
	2,249,057	1,618,432	139,508	60,268	111,634	72,911	3,803	7,651

STATEMENT showing the Value of Goods Imported into Mosul during the Years 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 (until September 30).

Articles.	(A)—ALEPPO.				(B)—JERUSA.				(C)—MARDIN.				(D)—SEERT.				Gr and Total of (B), (C) and (D). — Rupees.				
	1921.	1922.	1923.	1924.	Total Rupees.	1921.	1922.	1923.	1924.	Total Rupees.	1921.	1922.	1923.	1924.	Total Rupees.						
Animals, living ..	..	300	1,840	..	2,140	274,160	278,352	144,913	44,125	741,559	1,114	4,800	..	..	6,914	10,702	6,800	..	731	18,323	765,796
Apparel ..	2,333	4,981	18,535	61,272	77,222	29	280	23	35	368	150	530	..	..	703	60	..	..	..	60	1,121
Arms and ammunition ..	..	..	..	..	784	..	..	..	..	..	375	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	375
Belt ..	..	116	511	..	627	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Books ..	1,124	..	2,930	1,915	5,969	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Boots and shoes ..	2,068	1,433	2,602	9,611	16,714	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Brushes and brooms ..	..	..	..	..	189	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Buttons ..	..	85	104	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Carpets ..	..	..	442	1,255	1,707	2,719	2,978	1,255	1,218	8,170	221	..	..	..	164	..	..	..	..	..	25,794
Chemicals ..	..	..	..	..	709	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,290
Clocks and watches ..	200	72	103	760	1,221	..	1,777	..	..	2,813	..	48	..	..	67	3,290	..	..	..	10	2,800
Coal, coke and charcoal ..	..	7,637	18,106	437	70,128	973	203	..	..	203	2,333	..	..	..	2,333	..	..	..	..	..	2,596
Cordage and rope, &c. ..	43,948	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	232	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	222
Drugs and medicines ..	2,867	662	..	..	3,409	3,499	7,290	2,337	395	13,511	2,032	153	..	..	2,175	168	168	..	..	276	15,962
Dyes and dyeing material ..	26,729	7,657	8,027	15,050	67,403	..	60	..	..	60	200	186	..	12	175	573	..	..	..	..	633
Earthware ..	..	41	..	3,980	4,021	26,698	6,168	2,665	12,500	48,081	32,714	3,257	21,168	34,131	91,540	93,748	11,561	37,083	29,181	141,913	281,484
Fruits and vegetables ..	..	89	3,355	12,275	15,716	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..	..	..	..	..	11
Furniture ..	..	139	362	1,275	1,776	..	..	..	..	440	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	440
Glass and glassware ..	20,158	1,500	125	..	21,783	31,837	1,638	22,630	19,778	75,583	33,306	1,723	..	18	4,755	38,802	101	10,468	23	10,592	124,977
Grain, pulse and flour ..	..	25	25	..	50	..	297	136	..	403	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	403
Gum and resins ..	..	188	39,381	54,301	83,850	..	111	..	..	111	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	111
Haberdashery ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9,369	7,469	4,361	21,143	..	4,546	..	50	4,596	..	65	542	..	697	26,346
Hair and mohair ..	..	4,019	2,973	4,237	25,327	..	274	15	..	..	1,394	..	..	..	1,394	70	55	..	..	..	125
Hardware ..	14,208	782	..	116	848	700	535	7,442	3,310	12,187	50	281	365	..	734	388	303	..	4,221	4,912	17,833
Hides and skins ..	..	884	1,074	6,733	9,191	..	30	..	45	65	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Instruments ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lace and embroidery ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Leather ..	..	900	1,587	277	2,777	..	404	110	39	553	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	553
Liquors ..	..	160	..	..	150	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Machinery ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mats ..	..	..	..	2	490	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	25	..	..	25	25
Mats and matting ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	91	..	..	146	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	146
Metals and ores ..	1,076	10,244	207	184	12,311	758	2,086	457	835	4,136	296	..	55	200	2,300	1,584	690	500	737	3,520	10,016
Oil ..	..	339	..	326	..	..	30	..	..	20	54	..	..	..	54	..	..	..	298	..	372
Paper and pasteboard ..	2,780	8,695	652	800	12,937	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Perfumery ..	20	102	1,277	48	1,447	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Polishes ..	..	..	11	768	779	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Provisions and oilman stores ..	..	..	64	14,282	14,346	39,645	23,168	41,835	..	104,648	36,722	2,083	2,198	39	42,533	8,788	93	72	7	8,960	150,161
Rubber ..	..	127	7,760	6,130	14,697	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Salt ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Seeds ..	2,181	..	35	..	2,216	18,400	..	..	..	18,400	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18,400
Soap ..	21,191	37,911	524	221	59,847	2,108	1,637	3,078	5,464	12,387	304	77	2,096	..	2,977	2,663	1,423	1,575	..	5,991	20,925
Spices ..	..	..	..	..	..	298	21	..	..	282	..	..	..	..	282	194	157	6	..	..	357
Stationery ..	148	1,149	..	2,936	1,801	..	298	40	19,175	19,483	4,701	2,446	1,451	..	8,679	..	..	459	105	564	28,726







STATEMENT showing Value of Goods (Country and Foreign Produce) Exported and Re-exported from Mosul during the Years 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 (until September 30)—(continued).

Articles.	(A.)—ALEPPO.										(B.)—JERUSALEM.									
	1921.		1922.		1923.		1924.		Total.	1921.		1922.		1923.		1924.		Total.		
	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	Rupees.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	Rupees.		
Silk piece-goods .. ..	..	1,500	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500	..	..	..	6,500	..	774	..	..	7,274		
Wool piece-goods .. ..	..	6,260	..	1,740	..	576	..	..	8,676	..	..	..	..	..	387	..	..	387		
Wool, other sorts .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Gold and silver thread ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	..	..	10		
Tambaki .. ..	..	..	..	800	..	..	..	..	800	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Manufactured articles ..	..	9,535	..	470	..	1,175	..	217	11,397	..	1,881	..	50	..	2,873	..	3,305	8,109		
Unmanufactured articles ..	..	..	..	4,270	..	..	..	..	4,270	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
									1,852,081									700,702		

Articles.	(C.)—MARDIN.										(D.)—SHEET.										Grand Total of (B), (C) and (D).
	1921.		1922.		1923.		1924.		Total.	1921.		1922.		1923.		1924.		Total.			
	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.		C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.	C.P.	F.P.						
																Rupees.	Rupees.		Rupees.	Rupees.	
Animals living .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,806	..	3,806	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Apparel .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500	4,571	3,518	9,589	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,072		
Boots and shoes .. ..	..	12,200	..	107	..	732	..	114	13,153	..	1,650	..	..	..	4,432	..	595	5,027	25,091		
Candles .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	497	..	..	497	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	50	1,700	21,479		
Carpets .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,000	..	..	258	1,258	..	..	..	..	240	..	..	249	1,059		
Chemicals .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,258		
Coffee .. ..	..	34,774	..	10,400	..	..	..	..	45,174	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	180		
Drugs and medicines .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,258		
Dyeing materials .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	18	..	..	18	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	220	220	180		
Fruits and vegetables ..	..	23,870	..	14,695	..	2,238	..	2,786	43,589	..	290	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	45,878		
Dates .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18		
Furniture .. ..	11,873	..	4,010	..	2,130	..	4,023	..	22,036	890	..	3,234	..	25	..	1,854	..	6,003	49,393		
Glass and glassware .. ..	..	1,050	..	500	..	..	..	640	1,140	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,140		
Gums and resins .. ..	..	..	..	340	..	..	..	..	1,390	..	..	..	150	..	..	..	..	..	1,982		
Grain, pulse and flour ..	9,090	..	1,200	..	4,903	..	716	..	15,909	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	292	442	16,799		
Hair and mohair .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	656	..	..	656	..	..	1,430	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,346		
Hardware .. ..	..	21,730	..	727	..	642	..	258	23,357	..	7,556	..	4,000	..	338	..	..	1,430	47,706		
Hides and skins .. ..	51,295	..	14,715	..	329	..	..	..	66,339	200	..	5,551	..	6,684	..	3,573	..	11,986	102,649		

Instruments and apparatus .. ..	650	650	13	12	667
Intestines .. ..	995	490	1,485	2,400	10,099
Leather .. ..	600	600	584	145	600
Spirits .. ..	6,668	6,668	584	145	7,837
Matches .. ..	69	822	891	3,717	5,040
Mats and matting .. ..	50	132	39,512	139	45,728
Metals and ores .. ..	36,480	2,850	39,512	139	45,728
Oils .. ..	790	790	790	1,683	2,870
Paints .. ..	71	71	71	71	790
Perfumery and toilet requisites ..	71	71	71	71	84
Paper .. ..	2,950	2,800	2,030	132	7,912
Provisions and oilman's stores ..	310	470	780	1,400	2,130
Soap .. ..	1,690	260	1,950	2,300	2,300
Spices .. ..	73,297	27,520	5,838	1,365	108,020
Sugar .. ..	63,084	12,072	245	261	75,662
Tanning materials .. ..	3,300	3,300	3,300	1,835	1,270
Tea .. ..	780	275	272	266	1,493
Cotton, raw .. ..	280	280	840	170	1,010
Cotton, twist and yarn .. ..	196,475	10,985	11,928	219,388	17,080
Cotton piece-goods .. ..	2,130,801	442,830	55,156	54,544	2,683,421
Sewing thread .. ..	1,225	500	10,459	11,472	23,656
Cotton, manufactured, other sorts ..	52,620	52,620	52,620	96,100	96,100
Flax .. ..	1,200	88,270	12,691	923	103,084
Silk piece-goods .. ..	4,400	128	4,528	700	700
Wool piece-goods .. ..	700	700	700	700	700
Wool, other sorts .. ..	700	700	700	700	700
Gold and silver thread .. ..	700	700	700	700	700
Tumbaki .. ..	40,492	1,232	3,511	2,649	47,884
Manufactured articles .. ..	1,232	3,511	2,649	47,884	10,000
Unmanufactured articles .. ..	1,232	3,511	2,649	47,884	10,000

November 18, 1924.

H. S. G.



STATISTICS showing Customs Figures for various Categories of Articles exported from Mosul to Bagdad, 1921-1924. (See paragraph 2 of the "Note on Customs and Revenue Statistics to supplement Answer to Question XIII of the Questionnaire for the British Government.")

Articles.	1921.			1922.			1923.			1924.		
	Kilog.	Number.	Value (Rupees).	Kilog.	Number.	Value (Rupees).	Kilog.	Number.	Value (Rupees).	Kilog.	Number.	Value (Rupees).
Cigarette papers	150,118	...	1,102,854	210,087	...	1,085,257	216,640	...	2,556,112	105,516	3,130	787,805
Groceries	1,275,042	93,063	588,076	231,368	...	139,331	1,300,950	...	203,880	527,171	806,180	191,018
Wood and timber	...	...	733,510	...	108,441	719,079	...	90,923	285,006	...	68,101	231,792
Wool	146,050	...	153,527	...	...	882,411	952,522	...	1,409,072	1,008,770	...	1,517,400
Hides and skins	...	...	...	...	30,155	108,234	...	100,800	30,400	16,193	89,879	1,031,450
Fuel	20,948	...	4,011	178,200	...	10,430	108,567	...	6,904	133,690	165	6,303
Spices	7,725	...	18,003	...	...	250	6,147	...	18,906	5,115	...	706
Intestines	10,811	...	143,020	120,800	...	113,300	...	84,027	69,900	...	5,000	5,000
Piece-goods	22,046	161,642	143,800	...	...	52,642	3,968	...	21,010	2,801	5,000	23,000
Brass and copperware	13,595	1,413	8,058	68,730	...	28,700	40,921	...	18,420	47,059	2,519	24,039
Galls	328,125	...	1,084,083	755,007	...	317,306	161,628	...	68,580	316,041	16	146,212
Skins, wild animals	...	...	...	...	27,878	128,817	...	27,005	100,838	...	...	...
Leather	1,075	1,000	11,719	...	4,289	13,761	...	4,301	10,825	...	1,300	3,107
Empty tins	...	20	150	...	...	...	...	...	1,480	...	...	...
Turkeys	...	...	23,005	...	...	...	11,855	...	8,028	...	581	465
Mohair	...	...	15,000	1,210	...	...	...	...	4,042	20,020	...	10,901
Sackings	12,000	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	230	5,740	210	10,933
Foreign liquors	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,250	...	...	...
Carpets	...	654	17,051	700	145	8,024	...	1,412	33,365	...	...	11,732
Stones and marbles	1,000	2,670	10,071	...	...	3,670	...	341	1,528	...	221	3,066
Machinery	1,205	122	8,850	...	...	30,870	100,770	...	13,600	...	400	3,925
Wheat	102,981	511	31,380	218,945	...	185,290	...	...	21,810	33,200	...	3,150
Ironmongery	2,831	17,000	29,731	...	112,115	...	7,250	...	10,080	208	1,700	4,400
Treasure, specie	...	...	234	1,433	...	1,237	...	...	46,254	...	...	...
Local wine	...	...	9,650	...	...	...	2,071	...	1,298	...	423	205
Cigarettes	14,579	...	45,187	...	...	...	...	...	4,000	...	...	1,500
Furniture	...	...	2,039	...	...	...	220	...	11,000	3,410	9	11,620
Local pottery	17,964	11,458	73,739	...	...	...	4,832	...	1,021	...	2,201	1,795
Tanning materials, others	1,429	25,589	6,150	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dyeing materials	2,500	...	8,422	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Seeds	4,500	383	27,327	3,255	...	5,750	...	...	3,243	...	...	2,105
Arab tenting	...	11	6,500	...	1	2,000	...	...	610	...	...	140
Vehicles	...	...	2,000	...	...	...	...	...	735	...	1,034	11,225
Animals	...	...	...	1,251	...	3,275	...	...	...	...	2	430
Ghee	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Apparel	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cotton	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tobacco, Mardin	...	740	5,446	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,825
Articles not enumerated	...	...	25,532	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	36,873
Tobacco, local	...	...	...	455	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,008
Total	2,070,175	317,413	4,985,448	2,730,142	305,255	3,908,018	3,100,256	370,297	5,391,716	2,739,822	984,501	4,354,742

[E 11276/7/65]

No. 125.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 1305. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 20, 1924.

I HAVE carefully considered the observations contained in your despatch No. 903 of the 9th instant on the alternative methods of procedure for reaching a settlement of the Turco-Irak frontier question, either by direct negotiation with Turkey, or by decision of the League of Nations; and I see much force in the arguments advanced in support of your opinion that the Turks will in fact accept the decision of the League, and that direct negotiations with them are not likely to succeed.

2. I therefore propose, if the Turkish Minister approaches me again with a view to direct negotiation, to give him to understand that His Majesty's Government prefer to leave the matter in the hands of the League.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 11672/5711/65]

No. 126.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 929.)

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting an alleged incident on the Turco-Irak frontier.

Constantinople, December 19, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Note to Turkish Delegation.

EN réponse à la note verbale de la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères en date du 11 décembre, la Mission britannique en Turquie a l'honneur de l'informer que le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique à Bagdad n'a aucune connaissance d'un incident qui serait survenue le 23 novembre entre des Turcs et des nestoriens.

Il est, toutefois, possible que des renseignements erronés soient parvenue au Gouvernement turc au sujet du fait suivant :

Une petite bande de nestoriens se serait rendue à Chumba vers le 9 novembre et serait rentrée à Ain Nuni le 17 novembre. Ils déclarent avoir passé devant une poste turc à Gemani, mais le seul incident qui se soit produit serait que des Turcs auraient fait rouler sur eux quelques morceaux de rochers. De plus, un officier anglais qui se trouvait à Ain Nuni le 23 novembre n'a reçu aucunes nouvelles de la traversée de la frontière vers cette date par les nestoriens. Le cas échéant, on l'aurait certainement renseigné.

Mission britannique, Constantinople,  
le 19 décembre 1924.



## CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

[E 6062/424/91]

No. 127.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 28, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah Report for the period 30th May–28th June.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Simla, Aden and Beirout (for communication to Damascus).

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 127.

*Jeddah Report for the Period May 30 to June 28, 1924.*

THIS has been a black month for King Hussein. He claims to have secured recognition as Caliph from Shereef Yussuf-al-Hindi (C.V.O., M.B.E.), "in the name of himself, and of Abdul Rahman-al-Mahdi, Sayyid Ali-al-Mirghani and all the religious leaders and the people of the Sudan," but he has little else to bring him comfort. No longer can even his own newspapers represent him, as they were doing a few months ago, as bestriding the world like a spiritual Anthony, with realms and islands as plates dropped from his pocket, and he has to make much of an oath of allegiance from the small town of Midi, which, being a great slave-trading centre, might well have recognised its chief customer earlier. His attempt to get round the Imam has failed, nor has he had any better fortune with Lahej. Dr. Naji-al-Asil is returning to the Hedjaz (or at any rate leaving England) with little to show for the £15,000 which, I believe, his two agreeable years in London have cost the Hedjaz; and while the King hails a new recruit in Mr. Philby, he has yet to learn that Mr. Philby's nostrum for the Arab world is republicanism. On the Mahmal question he has made a complete surrender. In a very brief notice the "Kibla" describes this stream as flowing in its old bed, but in point of fact it is to flow in the new one dug for it by Egypt. There is to be no restriction with regard to the number of doctors accompanying the Mahmal, the places where they may install their hospitals, the time they may stay or the patients they may treat, and the Mahmal question has been recognised by the King as independent of that of the Hedjaz Wakfs.

The Wahabis are quiet. The "Kibla" published a communiqué about them, in order, it said, to put an end to the absurd rumours which were in circulation. The communiqué, which professes to be based on a telegram from Kufudah, describes Ibn Saud's son, Feisal, as having been unsuccessful in a fight with some unspecified persons in Wadi-al-Ukail, says there is disorder at Bisha (on parallel 20° north, some 150 miles south-east of Taif), and that Ibn Saud has threatened to cut down the trees there. Cutting down trees is considered to be a low trick, for all the Prophet did it; but it is possible that the royal communiqué is not correct. In the first place, King Hussein hates the truth as he hates the French; in the second, a telegram from King Feisal to his father, which is published with the communiqué, is not in accordance with the facts as reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, in that it represents the slaughter of the Dhafir by the Wahabis as a sweeping victory for Irak, in which of 2,000 Wahabi camels only 100 escaped, and many Wahabi leaders (names given) were "recognised among the dead."

The Advisory Council to the Caliphate is reported by the "Kibla" to have met twelve times. In Ramadan it held a meeting of the very greatest importance; it came to the earth-shaking decision—to advise all the Moslems of the world to follow the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet. As a matter of fact, the report is less silly, if less innocent, than it sounds. The game is clearly to represent certain Indian ulama as wholehearted supporters of King Hussein as Caliph, three of them, one being Abdul Kadir-al-Badayuni, being mentioned as present at the meeting. Any Moslem

might take part in a discussion leading to so innocuous a conclusion, and Abdul Kadir and his friends were not to know that the report would be tacked on to a declaration of King Hussein's right to the Caliphate.

The unprecedented delay in the departure of the post-Ramadan caravan for Medina was reported last month. At length both the camel-men and the Bedouin were declared to have been satisfied, and permission was given for the pilgrims to leave for Medina. The accumulation was so large that the pilgrims were split up into two bodies, the smaller starting from Jeddah, the larger setting out later from Mecca. Both were to go to Rabigh, and from there by the same route. The two caravans contained about 25,000 persons, and all of these, except for those who died in the desert and a few stout-hearted Afghans who finished the journey on foot, are now back in Mecca, without having reached Medina. The smaller caravan waited outside Rabigh for about ten days, while the larger was waiting in the desert at Asfan. It soon became clear that the Bedouin were resolved to let no pilgrims pass, at any rate not without delay and payment of heavy tolls, and the caravans were recalled. Even the return was not easy, as large numbers of camel-men, who are of course related to the robber tribes, had fled with their camels, leaving their pilgrims stranded. The Hashimite steamers "Tawil" and "Khandama" (see below) made several trips to Rabigh to bring back some of the pilgrims who had been left without transport, and somehow or other most of the unfortunate pilgrims got back. Caravans, consisting mainly of Egyptians, which had started from Yambo for Medina have also had to return. This incident gave King Hussein a shock so severe that not even his excuse (in the "Kibla") that the case was on all fours with the strike on the London Underground Railways was put forward with conviction, and he published a notice which, while carefully ambiguous and probably designed to protect the Hashimite Government from having to disgorge any of its share of the spoils, at least promised the pilgrims a refund of some kind. In reply to a letter from this agency, asking what compensation would be paid, the Hashimite Government declared that Indians and Egyptians would be given by the Hashimite Government £10 a camel in full settlement, and that the "Javanese" (i.e., all Far East pilgrims) had agreed to accept, in settlement of their claims, £2 a camel and free transport to Arafat and back to Mecca and Jeddah. The former terms are more favourable to the pilgrims; that is because the Indians and Egyptians are very few, and the King hopes to conciliate two important bodies of Moslems at a very small cost. The compensation to the Far East pilgrims will cost the Hashimite Government nothing. The cash payable is only £2 a camel, and the guides are being forced to pay the King £3 a camel, of which £2 goes to the pilgrims; the remaining £1 is, we may suppose, to soothe the King's lacerated feelings. Moreover, such free transport as is provided will certainly have to be provided by the guides. At present the guides are asking for the usual payment. In the end the pilgrims will probably have to pay at least something for the transport. The exact terms of the Government's decision have never been published in the newspapers, and by the time all the pilgrims get to know to what they are entitled it will be time to go to Arafat and too late to quarrel with the guides, whose power, backed as it is by the King, is very great.

The cause of the trouble is not known for certain. It was reported on very good authority, when the caravans were leaving, that there would certainly be trouble as the King, alleging that his promise had been misunderstood, had paid the Bedouin not the "half of six months' arrears" they had been expecting, but half of one month's. The payment was due when the caravan should be ready to leave Mecca, and if it is true that the Bedouin were induced to provide camels and then bilked—a supposition in accord with the short-sighted cunning which is one of the chief traits in the King's character—their action is reasonable. However this may be, by some means or other King Hussein has made one step towards Arab unity, in that he has united against him the Harb Bedouin, who have hardly been at one since the time of the Prophet. The "strike" is so general that not even goods can get through to Medina at present, and it seems unlikely that it will be safe for pilgrims to visit Medina after the Hajj. As only about 13,000 went before Ramadan and of the 100,000 or so foreign pilgrims at least 60,000 would wish to go, the number of pilgrims who will return home disappointed is very large. It will be interesting to see whether this has any effect on the number who come next year. It is difficult to believe that any except well-educated Moslems will forgo a chance to perform the pilgrimage. It seems to be a widespread belief that the greater the hardships the greater the merit acquired by the pilgrim. If this is so King Hussein is a benefactor to pilgrims, and the efforts of His Majesty's Government and of this agency to protect them are superfluous and even impertinent.



I have reserved the right to take up later the case of the pilgrims who have been disappointed in their hope to see Medina, but if they receive the promised compensation, or only slightly less, the matter had better be dropped. The Indian pilgrims who spent a month in the desert at Khaif last year and had to pay tolls amounting to £10 a camel, were full of indignation when they left Jeddah, but by the time they had reached India they had agreed to keep their troubles dark; and though they make private enquiries from this agency about compensation, no Indian paper that I have heard of has mentioned the scandalous incident. Whether this silence is due to religious or to political motives I do not know, but it is discouraging to find oneself more Mahometan than the pilgrims themselves.

The Hedjaz Government have published a notice stating that no pilgrim will be allowed to go to Medina on foot unless he has a certificate, signed by himself and countersigned by the consular authority concerned, declaring that he insists on going on foot and that he exempts the Hedjaz authorities from all responsibility for what may happen to him. There seems to be no reason to object to this measure. No British pilgrim walks who can afford to ride with a caravan, so that there is no question of forcing British subjects to go by caravan in order to swell the revenue obtained by the tax on pilgrim camels. The Dutch consulate, however, is inclined to think that the measure is aimed partly at the strong-minded Palambang pilgrims, who, although they have plenty of money, nearly always walk, as a protest against the high charges.

Some of the pilgrim charges are being raised again. Many pilgrims seem to have paid nearly £16 for their fruitless journey, as against £14 and 2 dollars, and the tax on each pilgrim going to Mecca from Jeddah has been increased.

The pilgrims on a British ship which arrived recently went to ask the captain's advice about an offer which the Acting Director of Quarantine had made them. For £40 they could go straight ashore; for £20 they would be allowed to do their quarantine on board and land next day, whereas if they paid the doctor nothing they would have to follow the usual practice and go to the quarantine islands. The captain said they could do what they liked, but they were not going to remain on his ship another day. Eventually the negotiations fell through because the pilgrims feared that when they had parted with their £40 the doctor would break his word. So they went to the quarantine islands, where, as usual, they stayed until next morning. This process, coupled with the sprinkling of the pilgrims with sea-water, is supposed to afford them adequate protection. The sterner measure of sprinkling with sea-water is sometimes omitted.

I learn on good authority that the sum given to the Director-General of Quarantine for the establishment of his hospitals at Maan and Akaba was £300. Of this he will have embezzled a certain amount, though perhaps not more than £100, so the hospital is not likely to be able to cope with any serious epidemic. This probably does not matter, as the pilgrimage has been clean for several years, and, with similar conditions prevailing, should be clean this year; but if an epidemic should break out in the Hedjaz, it would be rash to assume that the sanitary measures adopted by the Hashimite Government at Maan were sufficient to protect the countries beyond.

At one time it was rumoured that there was an epidemic in Mecca. Pilgrims were in fact dying at the rate of 100 to 150 a day, but I am satisfied that the heat and the usual dysentery, with perhaps some cases of typhoid, are sufficient to account for the mortality. There was a terrible heat-wave which lasted more than a month and coincided with a shortage of water. It appears that there had been interference with Ain Zubaidah, which supplies the city with drinking water. The trouble was eventually put right, but meanwhile the poorer pilgrims may well have suffered from lack of water, when the price was 3s. or 4s. for a 4-gallon tin.

His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt has secured a change in the Sudan quarantine regulations which will be very helpful to us. In Egypt the pilgrim season is officially announced to be closed when nearly all the pilgrims are known to have left the Hedjaz, but this has not hitherto been held to apply to the Sudan. Consequently any ship carrying to the Sudan from the Hedjaz, at any time, persons suspected of being pilgrims, unless the number of deck passengers was below one for every 100 tons, had to be disinfected. As this process costs £50, in addition to the loss resulting from the delay, the Khedivial Company—which provides the only regular means of communication with the Sudan—refused to carry Sudanese, Nigerians, &c., in numbers which might bring them within the scope of this onerous regulation. It has now been decided that, once the pilgrimage is declared in Egypt to be over, ships may take to Suakin from Jeddah any number of pilgrims, within the limits of their ordinary passenger

certificate. The pilgrims will be put in quarantine, but the ship will be allowed to leave at once with a clean bill of health.

It is to be hoped that the finances of the State of Chitral are flourishing. The Mehtar seems to have distributed huge sums in charity at Medina, and he is believed to have contributed heavily to the Hedjaz Railway fund. In Mecca he, like less prominent pilgrims, will be bled white. Every pilgrim of note has to make presents all round. Apart from what the King gets, all the officials, from the Prime Minister to the doorkeepers, call on the pilgrim for a present in money. If the present is considered to be smaller than the pilgrim's status had led the caller to expect, he is not slow to say so and to ask for the balance. Some pilgrims grow restive under this treatment, but perhaps the Mehtar of Chitral will consider himself repaid with the fuss that has been made over him and at being described in the Mecca press, first as Sultan and later as King of Chitral.

The Hedjaz Government, which cannot find money to pay its officials, still less foreigners having claims against them, have spent some £16,000 on the purchase of two ships. These are—

Steamship "Shustar"; British built (1897); previous owners: Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company (Limited); price: 140,000 rupees; net tonnage: 1,718.

Steam-yacht "Parnassos"; British built (1894); previous owner: Greek; price: £6,000, plus Suez Canal dues; tonnage: gross, 532; net, 210.

These ships have been renamed "Radhwa" and "Khandama" respectively, after two mountains in the Hedjaz. The "Radhwa" has for many years carried pilgrims between India and Jeddah, and obtained a certificate this year allowing her to carry 866, but the "Khandama" appears to be a most unpractical purchase; she has some eighty bunks, and, if crowded in every corner, could perhaps carry 250 persons in all without endangering their lives. On the other hand, she is said to have silver-chased lamps.

The Hedjaz Government wanted the officers and crew of the "Radhwa" to take service with them for two months on a vague contract in which the former undertook to repatriate the latter after two months unless a fresh contract had been entered into before then. They were inclined to listen to this proposal, but on learning that there are in the Hedjaz no independent courts to which any dispute about the contract could be carried, they decided not to allow their right to repatriation at the expense of the shipping company to lapse. This decision was welcome to this agency, which has no desire to see a crew of sixty—many of them Hindus—driven to choose between repatriation at their own expense (and probably the sacrifice of arrears of pay) or acceptance of a renewal contract with the Hashimite Government on unfavourable terms. It was about ten days before they could get passages to Aden, and during that time the captain (a Parsi) and three officers (one English, two Indians) agreed to stay on the ship. As a matter of fact their first trip may be profitable, as they are to fetch the Amirs Ali and Abdullah from Akaba. The latter, whose financial vagaries in Transjordan are well known, never travels by sea, it appears, without giving £50 or so to the captain who has the honour of his company on board.

The Hedjaz ships are a curse to the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company. Not only do the latter have to put up with unfair competition—unfair because the Hedjaz Government use their influence as a Government to penalise competitors, but they are expected to give their rivals active assistance, e.g., the Hashimite Government expects them to repair Hedjaz steamers at particularly favourable rates, and even claimed their assistance in recruiting a crew for the "Radhwa." And all that the Khedivial Company can do is to grin and bear it. At present the company are being threatened with a refusal of permission to load or unload cargo in the Hedjaz and with the loss of the Hedjaz mail contract, for having failed to answer the "Radhwa's" wireless request for a time signal. The signal was never received—probably because the one wireless operator was off duty. It only remains to add that the Khedivial have always had to carry the Hedjaz mails for nothing to get a complete picture of Hedjaz methods. The silly threats are typical of that nagging old fishwife, King Hussein.

An entertaining notice appeared in the "Kibla" recently, saying that the Hashimite Government had been inundated by Mahometans in other countries with offers of service in the Hashimite army, and was forced in self-defence to publish the rules under which such offers would be considered. The only clause of general interest is one providing that a volunteer from another country whose services are accepted will have his travelling expenses paid to the Hedjaz and, on completion of his three years' term, back to his own country. This notice is probably the usual Hashimite bunkum.



The only inundation from which they have really suffered is a sea of protests by Africans against compulsory service in the Hashimite army. This agency has secured the release of two such men (Nigerians) this week, but there are many more shut up in the barracks at Mecca of whom it is impossible to obtain exact knowledge.

The holding of slaves by British Indians turns out to be less widespread than I had feared. Still, it is disgraceful enough. Four Indians have released in all eight slaves and had the manumission recorded at this agency; two or three more are wriggling; and several others—men who have not taken out passports as British subjects recently—are definitely renouncing their British nationality and becoming Hedjaz subjects.

This agency received and passed on to the High Commissioner for Palestine a letter from the Hashimite Government alleging that the Palestine Government were crippling the Hedjaz Railway by refusing to transport coal or to repair "tools" requested for it. The facts, as might be expected, are quite different—the coal was carried at preferential rates and the repairs were executed, and the Palestine Government has been paid only about half the cost of the repairs.

Through the intervention of His Majesty's Government, King Hussein has been persuaded to settle three claims which have been dragging on for periods varying from nine months to two years. One of these was for £3,300, due to the Indian pilgrims who were robbed at Khaif last year. Another (also recorded in the monthly reports) was the claim of an Indian lady to money actually in the hands of the Hashimite Government and admitted by them to be hers, but withheld because the Governor-General of the Sudan was deciding an extradition case according to the law of the land and not according to the whim of King Hussein. The third claim was for the refund of money extorted from the Jeddah agent of a British firm in a matter which was not within the jurisdiction of the Hedjaz at all and which, apart from that fundamental objection, was decided in violation of the most elementary principles of justice. King Hussein agreed to the debit of the total amount of the claims (nearly £4,000) to a suspense account which survives from the days of the subsidy.

For over a year the Egyptian Postal Administration have been trying to recover a sum of about £50 for each of the years 1920-23 for the despatch of Hedjaz mails from Suez to places in Egypt and beyond. The Hashimite Government met the demand with three successive excuses:—

1. The month chosen as basis of the calculation was unfavourable to the Hedjaz. (It happened to be rather favourable; but, anyhow, it was the Madrid Postal Convention, and not Egypt, that had selected it.)
2. The Khedivial Mail Steamship Company ought to pay the claim. (The reasoning is: the Khedivial carry the Hedjaz mails to Suez for nothing, therefore they have a contract to carry Hedjaz mails, therefore they are responsible for all expenses in connection with Hedjaz mails outside the Hedjaz.)
3. The amount should be merged in that of the Hedjaz-Sudan cable. (Egypt have no interest whatsoever in the cable account.)

The Egyptian Government finally had to say that, unless the account was paid, they would no longer accept mails from the Hedjaz. The Hashimite Government have paid the sum (under £ E. 200) to this agency, but refuse to pay the £ E. 2 due for transmission to Egypt. King Hussein is a serious competitor to Bardolph, who, it will be remembered, stole a lute-case, bore it 12 leagues, and sold it for 1½d.

#### TEMPERATURE for May.

	Maximum.	Minimum.	Temperature at 10 A.M.	
			Dry.	Wet.
Average .. ..	89.3	74.4	87.7	83.1

R. W. BULLARD.

#### APPENDIX.

#### Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
				1924.	1924.		Packages.
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suakin ..	Suez ..	May 21	May 22	127	540
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 23	" 24	66	2,007
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 24	" 24	46	1,762
Borulos ..	British ..	Suez ..	Aden ..	" 25	" 25	319	458
Kenah ..	British ..	Aden ..	Suez ..	" 29	" 30	..	2,334
Englestan ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Port Sudan ..	" 30	" 31	1,926	2,236
Shuja ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	June 1	June 2	1,101	9,451
Eumaeus ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Port Sudan ..	" 2	" 3	920	200 tons
Ramleh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Sudan ..	" 3	" 4	..	6,070
Sultania ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 3	" 4	1,551	5,759
Shushtar ..	British ..	Suez ..	..	" 4	..	..	..
Tangistan ..	British ..	Karachi ..	Port Sudan ..	" 4	" 5	805	5,166
Teucer ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Port Sudan ..	" 5	" 5	932	30 tons
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suakin ..	" 5	" 5	333	606
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 5	" 5	27	832
Celebes ..	Dutch ..	Mokalla ..	Port Said ..	" 5	" 6	201	10 tons
Kenah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 7	" 8	371	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 7	" 7	21	874
Arabestan ..	British ..	Basra ..	..	" 9	..	1,404	37,891
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suakin ..	Suez ..	" 10	" 11	972	..
Etruria ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 12	" 12	514	..
Piemonte ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 13	" 13	838	..
Cagliari ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 13	" 13	633	..
Keemon ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Port Said ..	" 14	" 14	731	100 tons
Borulos ..	British ..	Aden ..	Suez ..	" 15	" 16	424	2,498
Radhwa ..	Hedjaz ..	Port Sudan ..	..	" 16	" 16	..	..
Dara ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Port Sudan ..	" 17	" 21	1,427	11,890
Gorjistan ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Port Sudan ..	" 17	" 17	929	128 planks
Kenah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suakin ..	" 17	" 17	557	1,529
Kangean ..	Dutch ..	Mombasa ..	Port Sudan ..	" 18	" 18	34	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 19	" 19	373	369
Etruria ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 19	" 19	504	..
Cagliari ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 19	" 19	627	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 20	" 20	194	..
Piemonte ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 20	" 20	825	..

[E 6471/1841/91]

No. 128.

Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 30, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, on receipt of your despatch No. 112 of the 11th June relating to the slave trade, I at once sent to His Majesty King Hussein a letter in the sense of paragraph 2 of that despatch. A translation of his reply is attached.

2. The enclosure to the reply, which, it will be noted, came from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and not from the King, was a copy of the King's letter, dated the 1st July, 1922, of which I sent you a translation with my despatch No. 27, dated the 19th March.

3. I am certain, in spite of the Hashimite Government's denial, that customs dues had been levied on slaves not long before my despatch No. 9, dated the 29th January, was written.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



Enclosure in No. 128.

*M. Sadaka to Consul Bullard.*(Translation.)  
(After respects.)

June 28, 1924.

YOUR letter to His Majesty my Lord, dated the 26th June, 1924, has been received. The first point mentioned therein is that relating to dues said to be collected by the Government on them (i.e., slaves); this is not correct and ought not to be mentioned. As to the rest of its contents, I content myself with referring to my letter, dated the 1st July, 1922, of which I enclose a copy.\*

Nevertheless, I would rather say that the justice and humanity of Great Britain and the League of Nations would be better employed in considering what is going on in Syria, for that is not less worthy of consideration than the matter of slavery. The most important duty of the said League is to apply their decisions to the situation in Syria; after that they can consider other matters.

Respects.

(For Foreign Secretary).  
SADAKA.

[E 7084/424/91]

No. 129.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 77. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 30, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 29th June to the 30th July.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Simla, Aden and Beirut (for communication to Damascus).

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 129.

*Jeddah Report, June 29 to July 30, 1924.*

(Secret.)

DR. NAJI-AL-ASIL arrived about ten days before the pilgrimage. He said that he would not be performing the pilgrimage as he must leave in a week in order to be back in London before Parliament rose. I do not know which picture is the more agreeable: King Hussein producing a straight answer within a week, or His Majesty's Government scanning the horizon for Dr. Naji's return. One is reminded of Brewer, who produced such an effect on Veneering's election by taking a cab and going down to the House to see how it looked. But Parliament will have to rise without Dr. Naji (if this is possible, constitutionally), for he is still in Mecca, where I hear he is ignored by the King and treated generally like dirt. However, he assures Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. that the King has promised to repay the sum of £500 which he drew from their firm in London, together with another £100 which he managed to get for his journey.

The Amirs Ali and Abdulla both came down for the pilgrimage. Ali is very popular here, while Abdulla is hated; but such is the Jeddah Arab that Abdulla's ante-room was crowded while Ali's was empty. The general opinion here is that if King Hussein dies (they say "if," having lost all hope that he ever will), Ali's alternative to renouncing all claim to the throne of King-Caliph would be to have his weasand slit by Abdulla. In that case, the Hedjaz, and foreign subjects in the Hedjaz, would be little if any better off. Abdulla has all his father's bad qualities, with less ability and *savoir faire*. At his reception he made a gross error in tact of which Hussein would never have been guilty. He first attacked the Algerian who is in charge of French interests in the Hedjaz, on the ground that the French had suppressed the liberty of Arabs in Syria. There being some thirty people, official and unofficial, present, Sheikh Kellal would have been fully justified in replying that neither was that the place nor was Abdulla the person to

\* Enclosure 2 in No. 91 of Part XIV.

discuss this question, but he defeated Abdulla by referring, with great good humour and in beautiful Arabic, to certain agreements recently concluded between Syria and Transjordan, and expressing the hope that this would lead to fruitful co-operation. Abdulla was even less fortunate when he started to be rude to the Netherlands consul. In a superior tone he told M. Van der Plas that the Netherlands Government ought to do all in their power to assist Javanese pilgrims, as thereby they would not only earn the gratitude of their subjects but also please His Majesty the Caliph. The Hedjaz did everything possible for pilgrims; what did the Netherlands Government do? M. Van der Plas replied that the Netherlands Government allowed pilgrims, as an exceptional measure, to take gold out of Java; what was the policy of the Hedjaz Government in this respect? At this cruel thrust the Amir muttered something unintelligible and changed the conversation, while the ranks of Tusculum (smugglers of gold to a man) came as near to tittering as true Oriental politeness allows.

Driven, for lack of fresh material, to repeat itself, the "Kibla" prints a letter of recognition from "the Shi'ahs of Najaf," signed "Mirza Abdul Karim-al-Zinjani, Mufti of the Shi'ahs." A long article in which the secretary of the Caliphate Committee in Penang comes to the conclusion that King Hussein is the only person who is qualified for the post of Caliph is marred by the omission of the secretary to sign his name. Much is made of recognition by Sidi Alfaril, "Commander-in-chief of the Liberian army and leader of the Moslems in Liberia." This gentleman, who is covered with medals, produces as credentials a letter in which the Secretary to the Gold Coast Government says that if Sidi Alfaril really volunteered in 1914 to help the Allies, will he please send a copy of any letter in which the offer was made.

The "Kibla" prints a letter, signed by Haji Muhammad Kasim, of Bombay, Muhammad Abdul Kadir-al-Kadiri, of Badayun, and Aba Khalid Rashid-al-Din Ahmad (known as Padshah Mia), of Bengal, recognising the King as Caliph, declaring the Hedjaz to be free from European influence, and contradicting the reports current in India that pressure is put upon pilgrims to make them recognise King Hussein as Caliph. Some of Padshah Mia's pupils, who came to this office, cursed him for having "sold his principles for a car," i.e., in order to travel to Jeddah in one of the King's motors instead of on a camel, but declared that he signed the letter out of fear. It is one thing, they said, to oppose the British Raj, which at worst puts you in a prison, where you are quite well treated, and quite another to oppose a despot, who is quite capable of having your throat cut.

There seems to have been some friction between the Mahmal people and the Hedjaz authorities. I have been unable to learn the cause, but it is credibly reported that before he left Mecca the Amir-al-Haji formed up his troops before the great mosque, and made them play the Egyptian National Air and give cheers for "King Fuad, the only independent Arab ruler." Possibly King Hussein had been conducting Caliphate propaganda among the Egyptians.

The Pilgrimage Conference was duly held at Mecca. According to the "Kibla" there were several preliminary meetings at which a programme dealing with the following points was drawn up:—

1. Mutual acquaintance of Moslem peoples should be encouraged.
2. Arab unity should be nucleus of Moslem unity.
3. Executive committee should be formed to draw up programme for a general congress and to establish branches in Moslem countries.
4. Financial committee should be formed to raise funds.
5. Publicity should be directed solely to the betterment of Moslems in the matter of religion.
6. Education of Moslem children should be based on religious principles. They should never be sent to foreign schools.
7. Technical education in Moslem countries should be encouraged.
8. Study of Arabic in Moslem countries should be promoted.

According to the "Kibla," Sheikh Umar Kurdi, ex-kadi of Medina, was elected president of the congress, and resolutions were passed protesting against the usurpation of portions of the Hedjaz Railway, a Moslem Waki, by England and France, and supporting the protest of Abdul Kadir-al-Mudbaffar against the wrongful seizure of Palestine and "its conversion into a national home for the Jews." According to a later number of the "Kibla," a telegram of protest about Wakfs has been sent to the League of Nations, the Caliphate Committee in India, Al Azhar and various Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian newspapers. The telegram includes a protest about the retention by the Turks of the treasures taken from the Prophet's tomb.



I may mention here that Abdul Kadir Mudhaffar, speaking to the Ruler of Bandung, an important Javanese chief, railed against the Javanese as miserable cowards for allowing fewer than 200,000 Europeans to rule 30,000,000 of them, and said he would go to Java next year to rouse the people from their lethargy.

On the whole the promise to compensate the pilgrims who set out for Medina and had to return unsuccessful has really been kept. All the Indians and Egyptians got their £10 and all the Malays their £2. The only difficulty was over the free transport to Arafat and back to Jeddah, which the Malays were promised. As we anticipated, they had to quarrel with the guides for this, but they were surprisingly successful, and in the few cases which have come to my notice where free transport was not provided, the money was refunded by the guides' agents in Jeddah. Little or nothing has come out of the King's pocket, of course; the guides have had to pay. One can almost find pity for these leeches; greedy brutes as they are, their master is as brutal and far more greedy.

The "Kibla" announced the departure of a caravan for Medina on the 28th July, but it has not left yet. It is now quite certain that the return of the big caravan was due to the swindling of the camelmen by the King; he gave them a smaller share of the spoil than he had promised.

The King is booming the route via Akaba. The "Kibla" publishes a tariff, and declares that a Hedjaz steamer will leave Jeddah for Akaba every ten days, and that cars (and camels) will meet the ship and trains the cars and camels. This rosy picture is not justified by anything I have heard from the Amir Ali and Thabit "Pasha" (Director-General of Quarantine), who have both been on the spot recently. The Amir Ali considers that he did wonders in getting 1,200 pilgrims from Medina to Ma'an in twenty-five days. The journey each way took five to seven days or longer. Thabit reports that if the track is improved it may be possible next year, when they get the rolling-stock now on order in Germany, to carry half as many passengers as the line ought to carry. The project for the formation of a motor transport company failed, but the Hedjaz Government have bought three lorries and some cars, and with these they can carry about sixty persons at a time. These cars cannot carry a boat-load or train-load of pilgrims at a time, so either they will have to make several journeys or many pilgrims must travel by camel. The tariff published in the "Kibla" gives the cost of 1st and 2nd class railway tickets, but I believe that there are only goods trucks running at present. Khan Bahadur Pir Sadr-al-Din-al-Gilani, a dignitary from the Punjab, certainly travelled in a goods truck, though it is always possible that this was just to "learn" him not to be an anti-Caliph Hussein toad. What Pir Sadr-al-Din complained of most was the long wait of fourteen days for a train at Ma'an. He could have visited Jerusalem in that time, but every day he was assured by the railway authorities and by the Amir Ali that the train would really arrive the next day and that he would miss it if he left Ma'an.

This is the tariff published in the "Kibla":—

			1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
		£	£	£ s. d.	£
Steamer, Jeddah-Akaba	single	..	6	4 0 0	3
Car, Akaba-Ma'an	..	2	..	..	..
Camel, " " "	..	10	..	..	..
(Mejidiyahs, about £1.)					
Train, Ma'an-Medina	..	..	10	7 10 0	5
Train, Medina-Amman	..	..	11	8 10 0	6

It is calculated that there were about 150,000 pilgrims at Arafat on pilgrimage day, but in spite of this accumulation of human beings in very primitive conditions there is again no trace of plague or cholera. The Quarantine Board at Alexandria have declared the pilgrimage clean. The British delegate on the board telegraphed asking whether there was any truth in the persistent rumours that there was an epidemic of dysentery in the Hedjaz. I replied that while both amœbic and bacillary dysentery are fairly common, there is no ground whatever for thinking that it is worse than last year. The death rate on pilgrimage day seems to have been high this year, but nearly all the deaths were due to heat and lack of water. I reported last month the shortage of water at Mecca. My belief that the difficulty had been overcome was incorrect, and pilgrims continued to have to pay high prices for brackish well-water. But it was on the

journey from Arafat to Mecca that the shortage was most serious. All pilgrims, including the acting French consul, Sheikh Kellal, and our doctor, Munir-ed-Din, tell pitiful tales of the old and weak falling by the roadside and dying for lack of water, while the younger and stronger hurried on pitilessly, fearing lest a like fate should befall themselves. This has not prevented King Hussein from publishing a report in the "Kibla" saying that everything was perfect and all the pilgrims were delighted. The truth is, that what with the failure of the main caravan to reach Medina and the death of so many pilgrims in sight of their fellows, this has been a disastrous pilgrimage. Pilgrims are arriving at Jeddah in a very exhausted state. My Netherlands colleague reports that of 1,750 pilgrims who had booked by a steamer due to leave next day, twenty-five died during the night. A death rate of over 1·4 within twenty-four hours is startling.

In spite of this we have no emaciated Indians lying at the agency gate waiting for a passage home. The deposit system seems to be working admirably so far as Jeddah is concerned. Nearly every Indian pilgrim who arrives at Jeddah on his way home goes straight to one of the shipping agencies, and on the strength of his passport, which bears a stamp saying that he has made a deposit of 60 rupees in India, gets a passage to Bombay or Karachi. The only Indian pilgrims who have to come to this agency (other than the few who have some complaint to make) are those who have lost their passports, and these are less numerous than our previous experience of Indian passports had led us to fear. At a rough guess, and exclusive of those who travelled by the steamer which was burnt—the steamship "Frangestan"—only about 1 per cent. of pilgrims have lost their passports. Where the name and details given by such a pilgrim correspond with those in the lists sent us from India, and his dialect supports his tale, he is given an emergency pass which is good for a passage provided that no passage has already been granted in virtue of the passport which the pilgrim claims to have lost. Where the name cannot be found on the lists, the applicant is refused an emergency pass and is advised to buy a ticket for cash and to get from the shipping agency a certificate that he has done so, in order that he may recover the money in India if he can establish his identity there. Some trouble could be saved to this office, and possibly some pilgrims who are now refused emergency passes would obtain them, if the Karachi lists gave the name of the ship by which the pilgrim travelled. The Karachi authorities say that they are unable to supply this information, but as it appears in the Bombay lists the difficulty cannot be insurmountable.

His Majesty's representative in Egypt has obtained from the Quarantine Board another concession of great value. The regulations in force last year stated that no foreign pilgrim could land in Egypt unless he had a ticket to some place beyond, and this had the ridiculous result of making it impossible for a foreign pilgrim who was unable to book through to his destination from Jeddah to land in Egypt in order to get his ticket, or, rather, it made it impossible for him to buy a ticket for Egypt from a reputable company in Jeddah. This has been set right by a circular from the Quarantine Board to the shipping agencies in Egypt, authorising them to issue tickets to Suez to any pilgrim who "is obliged to land in Egypt" provided that he gets an embarkation permit from his consulate.

Messrs. Lazzarini, of Suez, who hold the contract for the transport of the Mahmal and the "official" Egyptian pilgrims this year, are doing their work very efficiently. There have been no incidents of the kind with which the incompetence and lack of scruple of M. Schemel made us familiar last year. It is suggestive that, on examining a complaint which arose because two people were claiming the right to book pilgrims independently for the same boat, I found that the one who had no claim at all was acting on a letter written by M. Schemel.

All agents booking pilgrims for Syria by direct steamer are charging £1 (gold) extra for payment to the Director-General of Customs for the Hedjaz Treasury. The Director-General of Customs wanted to make a similar arrangement for all boats going to Suez, but the proposal fell through because the Khedivial agents wanted the order in writing. This they could not get, because the King does not want it to be known that he taxes his beloved Syrians £1 a head to leave the Hedjaz and wishes to be free to deny all knowledge of the arrangement. A similar secret tax was levied last year, but when, towards the end of the season, the news leaked out that the agents were taking £1 more than the real fare, and some pilgrims complained to Mecca, the King, with his pockets full of the sovereigns already levied by his orders, flung one of the agents into gaol for oppressing the pilgrims. As the latest expert on Arab affairs, Colonel Jacob, says in his newly published book, King Hussein is a genial, kindly old man.

Osman Digna, who was allowed by the Sudan Government to come on the



pilgrimage, will have to be sent home again. He is not responsible for his actions, and there is no one here who can look after him. He had to be conducted through the rites of the pilgrimage by force.

The Africans (Takrunis) who were reported last month to be under guard in the barracks at Mecca as conscripts, were sent to Arafat on duty. They deserted in a body and fled into the desert. The treatment of Takrunis in the Hedjaz has so scared the pilgrims who came from Nigeria, &c., this year that, instead of spending some time at Mecca, as they usually do, and trying to get to Medina, they are all flooding down to Jeddah to get away as soon as they can. It is to be hoped that they will spread in their own country the news of the treatment Takrunis get from the "Caliph."

King Hussein has recently inflicted heavy fines (£200 in some cases) for overloading camels, not because he has become a member of Our Dumb Friends' League, but because, in order to get still more money out of the tax on camels carrying goods to Mecca, he has greatly reduced the maximum load a camel may carry, and anyone who puts a reasonable load on a camel is considered to be defrauding the revenue.

The "Khandama" (formerly "Parnassos") has been rechristened "Raghmatin," after two small hills in the Hedjaz. The name "Khandama," which is that of a mountain larger than Radhwa, was given to the "Parnassos" in the belief that she was larger than the steamship "Radhwa" (formerly "Shushtar"). Having bought the "Parnassos," they found it was about one-quarter the size.

I understand that the "Radhwa" has already been stripped of most of her pilgrim fittings, and that, above all, she has no medical stores on board. This will not prevent her being used for pilgrims. She has sailed for Akaba and Suez, while the "Raghmatin" has made a trip to Suakin with pilgrims. Two years ago there was trouble between the Quarantine Board in Egypt and the Hedjaz authorities, because the Hedjaz steamship "Tawil" went to Suez with more pilgrims than her capacity warranted. This was smoothed over on the ground that the pilgrims had been carried as an act of charity, but the Quarantine Board stated that in future the regulations would have to be complied with. I warned the High Commissioner for Egypt and the Governor at Port Sudan that Hashimite steamers would be calling with pilgrims, and that, as the object was simply to make money, there was no need to relax the regulations. British pilgrims who travelled on the "Raghmatin" from Akaba to Jeddah complained that the first class bath-room, which they were entitled to use as first class passengers, was kept locked, on the ground that there was no one to keep it clean, and that throughout their three days' journey the allowance of drinking water was two or three small tumblers daily—say, a pint and a half, instead of the gallon which is laid down by the convention as a maximum. I wrote to Mecca about this shortage of drinking water, and, although I received no reply, there is reason to believe that the protest, or the passengers' complaints, or both, have had some effect. There is as yet no certain news of the despatch of a Hashimite steamer to Basra. The kaimakam, in his capacity as shipping agent, booked pilgrims for the Persian Gulf on a Bombay-Persia steamer, and, though until the last moment he was afraid he might be stopped, he was able to get the ship away. The Hedjaz authorities are finding it more difficult than they thought to run a fleet of steamers. The service is managed by a clerk, who works under the orders of the Director-General of Customs. I have myself seen the director-general, one of the busiest men in Jeddah, booking an order, by telephone, for one passage to Akaba, and be sure it's with food.

The American journalists, about whom a warning was inserted in the February report, did not, after all, go to Palestine and Irak, or some officials there might have had reason to be grateful for my warning. Mr. Morrill is publishing a book entitled "Primrose Paths from Paris to Palmyra." According to the prospectus, of which he has been good enough to send me a copy, this book contains "fascinating, unforgettable pictures of the wild high life of Paris, . . . Cairo, Alexandria . . ." The author "chatted with courtesans, smugglers . . . visited all the leading churches, cabarets and houses of prostitution; was an interested spectator at nude dances in Europe, Asia and Africa . . ." There has been "nothing like it in literature since the vivacious, salacious travelogues of Sterne and Casanova." One of the illustrations shows that guileless official, the British agent at Jeddah, photographed with a party at Eve's Tomb; another, of which a copy is given in the prospectus, is a photograph of one of Morrill's lady friends in a costume which consists of a strip of cloth on her head and a bangle on each ankle.

## TEMPERATURE for June.

	Maximum.	Minimum.	Temperature at 10 a.m.	
			Dry.	Wet.
Average .. ..	94	78.9	91.4	88.4

R. W. BULLARD,  
Agent and Consul.

P.S.—The cause of the disagreement between King Hussein and the Egyptian Amir-al-Hajj was this: The kiswah (covering for the Ka'bah) had in one corner an inscription saying that it was the gift of King Fuad, and King Hussein was silly enough to cover up this inscription or, as some say, to cut it out. The Amir-al-Hajj seems to have made a great scene, he and the King bellowing so loudly that what they said was easily heard downstairs. It is said that when coming away from the interview the Amir-al-Hajj shouted that Muhammad Ali had overthrown the Hedjaz, and that he and his 300 men were quite capable of dealing with it now. It is believed that the Egyptian Government are taking the incident seriously. The Mahmal was hurried away, and the "official" ships are being rushed back for Egyptian pilgrims as quickly as possible.

A Russian consul (Muhammadan) is expected to arrive in a few days. The King has ordered that he is to be received at the quay with a band. All consuls have to bear this, but the Russian consul (with his wife) is to be put up in the kaimakam's house. The King is reported to be in a flutter of pleasurable excitement at the approaching arrival of an emissary from a Government which may be able to help him to attain his political aims.

R. W. B.

## APPENDIX.

## Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
							Packages.
Keneh ..	British ..	Suakin ..	Aden ..	June 21 ..	June 21 ..	779	..
Massawa ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massawa ..	" 21 ..	" 21 ..	61	..
Egypt ..	Egyptian ..	Beirut ..	..	" 23 ..	..	1,606	..
Radhwa ..	Hedjaz ..	Port Sudan ..	..	" 21 ..	..	..	..
Amazonia ..	Egyptian ..	Beirut ..	..	" 25 ..	..	684	..
Borulos ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 25 ..	" 25 ..	373	411
Mansourah ..	" ..	" ..	Suakin ..	" 26 ..	" 26 ..	336	..
Cagliari ..	Italian ..	" ..	Suez ..	" 26 ..	" 26 ..	633	..
Etruria ..	" ..	" ..	" ..	" 26 ..	" 26 ..	508	..
Homayun ..	British ..	Bombay ..	..	" 26 ..	..	950	2,770
Piemonte ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 27 ..	" 27 ..	834	..
Massawa ..	" ..	Massawa ..	..	" 27 ..	" 27 ..	71	..
Asmara ..	" ..	Suez ..	Massawa ..	" 28 ..	" 28 ..	71	..
Sheffield ..	British ..	Beirut ..	..	" 28 ..	..	356	..
Gorjistan ..	" ..	Port Sudan ..	..	" 28 ..	..	..	..
Mansourah ..	" ..	Suakin ..	Suez ..	" 29 ..	" 29 ..	557	..
Englestan ..	" ..	Bombay ..	Port Sudan ..	" 30 ..	July 2 ..	2,277	2,763
Belgrano ..	French ..	Beirut ..	..	" 30 ..	..	794	..
Jeddah ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Suez ..	July 1 ..	" 4 ..	1,343	5,650
Prinkipos ..	Greek ..	Suez ..	..	" 2 ..	..	179	..
Halal ..	British ..	Aden ..	Suez ..	" 2 ..	" 2 ..	101	..
Dara ..	" ..	Akaba ..	..	" 4 ..	..	..	..
Cagliari ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	..	" 4 ..	..	633	..
Sultania ..	British ..	Bombay ..	..	" 5 ..	..	1,524	..
Piemonte ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	..	" 5 ..	..	690	..
Massawa ..	" ..	" ..	Massawa ..	" 5 ..	" 5 ..	37	..
Borulos ..	British ..	" ..	Port Sudan ..	" 5 ..	" 5 ..	317	437
Keneh ..	" ..	Aden ..	Aden ..	" 6 ..	" 6 ..	153	2,143
Arabestan ..	" ..	" ..	Port Sudan ..	" 9 ..	" 9 ..	..	..
Borulos ..	" ..	Port Sudan ..	Suez ..	" 9 ..	" 10 ..	20	1,360
Englestan ..	" ..	" ..	..	" 10 ..	..	..	..

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 3rd July and left on the 5th July.



[E 7495/1841/91]

No. 130.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 78.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 7, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram of the 4th August, No. 19, in which I informed you that three girls, Netherlands subjects, had been found to be in slavery in Mecca, and that the Netherlands consul had hitherto failed to secure their release. One of the girls has been released, the other two have been taken away from their masters by King Hussein and are being kept apart in a safe place until their origin is formally established. I am reporting the cases fully, partly because they afford us valuable precedents, partly because they are of interest to the authorities at Singapore.

The facts, so far as they have been ascertained, are as follows:—

2. A young Javanese Moslem girl was entrusted to an Arab woman, then living in Java, to learn Arabic and the principles of Islam. When the Arab woman decided to return to Mecca the girl's parents asked that she might be allowed to go with her to perform the pilgrimage and to continue her instruction. The woman agreed on condition that they gave her an I.O.U. for 100 guilders. Once arrived in Mecca the woman announced that the girl was her slave and treated her as such. This was three or four years ago. Last year the girl's brother came on the pilgrimage, got into touch with his sister secretly and managed to smuggle her away, but at Bahrah, halfway between Mecca and Jeddah, they were overtaken by the "owner" and a party of Hashimite police and the girl was dragged back into slavery. The case then came to the notice of the Netherlands consul. The greatest circumspection had to be used, as it would be easy, as precedents have shown, for a slave in whom a foreign consulate was interested to be made to disappear. Once sure of his facts the Netherlands consul applied to the Foreign Secretary, Sheikh Fuad, for the girl's release. Finding the facts to be as stated, Sheikh Fuad did not deny the girl's right to freedom; but he had the impertinence to convey to the consul the "owner's" demand that she should receive not only the value of the I.O.U. but also a refund of all the money spent on the girl in the Hedjaz, including the expense of her recapture. The demand was withdrawn in face of the Netherlands consul's indignant refusal, and the girl was released.

3. Two Christian Javanese girls wished to visit some relatives in another island. An Arab offered to take charge of them, and instead of taking them to their relatives brought them to Singapore, and thence to Jeddah. It is said that he sold them for £500 apiece, Javanese slaves being rare and Christian Javanese hitherto unknown. They both got into the hands of the Shaibi family, but whether by purchase or as a present is unknown. The Shaibi are considered to be one of the first families in Mecca; they are the hereditary keepers of the key of the sacred mosque and incredibly holy. The girls might have remained in their power for ever, but the possession of Christian slaves so tickled the vanity of the Shaibi that they boasted of it openly. When this scandalous case was brought to his notice by the Netherlands consul, Sheikh Fuad seems to have had a nervous breakdown, and getting no satisfactory reply the consul sent his Javanese representative in Mecca to the King with a strongly-worded written statement. To his astonishment the King expressed the most profound gratitude to the Netherlands consul for having brought the case to his notice, removed the girls at once from the custody of their "owner," and promised to punish the Shaibi severely as an example to others. It is unlikely that he will venture to punish such important people for conduct which is considered legitimate in the Hedjaz and which he probably approves in his heart; but at least there is much gained.

4. I have stressed the fact that these two girls were Christians, not because I think slavery is in itself more painful to a Christian than to a Moslem (though possibly to be of the same religion as his master and to live in the Holy Land may give a Moslem slave consolation which a Christian would not feel), but because, if the facts are as stated, these two Christian girls must have come to the British port of Singapore in the charge of a Moslem Arab and must have sailed from there as Moslem pilgrims on a British ship, under the eyes of British authorities, for a country which is purely Moslem and which openly recognises and encourages the slave traffic. The facts may not be as I have stated (I will report further when the girls have reached Jeddah and have been questioned), but that there is no inherent improbability in the tale that the girls passed through Singapore is, I think, certain. I have recently conveyed to the Singapore Government a complaint from the Netherlands consulate at

Jeddah that a very high proportion of Dutch pilgrims who sail from Singapore hold other people's tickets—a circumstance which suggests lack of control. The Malay pilgrimage officer attached to this agency is unable to inform me of any measures taken to control the departure of passengers on pilgrim ships bound for Jeddah, but that may be due to his ignorance and not to absence of control. I believe that the control at the bigger Dutch ports is strict, police and steamship agents being stationed on the quay to see that passport and ticket correspond with the holder. It would not be an unfair rule, I suggest, to compel all Arabs, whether men or women, who are in charge of Malay or Javanese girls or women, to give a good account of themselves before being allowed to embark. The master of the steamship "Antiochus" recently put off at Penang an Arab who had embarked at Singapore with two Malay girls and could not give a satisfactory account of himself, and as they did not come on board again there is reason to believe that the authorities, to whom they were delivered, found the suspicion justified. I should be glad to learn what the result of the inquiry was, and what, if anything, is done at Singapore and other Straits Settlements ports to prevent the slave traffic (for that is what the "white slave" traffic becomes when directed towards the Hedjaz) from being carried on under the cloak of the pilgrimage to Mecca.

5. My Netherlands colleague has now received instructions from his Government to protest against the slave trade and is acting on them. I regret to learn from your despatch of the 9th July, No. 126, that the French propose to wait until their consul returns to his post at some unspecified time. This is a particularly good moment for a united effort on the part of the four representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands to bring King Hussein to make some serious concession in regard to the importation of slaves. He is rather shaken by the two cases which I have related and by the attention which the matter is receiving in Parliament, and I have a serious case about which I am on the point of attacking him. There is in this agency at present a young woman, with her daughter of 8 years of age, who is undoubtedly of Sudanese origin and came from there only a year ago. The kaimakam of Jeddah has stated to me that he allowed this woman to be sold in his presence after satisfying himself by the examination of witnesses that she and the seller were both from French Sudan. The woman is really from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, though the seller is probably from the French side of the border, but that does not diminish the atrocity of the kaimakam's statement viewed from the standpoint of Europe. His defence is that witnesses stated, and the woman admitted, that she was a slave in her own home. This is a subterfuge, for the kaimakam is a man who has travelled and who knows perfectly well that there is no slavery either in French Sudan or in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; and, in any case, we cannot allow such scandalous treatment of our people by the Hedjaz officials. I am working with my French colleague on this case, but he is much hampered by lack of general instructions. My own opinion is that a protest would come with particular force from a Mahometan (Sheikh Kellal is a native of Algiers) who detests slavery and is particularly anxious to combat the view that Islam can be held to justify the existence of slavery to-day. My Italian colleague has received no instructions, and I do not know that a protest from him would come with any force. He is a Syrian whose only desire seems to be not to offend the local authorities and who himself appears to have no personal feeling whatever against slavery.

6. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Singapore.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

[E 7715/1841/91]

No. 130.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 87.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 18, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 23 of the 13th August, dealing with a slavery case and sent for obvious reasons in plain language. I had already referred to this case in my despatch No. 78, dated the 7th August (paragraph 5), but it will be convenient to report on it fully here.

2. About two months ago I received information that a native of the French Sudan named Muhammad Baikumah was trying to sell a woman who was believed to be from the same territory. I told my French colleague, Sheikh Kellal, who



asked the kaimakam to send the man to him. The kaimakam put him off with evasive replies and finally said that the man has disappeared. On the 5th August the woman took refuge in this agency, with her daughter of 8 years of age. I found that Muhammad Baikumah was again in Jedduah, and I was able to learn the exact location of his hut. Armed with this information Sheikh Kellal was able to compel the kaimakam to send the man to the French consulate. The enquiry took place in my presence. Muhammad Baikumah admitted that he was a native of Abesha, in French Sudan, that he had sold the woman, Maimunah bint Ahmaq (or Muhammad), and that he was well aware that in doing so he was breaking the law of his own country. The only point left in doubt was whether the woman was actually born in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, as she asserted, or whether she was brought over the border from Abesha, as the accused maintained, when she was a child. Presumption being in favour of the former claim, Sheikh Kellal left it to me to deal with her case as though she was undoubtedly a native of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

3. When I called on the kaimakam to discuss the case he admitted full knowledge of it from the beginning. He claimed that the only point at issue at the time when the French consulate was trying to secure Muhammad Baikumah was whether the woman should be sold alone or with her child, and demanded praise for his humanity in decreeing that they should be sold together. He maintained that Baikumah and several witnesses testified, and the woman admitted, that she was Baikumah's slave in the French Sudan, but he admitted being fully aware that slavery is illegal both in French and in British territories. I spoke to the kaimakam in the most severe terms, characterising as absolutely unacceptable that the subject of any European Power should be adjudged, on any evidence whatsoever, to be a slave, and requesting him to inform Mecca that the woman and her child were at the British agency and would on no account be handed over to the Hedjaz authorities. Two or three days later I learned that a policeman was watching the agency from a neighbouring house, and had said he had orders to seize the woman if she came out of the agency. Not knowing quite how far King Hussein's madness would lead him, and wishing to avoid any incident which might be humiliating to the agency, I telephoned to the Foreign Secretary saying that I regarded the posting of the sentry as a compliment to the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding slavery, that I proposed to send the Sudanese woman and her child to the Sudan, and that I threw on the Hedjaz authorities all responsibility for the consequences if they interfered. Sheikh Fuad said he was afraid to speak to the King about another slavery case, as he was already severely compromised by his attitude in regard to the cases recently discovered by the Netherlands consulate. I therefore wrote direct to King Hussein and telegraphed to you in plain language. On the 16th August I took the woman and her child on board the Khedivial boat just before it left for the Sudan.

4. Copies of the correspondence with Mecca are enclosed. It seemed inadvisable to leave the Foreign Secretary's letter of the 14th August unanswered, and I therefore replied in a letter, dated the 18th August, in which I confined myself to the unanswerable case of British subjects or protected persons wrongfully treated as slaves in the Hedjaz. I trust that my attitude will be approved. King Hussein is much shaken by the recent attacks of the British and Netherlands representatives here, and the moment seems favourable for strong support by His Majesty's Government and by the other Governments concerned. In this connection I beg to refer to my despatch No. 88, dated the 18th August.

5. I may add that a few days ago a young Sudanese came to this agency for a pass to enable him to go to the Sudan. He said he was brought to the Hedjaz by a Takruni (the general name for Nigerians, Congolese, &c.) when he was a young boy, was sold to the Amir Ali as a slave, and after five or six years of slavery was set free. He had with him a decree of manumission issued by the religious court stating that he had been set free by the Amir Ali. There is no reason to disbelieve the rest of his story. The sale of young Africans in the Hedjaz—usually in Mecca—by anyone into whose power they fall owing to, e.g., the death of parents or other relatives on the pilgrimage, is, I am afraid, painfully common. King Hussein himself has many slaves, and I have no doubt that some of them were born in the Sudan under Anglo-Egyptian rule.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 131.

*Consul Bullard to King Hussein.*

(After respects.)

*Jeddah, August 13, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter of the 27th June, in which the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the slave traffic were conveyed to your Majesty, and to report to your Majesty a case which cannot fail to cause His Majesty's Government, when I acquaint them with it, great surprise and concern.

On the 5th August a black woman with a little girl of 8 years came to this agency. She gave her name as Maimunah, and stated that she was a native of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, that she came from there to the Hedjaz about a year ago, that a certain Muhammad Baikumah, a Sudanese, had sold her into slavery in Jeddah, and that she now wished to take refuge in the British agency.

Having satisfied myself that the woman was a Sudanese, and had in fact come to the Hedjaz fairly recently, I called on his Excellency the Kaimakam of Jeddah. To my great astonishment, he not only confessed to full knowledge of the case, but admitted that, though satisfied by the evidence of competent witnesses that both the seller and the woman Maimunah were natives of the French Sudan (the woman has lived nearly all her life in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but may perhaps have been brought from French Sudan as a young child), he nevertheless allowed the former to sell the woman in his presence. In view of this admission I am taking an early opportunity, with the approval of my French colleague, to send the woman and the child (her own child) back to the Sudan, where the question whether she is from French or Anglo-Egyptian Sudan can easily be decided. I trust that your Majesty will give the Jeddah authorities the necessary instructions in order that if this agency needs any help in the matter they may not be lacking either in goodwill or in performance.

It is hardly necessary to inform your Majesty that the details of this surprising and painful case are being reported fully to His Majesty's Government.

(Compliments.)

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 131.

*Fuad-al-Khatib to Consul Bullard.*

(Translation.)

*August 14, 1924.*

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 13th August, addressed to His Majesty my Lord, has been received, and I have the honour to reply that we have already informed you categorically that it is impossible to cancel what is one of the fundamental provisions of (our) religion, and that the slaves come only from the Sudan, &c. If you stop them, naturally, this occurrence will be removed, and thus the aim of His Majesty's Government will be attained, and the (Hedjaz) Government will be saved from the consequences of cancelling a fundamental religious provision. As to your statement regarding the kaimakam and his case, the owner of the said woman reported to the Government that she was his property. So they were referred to the religious court, where the man proved that the woman was his servant. This judgment must be considered valid. There is need for us to be otherwise than clear on this point. If you want to send her (away) for the investigation to which you refer, that also is in accordance with our religious law and our faith; you can therefore send her. Instructions in this sense have been given to the authorities at Jeddah.

In our opinion, this case does not necessitate in the least the astonishment you speak of; and, of course, you can write whatever you like about it.

(With respects.)

FUAD-AL-KHATIB,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.



Enclosure 3 in No. 131.

*Consul Bullard to King Hussein.*

(After respects.)

*Jeddah, August 18, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of a letter from the Foreign Secretary, dated the 14th August, regarding a Sudanese woman who, with her child, had taken refuge in this agency.

Your Majesty will doubtless hear from His Majesty's Government again on the subject of slavery and slave-trading in general, but the Foreign Secretary's letter contains a misconception which I think it essential to clear up at once. I have sent the woman and her child to the Sudan, not for an investigation, but because she wanted to go. Being a Sudanese she has as good a right to leave the Hedjaz as a Hedjaz subject travelling in England has to leave England. Any human being who comes to the Hedjaz, being a subject of any part of the British Empire or of any territory for the Government of which His Majesty's Government are responsible, is free at the moment of arrival in the Hedjaz, and that free status cannot be altered in the slightest by any evidence of any witnesses, or by the decision of any Hedjaz official or kadhi, or by the views of the Hedjaz Government, or by any other means whatsoever. Should it come to my knowledge that any such person is being treated as a slave in the Hedjaz I shall ask for his immediate release with the confident expectation of immediate compliance on the part of the Hedjaz authorities, while if any such person appears at this agency and expresses a wish to leave the country he will be sent away at the first convenient opportunity.

(Compliments.)

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7716/1841/91]

No. 132.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 88.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 18, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 78 of the 7th August, regarding specific cases of slavery in the Hedjaz.

2. The case reported in paragraph 3 of that despatch seems likely to have very important consequences. Enquiry tends to show that considerable numbers of children from the Far East are entrusted to men in Mecca, who receive them nominally as pupils to be instructed in religion, but in fact as slaves. The two girls in question prove to be younger than was at first believed; one is 10, the other only 8. The people who brought them to the Hedjaz and handed them over to the Shaibi family (the leader seems to be a Javanese who has lived a considerable part of his life in Mecca) will be brought to trial in Java, and whether they were acting in good faith or not will be established then. A point which may tell against them is that they accepted a present of £60 in return (it is the custom, it seems, to describe such children as "presents"). But of the baseness of the recipient there is no doubt. He says, virtuously, that he would not dream of selling such "presents"; that would be wrong; he would only "use" them himself. And he, as I have already related, belongs to the family which has hereditary charge of the key of the mosque at Mecca and makes an enormous income out of its consequent sanctity. In spite of attempts both by the Shaibi family and by the King to effect a compromise, the Netherlands consul has secured the release of the two girls and the arrest of most of the persons who appear to have had any part in or knowledge of the bringing of the children from Java, and, moreover, in the course of his investigations he came upon the traces of two more Javanese children, boys of 3 or 4 years of age, who had been handed over in Mecca for "religious education," and secured their release also.

3. In my telegram No. 22 of the 11th August I reported that, in answer to his general protest, the Netherlands consul had received a reply similar to ours, except that the recent cases were quoted as evidence of willingness to co-operate with the consulate. This was an oral reply given by telephone; stress was laid on the obligation on the European Powers to prevent the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery, and the usual religious argument was advanced to prove that it was impossible to forbid slavery or the traffic in slaves in the Hedjaz. Nothing was

said about Syria, &c. The correspondence has now run into one stream with the letters about the specific cases, and I believe that a written reply on the general question has not been received. Even if it were received, it would hardly go so far, as the Hedjaz Government have been driven by the force of circumstances in dealing with the above cases and with that reported in my despatch No. 87 of the 18th August.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Singapore.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7717/5968/91]

No. 133.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 89.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 18, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 18 of the 31st July, in which I reported the imminent arrival of a Soviet representative in Jeddah. On the 6th August he arrived. According to the card which he left with me when he called he is—

Kerim Khakimov, agent et consul général de l'U.R.S.S., près de Sa Majesté Hachimite le Roi d'Arabie.

According to his own account he was on Rothstein's staff in Tehran and later was at Meshed. He is a Tartar from Ufa. He speaks Russian, Turkish and Persian, but neither English nor French. He seems to know some Arabic, but cannot speak it. He brought with him two other Tartars whom he describes as first and second secretaries. One of them knows French, the other no European language but Russian. The staff also includes an interpreter, who knows Arabic and a little English (said to be a Russian who has lived in Syria) and an alleged typist, whom I identify with the Naum Markovich Belkin mentioned in your despatch No. 132 of the 17th July, as being bound for the Hedjaz (M. Khakimov appears on the same list).

2. None of the party of five was ever in Jeddah before, and they knew so little about conditions here that they arrived, in a Red Sea midsummer, with three ladies and three small children, with no house to go to and with no clothing except such as can be worn comfortably in Jeddah perhaps five days in the year. The King ordered that they should be quartered on the Kaimakam of Jeddah; later he directed them to the Director of Custom-House, where they are living miserably in three or four rooms while they hunt for a house.

3. Being a Muslim, M. Khakimov has one advantage over his foreign colleagues; he can go to Mecca. He went there, in a car provided by the King, soon after his arrival, and when the King came to Jeddah a few days later to speed the Amir Abdullah on his journey and to inspect the least useless of the boats he has bought, he called on the Soviet representative and stayed with him over an hour. The visit attracted much comment, the more because King Hussein seemed to have long abandoned the habit of returning the calls of foreign representatives in person.

4. Before the war the Russian consulate, though not very busy, had some work to do. Two lines of Russian steamers called regularly, and some thousands of pilgrims from Bokhara came to Jeddah every year. There have been no (Russian) Bokhariot or other Russian pilgrims, so far as I know, since the war, and M. Khakimov does not seem to expect many, since he says that few if any Russian subjects have at present as much money as would buy a ticket for Jeddah, and if they had they would spend it on something else. As to steamers, one Russian boat, bound, it is said, from Odessa to Shanghai and Vladivostok, has just called, but whether a regular service is to be maintained may be doubted. It is, therefore, impossible not to share to some extent the impression prevailing everywhere in Jeddah, that the main object of the mission is propaganda. The size of the mission, the foolish recognition of King Hussein as "King of Arabia," and the fact that a courier is to travel between the mission in Jeddah and the Soviet representative in Rome (M. Khakimov has asked me for a diplomatic visa to enable the courier to cross Egypt without hindrance) lend some colour to the belief. The suitability of Jeddah for propaganda on an enormous scale is obvious, especially when King Hussein's

[13028]



views on East and West are taken into account. The mission seem to have plenty of money, and two cars and a launch are said to be on the way for their use.

5. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Simla, Singapore, Egypt and Khartoum.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7532/1841/91]

No. 134.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 91.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 20, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to several recent despatches and telegrams, ending with my despatch No. 88 dated the 18th August, regarding slavery in the Hedjaz, and to enclose certain suggestions, drawn up in consultation with my French, Italian and Netherlands colleagues, as to the form which representations to the Hedjaz Government by the four Powers might take.

2. The present position in regard to such representations is this:—

His Majesty's Government have protested and have received an unsatisfactory reply (see my despatch of the 30th June, No. 69).

The Netherlands Government have protested and have received an unsatisfactory oral reply (see my despatch of the 18th August, No. 88, paragraph 3).

The French Government are prepared to make a protest, but propose to wait until the substantive holder of their consulate in Jeddah returns to his post (see your despatch of the 9th July, No. 126, and the comments at the end of paragraph 5 of my despatch of the 7th August, No. 78).

The views of the Italian Government are unknown to me. My Italian colleague has received no instructions.

3. While this discussion about the general question has been going on the Hedjaz Government have had to admit, by their actions, that at least they are bound to set free a person belonging to a territory for which His Majesty's Government, the Netherlands Government or the French Government are responsible, if their attention is called to the case by the representative concerned. It is suggestive of the distance the Hedjaz has slipped back under King Hussein that this meagre victory should give us satisfaction. It seemed to the four representatives concerned that it would be most desirable to get this principle recognised in writing by the Hedjaz Government, and to endeavour to compel them to promise their active co-operation in all such cases. At present they not only say openly that it is the business of the European Powers to prevent people from being carried from their territories to the Hedjaz for purposes of slavery and that their religion prevents their forbidding slavery in the Hedjaz, but they even show more or less reluctance when a foreign representative demands the liberation of one of his own fellow-subjects.

4. The minutes enclosed purposely refrain from specifying the form which active co-operation should take. It is probably useless to expect King Hussein to make a public declaration that British and other foreign subjects are free, but he might, *e.g.*, warn all officials, particularly the judges of the religious courts, that if they hear of any subject, &c., of one of the four Powers being sold or kept in slavery the Hedjaz Government or the foreign representative concerned must be informed at once. It would be for the four Governments to decide whether the steps taken were adequate or not. It would be very satisfactory to have a definite penalty prescribed for a contravention of the principle, but this cannot be expected: King Hussein believes it impious to have any legal guide but the Shara law, supplemented by his own despotic power, and one of the main counts in his indictment against the Turks is that they dared to introduce modern codes.

5. The question of pressure (see paragraph 6 of the suggestions) was urged strongly by all my colleagues. Each of the consulates they represent has painful memories of the time (in 1920, I believe) when on instructions from their Governments they asked for the application of the Capitulations, and King Hussein, encouraged, they believe, by the abstention of His Majesty's Government, returned a flat refusal. I agree with them that it would be well to have some form of pressure ready in case of a rejection of the very reasonable demands suggested.

6. The discussion was confined to the representatives of the four Powers known to be in communication with each other in regard to the slavery question. The Soviet agent and consul-general was not invited to join in the discussion. There were many reasons for this. The fact that the French and Netherlands Governments are not in official relations with the Soviet Government is perhaps reason enough.

7. The discussion was rather hurried owing to the imminence of the departure of two of the consuls on leave. Now that I come to translate the minutes I see various points where improvements could have been effected, but I venture to recommend them as offering a basis for immediate action which would almost certainly be successful. They are of course not meant to imply that no effort should be made to bring about the complete abolition of slavery in the Hedjaz.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD,

*Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure in No. 134.

*Translation of Minutes of a Meeting on the Question of the Slave Trade held at the British Agency, Jeddah, on August 13, 1924.*

Present:

Mr. Bullard, British Agent and Consul.

Van der Plas, Netherlands Consul.

Fares, Italian Consul.

Kellal, Acting French Consul.

AFTER a discussion on the question of slaves in the Hedjaz it was agreed unanimously that each of the four representatives mentioned above should submit to his Government the following suggestions:—

1. That joint representations, which would probably be far more effective than representations made separately, should be made to the Hedjaz Government by the four Powers.

2. That in view of the attitude adopted by King Hussein and of the nature of the arguments on which he bases himself, it would be well, while not admitting even tacitly that the detention in slavery of *any* human being is legitimate, to confine the representations to the suppression in the Hedjaz of the enslavement or detention in slavery of persons subjects of or protected by the four Powers.

(In this connection the Acting French consul suggested that it would perhaps be better to raise the question of the Capitulations, which in themselves would give each of the nations concerned the right to protect its subjects or protected persons from the traffic if they should fall victims to it in the Hedjaz. The suggestion was rejected by a majority, with a view to avoid complicating the representations.)

3. That the four Powers could inform the Hedjaz Government that in their territories all persons, whether subjects or protected persons, of whatever race or kind, are and remain free, and that such persons cannot by any means whatsoever become slaves either in the Hedjaz or elsewhere.

4. That it seems unbelievable that the Hedjaz Government would reject in writing a proposition so reasonable placed before it by four European Powers. Moreover, as certain recent events have shown, the Hedjaz Government act as though they admitted the validity of this theory whenever specific cases are brought to their notice by a foreign representative, though they have never made a clear admission to that effect even orally.

5. That if the Hedjaz Government admitted that persons subjects of or protected by the four Powers are free in their own country, in the Hedjaz and elsewhere, the four Powers would be justified in asking them to take such steps as they (the Hedjaz Government) thought fit in order to make the principle known in the Hedjaz, and also to take the initiative in seeking out and repressing any contraventions (of the



principle) without waiting for an application from one or more of the foreign representatives.

6. That in view of the importance of the point at issue, of the character of King Hussein, and of the necessity of avoiding a diplomatic rebuff incompatible with the prestige of the four nations, it would be well if each of the four Powers could decide and communicate to its representative in Jeddah, with the instructions regarding the representations in question, what form of pressure would be brought to bear on the Hedjaz in case of rejection of proposals so reasonable. The four Powers would not necessarily adopt the same form of pressure; each could choose the form which, from its own particular point of view, appeared to be suitable.

R. W. BULLARD.  
VAN DER PLAS.  
A. FARES.  
KELLAL.

No. 135.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, September 4, 1924.*

KING HUSSEIN informs me that Wahabis have attacked and burnt palace near Taif belonging to relative of his.

This suggests that they have penetrated outer defences of Hedjaz.  
(Sent to India.)

No. 136.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 8.)*

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, September 7, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 29.

Amir Ali, who is in command against Wahabis, has fallen back on a place west of Taif; this presumably means that Taif is abandoned, but Hedjaz Government have no details.

King Hussein asks His Majesty's Government what is to be done in view of this open hostility, and begs for speedy reply.

I have asked, without, however, receiving coherent answer, what they suppose His Majesty's Government can reply, and have suggested as an unexceptionable measure defeat of the enemy. Later message just received attributes trouble to alleged assurances of His Majesty's Government that Ibn Saud would not attack and to their refusal to provide him with munitions of war.

(Sent to India.)

No. 137.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 8.)*

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, September 8, 1924.*

ARABS described as Wahabis have taken Taif. Whether they propose to advance on Mecca not yet known.

(Sent to India, Egypt, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Singapore.)

[E 7696/7696/91]

No. 138.

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 539.)

Sir,

*Ramleh, August 24, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since the return to Egypt on the 5th instant of the Mahmal from Mecca the alleged discourtesies of King Hussein to his Egyptian guests during the period of the pilgrimage have been the subject of much criticism in the vernacular press.

2. In justification of this criticism the newspapers reproduce letters from individual pilgrims reporting the continual indignities to which the Emir-el-Hajj, and Egyptian subjects in general, were subjected while in the Hedjaz.

3. According to a long report published in "Al Siassa," which I understand is substantially correct, the arrival of the Mahmal at Jeddah coincided with that of the Emirs Abdulla and Ali. Both the Emirs had been instructed to welcome the Emir-el-Hajj, the Mahmal and its escort, but, as Abdulla was ill, Emir Ali went alone to see the Emir-el-Hajj and conveyed to him King Hussein's greetings and the apologies of his brother Abdulla for his absence. The two Emirs left on the next day for Mecca, and, to avoid inconvenient crowding on the road, the departure of the Mahmal was postponed till the following day.

4. When the Mahmal arrived at Jeddah, the Emir-el-Hajj requested the Hashimite authorities, in execution of the agreement concluded between them and the Egyptian Government, to allot appropriate sites for the Egyptian hospitals at Jeddah and Mecca respectively, in order that the Medical Mission might proceed to make the necessary preparations for the treatment of sick Egyptian and any other pilgrims who might apply for medical treatment. The reply of the Hashimite Government was to the effect that the Egyptian Medical Mission might establish itself in the ordinary Jeddah hospital, which is an old and dilapidated building situated at a distance of three kilometres from the city. The Emir-el-Hajj protested against this proposal on the ground that the remoteness of the site would hamper and even nullify the work of the mission. He decided, however, not to press the matter until after the arrival of the Mahmal at Mecca, when he hoped to be able to settle the question by direct negotiation with King Hussein.

5. On entering Mecca the Egyptians were welcomed and entertained lavishly in a magnificent tent which had been specially erected. Here they received the visits of the Emir Ali, the Grand Kadi, and some other senior officials of the Hashimite Government. Subsequently the Emir-el-Hajj and his escort visited King Hussein. In the course of conversation they raised the question of the Egyptian Medical Mission, upon which His Majesty expressed his dissatisfaction that such missions should be sent to the Hedjaz. Since the majority of the Moslems who made the pilgrimage were foreign subjects, if he were to approve the despatch of an Egyptian Mission, other communities would claim the right to take similar action. In this connection he criticised the sending of Scholastic Missions by the Egyptian Government to Europe, on the ground that the despatch of Egyptian boys to Europe would be detrimental to their manners, which could be better improved by other means. This advice, the King emphasised, was given to the Emir-el-Hajj in a friendly spirit as from one brother to another. His Majesty went on to say that the agreement between the Hashimite and the Egyptian Government was that the Medical Mission should come with the Mahmal and remain as part of the Mahmal, and that when the escort of the Mahmal returned to Egypt, the mission should accompany it. The Emir-el-Hajj objected to this interpretation and said that the agreement laid down that the hospitals should be set up in places to be allotted to them in Jeddah and Mecca, and that they should remain in the Hedjaz until the pilgrimage was over. His Majesty, however, insisted upon his point of view and produced the file of the correspondence exchanged between Egypt and the Hedjaz to support his contention, but eventually suggested as a compromise that an Egyptian doctor, selected by the Emir-el-Hajj, should be seconded to the Hashimite Medical Department to attend to the pilgrims under Hashimite auspices. The King himself would pay this doctor's salary, but he would never agree to the general practice of foreign medical missions in the Hedjaz. As, however, the Egyptian Medical Mission had actually arrived, he would agree for this year to its being allotted accommodation in the hospitals of Jeddah and Mecca. His Majesty then issued orders to this effect.



6. The King apparently did not return this visit, pleading, with his apologies, the shortness of time. The Emir-el-Hajj, however, visited him at Muna on the day of Bairam, and His Majesty returned the visit on the next day.

7. The Emir-el-Hajj and other prominent Egyptians were greatly surprised to find, on their return to Mecca, that the name of His Majesty King Fuad had been removed from the Egyptian Kiswa of the Ka'aba and replaced by a piece of an old Kiswa which had been sent, before the war, by the Ottoman Government, embroidered with a verse from the Koran. Furthermore, the Kiswa which had been sent by Egypt to cover the tomb of Ibrahim had been removed. The Emir-el-Hajj protested strongly against this, and as a result the tomb of Ibrahim was covered on the following day by the Kiswa from Egypt, which incidentally was decorated with the name of His Majesty the King of Egypt.

8. The same newspaper, from which the above narrative is taken, further reports that King Hussein maintained his decision not to allow the Egyptian Medical Mission to remain in the Hedjaz after the departure of the Mahmal from Jeddah, and that he eventually instructed his officials at Jeddah to issue orders to the Egyptian doctors and the personnel of the two hospitals to leave the Hedjaz with the Emir-el-Hajj.

9. The Egyptian pilgrims have apparently complained to the Government about the poor condition of the camels which were supplied to them by the Hashimite Government, and of the scarcity and bad quality of the water which many had to buy from the Bedouin at extortionate rates. I may add that the Arab agent has remarked to me that he thought the Egyptians should have been very grateful for the camels, which were taken away from other pilgrims and given to them.

10. The foregoing account of what occurred in the Hedjaz is a great deal more moderate than the versions which appeared in the remainder of the vernacular press, which conveyed, by their comments and by exaggerated reports from unknown correspondents, the impression that King Hussein had insulted the Egyptian Government to an even greater extent than last year. This view is very generally shared by the Egyptian public, and the publication of the Emir-el-Hajj's report on the pilgrimage is awaited with interest. I am unable to say when it will appear, but I have learned that the Ministry were discussing its terms before their attention was diverted to the consideration of the Sudan problem.

11. I understand that this year's Emir-el-Hajj is addicted to the use of violent language, and that it is officially thought here that with more discretion on his part many difficulties might have been avoided.

12. In addition to the troubles recounted above, an incident occurred which has acutely piqued King Fuad. The following account of it is derived from Hassan Nashat Pasha, Under-Secretary for Wakfs.

13. Every year that the Mahmal has been despatched from Egypt to Mecca the name of the ruler of Egypt has been embroidered thereon. When the war broke out Egypt was unable to send the Mahmal, and in 1914, before the Arab revolt, Sultan Rashad of Turkey sent a carpet to cover the Ka'aba in place of that which Egypt was not able to send. The name of Sultan Rashad appeared on this carpet. When the Arab revolt broke out, King Hussein was anxious to obliterate all connection with Turkey, and accordingly caused the ulama of Mecca to authorise the publication of a fetva, saying that no name should appear on the Kiswa of the Ka'aba other than that of God and Mahomet. On the strength of this fetva, Sultan Rashad's name was removed from the cover of the Ka'aba. Since the resumption of the despatch of the Mahmal from Egypt the name of the ruler of the country has been embroidered upon it. This year, however, King Fuad's name was cut out by King Hussein's orders, and a patch inserted from an old Kiswa, bearing a verse of the Koran.

14. Negotiations are now in progress between the Hashimite Government and the Egyptian Government, through the Arab agent, Said Abdel Malek-el-Khatib, and the Egyptian Ministry are most anxious to settle the question amicably. But, according to Nashat Pasha, they will insist that King Fuad's name, as the donor of the carpet, should be embroidered on it. The Ministers, however, are seeking for a compromise of some kind, and are, on the whole, favourably impressed by the attitude of Abdel Malek-el-Khatib.

15. The Arab agent in Cairo has given me a somewhat different account of this incident, in that he states that King Fuad's name has been removed every year from the Kiswa of the Ka'aba. In previous years the patch which has been substituted has been taken from another carpet of Egyptian manufacture and has escaped detection, but this year it was carelessly taken from a German carpet—an old gift of the Turkish Government—and the difference was easily remarked.

16. I shall not fail to send you a copy of the report on the pilgrimage by the Emir-el-Hajj as soon as it is published.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Jeddah.

I have, &c.

A. K. CLARK KERR,

Acting High Commissioner.

No. 139.

Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 8, 1924.

I HAD been unable to get clear statement of position from King Hussein, but I have just seen Sudanese notable Sherif Yusuf Hindi, who has come from Mecca nominally on his own behalf, but undoubtedly with King's knowledge. According to him position is this:—

Hedjaz army has almost disappeared. Commander-in-chief says that Mecca will fall in two or three days. King declares intention to die there. Not a man in the capital is prepared to fight, and tribes are indifferent.

Jeddah jubilant, though apprehensive of British intervention on behalf of King Hussein.

Yusuf asks whether His Majesty's Government cannot intervene to prevent fighting in holy city. I used usual arguments about complete neutrality in religious matters.

I fear abdication, flight or death of ruler is first step towards peace. There are signs of flight.

No. 140.

Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 9, 1924.

ALL news here represents the behaviour of conquering forces in Taif excellent, no looting even. British subjects in Mecca all right. Omens point to peaceful transfer of capital to Wahabis owing to defection of whole of people; Jeddah quiet.

(Repeated to Simla, Alexandria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Straits Settlements.)

No. 141.

Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 10, 1924.

MY telegram No. 36.

Acting Netherlands consul has just returned from Mecca. He disputes general report that Wahabis have acted well at Taif. He has evidence, he says, that at least seven harmless Javanese Netherlands subjects have been killed there, besides considerable number of residents of Hedjaz. Whether this is correct or not, refugees are coming to Jeddah from Mecca, and many more are expected. If population largely increased, water supply, which depends mainly on condenser, will be insufficient. I request authorisation to send [?] British subjects to Kamaran or Tor in case of need. Pilgrims and registered British subjects probably not more than 2,500, mostly Indians. Kamaran preferable, as nearer. Pilgrims could be taken from there by other ships; residents could not [sic] return when situation clears.

This remedy would only be adopted in case of urgent necessity. There is in harbour one Indian pilgrim ship for 1,100 persons, and presumably Khedivial boats could come at short notice on receipt of a wireless message from a man-of-war.

(Sent to Egypt, India and Aden.)



No. 142.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 11.)*(No. 40.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Jeddah, September 10, 1924.*

WITH my French and Netherlands colleagues I have telephoned to Mecca to express hope that all subjects of our Governments are and will remain safe. Answer received that Hedjaz Government will do their best; foreigners will be protected as if they were Hedjaz subjects; and will Powers concerned sell Hedjaz four aeroplanes? We refused to discuss the aeroplane question.

As Hedjaz Government may collapse and speedy communication with Ibn Saud and through him with the attacking forces is impossible, we suggested that we should find means of sending Wahabi leader in Taif joint communication saying that we trust that interests of foreigners will be safeguarded. Recipient might give letter political complexion, but that seems better than inaction. Hedjaz Government would be informed of action taken.

Do you see any objection?  
(Sent to India.)

No. 143.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 12.)*(No. 42.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Jeddah, September 11, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 39.

Am not convinced that story of murders is not based on work of robbers during interregnum skilfully embroidered by King, who directly and indirectly is spreading fantastic stories of atrocities. Exodus from Mecca seems to be slowing down.

This does not mean that permission to use Kamaran in case of extreme need is not required.

(Repeated to India, Aden and Egypt.)

No. 144.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 12.)*(No. 44.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Jeddah, September 12, 1924.*

TALES of Wahabi atrocities in Taif, encouraged by King, caused anxiety in Mecca, but now generally disbelieved there. Exodus from capital, which had begun, has nearly ceased. No movement of either side.

Public opinion generally in favour of King Hussein's removal, but disagreement as to alternative, and public courage nil.

(Same addresses as No. 38.)

No. 145.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 12, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 10th September: Protection of foreigners in Hedjaz.

You are authorised to communicate with Wahabi leader, but communication should take the form of a warning rather than a mere request. Exact wording is left to your discretion, but it should be framed somewhat on following lines:—

"Leader of Wahabi forces is hereby warned that there are resident in cities of Hedjaz a number of British Moslem subjects, principally natives of India. His Majesty's Government are watching development of events with

some anxiety, and must insist that, should fighting take place in or around the cities where the above British subjects live, every precaution shall be taken to safeguard their lives and property."

If you cannot obtain immediate collaboration of your French and Dutch colleagues, you are authorised to act alone in despatching a message to Wahabi leader as regards British subjects.

[E 7906/7906/91]

No. 146.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 93.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 22, 1924.*

1. I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of an enquiry received from the Intelligence Bureau, Simla, relating to a well-known Bengal agitator, Badshah Mian, and of my reply.

2. The information given in paragraph 2 of my letter of reply hangs together tolerably well. The Indian Moslem leaders must realise the difficulty of displacing a Caliph who is actually resident in the Moslem Holy Land, especially when the country to which they look for help, Turkey, remains completely indifferent. On the other hand, they must realise the advantage, for purposes of propaganda and intrigue, of having the Caliph resident in a place where no non-Moslem can set foot, and they must know that King Hussein is fanatical, obstinate, hostile to European influence in the East, and in other ways also a particularly suitable figurehead for the anti-European movement. Unluckily for them, they have so assiduously disseminated the opinion that King Hussein is a catspaw of England that an immediate reconciliation with him is impossible. It would be natural, then, that they should put out feelers to test public opinion, and Badshah Mian is possibly such a feeler. He goes back a strong supporter of King Hussein as Caliph; he has enough influence to carry some people with him, but probably not enough to discredit the Caliphate Committee if he fails. Another year or two of this kind of thing and King Hussein and the Indian Moslem leaders might be ready to unite: the King might think he had enough backing in India to warrant a breach with England, and a breach would itself increase his following.

3. By "breach" I do not mean hostile action, but a definite public disagreement on some point of great importance. For instance, King Hussein might publicly declare it to be unlawful for Jerusalem, the third holy city of Islam, to remain under a European mandate, or represent as an attack on the borders of the Holy Land the insistence of His Majesty's Government on the retention in the mandatory area of the Ma'an district, which King Hussein has constituted a vilayet under Mecca. I am much inclined to the belief that he will never sign a treaty which recognises the British mandate over Palestine and Transjordan, and that if he continues to negotiate it is mainly because he needs time for the Caliphate situation to develop.

4. I write in ignorance of the situation in India. My data are slight indications observable here, such as the support given to King Hussein by so prominent a Caliphate agitator as Badshah Mian, and the conviction that the Indian Moslem leaders cannot fail to realise how suitable King Hussein is, from their own point of view, to be Caliph. Any movement towards recognition of King Hussein as Caliph by Indian Moslems in general will of course be delayed by the effect of the anti-Hussein propaganda already disseminated in India and by the hardships suffered by Indian pilgrims in the Hedjaz.

5. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

*Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, to Consul Bullard.*

*Intelligence Bureau, Home Department,*

*Simla, July 4, 1924.*

Dear Sir,

I WRITE to inform you that, among pilgrims who sailed for Jeddah by the steamship "Englestan," on the 14th ultimo, was one A. K. Rashiduddin Ahmed



alias Pir Badshah Mian, of District Faridpur (Bengal), accompanied by his brother Raziuddin Ahmed. Pir Badshah Mian is a non-co-operator and Caliphate agitator, and I shall be obliged if you will kindly let me know whether he comes to notice in the Hedjaz.

Yours sincerely,  
[?]

Enclosure 2 in No. 146.

*Consul Bullard to Intelligence Bureau, Government of India.*

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 22, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th July, in which you ask about A. K. Rashiduddin Ahmed, alias Pir Badshah Mian.

2. This man has been hand-in-glove with King Hussein ever since his arrival. He recognised the King as Caliph, and in return has been treated with distinction and respect out of all proportion to his status. From a fairly good source I learn that he urged King Hussein to break off relations with His Majesty's Government, whereby, he said, the King would gain the support of the whole Moslem world. The King is said to have replied that if the present treaty negotiations came to nothing he would not hesitate to follow this advice. From an absolutely trustworthy source I learn that Badshah Mian claims to be acting throughout on the instructions of Shaikat Ali.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7907/424/91]

No. 147.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 94. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, August 30, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 31st July to the 30th August.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Simla, Aden, and Beirut (for communication to Damascus).

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 147.

*Jeddah Report. July 31 to August 30, 1924.*

THE imminent arrival of a Soviet representative was reported in a postscript last month. On the 6th August arrived one Kerim Hakimov, "agent et consul général de l'U.R.S.S. près de Sa Majesté hachimite le Roi d'Arabie," with two secretaries and two other assistants, three ladies and three children. Their information about Jeddah must have been bad, for they had no house to go to, no furniture of any kind (there is none to be got in Jeddah), and only European clothes such as can be worn on perhaps five days in the year in Jeddah. The King first ordered them to be quartered on the Kaimakam of Jeddah, later on the Director-General of Customs. The Director-General got rather tired of providing houseroom for eleven guests while they went about coveting other people's houses, and at last he ordered one of his subordinates in the customs to evacuate a fine house the latter owns and inhabits. No pity need be wasted on this man, as he only acquired so large and fine a house by the most shameless corruption. More to be pitied is an old man who was flung out at a day's notice to make room for the customs official. This old man owns no other house but one which is occupied by the dispensary attached to the Netherlands consulate, and as the consulate had no intention of making room for people turned out to accommodate "Bolsheviks," the chain of evictions came to an end for a moment. Probably the ripples are still spreading, though imperceptible to any except the immediate sufferers.

M. Hakimov and two of the others are Tartars and Moslems. The second secretary (Naum Belkin—perhaps a Jew) knows French, the other two know no European language but Russian. M. Hakimov and the first secretary, Yusuf Ouimetov, were both in Tehran with Rothstein, and talk Persian.

Being a Moslem, M. Hakimov has one advantage over his foreign colleagues: he can go to Mecca. He went there, in a car provided by the King, soon after his arrival, and when the King came to Jeddah a few days later to speed the Amir Abdullah on his journey and to inspect the least useless of the boats he has bought, he called on the Soviet representative and stayed with him over an hour. The visit attracted much comment, the more because King Hussein seemed to have long abandoned the habit of returning the calls of foreign representatives in person.

Before the war the Russian consulate, though not very busy, had some work to do. Two lines of Russian steamers called regularly, and some thousands of pilgrims from Bokhara came to Jeddah every year. There have been no (Russian) Bokhariot or other Russian pilgrims, so far as we know, since the war, and M. Hakimov does not seem to expect many, since he says that few if any Russian subjects have at present as much money as would buy a ticket for Jeddah, and if they had they would spend it on something else. Nor is it likely that any considerable number of Russian ships will call at Jeddah for the next year or two. It is, therefore, impossible not to share to some extent the impression prevailing everywhere in Jeddah, that the main object of the mission is propaganda. The size of the mission, the foolish recognition of King Hussein as "King of Arabia," and the fact that a courier is to travel between the mission in Jeddah and the Soviet representative in Rome (M. Hakimov has asked me for a diplomatic visa to enable the courier to cross Egypt without hindrance) lend some colour to the belief. The suitability of Jeddah for propaganda on an enormous scale is obvious, especially when King Hussein's views on East and West are taken into account. The mission seem to have plenty of money, and though they have no beds they have a motor-car.

On the anniversary of the King's accession a notice was published saying that, while he is still endeavouring to strengthen the bonds of friendship with his great allies, he feels it is one of his chief duties to cultivate good relations with Moslem and other eastern countries. According to this notice, the Persian Government have appointed a representative in Jeddah (since the war they have simply sent a consular officer each year for the pilgrim season), and the Hedjaz Government are about to appoint one in Tehran; negotiations with Afghanistan with a view to the exchange of representatives are in progress; and a Hashimite representative will shortly be appointed in Moscow. Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib tells me that he is to go to open the "Embassy" in Tehran, though not, he fears, to hold the post permanently.

A sense of proportion is not one of King Hussein's qualities. How clumsily he dealt with the Egyptian Government, by hiding or cutting out King Fuad's name which had been embroidered on the Ka'bah covering, was related in the postscript to our July report. A few days later a little scrubby Egyptian boy, working in the office of the "delegate" whom the Egyptian Government had sent to deal with the return of the Egyptian pilgrims, telegraphed to King Hussein that he would like to be present at the Friday prayer in the mosque at Mecca. The King telephoned to Jeddah and arranged for the boy to be taken to Mecca on the Friday morning in one of the royal cars, and he was brought back by car the same evening with a gold watch bearing the royal arms as a present. It was a sad ending to this perfect day to be discharged immediately and sent back to Egypt in disgrace.

With oriental suddenness Dr Naji-al-Asil has been restored to favour. There was a very striking contrast between the penniless, rather seedy adventurer, who arrived two months ago—unexpected, for the King, who had been notified from Suez of the date of his arrival, had not troubled to warn the officials in Jeddah—and the plump, well-dressed, smiling young man, with pockets full of money, who went off the other day with the Amir Abdullah for a visit to Transjordan on his way to London. What brought about the change it is impossible to say, but it is possible that Dr. Naji dangled unauthorised promises before the eyes of King Hussein, since he told me the Foreign Office were prepared to make a certain concession which there is reason to believe the Foreign Office never discussed or thought about. However, Dr. Naji is in funds again; he has paid his debt to Messrs. Gellatly Hankey, though not the expenses they incurred in telegraphing about his dishonoured draft; and he smelleth the grill-rooms of London afar off.

How far, if at all, King Hussein has advanced his Caliphate ambitions this pilgrim season is hard to determine. The jejune nature of the results of the



Pilgrimage Conference suggest complete failure. The King appears to have made no impression whatever on the resistance of the Javanese. His cause was certainly not advanced by a "blasphemy" uttered by the Amir Abdullah to the leading Javanese, when he compared his father to Abraham as keeper of the Ka'bah, and to the Prophet as the head of Islam. Nor is he any nearer recognition by the rank and file of Indians, who come to this country well primed with the anti-British and anti-Shereefian arguments of the leaders of the Caliphate agitation in India. But I am not convinced that those leaders are as hostile to King Hussein's claim as they appear. Maulvi Abdul Bari is openly favourable, and he, I understand, has great influence with his ex-pupils, the Ali brothers. Last month we reported the recognition of the King as Caliph by Muhammad Abdul Kadir and Badshah Mian. The latter, who is a well-known Caliphate leader from Bengal, has been treated by the King almost as a crowned monarch, in return for his oath of recognition. From an absolutely trustworthy source I learn that he claims to be acting throughout on the instructions of Shaukat Ali. This is perhaps true. The Indian Moslem leaders must realise the difficulty of displacing a Caliph who is actually resident in the Moslem Holy Land, especially when the country to which they look for help, Turkey, remains completely indifferent. On the other hand, they must realise the advantage, for purposes of propaganda and intrigue, of having the Caliph resident in a place where no non-Moslem can set foot, and they must know that King Hussein is fanatical, obstinate, hostile to European influence in the East, and in other ways also a particularly suitable figurehead for the anti-European movement. Unluckily for them they have so assiduously disseminated the opinion that King Hussein is a cat's paw of England, that an immediate reconciliation with him is impossible. It would be natural, then, that they should put out feelers to test public opinion, and Badshah Mian is possibly such a feeler. He goes back a strong supporter of King Hussein as Caliph; he has enough influence to carry some people with him, but probably not enough to discredit the Caliphate Committee if he fails. Another year or two of this kind of thing and King Hussein and the Indian Moslem leaders might be ready to unite: the King might think he had enough backing in India to warrant a breach with England, and a breach would itself increase his following. The "breach" would perhaps be a definite rupture of negotiations for a treaty on a point where King Hussein had a specious case for the Moslem world, *e.g.*, the impropriety of leaving Jerusalem, the third holy city of Islam, under a foreign mandate. He would like to be King of the Arab countries and Caliph of Islam, too, but there is no doubt that it is the second title he covets most keenly, and if he could conciliate Indian Moslems by breaking with His Majesty's Government, he would have to pay for that valuable—indeed, decisive—support only an ambition which by now he must realise it is impossible to attain.

This ambition must have received a check from the recent decision of His Majesty's Government to insist on adequate military and financial control in Transjordan and to refuse to allow the Ma'an district, which is part of the mandatory area, to continue to be administered from Mecca. In replying to communications from His Majesty's Government on these points, King Hussein claims that the Amir Abdullah has been administering Transjordan on behalf of "the Central Government," *i.e.*, the Hashimite Government at Mecca. He also deals with the matter, in his usual way, in the press. Readers of the "Kiblah" are invited to admire the efficiency of Hedjaz officials as shown by a power of attorney issued in "the Vilayet of Ma'an, which is directly dependent on the capital." The document, which is quoted in full, describes itself as being issued "in the Hedjazian Vilayet of Ma'an, which is dependent on the capital, Mecca." In regard to the recent murder of a French officer and his wife on the Syrian border—the incident which finally made it impossible to leave to the Amir Abdullah full responsibility for the military control of Transjordan—the "Kiblah" suggests that this odious crime, so contrary to the religion and the customs of the Arabs, was committed by some enemy in order to bring the Arabs into disrepute. However, the (probably royal) writer does not seem to believe in this theory himself very strongly (this is not surprising, since one of the strongest Arab customs is the blood feud) for he goes on to advocate "noble legal steps" for the vindication of "Arab rights."

A glowing communiqué was issued from Jeddah through Reuter reporting the complete defeat of an enormous Wahabi army by the Transjordanian forces. There was hardly a figure mentioned which was below a thousand. The Arab war correspondent is the counterpart in anthropology of those savages who cannot calculate beyond three: numbers below a thousand mean nothing to him.

Pilgrim ships leaving for India have carried in all 13,908 passengers. In order to enable all the pilgrims waiting in Jeddah to leave, the two last boats—no other being due for three weeks or more—were authorised by this agency to carry about 10 per cent. over the certificate number. There are now probably a thousand Indian pilgrims in the country, of whom nearly all left for Medina after the Hajj. Several hundred of them are rich merchants who intend to go home via Palestine and Irak. The others will have to get back to Jeddah somehow. It is encouraging to find that a caravan of Afghans and frontier Indians has just arrived at Jeddah from Medina. They travelled via Rabigh. They paid £4½ a camel, *i.e.*, only £2½ each, or less than half the train fare from Medina to Ma'an. They saw no Bedouin, and paid no toll. This successful trip and the high cost of the Akaba-Ma'an route will probably induce many others to return by camel, though it is not to be expected that all will get through without paying toll.

Last month it was reported that all the Indians who were in the abortive Medina caravan had received £10 a camel as compensation. This statement needs modification. All, or nearly all, gave receipts for £10, but some are believed to have received only £8 or £9. How this happened is not quite clear. What is certain is that the amount awarded was perfectly well known, and that all Indians who insisted on having it received it. Whether the others were deluded or over-persuaded cannot be said. Probably over-persuaded. This agency recently took up strongly a case where an Indian, according to his own statement and to other evidence, had been swindled by a mutawwif over expenses for his father's funeral. The complainant was got at by the mutawwif and thereupon retracted his statement and declared that his mind must have been unhinged by grief when he made it. There was not the least doubt that he was truthful in his complaint, and that later he lied because of the pressure—probably religious—brought to bear on him; but anyhow our case broke down. So long as the feelings which prompted the withdrawal exist among Indians—and there is good reason to believe that they are common—our endeavours to protect Indian pilgrims against robbery and oppression will be to a large extent neutralised.

A considerable number of pilgrims, Indians and others, have been to Medina and back on foot. The regulation published some months ago, stating that any pilgrim who wanted to go to Medina on foot must provide himself with a certificate, countersigned by his consulate, admitting his own responsibility and exonerating the Hedjaz Government seems to have been a dead-letter. Opinions differ as to this measure. This agency inclines to the belief that if King Hussein were a wise and humane ruler (an extravagant hypothesis), he might still have adopted the measure. The Indian Government, however, are strongly opposed to it. The attitude His Majesty's Government are to take should be decided upon before next pilgrim season.

In that there are no destitute Indian pilgrims in the Hedjaz, or at any rate not more than a score or two, the deposit system must be held to be successful. Like everything else which the pilgrim guide comes into contact with it has been abused, and people who were not pilgrims—or at least who had never paid a deposit in India—presented passports bearing deposit receipts and secured passages in exchange. A careful report on the working of the system is being compiled, and suggestions for making the system reasonably proof against fraud will be put forward. It is hoped that the defects revealed this year will not be held to have outweighed the enormous advantages of the scheme. It would be a disaster to His Majesty's Government, to the shipping companies and to the pilgrims to abandon it.

Hashimite ships have been to Suez and to Suakin with pilgrims on several occasions, and the quarantine authorities there have found no fault with them. The King much wanted to play the rôle of benefactor to some of the "official" Egyptian pilgrims, who had become extremely noisy and ill-tempered because they were not sent away by the first steamer, and he offered to carry some on his boats. The Egyptian delegate replied very properly that adequate arrangements for the transport of their pilgrims had been made by the Government of Egypt, and that the Hedjaz Government need not trouble themselves about the matter. To let the world know how his benevolence had been frustrated the King got up quite a little play on the occasion of his recent visit to Jeddah. When the four foreign representatives were paying him their official visit an Egyptian pilgrim was ushered in. He poured out his complaint about the shortage of steamers and asked for help. "O my son," said the King in his best dear-old-lady tones, "my heart bleeds. I desire nothing but the good of all pilgrims of whatever race or nation—my ships are at your disposal—no charge . . . but the Egyptian delegate . . ." &c. It was most affecting.



The King, however, forgot to mention that the accumulation of Egyptian pilgrims was due to two circumstances for which he himself is responsible: the early departure of the Mahmal, which upset the shipping programme, and the difficulties of the Medina journey, by reason of which many pilgrims who would otherwise have gone to Medina were ready to leave the Hedjaz immediately after the Hajj instead of a month or so later.

Several steamers carrying pilgrims northwards were found at Tor to have more than the certificate number on board. One of these was under the British flag, the others Egyptian, but all were chartered by Syrians. The Quarantine Board seem to have contented themselves with warning the earlier boats, but later, finding a French boat carrying about 30 per cent. more than her proper number of pilgrims, they executed their threat to apply article 148 of the convention and fined the captain £T. 5 for each pilgrim in excess. It appears that Thabit "Pasha," the Turk who is Director-General of Quarantine in the Hedjaz, gave the earlier ships permission to carry more pilgrims than the number fixed by the Quarantine Board at Alexandria. It is regrettable that the very first boat breaking the regulation was not fined heavily. The regulation is clear enough, and no permission had been obtained from this agency, which is responsible for Egyptian as well as for British vessels. The men who charter vessels for one or two trips to Jeddah during the pilgrim season—most of them Syrians—are quite unscrupulous, and having no regular business have no sense of responsibility. They squeeze what they can out of the pilgrim season and then disappear for another year. On the other hand, the character of the Director-General of Quarantine at Jeddah is well known: he is brutal and boundlessly corrupt, and being a favourite of the King's is under no control whatsoever. It is clearly dangerous to allow the overloading of pilgrim vessels to be arranged between two such parties as these. Next year warning should be given in good time that a certificate from the quarantine authorities in the Hedjaz is not sufficient to warrant a master of a pilgrim ship in carrying more pilgrims than the number fixed by the Quarantine Board's certificate.

On the anniversary of the King's accession a considerable quantity of the new Hedjaz coinage in silver and bronze was issued. There was much agitation beforehand as to the value which would be placed by the King on Turkish dollars (medjidiés). The sensible thing would have been to leave them to find their market value, but King Hussein insisted on their having a fixed rate in relation to his own coinage. However, the market has already proved too strong for him, and medjidiés are considerably cheaper than the rates fixed.

The rates for gold and Hashimite silver are:—

20 Hashimite piastres = 1 Hashimite dollar (riyal).

5 riyals = 100 Hashimite piastres = 1 Hashimite pound (dinar) = £T. 1.

112 Hashimite piastres = £1 gold.

Very little gold is being issued, because this results in a loss equal to the cost of minting. The coining of silver, however, is proceeding rapidly, and at a profit of more than 50 per cent. to King Hussein. He can get about 11 medjidiés for the gold value of his dinar, and five of these converted into riyals can then be paid out as equivalent to a dinar.

After a delay of only about two months this agency managed to recover from the Hedjaz Government the commission paid on a sum of money remitted to the Egyptian Government on their behalf in payment of a three-year-old debt.

The committee sent to India to collect money for the repair of the Al Aksa Mosque having met with little success, King Hussein has promised £25,000, and as much more as may be required, for the purpose. It is hard to get compensation for pilgrims who have been wronged, but there is always plenty of money for advertisement, for propaganda, and for such purposes as establishing useless diplomatic agencies in Persia and Russia.

At the request of the Hedjaz Government an Indian has been deported to Bombay. He was accused by over twenty Indians of having called the Prophet a pig, convicted of the offence by the Shara' court on the evidence of two witnesses, and condemned to eighteen months' imprisonment and deportation. The King remitted the imprisonment on condition that the man left the country at once. The general opinion, which this agency shares, is that it was a trumped-up case. It would appear that the Indians wanted to get the accused evicted from a certain house, and arranged to commit just so much perjury as would effect this purpose. In their ignorance of the Shara' law they committed too much perjury and got the

man evicted from the country as well. Their tender hearts were smitten at this unlooked for result, and they earnestly begged the court to "forgive" him; but the revocation of a sentence not being within the court's power, and the accusers not having thought of the plan of explaining that they were all liars, the deportation had to be proceeded with.

The slavery question has been prominent this month. Not only has the general issue obtained public notice, owing to a question in the House of Commons, but three of the foreign representatives here have had specific cases to deal with. A woman who belongs to the Anglo-Egyptian (or possibly French) Sudan, and who came to the Hedjaz only a year ago, took refuge at this agency with her little girl of eight years of age, and complained that she had been sold as a slave. The truth of her statement was easily established, and, after indignant remonstrances on the part of this agency, and the lamest shufflings by the Hedjaz authorities, the woman and her child were sent back to the Sudan. The man who sold them—a native of the French Sudan—is in custody at the French consulate. He has confessed the crime. The most disturbing feature of the case was that the Kaïmakam of Jeddah admitted that he had been fully acquainted with the case, as the result of a dispute of some kind, and that he had allowed the woman and her child to be sold in his presence after taking evidence which convinced him that both the seller and the alleged slaves were from the Sudan.

The Netherlands consul has secured the release of five Javanese who were being kept in slavery, more or less disguised, in Mecca—one young girl, two girls of 10 and 8, and two boys of about 3. The young girl was brought to the Hedjaz as a pupil in Arabic and religion by an Arab woman, who, on arrival here, treated her as a slave. She escaped last year, with the assistance of her brother, but was overtaken by her "owner" and some Hedjaz police on the road to Jeddah, and dragged back into slavery. The case then came to the notice of the Netherlands consul. The greatest circumspection had to be used, as it would be easy, as precedents have shown, for a slave in whom a foreign consulate was interested, to be made to disappear. Once sure of his facts, the Netherlands consul applied to the Foreign Secretary, Sheikh Fuad, for the girl's release. Finding the facts to be as stated, Sheikh Fuad did not deny the girl's right to freedom; but he had the impertinence to convey to the consul the "owner's" demand that she should receive a refund of all the money spent on the girl in the Hedjaz, including the expense of her recapture. The demand was withdrawn in face of the Netherlands consul's indignant refusal, and the girl was released.

The other cases reveal evidence of a widespread practice of entrusting Javanese children to people in Mecca, nominally for instruction in religion. How far the people who bring them to the Hedjaz are acting in good faith will doubtless be established when the six or eight concerned in the cases which have come to light are brought to trial in Java. As to the evil intentions of the guardians, there is, however, plenty of evidence. The two little girls were received as "presents" (this seems to be the technical term in such transactions) by the Shaibi family, the Hereditary Keepers of the Key of the Sacred Mosque at Mecca, and so holy that the money they make by simply holding out their hands almost puts them beyond the necessity of swindling. The enslavement of these children only became known because their owner was so tickled at having a rare kind of slave that he boasted of it openly. The main facts having been established, complaint was made to King Hussein by the Netherlands consulate. The King professed to be most grateful for having the matter brought to notice, secured the girls' release, and promised to punish the Shaibi. It seems that this particular form of villainy is common enough to have its rules: Shaibi has protested that he quite realised his obligations towards the girls; he could not dream of selling girls received as "presents," he would only "use" them himself. It is unlikely that he will be punished, for King Hussein would hardly dare to offend so important a family (after all, Mohamet had to compromise with people like the Shaibi), and besides, the King probably sympathises with him. All we can be certain of is that if the representative of a European Power finds a subject of that Power being kept in slavery in the Hedjaz and draws the Hedjaz Government's attention to the case, the Hedjaz Government will, more or less reluctantly, secure the release of the "slave" and, if the keeper or the seller is a foreigner, hand such keeper or seller over to his consulate. The Hedjaz Government apparently admits no obligation to prevent foreign subjects from being enslaved in the Hedjaz. Indeed, King Hussein says openly that it is the business of foreign Powers to prevent the slave traffic, though he knows quite well that, even if



His Majesty's ships could block the Red Sea completely against the passage of slave dhows, many foreign subjects would still be brought into the Hedjaz and enslaved there. The Javanese cases are startling because it is customary to think of slavery as limited to the African races, but the enslavement of young Africans who are left defenceless in the Hedjaz through the death of their parents or guardians or from some other cause, is common. As to expecting the Hedjaz to recognise that slavery as an institution is wrong, that seems vain. The Hedjaz will voluntarily give up slavery when it willingly ceases to rob pilgrims. Every Hedjazi who can afford it keeps slaves; the King's palace is crowded with slaves; and the holy shrine itself is guarded by poor wretches, who are not only slaves, but have been emasculated to make them fitter guardians of a place which may be visited by women.

It will be remembered that, a year or so ago, an Arab, who, after taking about seventy lessons in flying, was able to take a turn by himself, was decorated and cited in the "Kiblah" as an ornament to his race; and that the next time he flew he smashed his machine to pieces. Recently the "Kiblah" announced that two Arabs had learned to pilot an aeroplane, thereby proving the particular aptitude of the Arab race for flying. The "Kiblah" did not mention what the Russian pilots know to their cost, that the two Arabs had had between them nearly 700 lessons before they succeeded in flying a yard alone. Their talents are rusting now, as one of them had hardly had time to pin on his decoration when he smashed to pieces the only machine they are allowed to touch.

#### TEMPERATURE for July.

		Maximum.	Minimum.	Temperature at 10 A.M.	
				Dry.	Wet.
Average	..	98.1	83.3	95.9	90.4

R. W. BULLARD.

#### APPENDIX.

#### Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1924.	1924.		Packages.
Arabestan	British	Port Sudan	Batavia	July 13	July 23	1,339	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Sudan	" 15	" 16	..	6,068
Karimata	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 15	" 19	1,550	..
Sitoeboudo	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 16	" 19	1,710	..
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 17	" 17	..	1,525
Sembilan	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 17	" 20	1,409	47 tons
Tantalus	British	Batavia	Batavia	" 17	" 20	1,307	200 tons
Tangistan	British	Port Sudan	Singapore	" 17	" 20	912	..
Perseus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 18	" 22	1,417	21 tons
Cagliari	Italian	..	Tor	" 19	" 19	639	..
Mansourah	British	Port Sudan	Suez	" 19	" 20	337	14
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 19	" 21	67	1,036
Madioen	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 19	" 21	1,654	..
Alcinous	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 19	" 23	995	..
Palamed	Dutch	Amsterdam	Sabang	" 20	" 22	921	5 tons
Etruria	Italian	..	Tor	" 20	" 20	523	..
Piemonte	Italian	..	Tor	" 21	" 21	746	..
Englestan	British	..	Bombay	" 21	" 21	2,028	..
Sultania	British	..	Karachi	" 21	" 21	524	..

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1924.	1924.		Packages.
Dara	British	..	Karachi	..	July 21	1,427	..
Raghmatan	Hedjaz	..	Suakin	..	" 22	460	..
Kenah	British	Aden	Suez	July 21	" 23	560	3,086
Melampus	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 21	" 24	1,171	50 tons
Radwa	Hedjaz	..	Akaba	..	" 23	416	..
Gorjistan	British	..	Karachi	..	" 23	957	..
Homayun	British	..	Bombay	..	" 23	940	..
Borulos	British	Suez	Suez	" 23	" 25	353	881
Jehangir	British	Bombay	Basrah	" 23	" 27	1,257	6,551
Egypt	Egyptian	..	Suez	..	" 24	1,715	..
Sheffield	British	..	Suez	..	" 24	340	..
Amazonia	Egyptian	..	Suez	..	" 24	757	..
Machaon	Eritish	Rotterdam	Singapore	" 24	" 25	1,288	..
Medan	Dutch	Rotterdam	Sabang	" 24	" 25	995	40 tons
Raghmatan	Hedjaz	Suakin	Suakin	" 24	" 25	480	..
Radja	Dutch	Amsterdam	Sabang	" 25	" 26	974	17 tons
Kambangan	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 25	" 26	1,638	..
Etruria	Italian	Tor	Tor	" 26	" 26	524	..
Glaucus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 26	" 27	1,282	5 tons
Alavi	British	Port Said	Bombay	" 26	" 30	1,027	..
Antiochus	British	Liverpool	Batavia	" 27	" 28	1,089	1 ton
Piemonte	Italian	Suez	Tor	" 28	" 28	883	..
Djember	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 28	" 29	1,760	2 tons
Belgrano	French	..	Suez	..	" 29	1,682	..
Prinkipos	Greek	..	Suez	..	" 29	340	..
Kenah	British	Suez	Suez	" 29	" 30	539	..
Atrous	British	New York	Singapore	" 30	" 30	1,185	..
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 31	" 31	..	656
Eumaeus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	Aug. 1	Aug. 1	1,293	..
Borulos	British	Suez	Aden	" 1	" 2	580	..
Cagliari	Italian	Suez	Tor	" 2	" 2	668	..
Prometheus	British	Liverpool	Batavia	" 2	" 3	952	13 tons
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 3	" 3	..	1,040
Piemonte	Italian	Tor	Tor	" 3	" 3	836	..
Deli	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 3	" 4	1,625	..
Teucer	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 5	" 6	978	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Suakin	" 6	" 6	143	283
Etruria	Italian	Suez	Tor	" 6	" 6	508	..
Samarinda	Dutch	Rotterdam	Sabang	" 7	" 7	992	1 ton.
Piemonte	Italian	Tor	Tor	" 9	" 9	829	..
Mansourah	British	Port Sudan	Suez	" 9	" 10	192	3
Halal	British	Port Sudan	Suez	" 10	" 11	..	1,575
Nijkerk	Dutch	Amsterdam	Durban	" 11	" 11	111	..
Armanistan	British	Port Sudan	Singapore	" 11	" 14	1,463	..
Helenus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 12	" 13	1,351	..
Gorjistan	British	Karachi	Bombay	" 13	" 14	957	..
Etruria	Italian	Tor	Tor	" 13	" 14	508	..
Laertus	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 14	" 14	982	..
Kenah	British	Suez	Suakin	" 15	" 16	99	2,076
Idomeneus	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 16	" 17	893	..
Dara	British	Karachi	Karachi	" 16	" 18	1,427	165
Englestan	British	Bombay	Singapore and Batavia	" 16	" 18	1,813	..
Rhesus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 17	" 17	909	..
Sultania	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 17	" 18	1,524	..
Zayani	British	Basrah	Bombay	" 17	" 22	1,057	37,164
Antenor	Dutch	Amsterdam	Sabang	" 18	" 18	922	..
Borulos	British	Aden	Suez	" 18	" 19	66	840
Krakatau	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 19	" 19	1,085	..
Soemba	Dutch	Amsterdam	Sabang	" 19	" 20	771	..
Etruria	Italian	Tor	Tor	" 19	" 20	..	..
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 21	" 21	..	..
Autolytus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 22	" 23	1,247	..
Homayun	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 23	" 24	1,040	1,298
Dardanus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 23	" 23	1,299	..
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 24	" 24	..	..
Selma City	American	New York	Aden	" 24	" 27	..	15,000
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Sudan	" 25	" 25	..	401

Italian cruiser "Calabria" arrived at Jeddah on July 25 and left the same day.



No. 148.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 14, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 26.

As I am debarred from going to Mecca, Indian pilgrim officer has volunteered to go to look after British subjects in general. He will return in two or three days to report. He takes letter addressed to "Leader of forces which have occupied Taif," and will try, with the cognisance of authorities, to send it to Taif. Letter is signed by me and my Netherlands colleague. My French colleague has not received reply.

Letter is accompanied by one signed by me alone referring to report that British Indian is detained at Taif with six other men until each pays £1,000 and conveying protest subject to the truth of the report.

(Sent to India.)

No. 149.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 14, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Copies of both letters were despatched yesterday by a messenger direct to Taif. I hope to have a reply by about 21st September.

Demand for curious total of £7,000 believed to be way of recovering debt from King Hussein, who is alleged to owe a Wahabi this sum.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 150.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 15, 1924.

NOW certain that there was indiscriminate looting and killing on occupation. Indian pilgrim officer now in Mecca reports that many native Hedjazis and some Javans were undoubtedly killed, but as to registered British Indians, of whom there were a few families, while all robbed, some missing and one apparently held to ransom, he has up to the present no authentic evidence of killing. Enquiry proceeding.

Public admitting news reluctantly, as Wahabis hitherto regarded as deliverers from the rule of Hussein.

Force which took Taif now believed to be not more than 1,000 or 2,000 and to consist mainly of men of the Bukum tribe with some Nejdīs. Whether this is the whole force or only an advance guard not known. Tribal attitude round Mecca unknown.

(Same addresses as telegram No. 44.)

No. 151.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 16, 1924.

MY telegram No. 45.

King refused to let first letter be sent; I was compelled to telephone to him that he would be held jointly responsible for any further harm suffered by British subjects at hands of invaders before he would consent.

His objection, which he stated plainly, was that letter confined representations to British subjects and said nothing about Hedjaz; when I insisted that letter

should be allowed to go, he said that would finally destroy his confidence in His Majesty's Government. This is fortunate, as that confidence seems to have been based on belief that whatever hole he got into His Majesty's Government would pull him out.

Pilgrim officer, however, not hopeful of finding a messenger.  
(Sent to India.)

No. 152.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 17, 1924.

FOLLOWING is appreciation of position:—

If invaders had followed up victory they would probably have taken Mecca with little fighting, and been welcomed by the inhabitants. Massacres have damped enthusiasm for the Wahabis, without, however, strengthening defence. General opinion continues to be that if Hussein were removed Hedjaz could come to terms with the enemy more easily, but action to this end is not likely to be taken. Regular army consists of a few hundred indifferent troops demoralised by defeat supplemented by a few hundred pressed men from Mecca, who have no officers and are appealing to Jeddah merchants for rations. Rifles short, and Amir Ali an uninspiring general officer commanding. No serious promise of help received from tribes; they are openly sitting on the fence. Reasonable interpretation of their attitude is: Why fight for a king we hate against a formidable enemy when we may hope to conciliate latter by calling ourselves Wahabis and joining in the pillage or even by merely remaining neutral?

It seems unlikely that Wahabis would have attacked Taif if they had not had reason to believe that Hedjaz tribes would be at the worst neutral.

It would seem that if Wahabis attacked with three or four thousand men they could take the capital. Everything therefore depends on them, and of their intentions we know nothing beyond threat which they told refugees to carry to Mecca (see my telegram No. 50). Situation may change for the worse at any moment. On the other hand, Wahabis may wait long time, as in Taraba, before advancing. Ease with which strong position of Taif was taken would presumably encourage early move. Recovery of Taif by Hedjaz most unlikely during present régime.

Even if attack on Mecca postponed, position would be unstable and pilgrimage would be impossible except with goodwill of Wahabis. Mecca's chief source of fruit and vegetable supply would be in their hands, while place of pilgrimage at Arafat and source of spring, which is essential to the capital in pilgrimage season, would be nearly if not actually in no-man's-land.

(Repeated to Simla.)

No. 153.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 25, 1924.

I HAVE received from King Hussein telegram in which he asks His Majesty's Government what he is to do to repulse Ibn Saud's attacks. Although he does not say so clearly, I gather that he means it is all up. He repeats his offer to resign in favour of Ibn Saud.

(Sent to India.)



No. 154.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, September 26, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 63.

Following is summary of telegram from King Hussein:—

"State of army no longer inspires confidence. We will endeavour to protect all Moslems in Mecca—that is first duty; second is tranquillity, prosperity and independence of the country. Our relations with His Majesty's Government oblige us to ask them to turn attention to what may repulse attack of his Excellency Ibn Saud and obviate consequences observed at Taif. If object is myself, I repeat, as already stated to his Excellency, that I resign to him headship and its functions.

"I confidently hope that my petition will be granted as soon as possible, as situation is critical."

I am informing my colleagues that I have received from the King telegram in above sense.

No. 155.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, September 27, 1924.*

ATTEMPT to retake Taif failed completely, and Hedjaz Government cannot make another. Wahabis not advancing; in any case, Mecca resistance negligible.

Situation in capital: Government departments shut; population fleeing on foot in hundreds; King and leading officials still there, but sent families here.

Jeddah anxious but quiet.

(Addressed as my telegram No. 44; also to Sudan.)

No. 156.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, September 27, 1924.*

I HAVE had much difficulty in discouraging Jeddah people, who think business of His Majesty's Government is to save them from Wahabis or King Hussein or both, but I think neutral attitude is slowly having effect.

There is again much talk here and in Mecca about deposing the King. I doubt whether conspirators will dare to act, but he might possibly abdicate.

I presume if he is replaced by Amir Ali either with or without his consent, latter should be treated as *de facto* head of the Government, but not recognised formally. Apart from usual difficulties attending such cases there is probability that Ibn Saud wishes to get rid of whole Shereefial family.

Is suggested attitude approved?

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 157.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 28.)*

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, September 28, 1924.*

BRITISH, French, Italian, Netherlands and Persian representatives have drawn up joint communication addressed to Wahabi leaders saying that they will be held responsible for any harm to life or property of our nationals. Each of us is sending out several copies by various means.

(Sent to India and Singapore.)

No. 158.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 28, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 26th September: Wahabi attack on the Hedjaz.

You should explain to King Hussein that His Majesty's Government have never wavered from their policy of assisting in every possible way to promote peace and good-fellowship among the various rulers of Arabia. At the same time, they adhere to their traditional policy of non-interference in religious matters, and do not propose to be entangled in any struggle for the possession of the Holy Places of Islam which may be entered upon by the independent rulers of Arabia. In this event, they intend to confine their efforts to an attempt to safeguard His Majesty's Moslem subjects and Moslems under his protection in the Hedjaz so far as this is practicable. Only in the event of both the contending parties spontaneously asking for the good offices of His Majesty's Government to assist them to settle their differences by peaceful arrangement would His Majesty's Government be prepared to undertake such a task, which they attempted last winter at the Koweit Conference in vain, largely owing to King Hussein's delay in agreeing to send a representative.

No. 159.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 30, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 27th September: Situation in the Hedjaz.

In the event of dethronement of King Hussein you should accept attitude suggested in penultimate paragraph of your telegram.

No. 160.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 1.)*

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, September 30, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 35.

King has sent rejoinder not worth telegraphing; will send by post. One argument is that article 4 of Najis Treaty says King and Ibn Saud to be as before Arab revolt.

No. 161.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 2.)*

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, October 2, 1924.*

CIVIL Government, Mecca, ceased to function; even press silent; no defence, but Ali on Taif road with perhaps fifty men. King in palace with guard, consisting mainly of personal slaves, and Syrian officers declare he will fight to the last, whatever wishes of people.

No one else desires to resist; almost all notables and officials left capital, many going to Egypt, India and elsewhere.

Generally believed that Ibn Saud or other person in authority is in or near Taif; this is supported by fairly trustworthy news of released men held to ransom.

Calculated that 15,000 refugees arrived at Jeddah from Mecca. Situation here good except for shortage of water; local authorities disregarding Mecca instructions and managing well; attitude of local tribes not threatening.

(Sent to Simla.)



## No. 162.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 3.)*

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 3, 1924.*

MECCA notables now here and leading men of Jeddah to-day telegraphed to King Hussein insisting on his abdication. They now inform me that he has agreed to abdicate.

## No. 163.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 4.)*

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 4, 1924.*

AMIR ALI came to Jeddah yesterday with message from King that he would abdicate if people thought that would improve the situation. Notables of Mecca now here and leading men of Jeddah, after short discussion, telephoned to King that they wished him to retire in favour of Ali.

Meanwhile, when returning call, Ali asked vainly for my opinion whether he should [? omitted: accept] throne, and whether he could count upon any support from His Majesty's Government. Offer of Ali was to be constitutional ruler of Hedjaz alone; Caliphate not mentioned, and connection with other Arab countries expressly repudiated.

Later, four Jeddah notables, viz., Governor, Director-General of Customs, President of Municipality and Director of Education, came as deputation to say that King had agreed to abdicate and wanted person selected as successor to take over without delay, whereon he would leave immediately (copies of telegrams exchanged with King, certified by deputation and others, have been sent to each of the foreign representatives); but that Ali, after promising to accept the throne if his father should abdicate, had refused on the ground that the situation was hopeless, and had decided to leave the country with the King.

Deputation made requests varying from demand for British protection or mandate, to proposal that, if they sent message to Wahabis offering to surrender, I would ask Wahabis to halt or to refrain from massacre, or would intervene in some other way "in the name of humanity." When they found this hopeless, they asked me to request your instructions on the point. I replied that, while I would report what had occurred, as was my duty, there was no reason to expect the slightest change in policy of His Majesty's Government, which was shaped in relation to Hedjaz, not to any particular ruler or form of Government. Deputation left with no policy whatever.

Reason why they appeal to British agency is, of course, that they refuse to regard independence of the Hedjaz, which they consider the source of all their troubles, as one of the results of the war, but attribute it solely to His Majesty's Government.

Wahabis are believed to be at Arafat or even nearer. Ali says they can walk in whenever they like.

## No. 164.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 4.)*

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 4, 1924.*

KING HUSSEIN abdicated. After much hesitation Ali accepted as King of the Hedjaz only.

Wahabis nearing.

See my telegram No. 65.

## No. 165.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 4, 1924.*

HAVING been notified in writing that Amir Ali, on abdication of Hussein, had become ruler of Hedjaz. I paid a private call on him. He laid stress on difficulty of his position, and hoped for good relations with His Majesty's Government. He spoke of going to Mecca 5th or 6th October.

(Sent to India.)

## No. 166.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, October 4, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Appointment of Ali seems to have been manoeuvred by small group of officials. There is a strong party which wanted to establish Provisional Government having no connection with Shereefial family as first step towards peace with Ibn Saud.

(Sent to India.)

## No. 167.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 5, 1924.*

ALI tells me that, firstly, he has nothing to do with Caliphate—that is the business of the Moslem world; secondly, he would be glad if treaty negotiations in London could continue.

(Sent to India.)

[E 8654/7624/91]

## No. 168.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 95. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, September 21, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a rather hastily compiled report on the Taif incident.

2. Copies of this despatch are being, or will shortly be, sent to India, Singapore, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Beirut (for Damascus), Bagdad, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Aden.

3. The refugee question will be dealt with in a separate despatch, copies of which will be sent to India and Singapore only.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 168.

*Report on Capture of Taif.*

BUSHIRE had news on the 8th August that a force had left Riyadh on the 1st August to attack Taif. On the 17th August, when I commented on this report by telegraph, there was still no news of a projected attack here. It was on the 31st August that I first heard of a "Wahabi" concentration near Taif. Sheikh Fuad, the Foreign Secretary, mentioned it when he passed through on that date on his way to Tehran, but not as being more serious than usual. Had the King known how serious it was he would have retained Sheikh Fuad, who would have been



invaluable to him in such a crisis. The Acting Foreign Secretary mentioned the report the next day on the telephone, and said that the Amir Ali had gone out to tranquillise the people. There was still nothing to show that the threat was more serious than in May (see my report for that month), when the Russian airmen were sent out several times to report and were asked—but refused—to drop bombs on the supposedly hostile encampment. On the 4th September the Hashimite Government informed me by letter (not by telephone or telegraph) that the Wahabis had taken and burned the Palace of Suwaihit, situated to the north-east of Taif. This was reported to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of India, with the comment that the outer defences of the Hedjaz must have been penetrated. On the evening of Friday, the 5th September, Taif was taken, the Hedjaz forces, under Amir Ali, withdrawing first to Hadah, and later to Arafat.

2. The Hedjaz Government at once telegraphed to me to ask His Majesty's Government what steps should be taken "in view of such open hostility." They were quite unable to explain what kind of reply they thought His Majesty's Government could give. They wrote again later, attributing their troubles to alleged assurances by His Majesty's Government that Ibn Saud would not attack and to His Majesty's Government's refusal to provide them with munitions of war. When the Consular Corps telephoned to Mecca to enquire as to the safety of British subjects, we received the assurance that foreigners would be protected as if they were Hedjaz subjects, and would we let the Hedjaz Government have four aeroplanes on payment.

3. All the reports received in Jeddah, particularly one from the Sudan notable the Shereef Yussuf-al-Hindi, who made a special journey to Jeddah with the King's consent, and the King's demands for advice, aeroplanes, munitions, &c., made it clear that Mecca was in danger if the Wahabis in Taif cared to advance, or another hostile force attacked from another direction. The regular army—such as it is—began to melt away. Mecca was known to be disaffected to King Hussein, and the tribes to have been long tired of his blockade policy, which kept them on very short rations in the hope of keeping Nejd short of supplies, and particularly angry at his greed amounting this year to swindling, over the division of the money obtained from pilgrims for the journey to Medina. If Mecca fell, the administration of Jeddah would probably break down, and in that case the tribes might possibly attack the town for the foodstuffs they so badly need. The only way of escape for British and other foreign subjects fleeing from Mecca would then be closed. A preconcerted signal was therefore sent to the Sudan asking for the nearest sloop to come over. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 10th September. The French armed yacht "Diana" was already in port. She had come in the previous day to take on board a French Sudanese accused of slave trading and ordered to be taken to Jibuti for trial, and was detained by the acting French consul until instructions for her to remain until further orders could be received from Paris. Both ships are here still.

4. The first feeling in Jeddah was of hardly concealed delight. The Hedjazi townsman is a mean-spirited and cowardly creature, whose most doughty deed is the swindling of a live pilgrim or the robbing of a dead one. His hatred of King Hussein had hitherto been concealed under an effusive servility, but at the sight of the Wahabis about, as he thought, to set him free from King Hussein, he began to talk treason boldly. The early rumours of the behaviour of the Wahabis at Taif were uniformly favourable to them; they had committed no excesses of any kind; there had not even been any looting; and when, on the 11th September, the foreign consuls and the leading officials in Jeddah received a telegram from Mecca, signed by a large number of Hedjazis and foreigners, but in reality, as was well known, composed by the King, accusing the Wahabis of desecration of the tomb of the Prophet's cousin, Abdullah-bin-Abbas, and of looting, murder and other excesses, not a soul was prepared to believe the story. It is a necessary rule with all foreign representatives here to believe no statement of King Hussein's until it is corroborated from some independent source. The inhabitants of Jeddah observe the same rule, and, in addition, they are animated by a most determined will to believe nothing but good of the Wahabis. Mecca was a little excited by the news and a few people fled to Jeddah, but even there the anti-Hussein feeling was too strong, and the belief in the possibility that excesses had been committed died away.

5. The first reliable evidence in support of the story of pillage and murder was brought to Jeddah on the 10th September by the Javanese Mahometan, Sheikh Pravira, who is at present acting Netherlands consul. He had the evidence of Javanese pilgrims that some of their people had been killed, while they themselves had been robbed of all they possessed, except their underclothes. Arabs could have

given clearer evidence, but no refugees other than these few Javanese arrived for some little time. Now the Javanese are notoriously ignorant of local affairs, and they had clearly fled very soon after the evacuation of Taif by the Hedjaz forces. It was therefore thought that the assailants were possibly local ruffians who had profited by the interregnum and not the invaders at all. Moreover, these refugees were brought in from the front line by the King, in his car, and the suspicion could not be avoided that, in the state of alarm and distress in which they arrived, they might have been unwillingly inspired with the King's views. Nevertheless, the information was reported to His Majesty's Government, and the Government of India were asked whether, in case of need, refugees could be taken to Kamaran. The British, French and Netherlands representatives suggested to their respective Governments that they should send to the leader of the occupying forces a letter expressing the hope that the interests of foreigners would be safeguarded. His Majesty's Government approved the proposal that a letter should be sent, but directed that it should be in the form of a warning. A letter in the sense prescribed was sent of by secret messenger on the 13th September. It was signed by me and by my Netherlands colleague; instructions authorising the acting French consul to sign were not received until the 15th September. With the letter I sent one signed by myself alone, saying that news had been received that a certain British Indian was being held to ransom, and protesting—subject to the truth of the report—against such conduct.

6. My greatest difficulty arose from the fact that, being debarred from going to Mecca, I could not personally advise the large number of British subjects in permanent or temporary residence there. This was discussed with Mr. M. Yasin Khan, the Indian pilgrimage officer, and he volunteered to go to Mecca to look after the interests of British subjects in general. He arrived there on the 14th September. His instructions were: (1) To endeavour to despatch, with the cognisance of King Hussein, duplicates of the two letters already sent to Taif by secret messenger; (2) to investigate the reports of pillage and massacre; and (3) to get into touch with the various British communities in Mecca, not only with the Indians, but with the Malays, Nigerians, and others, as well. Pilgrims who had performed the Hajj were to be told that they would be well-advised to go home in view of the economic difficulties incident to the situation; merchants and other residents who asked for advice must decide for themselves: if, in case of need, they applied to the British agency at Jeddah, they would be given such assistance as was possible and as the circumstances warranted.

7. When Mr. Yasin Khan and Sheikh Pravira showed King Hussein the two letters which it was desired to send to the leader of the invaders, the King said that the one signed by the British and Dutch representatives could not be allowed to pass out of the Hedjaz lines: the protest against the holding of a British Indian to ransom might go if the form of address ("To the Leader of the Force which has occupied Taif") were changed and the name of the Wahabi leader inserted. It was necessary to telephone to the King personally, and to say that he would be held jointly responsible for any further harm suffered by British subjects at the hands of the invaders, before he would consent to our despatching the joint letter. As to the other letter, I was compelled to insist on the retention of the form of address I had used, since I had no official information as to the identity of the attacking force or of their leader. As it turned out, the discussion was academic, since Mr. Yasin Khan was unable to find a messenger who would agree to go to Taif, and in any case the King would probably have had him waylaid; but the discussion was useful in revealing King Hussein's views. He told me in so many words that he objected to the letter because it confined its representations to British subjects and said nothing about the Hedjaz. From this, and from other remarks, it was quite clear that he was still expecting that His Majesty's Government would pull him out of the pit he had helped so strenuously to dig for himself.

8. Taif has three functions very valuable to Mecca: it is a strong natural position; it supplies the capital with the bulk of its fruit and vegetables; and it serves as a health resort. As a health resort it had been neglected for some years, owing to the Wahabi menace, but gradually more and more of the wealthy Meccans resumed their old customs, and this summer a very large number of families had installed themselves in their Taif houses, among them two or three Indian families. There were also many pilgrims of various races. Most of these were Javanese.

9. Apart from the information obtained by Mr. Yasin Khan in Mecca, we have now the evidence of many refugees from Taif who have come to Jeddah. The



outlines of the story are clear. When the Wahabi attack was threatening during the three or four days preceding the capture of the town many of the Mecca people asked for permission to leave. This was refused by the kaimakam, the Sheeref Sharaf, on the ground that there was no danger, and that their return to Mecca would cause a panic there. Many, again, wished to leave when the Amir Ali evacuated the town, but they were told that he was only going to bring up reinforcements. After the evacuation some of the people invited the Wahabis into the town and into their houses. In spite of this, pillage and shooting began at once. Everything of value was taken, even to the outer garments; men and women were left with nothing but their underclothes. The Mecca people had with them many fine carpets, much money (in this country money is hidden in the house rather than deposited in a bank), and enormous quantities of jewellery. Everything was taken. If a man hesitated to produce his money and valuables, or was suspected of trying to conceal any, he was shot at once. Some families have lost five or six men. Most of the people who survived the massacre were sent to the Palace of Shubrah, an enormous building standing in a very large garden just outside the town walls. There they remained for four days, living on fruit. When the corpses were already swollen and putrifying about thirty of the survivors were compelled to remove them; they were given mules and ropes by which to drag the bodies away. Four days after the capture of the town the Mecca refugees collected in the Shubrah garden were ordered to return to Mecca, seven men only being kept until a sum of £1,000 should be paid for each. They were ordered to convey a message to the people of Mecca, to the effect that the Wahabis were coming and would treat them as Taif had been treated unless they got rid of the "shereef" (King Hussein), who was referred to as "Abu Khishah," i.e., "The Chap in the Gunny Bag," or "Him in the Sack." They left on foot, in their underclothes and barefooted. A small quantity of grain was given them by the Wahabis, but not enough to go round. One, an Indian, had managed to conceal £2, and was able to buy food on the way. A few died of exhaustion on the journey.

10. There is evidence that the invaders showed religious fanaticism. They constantly addressed their victims as "kuffar" (infidels) and "mushrikin" (those who join others with God, i.e., polytheists), and made many repeat the Wahabi formula. It appears that instead of "There is no God but Allah, and Mahomet is the prophet of Allah," the Wahabis say, "There is no God but Allah alone; he has no companion." To this they sometimes add: "and Mahomet is his slave and his prophet." They consider that the reverence shown by the Sunni for Mahomet savours of idolatry. It is alleged that the Wahabis demolished the tomb of Abdullah-bin-Abbas, cousin of the Prophet, but this, though widely believed and quite probable, is not well authenticated.

It is believed now that most of the invaders belong to the Bukum and Ataibah tribes. The military success and the enormous booty won by these fairly recent converts are likely to win other tribes to the Wahabi tenets.

11. The local estimate of non-combatants killed by the Wahabis is from 500 to 800. It is probable that some 200 were killed. The casualties among the British Indians who happened to be in Taif are these:—

- (1) Muhammad Sadik, son of Muhammad Nadim: held to ransom.
- (2) Muhammad Ismail, son of Abdullah: held to ransom.
- (3) Mian Jamal (Baroda): missing, believed killed.
- (4) Mian Ahmad (Baroda): missing, believed killed.

Nos. (1), (3) and (4) were registered at this agency. No. (2) was registered until 1914.

The three persons mentioned below, viz.:—

- (5) Mirza Abdul Rahman, killed;
- (6) Ahmad, son of No. (5), killed;
- (7) Amna, daughter of No. (5), killed;

were at first believed to be British Indians, but none was registered. Nos. (6) and (7) were certainly born in Mecca, and it is probable that not even the father, No. (5), was born in India.

It is said that there were also some Sindhis in Taif, and there is a story that the bodies of some of them were seen by the men who were made to bury the dead; but I can get no certain evidence of this.

The total number of Indians in Taif who were certainly or very probably entitled to be considered as British subjects was about twenty.

A certain Ali Johar-bin-Hasan Johar, who was killed, was a well-known Calcutta merchant, but I am not sure about his nationality. He is said to have been born in the Hedjaz.

12. A Syrian general who was with the Hashimite forces in Taif states that the Amir Ali decided to evacuate the town before he had lost a single man. There may be some jealousy in this, but it is certain that the Hashimite army did not make a very desperate resistance. At the moment of writing, the Amir Ali is advancing on Taif in the hope of retaking it, and one of the factors against him must be the ease with which he was driven out a fortnight ago. His force consists of perhaps 500 men which he brought from Medina, of whom most are West Africans; perhaps as many men of the Mecca troops, consisting of Yemenis of the worst kind (the lowlanders) "Hedjazis" (notorious for deserting with their rifles, even in peace time) from the agricultural country towards Taif; and Takrunis, who are nearly all unwilling recruits. The Mecca people were at first unwilling to furnish any recruits, but the higher rates of pay which the Amir Ali seems to have compelled his father to promise, or the realisation of the truth of the news of pillage and massacre, or some other cause, has secured a few hundred recruits from the two best fighting elements in Mecca: the men of Hadhramaut origin and the men of the Havas quarter. But everything depends upon the tribes, and so far no considerable body of tribal support seems to have been even promised. That the tribes are on bad terms with King Hussein must be very well known to the Wahabis; indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that Taif would hardly have been attacked if resistance from the tribes as well as from the Hashimite army had been anticipated. News received at the last moment before the typing of this despatch states that the Amir Ali has now with him about 2,000 tribesmen. These are, however, not from the bigger tribes, e.g., Harb, but Bani Sufyan (a sub-tribe of the Bani Thakif living near Taif), and odds and ends scraped together by the shereefs, who fear that the family will be wiped out if the Wahabis take Mecca, from their personal following among the small local tribes, e.g., Bishah and Hudhail.

As to the defence the Wahabis can make, it is impossible to make a forecast of any serious value. Their numbers are still unknown. The force which captured the town was probably not much over a thousand, and there is no reliable news of the arrival of reinforcements. And probably they are not too well supplied with cartridges. Artillery is not likely to play a large part in the struggle. The road to Taif is steep and bad, and, moreover, the guns are being kept, it is stated, for the defence of Mecca.

13. That the Hedjaz is not yet animated by a spirit of patriotism has been fully proved by the events of this fortnight. If a very few of the senior officials be excepted it may be said that the capture of Taif roused universal enthusiasm. The "war" was regarded as a personal struggle between Ibn Saud and King Hussein, and as a happy occasion by which the latter might be got rid of. The inhabitants of Mecca and Jeddah now say that but for the news of the massacres they would have deposed King Hussein. I much doubt whether their courage would have risen to this, but, at least, they were confident that if Hussein could somehow cease to be king, either they could have come to terms with Ibn Saud or, at the worst, they could fight the Wahabis with easy minds, knowing that their victory would not fix King Hussein's yoke more firmly on their shoulders; and this conviction is not dead yet. Both Mecca and Jeddah showed a spirit of independence which was completely lacking before. Jeddah town had hitherto been administered by the King by telephone, down to the most trivial detail; but it now runs itself. No man had ever dared to question the wisdom of an order, but when the public refused to accept the King's new coinage, believing that the Wahabis would come and render it worthless, and the King wished to force it on them, the leading officials and merchants secured the withdrawal of the order, and the Director-General of Customs, on his own responsibility, issued gold and Turkish silver in exchange for the King's copper. Mecca is said to have decided at last that the slow wretchedness of the rule of King Hussein is preferable to that of the Wahabis, but this seems to apply almost exclusively to the richer class, which lost so many men and so much property at Taif. The poorer people have no property to lose in a raid and little fear of being killed, whereas they suffer daily hardships from King Hussein's greed and from his foolish economic policy. Jeddah is at a loss, fearing about equally the arrival of the Wahabis, the success of King Hussein and an interval of disorder when the local tribes might come in and loot the town. They have therefore worked themselves into the belief that the foreign Powers must protect Jeddah, and the



wildest rumours—most of them based on the supposition that His Majesty's Government would intervene—have been afloat. I believe, however, that the attitude of complete neutrality adopted by the Consular Corps is beginning to convince them that His Majesty's Government and the other foreign Powers are interested in the struggle only in so far as it affects the rights and interests of their nationals.

14. When the crisis came, King Hussein's first step was to clamour for advice from His Majesty's Government and to make the false statement that they had promised him he should not be attacked. He clearly expected more than advice, for when I reminded the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how, according to the local press (written by the King), the Transjordanian tribes had recently beaten off a Wahabi attack, King Hussein wrote to say that the attack was only repulsed by means of British aeroplanes and tanks. Yet only a month or so earlier he had informed His Majesty's Government that the Amir of Transjordan was administering that territory on behalf of the Mecca Government. How little he has done to conciliate Ibn Saud is well known. He has endeavoured to starve the Nejd tribes by limiting to a quantity quite inadequate even for his own people the amount of food-stuffs and other necessities which might be taken out of the towns of the Hedjaz, and although this measure was rescinded when he took the title of Caliph, it has been applied in practice with little if any modification. For several years he refused to allow Nejdīs to come to Mecca on the pilgrimage. He was personally discourteous to Ibn Saud; he always refers to him as his Excellency instead of as his Highness; and on receiving from him a letter couched in very friendly language and bearing the full title of King of the Hedjaz, he sent a curt reply, beginning "O Excellency!" a form of address which he would embroider if he were writing, *e.g.*, to his own Director of Customs. He openly claimed that the first step towards peace in Arabia was the restoration of pre-war boundaries. This was to apply to all Arab rulers in the peninsula except himself. He by no means desired to be limited, as before the war, to the town of Mecca; but Ibn Saud was to give up his conquests, and the houses of Ibn Rashid, at Hail, and of Al Aidh, at Ibha, were to be re-established (this programme he published in his own newspaper only a few months ago). He constantly described himself as "King of the Arab Lands," as though he were the only king. And finally he took the title of Caliph. This last step gave Ibn Saud an opportunity, which he quickly seized, to win the support of some of the Indian Caliphate leaders. The "Bombay Chronicle" has been printing letters from him for some months, and describing him in articles as the man who really has Arab unity, the liberation of Arabia from European domination, and Moslem interests in general, at heart. On the other hand, by his Caliphate policy and his treatment of pilgrims, King Hussein has alienated all the important Mahometan communities except those of Syria, Palestine and Irak, whose adherence is due partly to racial but mainly to political considerations. Being disappointed in his hope that His Majesty's Government would intervene to save him from Ibn Saud, he would have been in a desperate situation if the Wahabis had not put themselves in the wrong by the excesses committed at Taif. The King at once telegraphed a protest all over the world, obtaining afterwards the signatures of the people whose names he had affixed to the telegrams. Copies of the telegrams were sent to the foreign consuls in Jeddah, and we thought it necessary to send a reply saying that, although our Governments must naturally be greatly distressed to hear of hostilities in the Holy Land of Islam, any foreign intervention was absolutely precluded by their well-known principles, and would, moreover, be displeasing to the Mahometan world. The telegram also gave us a useful opportunity to discourage people who have long lost their foreign nationality—sometimes for generations—but were expecting us to help them, by saying flatly that the figure of 20,000 foreigners mentioned in their telegram was grossly exaggerated, and to inform real nationals of our respective Governments in Mecca that if they applied to us they would be afforded such protection as was possible and as the circumstances warranted. The reply to this, couched in King Hussein's well-known style, was to this effect: Heaven forbid that European Powers should establish anything in the nature of a protectorate over the Hedjaz; but what about the Koweit Conference, which was held under the presidency of a British official? This naive appeal having had no effect, King Hussein was thrown on his own resources. He recovered a little from the panic of the first moment, when a few Wahabis could have walked into Mecca to the applause of the population, and began to try to win support for a policy of resistance—a policy which the Wahabis' conduct did something to advance. Two of his steamers are under orders to be ready to leave at twelve hours' notice,

and a quantity of specie has been put on board one of them (the yacht), but he remains at his post in Mecca, and at the present moment his army, such as it is, is moving towards Taif.

15. Whatever happens, the prospect is gloomy. If King Hussein retakes Taif he will be even more obstinate and vainglorious than before. His people, who ventured to show their hostility to him when Taif was first captured, will feel the weight of his anger, and both they and the pilgrims will be bled even more than before to produce money for defence; and he is likely to be particularly hostile to British interests, in revenge for the disappointment of his hopes that they would support him against Ibn Saud. And all the time there will be the menace of another attack from the desert. If the Wahabis should take Mecca there would be the immediate difficulties resulting from the flight of large numbers of refugees of all kinds to the coast and from the temporary paralysis of administration in Jeddah, and the longer-lived complications arising from the difference between the tenets of the Wahabis and those of the bulk of the pilgrims. If things remain as they are, with Taif part of Nejd and Mecca part of the Hedjaz, the present state of instability may be prolonged indefinitely. The Wahabis would be within striking distance of the place of pilgrimage at Arafat and of the source of the famous Ain Zubaidah, near by, which is essential to Mecca when the town is full of pilgrims.

R. W. BULLARD.

No. 169.

*Abdel-el-Khatib, Diplomatic Agent, Hedjaz Government, to Mr. MacDonald.—*  
(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Cairo, October 5, 1924.*

I HAVE been ordered by His Majesty my King Hussein at Mecca to inform you that the well-known events that happened at Jeddah by some Hedjazian individuals convinced His Majesty to save situation by abdicating in favour of his eldest son, Amir Ali. His Majesty desires all peaceful consequences.

No. 170.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, October 5, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Comment 1. It is not absolutely clear to me (nor, I think, to Ali) that King Hussein has resigned Caliphate as well as Kingship.

2. Apart from insecurity of Ali's tenure, we have to remember that treaty as it now stands contravenes conditions offered of rule by notables, which included expressed repudiation of interest in other Arab countries.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 171.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 597.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

*Paris, October 5, 1924.*

THE fall of King Hussein has been the signal for a small anti-British outburst in several of the newspapers.

The "Journal des Débats" and the "Œuvre" are the most offensive. The former takes the opportunity to refer to the "series of operations designed by the Foreign Office in 1918 to prevent us from entering Syria despite the spheres of influence treaty concluded during the war," to "the mines sown under our feet in Syria by the visionary Colonel Lawrence," and to "Palestine become a centre of action against the traditional French influence"; the article is concluded by a warning to Great Britain not to court the fate of William II of Germany by the



conception of too great imperialist designs. "Better to work loyally with France than covertly to try to hold her in leash with the aid of Germany."

The "Œuvre" openly accuses British intelligence officers in the East of paying the Wahabites to upset King Hussein, on the ground that he was not sufficiently subservient to British policy.

Several papers also express a little sly pleasure that the Zaghlul negotiations do not seem to have matured.

## No. 172.

*Mr. MacDonald to His Majesty's Consular Representatives at Beirut (No. 18), Aleppo (No. 9) and Damascus (No. 11).*

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1924.*  
DAMASCUS despatch No. 142 of 5th September.

Following statement of policy of His Majesty's Government, which has been communicated to King Feisal and Emir Abdullah, is sent to you for guidance, but not for publication:—

"His Majesty's Government have never wavered from their policy of assisting in every possible way to promote peace and good fellowship among the various rulers of Arabia. At the same time, they adhere to their traditional policy of non-interference in religious matters, and do not propose to be entangled in any struggle for the possession of the Holy Places of Islam which may be entered upon by the independent rulers of Arabia. In this event, they intend to confine their efforts to an attempt to safeguard His Majesty's Moslem subjects and Moslems under his protection in the Hedjaz, so far as this is practicable. Only in the event of both the contending parties spontaneously asking for the good offices of His Majesty's Government to assist them to settle their differences by peaceful arrangements would His Majesty's Government be prepared to undertake such a task, which they attempted last winter at the Koweit Conference in vain, largely owing to King Hussein's delay in agreeing to send a representative. King Hussein has been informed as above.

"With regard to the areas bordering on Arabia in which His Majesty's Government hold responsibility under the League of Nations, they are prepared to give such assistance as may be practicable to the local Government concerned in repelling unprovoked attack by any independent Arab ruler, but this readiness to assist is conditional upon the local Government concerned being guided by them in its own policy towards that ruler. They cannot admit the right of these local Governments to intervene in a conflict between two independent Arab rulers, and will give no countenance to any such intervention."

Unless a definite breach occurs between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, you may continue to extend good offices to Nejdīs.  
(Repeated to Cairo, No. 188.)

## No. 173.

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 9.)*

(No. 326.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Alexandria, October 9, 1924.*

IN the course of conversation to-day, Acting Prime Minister, speaking "confidentially and only semi-officially," asked if His Majesty's Government could arrange that King Hussein, in the event of his leaving Jeddah for Europe, should not be allowed to land in Egypt, where his presence would be most unwelcome.

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 8748/7624/91]

No. 174.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Kerr (Cairo).*

(No. 190.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 10, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 326 of 9th October.

His Majesty's Government have no information regarding the intentions of ex-King Hussein, and are not in a position to control his movements.

Please repeat above to Mr. Bullard.

## No. 175.

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 11.)*

(No. 327. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Alexandria, October 11, 1924.*

PERSIAN Minister informs me he has been instructed by his Government to examine and report on possibility of suggestion that has been made to them that they should intervene between Wahabis and Hedjaz Government. He gathered that this suggestion had reached them in a roundabout way from King Hussein.

He said he thought his Government would follow any advice he gave, and that this would be in whatever sense His Majesty's Government wished. If you considered such intervention desirable, he would recommend it; if not, he would advise against it.

I told him I thought it unlikely that His Majesty's Government would wish to interest themselves in any such intervention, but he begged that I should consult your wishes.

I believe him to be well-intentioned man with genuine feelings of friendship for ourselves. He is most anxious that his *démarche* should be kept secret.

## No. 176.

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 12.)*

(No. 330. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Alexandria, October 11, 1924.*

PRESIDENT of Supreme Religious Court in Egypt, a sound and influential man, has expressed to me confidentially his view that solution of Hedjaz difficulties is to be found in putting Holy Places and surrounding territory under authority of a council representative of Moslem countries exercised through a Governor appointed by council. Membership of council to be roughly proportioned to population of countries represented.

He shares contempt of King Hussein and Ali and distrust of Wahabis, which is common in Egypt, and natural Moslem desire for peace and security in Hedjaz.

He is reluctant to attempt to move an initiative from Egypt unless he has reason to think proposal on above lines would find favour elsewhere, especially in India.

If such a proposal would not be contrary to policy of His Majesty's Government, would it be possible to discover whether thoughts of Moslem leaders in India are turning or ready to turn in the same direction?

## No. 177.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 13.)*

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 13, 1924.*

ALI'S offer to negotiate with Wahabis unsuccessful. He has therefore evacuated Mecca with all troops, in order, he says, to give no excuse for fighting there. Wahabis not more than two short marches from capital, probably nearer.

By evening of 15th October there will be no British pilgrims left in Jeddah.

(Sent to India and Singapore.)



[E 8971/7624/91]

No. 178.

*Sir H. Samuel to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received October 14.)*(No. 319.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Jerusalem, October 14, 1924.*

REFERENCE to telegram No. 454: Bagdad to Colonial Office.

Pasha Abu-el-Huda visited me to-day on behalf of Abdulla to plead cause of ex-King Hussein and to beg that he be not denied asylum in Transjordan. He urged King Hussein's long connection and co-operation with Great Britain, his age and his misfortune. He assured me that he would be merely a private individual, and that Abdulla would be responsible that he did not interfere either in politics or administration of Transjordan, which would be guided entirely by British adviser.

I still consider that objection to his residence in Transjordan holds good, but if no other suitable refuge is available I would not offer objection to his coming to Palestine provided that he had the means necessary to maintain himself and gave full guarantee of non-interference in politics or administrative affairs.

I should suggest Mount Carmel or Acre as suitable localities.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jeddah, No. 366.)

No. 179.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Kerr (Cairo).*(No. 194. Confidential.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, October 14, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 327 of 11th October: Proposed Persian intervention in the dispute between Hedjaz and Ibn Saud.

Please see telegram to consuls in Syria repeated to you in my telegram No. 188 of 7th October.

You should thank Persian Minister, and say that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to abstain from any intervention in this religious dispute. They cannot, therefore, give him any advice in a matter which must be left to Moslems themselves to consider.

No. 180.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 15.)*(No. 84.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Jeddah, October 14, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 67 of 28th September.

We have received letter purporting to be from Wahabi leaders, and almost certainly genuine, saying their aim is not foreign subjects and property; quarrel is with him (or those) who prevented them from performing pilgrimage, and that people and residents of Mecca are safe from harm to life or goods. Rest of message rather obscure, but probably means they do not intend to attack Jeddah and neighbourhood, and if any such attack is made, and we inform them of it, they will prevent it.

No. 181.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 15.)*(No. 85.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Jeddah, October 15, 1924.*

HUSSEIN left 14th October; destination kept secret, but doubtless Akaba.  
(Sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Egypt.)



[E 8988/7624/91]

No. 184A.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*(No. 38.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, October 17, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 36 of 30th September: Recognition of Emir Ali as King of the Hedjaz.

French Government propose to recognise Emir Ali as constitutional King of the Hedjaz and ask what are the intentions of His Majesty's Government.

Please telegraph urgently your observations and recommendations regarding course to be adopted.

No. 182.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 15.)*

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, October 15, 1924.*

Some of the Wahabis reached Mecca in pilgrim dress, performing usual ceremonies and assured population that there was no cause for alarm.

Ali apparently intends to try to hold Jeddah with the assistance of remainder of troops and of 1,500 volunteers, who, he says, are coming from Akaba, and to endeavour to squeeze Wahabis out of the capital by tribal pressure without actual hostilities. On the whole, Jeddah people consider this likely to invite attack, and would probably prefer to surrender the town to the Wahabis.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 183.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 16.)*

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 16, 1924.*

JERUSALEM telegram No. 366 of 14th October.

Before leaving, King Hussein sent to the acting Prime Minister a letter, of which he communicated copies to the foreign representatives, repudiating any policy not based on complete independence of Arab countries and reserving all rights of "opposition and disavowal" in this connection.

(Repeated to Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

No. 184.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 17.)*

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 16, 1924.*

THREE copies of a letter, dated 21st September, addressed to people of Mecca and Jeddah and districts, signed by Ibn Saud, reached Jeddah to-day. Writer recites misdeeds of King Hussein, says that he sent people to take Taif and intends to purify Holy Places; life and property are safe; will do nothing, and appoint no one as Governor people do not like; comes not as tyrant, but as adviser, and that question of Holy Places left to discretion of Moslems.

(Sent to India.)

No. 185.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, October 17, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 381.

I deprecate recognition for following reasons:—

1. There is complete cleavage between Ali and Syrian and Bagdad officers on the one side and nearly whole population of Jeddah on the other, former wanting to defend the town, latter to come to terms with Wahabis.
2. Local people are content to have Ali as King only so long as they do not thereby incur enmity of Ibn Saud or of Moslems in general, and on this point they are at present without a clear lead.
3. Wahabis are in Mecca, and people here are in active correspondence with them, and situation may develop rapidly.
4. Ali has not raised question of formal recognition.

I suggest we should wait until Ali raises issue.

Recognition might be interpreted as declaration in favour of Ali's retention of Holy Places, as to which see my telegram No. 88.

Proposal of French Government suggests that they are forgetting Ibn Saud in their desire to erect barrier against return of ex-King Hussein.



No. 186.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 18, 1924.*

LETTER arrived here signed by Wahabis' leader in Mecca, Khalid-bin-Luwai (himself a shereef), promising people of Jeddah security of life and property.

Considerable number of people arrived from Mecca to fetch their families. They state that all is quiet and life normal again.

(Sent to India.)

No. 187.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 20, 1924.*

SIR H. SAMUEL'S telegram No. 319 to Colonial Office, repeated to you No. 366, of 14th October: Situation created by King Hussein's abdication.

Colonial Office have informed Sir H. Samuel that in the event of unprovoked attack upon Transjordan His Majesty's Government will assist Emir Abdullah, and that if authority of Transjordan Government is restored over the Maan area (see my telegram No. 21 of 9th August), His Majesty's Government are prepared to render such assistance as may be practical against unprovoked attack on Maan. Emir Abdullah is being informed of this and invited to concert with Emir Ali for the immediate retrocession of the Maan area to Transjordan.

You should inform Emir Ali that His Majesty's Government are prepared to assist him and Emir Abdullah at once to define the exact frontier between Transjordan and the Hedjaz on the assumption that this frontier crosses the Hedjaz railway at or near Mudawara and leaves Transjordan access to the sea at Akaba.

Ibn Saud is being warned through the Resident at Bushire that His Majesty's Government will regard unprovoked aggression upon Transjordan within boundary defined in Foreign Office telegram No. 35 of 18th November, 1923, as an attack upon territory for which they are responsible, and will continue, as in the past, to reserve to themselves full liberty of action to deal as they think best with such aggression.

Sir H. Samuel has been instructed to inform ex-King Hussein that while His Majesty's Government raise no objection to his going to Akaba, they do not guarantee his personal safety there.

The above-mentioned message to Ibn Saud does not mean that His Majesty's Government are necessarily bound in case of attack to defend town of Akaba itself, or that Akaba will ultimately fall within Transjordan. This latter point is left for subsequent negotiation.

High Commissioner for Irak has been informed that His Majesty's Government will raise no objection if Government of Irak invite ex-King Hussein to go there. They would prefer this to his going to Palestine or Amman.

No. 188.

*Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 22.)*

(No. 9. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Damascus, October 21, 1924.*

SHEIKH SULEIMAN informs me that since beginning of this month secret intention has been forming in Damascus among most important Moslems to proclaim Sultan of Nedj Caliph.

The movement includes Sheikh Bedreddin [?and] Mufti, and they claim that when signal is given all Syrian Moslems will follow the lead. In reply to their proposals Sheikh Suleiman says that he has hitherto replied that he must refer matter to Nejd.

I have advised him to act accordingly, emphasising absolute necessity of avoiding a precipitate [?appeal] of that importance, and also danger which would result from assumption of Caliphate by Sultan of Nejd before Eastern Moslem world agrees. I think that he will write in the above sense to-day, obtaining reply in about a month.

French authorities are probably not only aware of movement, but also backing it. Although Sheikh Suleiman thinks that it has been kept secret from French authorities, this is unlikely, particularly as I learn from reliable source than an ex-Turkish officer closely in touch with pro-French officer Said Abdulkader left for Nejd a fortnight ago supposedly with letters containing French and/or Turkish proposals on the subject of Caliphate. I will pursue such discreet enquiries as are possible; pending receipt of instructions I do not propose to sound French authorities.

In view of very exceptional recent pressure on Sultan of Nejd and developments in Caliphate question above mentioned, I request instructions by telegraph supplementing those contained in your telegram of 7th October.

(Sent to Beirut, Aleppo and Jeddah.)

No. 189.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 23.)*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 22, 1924.*

ALI will probably abdicate and leave Jeddah in the course of next day or two. (Sent to India, Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

No. 190.

*Mr. MacDonald to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell (Damascus).*

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 23, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 9 of 21st October: Reported movement to invite Ibn Saud to proclaim himself Caliph.

You should be most careful to take no part in these intrigues, and, if consulted, you should be guided by the policy laid down in Foreign Office circular telegram No. 7 of 13th March.

(Repeated to Beirut, No. 20; Aleppo, No. 10; and Jeddah, No. 42.)

[E 9344/7624/91]

No. 191.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 27.)*

(No. 99.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, October 11, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report in continuation of the report on the capture of Taif which I sent with my despatch No. 95, dated the 21st September.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 191.

*Report on Capture of Taif.*

THE previous report followed the Taif incident up to the 21st September. At that time a heterogeneous force under the Amir Ali was moving out with the object of retaking Taif. Local scepticism as to its chances of success was justified. On the morning of the 25th September reliable information was received that the Hedjaz force had been completely defeated, and that the Amir Ali was again near, if not actually in, Mecca, and later in the day King Hussein telegraphed a message to His Majesty's Government which indicated that the situation was critical. A summary of the message was telegraphed to His Majesty's Government, who replied defining their attitude so clearly that King Hussein must at last have realised that their intervention in his favour was out of the question. He sent another telegram, it is true, but there was no conviction in it. One of the reasons advanced as justifying



the intervention of His Majesty's Government was: "Article 4 of the treaty which Naji-al-Asil brought says that I am to be with his Excellency Ibn Saud in the state which existed before the Arab revolt." The reference seems to be to one of the unauthorised additions which he made to the treaty in May 1923, before he published the famous declaration stating that a treaty with His Majesty's Government had been signed.

2. While King Hussein was trying to secure the help of His Majesty's Government against the Wahabis, and incidentally against his people, the people were thinking again of the possibility of getting assistance from some foreign Power, preferably Great Britain, against the Wahabis, and incidentally against King Hussein. Two of the leading merchants in Jeddah—one the president of the municipality, the other the nephew of the kaimakan—called on me, separately, to enlist the sympathy of His Majesty's Government. They asked for a British protectorate or mandate over the Hedjaz, or for any form of assistance His Majesty's Government liked to give, and they showed some indignation when I answered in the terms of the reply sent by His Majesty's Government to King Hussein. The local point of view is, of course, that under the Turks they had not to worry about defence, and, in spite of a certain amount of tyranny, they were pretty free to follow their profession of exploiting pilgrims; that His Majesty's Government drove away the Turks and established for them a régime which was far more oppressive and which involved the disagreeable responsibility of defence against foreign aggression, and that, consequently, His Majesty's Government ought to defend them when their own defence had broken down, and at the same time to liberate them from King Hussein—the immediate cause of the Wahabi attack. They are quite unable to think of the change of régime as one of many results of the world war, and of enthusiasm for an Arab as opposed to a Turkish Government, or for independence itself, I have discovered not a trace.

3. Thrown on their own resources, the notables of Jeddah, supported by nearly all the leading men of Mecca, who by this time had fled to the coast to escape the Wahabis, began again to talk loudly about deposing King Hussein. With the second and final defeat of the Hedjaz forces civil government in Mecca collapsed, and thousands of people, including nearly all the officials, fled to Jeddah—most of them, for lack of transport, on foot. It seemed possible then that, although King Hussein, surrounded by a band of personal slaves and Syrian and Iraqi officers, was swearing to resist to the death, he might possibly abdicate to escape from the humiliating position in which he stood between the Wahabi attack and the defection of his whole people. I accordingly asked His Majesty's Government, on the 27th September, whether I was right in assuming that, if King Hussein was replaced by the Amir Ali, either with or without the former's consent, the Amir Ali should be treated as the *de facto* head of the Government, but should not be recognised formally as ruler of the country. It seemed necessary to adopt this policy in view of the intention attributed to Ibn Saud to get rid of the Hussein family altogether. Another reason, not mentioned at the time, was the certainty that many of the notables were not enthusiastic supporters of Ali, and would prefer a provisional Government unconnected with King Hussein or any of his sons.

His Majesty's Government telegraphed instructions in the sense proposed on the 30th September.

4. On the 3rd October the Amir Ali came to Jeddah and summoned a meeting of the leading men of Jeddah and Mecca. He had been sent by his father, he said, to explain that the situation was desperate, and to say that the King was prepared to resign if they thought that that would improve the situation. The notables asked for an hour to make up their minds, and, after some discussion, they got into communication with King Hussein by telephone and telegraph and asked him to abdicate in favour of the Amir Ali. What happened then is related in the letters from the notables to this agency, which are sent as an appendix to this report. At first, King Hussein said he would accept anyone but Ali as his successor, his ostensible reason being that, from the point of view of the Wahabis, there was no essential difference between him and his son, while Ali, who had tried in vain to secure promises of support from the British agent, and, it is believed, from other foreign representatives too, refused the offer of the throne, on the ground that the situation was hopeless and that he had no desire to be a King for two or three days. The notables could think of no alternative to Ali's accession but foreign intervention, and late at night on the 3rd October a deputation, composed of four of the leading men in Jeddah—the kaimakan, the Director-General of Customs, the President of the Municipality

and the Director of Education—came to the agency, followed by a large crowd of supporters, to repeat their useless demand. They stated that the Amir Ali had gone back on his promise to accept the throne if his father should abdicate, and that they had no policy but to throw themselves on the mercy of His Majesty's Government. They asked for a British protectorate or mandate over the Hedjaz; failing that, for the intervention of His Majesty's Government to prevent the occupation of Mecca by Ibn Saud; failing that, that, if they wrote to the Wahabis offering to negotiate, I would send with their communication a letter asking the Wahabis to halt or to refrain from massacre, or would intervene in some other way "in the name of humanity." Finding that I was unable to accede to any of these demands, they asked me to request the instructions of His Majesty's Government. I replied that I kept His Majesty's Government informed of everything affecting their interests, and in the execution of my duty I should report what had now occurred, but that, the policy of His Majesty's Government being shaped in relation to the Hedjaz, and not to any particular ruler or form of Government the Hedjaz might have, there was no reason to expect that it would undergo the least change. The deputation then went back to the Amir Ali and again pressed him to take the throne. The negotiations went on until midday on the 4th October, when he at last gave in. The committee of notables thereupon sent out to the Wahabi leader a letter repudiating King Hussein and offering to negotiate, and despatched a telegram (a copy is given in the appendix) appealing for the intervention of the Moslem world.

5. There is little reliable information to be had in regard to the Wahabi forces. When Ali came to Jeddah on the 3rd October he told me that the Wahabis were quite close to such forces as he had, *i.e.*, at Arafat, or nearer, and that there was nothing to prevent their entering Mecca. There is no news of a further advance, and the general belief is that the main body of Wahabis is back in Taif. The leaders are believed to be Sultan-al-Din and the Shereef Khalid. The latter was employed under King Hussein, but fled to Nejd some years ago, in consequence, it is said, of a quarrel with the Amir Abdullah, who struck him on the mouth with his shoe. He became Governor of Tarabah on its capture by the Wahabis, and is said to be Governor of Taif now. There are constant rumours that Ibn Saud is at Tarabah, or even at Taif, and this is supported by fairly reliable information that the seven men who had been held to ransom have been released and are allowed to move about freely in Taif. It may be mentioned here that the detention of these men is believed to have been a method of recovering from King Hussein a sum of £7,000 which he extorted from a Wahabi who used to act as banker in Mecca for his compatriots. The ransom was never sent out to Taif, because King Hussein refused to allow any messenger to pass out to the hostile force.

6. There is some hope that if the Wahabis take Mecca they will behave better than they did at Taif. In the five weeks that have elapsed since the capture of Taif, Ibn Saud has had time to receive the news and to issue orders, and it is not to be expected that he will allow indiscriminate massacre and pillage in the Holy City. It is not known whether the two letters despatched to the Wahabi leader in Taif by this agency ever reached him; the messenger, a reliable Bedouin who is habitually entrusted with large sums of money, has not returned. When the Hedjaz force was finally defeated, a letter addressed to the Wahabi leader informing him that he would be held responsible for any harm to the lives or property of foreign subjects was drawn up and signed by the British, French, Italian, Dutch and Persian representatives, and each of them has sent out one or more copies (I have despatched copies by four different hands) in the hope that at least one may reach its destination.

7. The situation is better to this extent, that the delay has given many foreign subjects time to leave the country. Some 600 Indian pilgrims (including 150 destitutes from previous years) left for Bombay on the 1st October, and about 200 more who have since arrived from Medina should leave for India on the 15th October. A party of 150—the last of the season, it is hoped—arrived at Ma'an from Medina a few days ago, and the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, has been informed that they would do well to go home via Suez without touching Jeddah, where they might have to wait weeks for a steamer. About 400 pilgrims, of whom many were British Malays, left for Singapore on the 6th October, and some 500 more will sail on the 13th October. And, finally, 850 Takrunis (exclusive of children under 6) have been sent to Suakin by dhow at the expense of the Nigerian Repatriation Fund. If it came to an evacuation after the 15th October, we should have only British residents to deal with, with perhaps a few pilgrims who have not yet reached Jeddah from Mecca or Medina. Fortunately, the possibility of evacuation seems far more remote



than it did a month ago. Not only does the sacking of Mecca seem less probable, but the tribes near Jeddah seem less likely to give trouble. These tribes have no longer such obvious cause to pillage Jeddah, because the authorities here have very wisely abandoned King Hussein's senseless blockade policy, and are allowing the Bedouin to buy food-stuffs freely. Moreover, the flight to Jeddah of all the shereefs, many of whom had personal tribal followings of some importance, has given the small tribes of this neighbourhood a respect for the Wahabis which tends to keep them quiet. And, finally, the British and French warships, which have recently been joined by two Italian "sloops" (formerly British trawlers), have certainly had a stabilising influence. There is no longer a daily panic at the rumour that H.M.S. "Clematis" is going to bombard the town, but the knowledge that the ships are there helps to maintain law and order. The local authorities, whose police and watchmen are inadequate in quality, if not in number, have not hesitated to use the presence of the ships to give them moral authority, and have let it be known—without authorisation, it is hardly necessary to say—that, if a single foreign subject is injured, Jeddah will be shelled by the warships immediately. It is satisfactory to be able to state that, in spite of the waves of panic which have swept over the town at frequent intervals, law and order have been maintained very well indeed.

8. It is early to make any serious forecast about the new régime. Indeed, the new régime can hardly be said to have begun, since King Hussein is still in the country. There are signs of his departure to-day or to-morrow, but, until he has actually left, Ali will continue to be a cypher and no serious work will be begun. There is a feeling of great satisfaction at King Hussein's abdication, to the relief at the removal of a heavy despotism being added the conviction that the chief, if not the only, obstacle to good relations with Ibn Saud has been removed. Ali's position is not enviable. He seems to have been put into power by a small group of officials in opposition to the wishes of a strong party which did not want to commit the country to continued support of the shereefian family, and even his supporters would probably sacrifice him if he proved to be displeasing to Ibn Saud or if he refused to follow their advice. As to the latter, there is little fear, for Ali is as weak and irresolute as his father is obstinate and determined.

9. If the external menace is removed and the Hedjaz settles down under King Ali, the pilgrim will continue to be fleeced, but rather to satisfy the merchants, the pilgrim guides and the Bedouin than to fill the treasury; on the whole, he may gain a little financially. In matters other than financial there is more hope of improvement; e.g., the stupid practice of imposing quarantine at Jeddah on pilgrims who have already been quarantined at Kamaran was due solely to King Hussein's spite, and may be expected to pass away with him, and no future Government is likely to prevent foreign shipping firms from effecting at their own expense such valuable improvements as erecting lighthouses and dredging the harbour channel. Politically, the change may be of advantage to His Majesty's Government, provided that the new régime is not so weak as to leave pilgrims worse off than in King Hussein's reign. Ali is probably less displeasing to the Moslem world than his father, and his attitude towards the Caliphate, viz., that the choice should be left to the Moslem world, is conciliatory. This repudiation of King Hussein's Caliphate policy was one of the conditions on which Ali was offered the throne. Two others were that he should be a constitutional ruler, and that he should be King of the Hedjaz only, i.e., that he should disinterest himself in other Arab countries. It may well be doubted whether anything approaching constitutional government can be established in the Hedjaz, but to cease to be a nuisance to the mandatory Powers who are responsible for Palestine, Irak and Syria should be easy. It will be all the easier for the flight from Mecca of certain Palestinian and Syrian extremists who have fled to their countries of origin, where they will be safe under the protection of the mandatory Powers they have so often cursed.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 191.

*Hedjaz Notables to Consul Bullard.*

(Translation.)

October 3, 1924.

WE beg to inform your Excellency that, in view of the present state of the country, due to continued mistakes of policy and administration, the fact that danger is surrounding us on every side and the proved impotence of the Central Government, the whole Hedjaz people agreed to request King Hussein to abdicate his position.

It would then have been possible to take the necessary steps, and enter into communication with those concerned, for the safety of the country and ending the slaughter of innocent victims. King Hussein, however, is opposed to abdication, and has not acceded to our request many times repeated. We therefore have to inform you that he is personally responsible for whatever may befall the country and its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the rights of humanity demand intervention to safeguard the lives of the innocent and the conclusion of an agreement with the Emir Ibn Saud which will protect both life and property.

With respects.

The delegates of the entire Hedjaz people:

SULAIMAN KABIL.  
MUHAMMAD TAWIL.  
ABDULLAH ALI REZA.  
SALEH-BIN-ABU BAKR SHATA.  
FATEH-BIN-SULTAN.  
MUHAMMAD ALAVI.  
BAKRI KAZZAZ.

Enclosure 3 in No. 191.

*Hedjaz Notables to Consul Bullard.*

(No. 6.)

(Translation.)

October 3, 1924.

IN continuation of our letter No. 1 of to-day's date, we have the honour to inform you that the last communications exchanged with King Hussein are as follows:—

"His Majesty King Hussein, Mecca.

"The situation is very grave and there is no time for negotiations. If you will not abdicate in favour of the Amir Ali, we yet beg, in the name of humanity, that your Majesty will abdicate so as to allow the nation to form a provisional Government as a means of stopping the bloodshed of innocent Moslems. It will then be possible to enter into negotiations for our safety with whomever it may appear necessary, and later a successor can be appointed in accordance with our wishes. If you delay in complying with our request, upon your head be the blood of the Moslems. We beg you to incline before the opinion of the nation."

His Majesty's reply to the above:—

"I have already told you that I am perfectly disposed to abdicate. You should, however, with the delegates sign an official copy of the last communication and in this manner make your request."

Whereupon we repeated to His Majesty our first telegram, signed by the representatives of the people, and still await a reply, which will be communicated to your Excellency in due course.

With respects.

The delegates of the people of the Hedjaz:

SULAIMAN KABIL.  
ABDULLAH ALI REZA.  
MUHAMMAD TAWIL.  
SALEH-BIN-ABU BAKR SHATA.  
EL FATEH-BIN-SULTAN.  
BAKRI KAZZAZ.

Enclosure 4 in No. 191.

*Hedjaz Notables to Consul Bullard.*

(No. 11.)

(Translation.)

October 3, 1924.

WITH reference to our communication No. 6 of to-day's date, we have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following two telegrams have just been received from His Majesty King Hussein at Mecca, and from them it will be clear

[13028]



to your Excellency that His Majesty definitely abdicates his material and moral power:—

*First telegram. No. 68.*

"Willingly and thankfully. This has been my principal desire, which I have not ceased to express from the days of the Arab revolt until now. Only a few minutes ago I declared to you that I was prepared to accede with great pleasure, provided that you appoint some person other than Ali. I was expecting this to happen quickly. I anticipate it with delight, for I have no wish beyond the welfare of the country, its tranquillity and whatever seems necessary for its happiness."

*Second telegram. No. 69.*

"No objection. I have already announced to you that I agree to abdicate with great pleasure, and that I have no wish other than the tranquillity of the country, its welfare and happiness. You should now appoint some officials here to take over the country and administration from me with all possible speed, and I will then leave at once. If you delay taking over and any untoward event befalls, then you will be responsible. You have with you many shereefs; send one of them or someone else. In this connection, if my son Ali the Amir will accept the position from you, then in like manner appoint him yourselves direct."

The delegates of the entire Hedjaz people:

ABDULLAH ALI REZA.  
MUHAMMAD TAWIL.  
SULAIMAN KABIL.  
SALEH-BIN-ABU BAKR SHATA.  
BAKRI KAZAZ.  
FATEH-BIN-SULTAN.  
MUHAMMAD SHALHOUT.

Enclosure 5 in No. 191.

*Abdullah Abdel Rahman Serag to Consul Bullard.*

(Translation.)

October 4, 1924.

I BEG to inform your Excellency that, following upon the abdication of His Majesty King Hussein, the nation has recognised his Highness the Amir Ali as constitutional King of the Hedjaz only.

The Acting Prime Minister,  
ABDULLAH ABDEL RAHMAN SERAG.

Enclosure 6 in No. 191.

*Copy of Telegram despatched from Jeddah on October 4, 1924.*

AFTER the complete routing of the whole defending army, and also due to the absolute inability of the Government to defend and protect any longer the lives and properties of the nation, the whole nation of the Hedjaz has been in consequence in revolutionary situation.

As the whole country of the Hedjaz in general, and the two Holy Places in particular, have been now exposed to very grave and critical crisis, and as the Hedjaz is the most holy place in the eye of all the Islamic world, the nation has eventually decided and compelled Shereef Hussein to abdicate his throne and to betake himself to anywhere he likes to live.

In view of the existing disturbed atmosphere of the interior, and also to avoid the threatening revolutions and disturbances throughout the country, the nation has contemplated upon agreeing to the appointment of Amir Ali under the only title of "The King of Hedjaz," and under a constitutional Government, provided that he will fully abide by the decisions of the whole Islamic world pertaining to all the rights and interests of these Holy Places.

The nation has already sent formal despatches to the Imam Ibn Saud requesting him to send his representatives for entering into negotiations.

The nation of the Hedjaz will, after making this public announcement and after taking these precautionary measures, devolve all and singular responsibility on the shoulder of the whole Islamic world in the event of their not hastening to save this holy land and its people by stopping at once the advancing army of Imam Ibn Saud at the last halting stage, and also requesting him to send representatives as quickly as possible to accomplish the negotiations, and taking such effectual and safe actions to protect the country as the urgency of the case may require.

THE NATIONAL PARTY OF THE HEDJAZ, JEDDAH.

To—

His Excellency, President, Turkish Republic, Angora.  
Editor, "Hakmiat Milliah," Angora.  
The Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay.  
The "Islamic Review," Bombay.  
The Editor of the "Chronicle," Bombay.  
The Indian Moslem League, Aligar.  
His Exalted Highness Nizam, Hyderabad.  
Her Highness Begum Bhopal.  
The Central Khilafat Committee, Calcutta.  
Persian Foreign and War Ministers, Tehran.  
His Majesty the Ameer of Afghan, Kabul.  
Sayid Abdulla Dahlan, Singapore.  
Maulai Yousif Sultan, Morocco (White House), Casablanca.  
The Editor of "Tanin," Constantinople.  
The "Times," London.  
The "Matin," Paris.  
Sultan Solo Karta, Java.

No. 192.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 27.)*

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, October 27, 1924.

MY telegram No. 94.

Amir Ali promised to abdicate if people in general demanded this in writing, but by the time demand was presented he had decided to resist Wahabis to the last.  
(Sent to India, Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

No. 193.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, October 28, 1924.

TO a deputation which went to Mecca from Jeddah, Wahabi leader offered general immunity, non-intervention in affairs of Jeddah and retention of all officials. Only condition, Ali should be arrested or forced to leave.

People quite prepared to sacrifice Ali, but he, with small force, composed mainly of elements from outside Hedjaz, no longer under their control.

Wahabis threaten to treat Jeddah like Taif if condition not fulfilled. This is probably bluff, but population alarmed and rich fleeing in all directions. Jeddah should be easy to defend, but reliability of force doubtful. On the other hand, invader never yet met with serious resistance, and might not like to face trenches.

In any case, I do not expect attack to be made before arrival of Ibn Saud.

Philby arrives to-day.

(Sent to Simla, Bushire, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)



No. 194.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, October 31, 1924.*

I HAVE received telegram from Alexandria from Sayyid Talib. He says that Ali has telegraphed telling him that Philby is here and inviting him to come, and he asks me to telegraph my opinion. I am replying by post that I cannot give an opinion and that Philby's is unauthorised.

(Sent to India, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo.)

[E 9556/7624/91]

No. 195.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 3.)*

(No. 102. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, October 20, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 11th-20th October.

2. As Reuter's agent at Jeddah is now allowed to telegraph freely, it has been possible to reduce the number and length of telegrams sent by this agency.

3. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 195.

*Jeddah Report for the Period October 11 to 20, 1924.*

THE short period with which this report deals has been marked by the evacuation of Mecca by the Hedjaz forces and its occupation by the Wahabis, the departure of the ex-King Hussein from Jeddah and the receipt of communications from the Wahabis by people in Jeddah.

2. The letter sent out by the notables was never delivered to the Wahabis; the messenger returned, saying that he had been unable to get through, as the tribes beyond Mecca were in a state of great unrest. Later, the Amir Ali sent out letters, addressed to Ibn Saud, by four messengers. On the 12th October he telegraphed to the foreign representatives that three of his messengers had been arrested and the letters torn up, and that, as it might be deduced from this that the Wahabis intended to fight, he was withdrawing all troops from Mecca so that there might be no excuse for bloodshed in the Holy Places. The evacuation of Mecca was effected on the night of the 12th October, and on the 14th all the Mecca troops reached Jeddah with the Amir Ali.

3. On the 14th October, after a delay which caused the population acute anxiety, the ex-King Hussein left Jeddah on the Hedjaz steamship "Raqmatain." The delay was generally attributed to a desire to seize the throne again if a chance should present itself, but it may have been due to the difficulty of finding an asylum. Ex-monarchs are never welcome guests, and Hussein, with his known views, his activity of mind, his obstinacy, and the passion for clumsy intrigue which he revealed in connection with his assumption of the Caliphate, might daunt the most hospitable Government. He has probably gone to Akaba, but he kept his destination secret until the last moment. His last act was to send to the Acting Prime Minister, with a copy to each of the foreign representatives, a letter protesting against two of the conditions by which the Amir Ali's tenure of the throne has been restricted, viz., that his rule should be constitutional, and that it should be limited to the Hedjaz alone. A copy of this letter is attached as Appendix A. It will be noticed that it contains no reference to the Caliphate. Exactly what the reservation of his rights of opposition and disavowal means it is difficult to say, but it suggests that he does not propose to disinterest himself altogether in Arabian politics.

4. The communications from Ibn Saud and his general Khalid, translations of which are attached as Appendices B and C, have brought great relief to the people here. After the massacre and pillage at Taif and the formidable silence of Ibn Saud for over a month, the assurances were doubly welcome. They cover foreigners as well as Hedjazis, and it therefore matters little whether a letter (see Appendix D) which the Consular Corps had received a day or two earlier is genuine or not. At first it was taken to be authentic, in spite of the absence of seal or signature, but doubt has since been cast upon it. There is, however, proof of an improvement in the conduct of the Wahabis in the release of the seven men (including two Indians) who were held to ransom at Taif. They are all safe and at liberty in Mecca.

5. The assurances received from the Wahabis, and the news that no excesses have been committed in Mecca, have convinced the population of Jeddah and the Mecca refugees that the best policy is to surrender to the Wahabis at once. This policy, however, does not commend itself to the Amir Ali. He was anxious to negotiate, but always, it may be supposed, in the hope that negotiation would result in his retention of the kingship. He cannot be certain of attaining this object if he surrenders, for, though the complaints in Ibn Saud's proclamation are all directed against Hussein, it does not follow that Ibn Saud or the Moslem world would accept Ali even as temporal ruler of the Holy Places. Moreover, Ali is being encouraged to resist by the band of Iraklis and Syrians who are at the head of the Hedjaz army. They may perhaps be influenced by the fact that their occupation would be gone if Ibn Saud became master of the country, but, in any case, they wish to make one last struggle against the Wahabi invasion. They have been encouraged in this policy by the arrival of volunteers from Akaba. Some 400 have arrived, and the Amir Ali says that there are 1,500 altogether. Of these 400, over 100 are Bedouin; Tahsin Pasha, one of the Amir Abdullah's men, who came with them, describes them as Druses. The rest are believed to be from Transjordan. They are well dressed and well fed, and they appear to be pretty well trained.

The proposal of the Amir Ali and his military supporters is to act on the defensive for the present, and meanwhile to try to starve the Wahabis out by prohibiting the despatch of supplies from Jeddah to Mecca, and to endeavour to raise another tribal force. Supplies are already very low in Mecca, because there has been little transport available for food-stuffs during the last month. To keep Mecca supplied from Jeddah requires from 300 to 400 camels a day, but, owing to the camel-drivers' fear of conscription, not more than 100 camel-loads of food-stuffs a day have been sent to Mecca, on an average, since the fall of Taif. If the Amir Ali's force could be relied upon to repulse any attack on Jeddah, the economic blockade of Mecca might be effective. The population of Jeddah, however, are absolutely opposed to this blockade, which they consider will only starve their friends and relatives in Mecca and eventually bring the Wahabis down to Jeddah in a revengeful mood. The Amir Ali and his foreign troops would then, they assume, escape from the country, leaving Jeddah at the Wahabis' mercy. They are in active correspondence with the Wahabis, whom they are assuring of their friendship and their determination not to resist, but it is doubtful whether they can exercise any control over the Amir Ali and his military supporters.

6. Considerable excitement was caused by the announcement by the Amir Ali that Mr. Philby was coming to Jeddah. It was naturally assumed by most of the people here that, as Mr. Philby went to Riyadh, and later to Amman, as a British official, he could only be coming here on an important mission from the British Government, and it may be doubted whether even his own assurances that he comes as a private person will dissipate this suspicion.

R. W. BULLARD.

## Appendix A to Enclosure.

*Translation of a Letter from the ex-King Hussein to the Acting Prime Minister of the Hedjaz.*

I have noted your Excellency's telephonic communication of the 5th October, 1924, addressed to the Kaimakam of the Royal Palace embodying the information that the representatives of the people of Jeddah are desirous of my retirement from the Administration. I have always, from the time of the Arab revolt, expressed my complete willingness to abdicate whenever the people should desire it or it should appear necessary, and all know this to be the case. My wishes and aims are limited



to what is necessary for the public welfare, happiness and complete independence. The actual leadership is of small importance to me provided these ends be attained.

Now they have appointed my son Ali, on condition that the affairs and influence of the Hedjaz Government be restricted to its own territory and that a constitutional form of government be adopted, notwithstanding that the Arab revolt was based, firstly, on the principle of the complete independence of all Arab countries whose boundaries were defined, and, secondly, on the desire to put into force in these sacred lands the laws of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet.

To any limitation of the Hedjaz I make the following objections. At the present moment the Hedjaz is still in negotiations for the independence of Arabs in their countries. Moreover, even without the limitation it can be seen what dangers abound: as witness Ibn Saud's ambition in occupying Hail, the capital of the Amirate of Ibn Rashid, and Jaufr, the country of the Sha'lan family, and his attempt to seize Koweit, his attack on Asir, the principedom of Al A'idh—not to mention his attack on the sacred city of Mecca; the attempt of the Imam of San'a to seize the territory of Ha'id and Tahama belonging to the Shafa'is; the (attack of the) Idrissi on Hodeida and its vicinity, and his [sic] institution of a Constitutional Government whereby the precepts of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet are set at naught even in the holy places and replaced by a secular code. I contend that this restriction of influence is contrary to the laws of Islam, the precepts of religion and the illustrious traditions, both material and moral. Moreover, it is contrary to the principles of our revolt, in which the Hedjaz in particular and the Arabs in general poured out their blood and treasure in their efforts to attain these two honourable and sacred ends.

You are therefore requested to convey to the above committee, and every one else whom it may concern, my strong protest, firstly, against the limitation of the influence of the Hedjaz as explained above, for it will assuredly result in the Arabs being divided and deprived of their vital and fundamental rights; secondly, against what is contrary to the rules of the Koran. I hereby reserve my rights of opposition and disavowal, both material and moral, in everything concerning this question.

HUSSEIN.

October 14, 1924.

His Excellency the British Agent, Jeddah.  
(After respects.)

We find it necessary to communicate to you a copy of the above protest made to the Acting Prime Minister of the Hashimite Government and to the Kaimakam of Jeddah.

(Compliments.)

October 14, 1924.

#### Appendix B to Enclosure.

*Summary of a Proclamation by Ibn Saud, dated September 20, 1924, which was received in Jeddah on October 16, 1924.*

The motive prompting the issue of the proclamation is sympathy for the Moslems and a desire for their welfare, both temporal and spiritual. Every effort has been made to induce Hussein-bin-Ali to unite the Arabs, but his character was not to be changed. Evidence of his thoughts is to be found in his acts, which are repugnant, not merely to Moslems, but to non-Moslems too. Instead of following in the steps of his noble ancestors this man neglected the rights of the Holy Place. He has shown the greatest zeal in intriguing against Nejd and its people. In his rashness he even debarred Nejd from fulfilling one of the five Moslem duties, viz., that of performing the pilgrimage—apart from the brutality with which he treated pilgrims in general. Out of reverence for the House of God we refrained from interfering in Hedjaz affairs. Unhappily, we did not find similar forbearance in him. When he was in Transjordan recently his aims became clear to the Moslems, for he demanded the partition of Nejd and thereby made us despair of attaining Arab unity. Ibn Saud is unaware of having done anything to provoke this rancour; he has no desire for the vanities of Hussein or of his people, whether in regard to the kingdom or to the Caliphate; his sole object is that the word of God may be supreme and his religion exalted, and that the honour of the Arab world may be safeguarded.

Islamic zeal and Arab patriotism therefore led Ibn Saud and his people to endeavour, at the risk of loss of life and property, to make the religion of God supreme and to defend the sacred place. Ibn Saud has sent a force of Moslems to occupy Taif in order to be near and to have an opportunity to come to an understanding with his brethren. He wished his readers to know his views; if they agree, well; if they reject them, he is excused in the sight of God and of the Moslems. He swears by God that he will do nothing contrary to Moslem law, particularly in the Holy Place. His message to the people of Mecca and its dependencies, the notables, the townsmen in general, the residents, and the refugees (i.e., visitors) from all countries, is this: he promises them that their lives and property will be safe, and that they will be respected as the sanctity of the Holy Place requires. He will not treat them in a manner displeasing to them, and nothing shall be done to them, either now or in the future, except in accordance with law. He will do his best to make the Holy Place safe, as also its inhabitants, its roads and its pilgrims. He will not appoint as Governor anyone whom they dislike. He does not propose to treat them as vassals, but with advice, security and comfort. The question of the Holy Places will be left to the consultation of the Moslems. Nothing will be done in them which might injure them or their honour or their people, but only that which is agreed upon by the Moslems and accepted by Moslem law.

The present letter is his bond before God and the Moslems, and he gives his promise before God in regard to all that is written above. Indeed, he hopes to perform even more than he has written.

God guide us all, &c.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

#### Appendix C to Enclosure.

*From Khalid-bin-Mansur to Muhammad Tawil, Suleiman Kabil, Abdullah Zainal, Muhammad Nasif, and all the People of Jeddah.*

Greetings to all the true servants of God!

Concerning Hussein Pasha and his son Ali: you ought to have seized them because they carried away the treasury of the Moslems and the property belonging to the people and to you. It is hoped that Allah will (?) And you, all the people of Jeddah and the refugees (or visitors) therein, you are under the protection of God and of the Imam Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, and our protection is over your lives and property.

Peace be on him who follows the right path.

(Seal)

KHALID-BIN-MANSUR-BIN-LUWAI.

October 16, 1924.

P.S.—We have a letter from the Imam to the people of Mecca and Jeddah which we will send you.—KHALID.

#### Appendix D to Enclosure.

*From the Leaders of the Wahabi Armies to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, the Italian Consul, the Representative of the (French) Republic, the Representative of the King [sic] of Holland and the Persian Vice-Consul.*

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!

Your letter has been received and noted. It is not hidden from you that we Arabs have no designs on your property or your subjects. Our object is to fight him who (or those who) stood between us and that house which God has created as a means of reward and a place of sanctuary to the people. It is the honour of all Arabs, and we will, D.V., devote our property and our lives to its protection. The people and the residents of Mecca are safe from harm both in property and in person. We have no intention to attack Jeddah and its neighbourhood. If any attack (or encroachment) should be made on any part of it, let us know and we will prevent [sic] it. This is for your information.

The prayers of God be on Mahomet and on his family and his friends.

October 14, 1924.



No. 196.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 5.)*

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, November 5, 1924.*

PROCLAMATION by Ibn Saud, dated 16th October, in reply to telegram announcing abdication of King Hussein and election of Ali received here on 3rd November. In spirit it resembles the earlier one, but it says definitely that neither King Hussein nor any of his sons can be allowed to exercise sovereignty over the Hedjaz, and that anyone who helps them does so at his own risk.

(Sent to India, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Bushire.)

No. 197.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 5.)*

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, November 5, 1924.*

UNDATED letter, addressed to Consular Corps, sealed by two Wahabi leaders in Mecca, received 3rd November. They repeat that they have no designs on foreign subjects, but point out that Ali is "intriguing" against them and getting tribes to stop passage of supplies. They say: "If you are in a position to remove him from Jeddah, remove him; if not, set your subjects apart and inform us where they are, and we shall know what to do"; and they ask for speedy reply.

We have replied, taking note of assurances, asserting neutrality of our Governments and our inability to intervene, and confirming warning conveyed in our official letter.

(Sent to India.)

No. 198.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 10.)*

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, November 10, 1924.*

AMIR ALI was confident that he had won important Harb tribe, but these never reliable people now most unlikely to assist him as they have been heavily defeated at Asfan on Mecca-Rabigh road.

Several volunteers from Palestine and Transjordanian resigned, alleging enlistment under false pretences, bad conditions, &c. Others will probably follow.

Rabigh and Kurfudah have gone to Wahabis.

No supplies sent from here to capital for a fortnight. No news of arrival of Ibn Saud at Mecca.

Circular to same addresses as my telegram circular No. 65.

[E 9974/7624/91]

No. 199.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 17.)*

(No. 105.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, October 30, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 21st-30th October.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 199.

*Jeddah Report for October 21-30, 1924.*

(Secret.)

THE correspondence between the people of Jeddah and the Wahabis culminated in the despatch of a deputation to Mecca. According to the report which the deputation brought back, the Wahabi general, Khalid, offered the most handsome terms. The only condition he laid down was that the Amir Ali should either be seized or forced to leave the country; if that condition was complied with, Jeddah had nothing to fear; all the officials would be maintained in their posts, and not only would no harm be done to the people, but Khalid would not even send Wahabi troops to Jeddah, but would leave the town to govern itself; but if they failed to seize Ali or to force him to leave, the Wahabis would take Jeddah by force, and would treat the town as they treated Taif. This message was only what was to be expected; Khalid would naturally wish to secure Jeddah as he secured Mecca, without fighting. The threat of frightfulness was very likely bluff, but it was taken at its face value at Jeddah, where the population fell into a state of abject fright. This feeling was intensified when Ali finally announced his determination to fight. The leading men, stimulated by Khalid's message and by a telegram from Ibn Saud's secretary at Bahrein, saying that Ibn Saud would never make peace so long as Hussein or his sons ruled in the Hedjaz, pointed out to Ali that his presence alone stood in the way of peace, and he promised to abdicate and leave the country if they would make the demand in writing; but when the demand, signed by everyone of importance, was presented, he went back on his promise. In his decision to resist he has been encouraged, as was stated in the last report, by the Bagdadi and Syrian officers and by the arrival of reinforcements from Transjordanian and the Druse country. Other factors which have contributed to the decision are the constant encouragement he receives from the ex-King Hussein and the Amir Abdullah, the hope that something will come of Mr. Philby's visit, the arrival of a stock of ammunition from Europe and the discovery of a Turkish officer who is believed to possess the secret of making trenches.

2. Acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government, I informed the Hedjaz Government that Mr. Philby's visit was not authorised by them and that he has no authority to negotiate in their name. They replied that they quite understood this: Mr. Philby had asked if he might come as a friend, and they could not refuse. This does not prevent their representing the visit, privately, as authorised by His Majesty's Government and as offering, in consequence, high hopes of a successful issue. No one in Jeddah, except perhaps the Amir Ali and his entourage, believes that Mr. Philby comes as a private person, and one cannot blame them for their suspicions. Mr. Philby arrived on the 28th October. He just missed the mail steamer at Suez, and, to avoid a delay of ten days, he came down on a cargo boat, and the Hedjaz Government sent a launch some miles out to sea to take him off. This unusual method of travelling and landing only increased the suspicion attaching to the visit.

3. On the 21st October the Khedivial mail boat landed 156 cases of ammunition which they had brought over from Port Sudan. The instructions received by the agents were to hand the documents to Messrs. Lazzarini, as representatives, it appears, of the Banco di Roma. The cases were for the Hedjaz Government. They appear to have passed through the hands of Messrs. Thomas Cook and Son at Port Said, where they were disembarked from the steamship "Architect," a Harrison boat. The origin of the consignment is not known.

The Amir Ali assures his supporters that armoured cars, aeroplanes and munitions will reach Jeddah on a (? Dutch) steamer arriving about the 5th November.

Under the direction of the Turkish officer referred to above, a system of trenches has been made all round Jeddah, at a distance varying from a mile to a few hundred yards.

A Hashimite steamer brought about 300 "volunteers" from Akaba on the 29th October.

4. For the native of the Hedjaz, Mecca is now considered much safer than Jeddah. Most of the well-to-do people who had fled to Jeddah have returned to Mecca. The rest, and many inhabitants of Jeddah, would also have gone, but during the last few days the road has become unsafe. Several caravans have been robbed and the people composing them have had to return. These robberies seem to have been instigated, or at least allowed, by the Shereef Muhsin, who acts as intermediary between the Hedjaz Government and the tribes. One of the objects seems to have been to secure the



letters in which the people of Mecca have poured out their treasonable souls to the Wahabis; another, to reward tribes who have promised to help Ali against the Wahabis.

The Mecca road being closed, the population are seeking other ways of escape. Egypt and Eritrea refuse to take refugees, but many have gone to Suakin. Some hundreds of women, children and servants have been sent to the Jeddah quarantine islands, and all the dhows have been retained by the menfolk of these people to take them to the islands at a moment's notice if Jeddah is attacked.

5. The departure of all the Indian pilgrims, and also the cutting of the road, which removes the possibility (already greatly diminished by the reassuring attitude of the Wahabis) of our being flooded by Indians from Mecca, simplifies the evacuation problem very greatly. The special measures which had been taken at Kamaran by the Resident at Aden to provide for the possible arrival of 2,500 British refugees have been cancelled, the quarantine station being able to provide without expansion for some 500 persons; that is about as many as we should have to send there.

6. The Wahabis have committed no offences against life or property in Mecca, but they have prohibited as unnecessary the delivery of theological lectures and the use of all religious books other than the Koran and the Traditions. This policy has had the effect of driving a considerable number of Malay and Javanese theological students away to Jeddah, where they are waiting for steamers to call to take them home. Evidence obtained from these students and from other sources goes to show that the Wahabis have also desecrated various tombs at Mecca which the Sunni regards with veneration.

7. The Amir Ali has stated to various people that when Ibn Saud reaches Mecca he will go there—alone if necessary—and try to come to an arrangement with him, but that he will make no further attempt to negotiate with Khalid. It is unlikely that any attack will be made on Jeddah before Ibn Saud arrives. The Wahabis have met with no serious opposition hitherto, and will hardly attack an entrenched position if they can solve the problem in some other way. Jeddah is the most convenient port for Mecca, but it is not the only port. Trade, if not the pilgrim traffic, could be diverted to, e.g., Rabigh to the north or Lith to the south. Rabigh has gone over to the Wahabis, and there are signs that an attempt will be made to get supplies for Mecca through that place. Supplies at Mecca are already very low and prices high, and a solution must be found soon. What the attitude of the tribes will be is not known. At present they are busy swearing allegiance to both sides. They will probably not make up their minds until the scales have swung definitely one way or the other. Ali is giving them money and grain; the Wahabis could offer them a tax on all grain imported through Rabigh. Ali's resources are believed to be small, and he is collecting very little revenue, the main source—customs dues—having almost dried up, so that he might be outbitten by the Wahabis, who have in addition the prestige of Ibn Saud's name on their side.

R. W. BULLARD,  
Agent and Consul.

No. 200.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 22.)*

(No. 108.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, November 21, 1924.

VOLUNTEERS who came from Akaba are mostly natives of Palestine and Transjordan, with a few score Egyptians. About twenty have applied to me complaining of conditions and saying that they wish to return home. First few cases I took up unofficially with Foreign Secretary, thinking it better for all parties that malcontents should leave, and one or two have been released. Discontent, however general, and vigorous support by agency might cause collapse of volunteers, who are, as it happens, Ali's only hope.

Conditions are certainly bad, and men ought not to have been enlisted, as they maintain that they were without proper contract fixing in particular definite period of service; on the other hand, they came of their own free will and at the expense of Hedjaz Government. I propose to ignore applications for release in future, but to do what I can unofficially to secure improvement of conditions. Is this approved?  
(Repeated to Jerusalem and Cairo.)

No. 201.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 22.)*

(No. 109.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, November 21, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 40.

Ali decided that he would rather not discuss retrocession of Maan at present. He gives as a reason possibility of being accused of bribing non-Moslem Power by a gift of sacred territory.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

No. 202.

[E 10702/7624/91]

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 2.)*

(No. 110.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, December 1, 1924.

CIRCULATE all addresses [sic].

Wahabis have just annihilated, probably on suspicion of treachery, two small tribes within a few miles of Jeddah.

Letter of 1st November from Ibn Saud to consuls about their nationals, if not bluff, indicates intention of attacking Jeddah, unless Ali leaves; Hedjaz Government very short of funds. Spirit of defence poor.

Cable broken a fortnight ago repaired.

No. 203.

[E 10783/7624/91]

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 3.)*

(No. 108. Secret.)

Jeddah, November 8, 1924.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 31st October to the 8th November.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 203.

*Report for the Period, October 31–November 8, 1924.*

(Secret.)

THE Wahabis have made no direct movement against Jeddah, but whether this is because they feel that the town is too strong for them to attack or because they are awaiting Ibn Saud's arrival is not known. They have, however, raided and burned properties belonging to the Shereef Muhsin, towards the upper end of Wadi Fatmah, the fertile valley which cuts the Mecca–Jeddah road at an acute angle. Muhsin, who has much influence with the Bedouin, seems to have coquetted with the Wahabis for some time, but finally to have decided to support Ali, and the destruction of his properties is no doubt an act of revenge. Two places on the Mecca–Rabigh road, Asfan and Daff (near Khalis), inhabited by sections of the Harb tribe, have also been raided, the Harb defeated, and cattle and other supplies secured. Asfan is believed to be under Wahabi occupation. These raids on the Harb are probably to punish them for promising to support Ali, though a desire to establish communication with Rabigh, which has declared for the Wahabis, may be an additional motive. The Harb gave no support to Hussein, but for the last ten days they have been coming to Jeddah to collect money and food-stuffs in exchange for promises of help. As the Harb number, perhaps, 20,000, and stretch from Medina to Mecca, they ought to be able to play a decisive part in the struggle, but the various sections are not united, and the Harb valour has rarely been tried except against unarmed pilgrims. Ali believes that the Harb expect to get more out of his régime than they could ever get



under Ibn Saud, who would probably neither pay them a subsidy nor permit them to rob pilgrims, and that their help can therefore be counted upon, but the severe defeat which they have suffered at the hands of the Wahabis may outweigh vague hopes of financial advantage.

2. The defences of Jeddah are continually being strengthened. The town is now surrounded with wire as well as with trenches. More volunteers have arrived from Akaba, making about 800 in all. Most of them are apparently from Trans-jordania and Palestine. There are also in Jeddah several hundred Juhainah tribesmen of doubtful value from Yambo. Considerable quantities of small-arm ammunition have been received from Akaba; this is probably from Medina, where the Turks held enormous supplies when the war came to an end. The aeroplanes and armoured cars promised by Ali for the 5th November have not appeared, but authentic information has been received that a P. and O. steamer which has just left England is bringing aeroplanes to Jeddah. As there is only one pilot of doubtful value left—a Moslem—they can hardly be of much use. A foreigner here who is in touch with the Russian refugees in Egypt was asked by the local authorities to give them the names of some Russian aeroplane pilots, but, after consulting the Soviet agent, he refused. The Soviet agent objects to the engagement of Russian pilots by the Hedjaz Government, partly because the Soviet Government is neutral, but mainly, it appears, because it tends to damage the Soviet Government's prestige that Russian pilots can be found when no other Europeans will accept employment here.

3. Public opinion in Egypt is said to have been stirred by the receipt of a telegram, signed by several Jeddah people, declaring that the National party has ceased to exist and that recent messages in the name of the party were Government propaganda. The statement made in this telegram is correct. The National party, which was formed to bring about the overthrow of King Hussein, originally included nearly all the principal people of Jeddah, besides most of the important men among the Mecca refugees. It remained a united party until Ali, backed by his military supporters, finally refused to abdicate. The strongest man in Jeddah, Muhammad Tawil, Director-General of Customs, then went over to Ali with a few of his hangers-on; the rest of the party resigned. Any messages addressed to the Moslem world since then have come from Muhammad Tawil, who is now in reality, though not in name, Governor of Jeddah. Public opinion in Jeddah is still almost entirely in favour of surrender to the Wahabis, though only, as I have stated before, because they fear them most and do not believe that Ali can win in the long run. To keep this opinion from becoming articulate, Ali has just arrested four of the leaders—all of them members of the delegation which went to Mecca to see Khalid—but it is unlikely that he will venture to treat them with severity.

4. Ali is already short of money. Hussein took away large sums with him, but, according to Sheikh Fuad, he is professing to have come to the end of it, though all he has spent on behalf of the Hedjaz since he left is £5 a head to a few hundred volunteers. An attempt was made a few days ago to raise a "loan" of £30,000 from the leading Jeddah merchants, but it was dropped, owing to their hostility.

5. Attached to this report are translations of a new proclamation by Ibn Saud, dated the 16th October, and of letters exchanged between the Wahabi leaders in Mecca and the Consular Corps in Jeddah. In spite of the declaration that no son of Hussein can be allowed to exercise sovereignty over the Hedjaz, Ali is confident that when Ibn Saud reaches Mecca he will be able to come to an agreement with him. In this hope he seems to be encouraged by the band of experts he is collecting round him. Among these is Mr. Philby, who is believed to have sent out a letter to Ibn Saud through the latter's general at Mecca, Khalid. They have now been joined by Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib, the late Foreign Secretary to King Hussein, who was on his way to Persia on a special mission when Taif fell, and by Amin Rihani, the American-Syrian, who recently visited all the Arab rulers and is publishing a book about them. Sayyid Talib-al-Nakib, the Basra notable who was deported from Iraq in 1921, has been invited by Ali to come to Jeddah, the presence of Mr. Philby (who considers that, if Iraq had been made a republic with Talib as President, all would have been well there) being held out as an inducement. He telegraphed to me to ask my opinion. A reply was sent by post, saying that, His Majesty's Government being neutral, no opinion could be given, and that Mr. Philby's visit was unauthorised. Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sennusi is apparently trying to get to the Hedjaz from Syria, and there are vague indications, a local official tells me, that Mrs. "Rosita Forbes" has her eye on the situation.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 203.

PROCLAMATION.

*From Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisal (Ibn Saud) to the People of Mecca and Jeddah.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

WE have received a telegram in your name, stating that you have deposed Hussein and appointed his son in his place, and, as we desired that a spirit of mutual understanding should prevail between us and you, we thought fit to write this letter to you in continuation of our first letter.

We do not want to occupy your country or to exercise sovereignty over you, nor is there any hostility between us. You are the inhabitants of the Holy Places, and have a right to our respect and reverence. We absolutely refuse to agree that either Hussein or any of his sons should exercise sovereignty over the Hedjaz; the method of administration of the country will be left for settlement by the Moslem world, whose decision shall be final.

Whoever abandons his allegiance to the Shereef and his sons is under the safety of God, both his life and his goods; but whoever follows a path other than that of the Moslems and assists Hussein and his sons in his [sic] tyranny and injustice, we are excused before the Moslem world if harm befalls them during our attainment of the sacred aim we have in view.

People of Mecca and Jeddah! Our sole aim is to enhance the honour and dignity of Moslems and of Islam, and to make the country free for any visitors who may desire to come.

We beseech Almighty God, &c.

Dated 17.3.1343 (16th October, 1924). Reached Jeddah, the 3rd November, 1924.

Enclosure 3 in No. 203.

*Letters exchanged between the Wahabi Leaders in Mecca and the Consular Corps in Jeddah.*

(i.)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate!

YOU already know that we have nothing to do with your subjects. There remains, however, one point; that is, the stay of Ali-bin-Hussein in Jeddah. He is intriguing against us and our people and inducing the Harb (tribe) to cut the roads and to stop supplies between Mecca and Jeddah.

If you are in a position to remove him from Jeddah, remove him; if not, set your subjects and their dependents apart and inform us where they are, and we shall know what to do.

The proclamation of Sultan Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud in reply to the telegram of the people of Jeddah regarding the deposition of Hussein and the accession of his son Ali says that he (Ibn Saud) does not accept either Hussein or his sons. The proclamation will doubtless reach Jeddah soon. An early reply is desired.

(Sealed)

KHALID-BIN-MANSUR.  
SULTAN-BIN-BAJAD.

(ii.)

(After compliments.)

Jeddah, November 4, 1924.

WE have received your letter. As is not hidden from you, our Governments are maintaining absolute neutrality in the war which is in progress between Nejd and the Hedjaz. We are therefore neutral, too, and unable to intervene in the conflict



in any way whatsoever. We take note of your declaration that you have no designs against our nationals, and we confirm the terms of our first letter in regard to them.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AGENT AND CONSUL.  
ITALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL.  
ACTING FRENCH CONSUL-GENERAL.  
NETHERLANDS VICE-CONSUL.  
ACTING PERSIAN CONSUL.

[E 10826/7624/91]

No. 204.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 3.)*

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 3, 1924.

LETTER to foreign representatives from Sultan of Nejd dated 21st November asks us to send our national flags to Mecca or to set them apart and tell him where they are so that he may send men to guard them; otherwise he is not responsible.

Even if request were legitimate, neither scheme is feasible. While privately taking what steps we can for protecting our national flags we limit our reply to reminder that their safety rests on international law, and to reference to our previous warnings.

Letter contains proclamation to people of Jeddah in the same sense as earlier ones with request to us to communicate it to them. We are returning it to Ibn Saud pleading neutrality.

(Sent to India.)

[E 10826/7624/91]

No. 205.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 113 of the 3rd December: Wahabi attack on Hedjaz: protection of foreigners.

Your action approved.

No. 206.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 10.)*

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 10, 1924

MY telegram No. 113.

In letter dated Mecca, 5th December, Ibn Saud declares that he will not allow any harm to our nationals, but says that, as Jeddah is essential to Mecca and latter may become the scene of hostilities, we should advise our people to keep to their houses if a battle takes place.

This seems satisfactory. We are sending a polite acknowledgement.

(Sent to India.)

[E 11379/7624/91]

No. 207.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 17.)*

(No. 113. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, November 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 9th to 19th November.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 207.

*Report for the Period November 9-19, 1924.*

A TELEGRAM has been received by Ali in reply to a long telegram which he sent to Ibn Saud some weeks ago. Ibn Saud expresses personal respect for Ali, but tells him plainly to leave the Hedjaz and await the decision of the Moslem world, which Ibn Saud says he is ready to accept, whatever it may be. Ali and his supporters think that they would have a better chance if they could get Hussein out of the Hedjaz, but they have not yet been able to make him leave Akaba, where he sits demanding money from a Government which is itself penniless. The Hedjaz Government are hopeful that there will be little or no response to Ibn Saud's call for a Moslem conference at Mecca, and that, in order to escape from a difficult and rather ridiculous situation, he may agree to restore the administration of Mecca to Ali—doubtless with a proviso that no permanent arrangement can be made until the Moslem conference has pronounced its verdict, and that when the conference, which had been fixed for March 1925, before the Wahabis attacked the Hedjaz, eventually assembles at Cairo, it may be content to wrangle about the Caliphate and to leave the temporal power over the holy cities in Ali's hands.

2. Active anti-Hashimite agitation in Jeddah has died down. Five of the ringleaders were arrested and submitted to questioning by the military authorities, who reported that they ought all to be either executed, or imprisoned for life, or condemned to perpetual exile. Ali pretended to be about to exile them, but to allow himself to be persuaded to give them a free pardon on condition that they took the oath of allegiance to him. Ali is not in a position to punish anyone of importance at present, and the accused do not seem to have taken the situation seriously.

3. Ali seems no longer to place reliance on the Harb. Such of the tribesmen as stayed in Jeddah made themselves a nuisance with brawling and robbing, and all of them have now been sent away. Some are said to be guarding the road, but they are unlikely to do anything more valiant than they are doing at present, viz., robbing the few Javanese and Malay pilgrims who are driven by hunger to make the journey to Jeddah. It is now quite certain that the defeat of the Harb by the Wahabis at Asfan was very severe and that the Harb are cowed by it. The leading sheikh of the Harb, Ibn Asim, was killed. The Wahabis, too, it is believed, had considerable losses, but then the Wahabis do not fear death, whereas it makes no appeal to the Harb.

4. More serious than the defection of the Harb is the discontent among the volunteers who came from Akaba. Several score of them are Egyptians—relies, it is said, of an Egyptian labour corps which was disbanded in Palestine. The Hedjaz Government are trying to invent an excuse for sending away twenty or thirty of them without letting it appear that they are giving way to the men's desire to go. But it is not only Egyptians who are discontented. About fifteen Palestinians have come to the agency with complaints; they are ill, and there is no doctor and no drugs; they were promised £5 a month and have received only £3 10s. or £4; their pay is overdue; their quarters are bad; their officers are brutal; and so on. Hitherto I have sent them along to the Foreign Secretary with a card and have talked to him about it unofficially, but the movement is becoming serious. The men all declare that they did not sign a contract, and they therefore claim, with some reason, that they are entitled to leave when they have worked off a month's pay, especially as the second month's pay, which ought to have been forthcoming at the beginning of the second month, is overdue. It is certain that this discontent is fairly general. This is not surprising, for, even if the conditions were good and the pay regular, Palestinians might be forgiven for unwillingness to fight for a country which refuses to fight for itself. It seems probable that the volunteer army will crumble away of itself, or that, if the Wahabis attack before disintegration is complete, it will give way at once.

It will be remembered that it was mainly the arrival of the first party of these volunteers which induced Ali to abandon his intention to leave Jeddah to the Wahabis.

5. The aeroplanes are expected to arrive from England in a few days. The authorities have managed to get into direct touch with some Russians in Egypt and persuaded four of them to come to Jeddah for air work. One is a pilot, the other three are mechanics. The pilot, Shirokov, and at least one of the mechanics, Shatkovski, have served in the Hedjaz Air Service before.

[13028]

2 A 4



6. A few Javanese and two Malays have arrived from Mecca during the last few days. Grain and flour are very expensive there, and not always obtainable at any price. Many Javanese and Malays would like to come to Jeddah, but they would have to leave their effects behind, as no camel-driver will venture to take his beast inside the Jeddah lines, and to travel without their money for fear of being robbed on the way. The Consular Corps are trying to devise a scheme by which caravans can come down under Wahabi escorts to within safe distance of the Jeddah lines, but the negotiations to this end are complicated at the outset by the fact that the Hedjaz Government have no control over the tribes, who are supposed to be their allies, and little reliance on their "regular" troops.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 11549/32/44]

No. 208.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)*

(No. 920.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, December 16, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 1240 of the 28th November, in which you enquire whether the Sheikh-es-Senussi may have been entrusted by the Turkish Government with some mission in Arabia. I regret to say that I have no direct and precise information on this point, but of course I shall not fail to report to you anything that may transpire in the future in regard to the sheikh's relationship to Angora.

2. Meanwhile, however, and arguing on purely general grounds of policy, I am disinclined to believe that any serious mission has been entrusted to Sayyid Ahmed. Since my return here this autumn I have had the impression that Turkish interest in affairs outside their own boundary has become of secondary importance only, and that Angora is concerning itself almost exclusively with its own native politics. It is true that within the last few days your own harmonious conversations at Paris and at Rome have filled the press, and perhaps, too, Government circles, with the fear that a strong Allied front is to be re-established inimical to Turkish interests, but this has not yet, in my opinion, affected what I regard as the present policy of Mustafa Kemal, namely, to keep aloof from any foreign complications. I will venture to quote in confirmation one or two remarks recently made to me. The Polish Minister, complaining from his own point of view of the torpor of Turkish foreign policy, illustrated his theme by saying that Angora had completely neglected all its interests in Transcaucasia, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. Dr. Adnan Bey, back for a few days in Constantinople, and talking to me about his former connection with me through the delegation, said: "Up in Angora now we take no interest in foreign affairs." M. Kral, the Austrian Minister, who has just spent a fortnight in the capital, recounting to me his experiences and impressions, said that Angora has completely dismissed from its mind all thought about Arabia and the Caliphate. Religious affairs, he said, interest them only from the secular point of view held by practical men dealing with an administrative problem, and just as politically they have thought much (though not deeply) of the French revolution, so in religious affairs they are thinking of Luther, Wycliffe and the Protestant reformation. M. Kral having spent much of his life in Turkey in the ex-Imperial Austrian consular service and speaking Turkish fluently, I rather value his opinion. Finally, I will quote Sir W. Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation, who has just spent three days in Angora. Lots of people told him that pan-Islamism is as dead as Abdul Hamid, and that they were looking forward to a settlement of the Mosul question with pleasure in order to cultivate better relations with His Majesty's Government. This is the common stock in trade of Turks talking to Englishmen; but Yunus Madi, a henchman of the President's, a violent Nationalist, and editor of the "Jumhouriet," the organ of the extremists of the Popular party, took Sir William's breath away by saying that Turks do not care in the slightest for Irak; that they would accept the League's verdict, whatever it is; and that they were very glad to have the League at hand to extricate them from a painful position without any loss of face.

3. So much for Turkish policy of the moment in general; but I do not wish to convey an exaggerated impression. If it is as I surmise, it is because the Turkish authorities are conscious of their own weakness and of elements in the Arab situation still unfavourable to themselves. I do not suggest that they have abandoned

definitely and finally all ambition to regain influence in some form or other over the Arab lands formerly subject to them, but they regard such ambition as a thing for the more or less remote future, to be thought of but not talked about or acted upon. Meanwhile, I think it likely that they would try to guard carefully but unostentatiously any outlying pawn in the Arab field, though they would hardly wish to push it on to an attack. When missions of disgruntled Mahometans from abroad come to Turkey, Angora, laic as it is, will be unwilling to turn them down completely, and rather than do so may allow itself to be drawn into a certain amount of minor intrigue. But this, I think, will for some time yet be in spite of, and not in accordance with, policy.

4. As to Sheikh Ahmed, I notice there are plenty of tales from Syria of his having been given a mission by Angora. Here a story is current that he was detected in treasonable correspondence with Prince Selim at Beirut, and that the Turkish Government gave him £T. 2,000 and told him to clear out. Of the two I am rather inclined to believe the latter.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Beirut and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.



## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 5825/1354/65]

No. 209.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Kellogg.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, July 17, 1924.*

HIS Majesty's Government have given their attentive and sympathetic consideration to the draft convention respecting the British mandate in Palestine enclosed in your Excellency's note of the 30th April, and I am now happy to inform you that they accept, subject to certain minor textual amendments, the United States Government's draft of the convention, with the exception of the second half of article 6, dealing with the privileges to be accorded to United States consular officers in Palestine. His Majesty's Government regret that they do not see the necessity for the insertion in the convention of any such stipulation as that proposed, since the Palestine Administration have every intention of treating United States consular officers in as favourable a manner as the consular representatives of other States.

2. As regards the remainder of the draft, I beg leave to suggest certain slight alterations in the wording to avoid all risk of ambiguity. It would be preferable that the second paragraph of the preamble should be amended to read: "... Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles." Article 1 would also be clearer if it were worded: "Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States consent to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the mandate recited above." The first half of article 6 might with advantage be altered to: "... and conventions which are or may be in force between the United States and Great Britain and the provisions of any treaties which are or may be in force. ..." Lastly, I suggest that the final sentence of article 8 should begin: "The present convention shall take effect ..."

3. As regards the penultimate paragraph of your note, His Majesty's Government agree that the present convention shall be applicable to such territory as may be under British mandate to the east as well as to the west of the River Jordan. They regret, however, that they cannot concur in the interpretation put by the United States Government on article 7 of the draft convention as regards changes in the administration of Transjordan, as it is essential that they be allowed latitude to make changes in the administration of that territory in such manner as may appear necessary, provided that such action does not conflict with the terms of the mandate.

4. The concluding paragraph of your note dealt with the question of most-favoured-nation treatment. I desire to assure the United States Government that American nationals in Palestine will receive most-favoured-nation treatment, but as no exchange of notes has yet taken place as regards the proposed assurances to be given to the Italian Government, I regret that His Majesty's Government are not in a position to give the specific assurance asked for in the last sentence of your note.

I have, &amp;c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 6032/202/44]

No. 210.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir O. Russell (Vatican).*

(No. 152.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 17, 1924.*

I DULY received your despatch No. 90 of the 26th ultimo, enclosing a copy of a note from the Cardinal Secretary of State suggesting that His Majesty's Government should reconsider their attitude in regard to certain points of the recent French memorandum with regard to the continuance of special liturgical honours to the French representatives in Palestine.

2. It seems clear that the object of the French authorities in seeking to obtain or retain the various privileges suggested in the memorandum, including those falling under heads 2 and 3, is merely to secure a form of treatment which will place the French representatives in Palestine in a position different from that of the representatives of other Powers. Were any of the privileges now claimed merely those which could legitimately be claimed in analogous circumstances by the representative of any other State, as is implied in Cardinal Gasparri's note, there is no reason to believe that the French Government would attach so great an importance to their acquisition or retention.

3. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government consider it impossible to make any concession on this question in the manner suggested in your despatch under reply, and I request that you will inform the Cardinal Secretary of State that they cannot modify their original decision that none of the special privileges asked for by the French authorities can be conceded.

I am, &amp;c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 7082/71/65]

No. 211.

*Mr. Dormer to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 114.)

Sir,

*British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, August 14, 1924.*

WITH reference to the Foreign Office despatch No. 119 of the 24th May, 1923, I have the honour to report that the current number of the Vatican official organ "Acta Apostolicæ Sedis," announces the appointment of the Rev. Godric Keane as auxiliary bishop to the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

As this Legation has already reported, the Arab element in Palestine has been pressing for some time for the appointment of an Arab auxiliary bishop, and there is no doubt that hope was cherished in French circles that the post would, as has been the case in the past, be given to a French citizen (please see Sir Odo Russell's despatch No. 169 of the 6th December, 1923, and Lord Curzon's telegram No. 34 of the same date).

On the other hand, Father Keane, who has already been a year in Palestine as secretary to Mgr. Barlassina, was the more obvious candidate, and it is satisfactory that the auxiliary bishop is now a British subject.

As regards Father Keane himself, this Legation has had little information since his arrival in Palestine. I understand that he was kept or stayed in the background during Cardinal Giorgi's visit and was not even present at the luncheon given by Mgr. Barlassina.

The appointment has not yet been announced in the press, and it is evidently desired to give as little publicity to it as possible.

The duties of an auxiliary bishop are not defined, but it would seem that Father Keane's work will prove no easy one. I hope to report further on the matter shortly.

I have, &amp;c.

CECIL DORMER.

[E 7618/1354/65]

No. 212.

*Mr. Kellogg to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 4.)**United States Embassy, London,  
September 2, 1924.*

Sir,

MY Government has instructed me to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 17th July, with regard to the convention respecting the British mandate in Palestine. In this communication it is indicated that, subject to certain minor textual changes and subject to the omission of the second paragraph of article 6, His Majesty's Government is prepared to accept the draft convention communicated in my note of the 30th April.

2. In view of the assurances contained in the first paragraph of your note that the Palestine Administration have every intention of treating American consular officers in as favourable a manner as the consular representatives of other States, my Government does not consider that the retention of the second paragraph of article 6 is essential. Further, my Government assents to the minor textual amendments suggested in the second paragraph of your note, save that the phrase "the United States consent" should read "the United States consents," since my Government regards the term "United States" as singular, and not plural.

3. With regard to the third paragraph of your communication, which relates to the territory of Transjordan, I desire to make it clear that it was not my Government's intention to suggest the necessity of consultation in matters relating to minor administrative changes in Transjordan. Its attention, however, had been called to



the communication of the League of Nations of the 23rd September, 1922, which indicated that His Majesty's Government, after a consultation with the States represented on the Council of the League of Nations, had reached an agreement as to the articles of the mandate, in addition to articles 15, 16 and 18, mentioned in article 25, which are, in any case, applicable, which would control the character of the British administration of Transjordan. It is my Government's view, as briefly set forth in my communication of the 30th April last, that it would be entirely consistent with the general policy which is followed by States enjoying mandatory administration over territories relinquished by the Central Powers as a result of the late war to consult with this Government as well as with the States represented on the Council of the League of Nations in connection with any general changes in the form of the mandatory administration of Transjordan.

4. My Government had, however, noted the statement contained in your communication that the Palestine convention shall be applicable to territory under British mandate to the east as well as to the west of the River Jordan, and the further statement that the changes which may be made in the administration of the territory will not be of a character to conflict with the terms of the mandate. My Government is not, therefore, disposed to delay the conclusion of the Palestine convention for the purpose of entering into a further discussion of the questions relating to Transjordan, since the essential points in which my Government is interested appear to be safeguarded by the assurances already given, which are understood also to embody the undertaking that the changes which may be made in the administration of the territory will not be of such a character as to conflict with the terms of the convention.

5. I am further instructed to inform you that my Government is gratified to note the assurance contained in your communication of the 17th July that American nationals in Palestine will receive most-favoured-nation treatment. This assurance satisfactorily meets the point raised in my note of the 30th April with respect to agreements which the mandatory might reach with other Powers if my Government's understanding is correct that the benefits of any agreements, such, for example, as that outlined in the communication from His Majesty's Foreign Office of the 15th August, 1922, would, if definitely concluded, automatically be extended to the United States and its nationals in the mandate territory of Palestine.

6. In view of the fact that full agreement has now been reached as to the provision of the convention to be concluded with respect to Palestine, and in the event that my Government's understanding of His Majesty's Government's position, as outlined in paragraphs 2 to 5, is correct, I am happy to state that my Government is prepared to proceed promptly to the signature of the convention and will send me full powers for this purpose.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
FREDERICK A. STERLING,  
*Counsellor of Embassy.*

[E 7622/1354/65]

No. 213.

*Mr. Sterling to Mr. Osborne.—(Received September 4.)*

*United States Embassy, London,  
September 2, 1924.*

Dear Osborne,

IN connection with the Embassy's official note of to-day's date to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, concerning the proposed Palestine Mandate Treaty, I desire to add that the Department of State at Washington is most anxious to conclude the agreement as soon as possible.

There does not now, in fact, appear to be any vital differences in the view-points of our two Governments, unless it is that your Government has comment to make with respect to the interpretation which Washington places, in the official note above referred to, upon the assurances contained in your note of the 17th July. I would be very grateful, therefore, if you would be good enough to see that your Government's reply is sent to us as soon as possible.

While the Embassy was not instructed to enclose with its official communication a draft of the convention as now understood by the Department of State, I am transmitting copies thereof to you for the purpose of verification with the proposed changes.

Yours very sincerely,  
F. A. STERLING.

Enclosure in No. 213.

*Draft Convention between the United States and Great Britain regarding the  
Mandate for Palestine.*

WHEREAS by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that, in the case of certain territories which as a consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, mandates should be issued and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League; and

Whereas the principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Terms of mandate]; and

Whereas the mandate in the above terms came into force on the 29th September, 1923; and

Whereas the United States of America, by participating in the war against Germany, contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the Government of the United States and the Government of His Britannic Majesty desire to reach a definite understanding with respect to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nationals in Palestine; His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries:

who have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention, the United States consents to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the mandate recited above.

ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

ARTICLE 5.

Subject to the provisions of any local laws for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandated territory, to receive voluntary applicants and to teach in the English language.

ARTICLE 6.

The extradition treaties and conventions which are or may be in force between the United States and Great Britain, and the provisions of any treaties which are or



may be in force between the two countries which relate to extradition or consular rights, shall apply to the mandated territory.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

#### ARTICLE 8.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. The present convention shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof,

Done in duplicate at                      this                      day of                      , 1924.

[E 7740/4300/16]

No. 214.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, September 8, 1924.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st September regarding the despatch of a Soviet representative to Palestine to examine the situation in regard to the property of the former Russian Governments situated therein, and to express regret that an earlier reply has not been furnished to your letters of the 10th June, the 24th June and the 18th July; all of which relate to the general question of Russian religious and charitable property in Palestine.

2. Before the subject could be satisfactorily dealt with, the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924, had to be promulgated, and local legislation had to be prepared in Palestine on the subject of charitable trusts. In this connection I am to refer to paragraph 2 of your letter of the 24th June.

3. You have already been informed of the promulgation of the Order in Council by a letter from this Department of the 12th August, and I am now to acquaint you that a Charitable Trusts Ordinance has been passed and the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine has been instructed that it may be promulgated. Section 37 of that ordinance has been specifically drawn to cover cases such as those which might arise in connection with the claim of the Soviet Government, and runs as follows:—

"Notwithstanding anything in this ordinance, if the court is of opinion upon the evidence of documents laid before it or of proved custom that any property in Palestine is held by the owner thereof under an obligation that the use of such property and the proceeds and income thereof shall be devoted to charitable purposes, the court may declare such property to be held in trust for the purpose of this ordinance, and the provisions of this ordinance shall apply thereto as though the trust had been created in accordance therewith.

"Provided that where the trust was created under foreign law the court shall, in exercising jurisdiction with reference thereto, apply the law under which it was created so far as such law is not contrary to the public policy of Palestine or to policy of this ordinance."

4. I am to suggest for the consideration of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald that the Soviet Government might now be informed of the promulgation of the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, but that the steps it is proposed to take to decide their claim, if and when it is ruled out of the jurisdiction of the Palestine Courts, should not be communicated to them in advance. A similar communication might also be made to the so-called council of the Palestine Orthodox Society in reply to their letter of the 26th May, of which a copy is enclosed.

5. I am to take this opportunity to forward for Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's information a copy of a confidential despatch, dated the 27th June, from the Officer

[E 7623/1354/65]

No. 213A.

*Mr. Kellogg to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 4.)*

*United States Embassy,*

*London, September 4, 1924.*

Sir,

UNDER instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that under date of the 19th August, 1924, the American consul at Jerusalem reports that a new customs duties amendment ordinance was published on the 15th August, 1924, increasing the rate on imported articles to a considerable extent, and that from the 18th August, 1924, duty has been collected under the new schedule.

The Government of the United States, as you are doubtless aware, has consistently taken the position that the authorities administering territories detached from the Ottoman Empire are bound by the obligations incident to the existence of the capitulatory régime, pending the final determination of the status of such territories, and in the absence of the assent of the interested Powers, to the suspension or modification of the rights derived from the Capitulations, and that American citizens in Palestine are entitled, by virtue of the Capitulations, to exemption from all taxes except such as are approved by the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States would, therefore, be pleased to receive an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the situation in Palestine which has arisen as a result of the reported attempt to collect from its nationals an increased customs duty without any previous request for the assent of the Government of the United States.

In this connection, I respectfully beg to call your attention to the communication which I addressed to you under date of the 2nd September, 1924, in reply to the proposals made in your note of the 17th July, 1924, concerning the Mandate Treaty for Palestine. My Government hopes that the treaty may be signed at an early date, thus obviating in the future difficulties which may arise from the absence of treaty provisions.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador)

F. A. STERLING,

*Counsellor of Embassy.*



Administering the Government of Palestine, which deals with the subject under consideration, and to comment on various points raised therein.

6. Paragraph 3 (b) of the despatch deals with the constitution of the special *ad hoc* commission, to which reference was made in your letter of the 24th June. The Secretary of State has considered the objection raised by the Officer Administering the Government to the removal of the Chief Justice and two British judges from their ordinary functions, but is of the opinion that the expense of obtaining the services of other British judges and bringing them to Palestine would be prohibitive. He is therefore disposed to instruct the High Commissioner as originally proposed that such an *ad hoc* commission, if and when it is appointed, should be composed of the Chief Justice and two British judges from the Palestine Judiciary. The Secretary of State would prefer, at this stage, to leave open the larger question as to how other disputes, which would normally come before the Holy Places Commission, should be decided.

7. With regard to paragraph 6 of the despatch, I am to enquire whether, in view of the apparently unsatisfactory distribution of moneys accruing from the properties of Russian societies occupied by Government, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald would concur in authority being given to the High Commissioner to inform the Spanish consul, if he considers this course desirable, that as the Soviet Government has now laid claim to these properties, the Palestine Government will no longer ask him to administer the rents and other moneys of such properties (which he was administering as the representative of Imperial Russian interests), but that pending a decision as to their ownership, arrangements will be made for a special officer to administer such rents as trustee.

8. I am to state that no answer has yet been received to the Secretary of State's telegram of the 4th August, to which reference is made in your letter of the 27th August. The High Commissioner has, however, been requested by telegram to expedite his reply.

9. With regard to the specific question of the despatch of a Soviet representative to Palestine to examine the situation in regard to the property of the former Russian Governments, I am to suggest that in the proposed communication to the Soviet Government, outlined in paragraph 4 above, that Government should be requested to state what precise steps the representative referred to proposes to take with this object, and whether he will have any official status during his visit.

I am, &c.

(For the Under-Secretary of State).

H. YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 214.

*Palestine Orthodox Society to Colonial Office.*

6, Throgmorton Street, London, May 26, 1924.  
Sir,  
I BEG to enclose a duly certified copy of the minutes of a meeting of the Council of the Palestine Orthodox Society.

It will be noted that the council confirmed that this society is a scientific and philanthropic organisation and has no political aims whatsoever.

I beg to refer to the interview I had with Major Young and Mr. Keith Roach, and to ask you to be good enough to inform me what steps the society has to take in order to obtain the necessary registration.

I am, &c.

V. R. IDELSON.

*Sitting of the Council of the Palestine Orthodox Society of April 5/18, 1924.*

I. Have heard:

The report of the President of the Council, Prince Schirinski-Schichmatov, expressing the wish to elect M. Boris Arseniev to be actual member of the Palestine Orthodox Society, inviting him to be assistant of the President of the Council.

Decided:

To nominate M. Boris Arseniev to be actual member of the Orthodox Palestine Society.



## II. Have heard :

The letter of his Eminence the Metropolit Antonius of the 6th/19th March, 1924, to the address of the president of the Orthodox Palestine Society, to which letter was annexed and extract of the resolution of the Holy Synod of the 22nd February/6th March, 1924, concerning the sending of his Eminence to Jerusalem and the draft of the council's answer.

## Decided :

To confirm the draft, after making some corrections in conformity with the council's resolutions, and to empower the president to give the necessary instructions to the manager of the "Podvorje."

## III. Have heard :

The letter of Baron Boris Nolde of the 27th March, 1924, communicating that Mr. W. R. Idelson, empowered by the council to defend the society's interests before the British Colonial Administration, finds it necessary, in view to guarantee the society's existence and the safety and integrity of its rights, to undertake some measures to accelerate the realisation of the society's purposes. After having considered all the questions arising out of the present political situation and the special local conditions in which must work the council's representatives in Palestine, the council has decided :

- (1) To confirm once more that the Orthodox Palestine Society, in conformity with its status, is a scientific and philanthropic organisation, being outside of all political questions whatever.
- (2) Following the example of other organisations working in Palestine, to request the Government of Palestine to grant the necessary registration.
- (3) To empower Mr. W. R. Idelson to request officially the British Colonial Administration to inform him, are there objections from their side for the society's registration, making the necessary steps to obtain a favourable answer.
- (4) To acknowledge M. Nikolaus Selesnev, manager of the "Podvorje," and his assistant, M. Antipov, as empowered to administrate the society's properties and to receive the money due to the society as long as the council will not find it necessary to nominate other persons for the purpose.
- (5) As regards Mr. Idelson's opinion concerning the desirability of convoking in Palestine, after the registration of the society, of a general assembly of the society's members for the purpose of electing the administrative staff, the council, considering that a very few members of the society have their seat in Palestine, has decided that the assembly must take place in Paris or in Berlin, and that it must be convoked in May or June 1924.

The President,  
PRINCE SCHIRINSKI-SCHICHMATOV.

The Members,  
A. ROGOVITCH.  
S. BOTKIN.

The Secretary,  
B. ARSENEV.

As per copy :  
PRINCE SCHIRINSKI-SCHICHMATOV.  
(Stamp.)

The Organisation for the Protection of the Interests of Russian Refugees in Germany certifies herewith the rightness of the present copy and translation.  
For the Chief of the Organisation,

(Signature.)  
Berlin, May 15, 1924.  
(Stamp.)

For the legalisation of the signature of the representative of the Organisation for Safeguarding the Interests of Russian Refugees, Berlin.  
British Consulate-General, Berlin, this 16th day of May, 1924.

(Signed) H. E. POMEROY,  
British Pro-Consul.

British Consulate-General, Berlin.  
(6 Stamps.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 214.

Brigadier-General Clayton to Mr. J. H. Thomas.

(Confidential.)  
Sir,

Jerusalem, June 27, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your confidential despatches of the 10th May and of the 10th June on the subject of the property in Palestine of certain Russian societies.

2. The lists which accompanied my confidential despatches of 26th October, 1923, and 11th January, 1924, provide all the information obtainable of the nature of ownership and tenure of properties in Palestine registered in the name of the former Imperial Russian Government; they show that of the properties scheduled only the consular residence and the consulate building in Jerusalem can be regarded as indisputably the property of the Soviet Government as successor to the Imperial Russian Government. With regard to the other properties, it would be for the Soviet Government to establish its title against the claims of the societies.

3. I have the following observations to make upon the draft Order in Council, of which a copy accompanied your despatch of the 10th June, and upon the suggested composition of an *ad hoc* commission to deal with disputes that are removed from the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts under that order :—

(a.) The wording of section 2 of the order should be amended to make it clear that the jurisdiction in the civil courts is ousted only for a cause concerning a religious building or site in dispute between different communities. It does not appear necessary that any dispute between persons belonging to one community which may arise with regard to the ownership of land on which, for example, a mosque or synagogue is situated, should be removed from the ordinary jurisdiction, and it is not unlikely that disputes of this kind will arise from time to time. Presumably articles 13 and 14 of the mandate, of which it is desired to ensure the full observance, refer to religious buildings and sites which are in dispute between different communities, and it is suggested, therefore, that the wording of section 2 should be : "Notwithstanding . . . no cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in Palestine which are in dispute between different religious communities in Palestine or the rights . . ."

(b.) It is submitted that the scheme formerly proposed, of a special English Judicial Commissioner to be appointed from outside Palestine, is preferable to that now suggested. The removal from their ordinary functions, for the purposes in view, of the Chief Justice and two British judges would seriously prejudice the administration of civil and criminal justice in Palestine, which is already beset with arrears.

If, therefore, the establishment of an *ad hoc* commission is undertaken in advance of the definite constitution of the Holy Sites Commission, I would urge that, no less than the Holy Sites Commission itself, it be constituted of a person or persons specially appointed by the mandatory.

4. I have referred in my telegram No. 189 of the 24th instant to the provision already existing in the Charitable Trusts Ordinance for the protection by the Palestine courts of charitable interests in implied trusts. Section 37 of the ordinance was specifically drawn to cover the kind of case which it was apprehended might arise in connection with the claim of the Soviet Union Government to the properties in Palestine of the Russian societies.

[13028]



5. I wish to take this opportunity of urging the desirability of an early decision being given upon the questions raised in paragraphs 4 and 15 of my confidential despatch of the 26th October, 1923. It is a matter of increasing urgency that the decision be notified, independently of the settlement of the larger issues with regard to Russian property in Palestine, to which your confidential despatch of the 10th June refers.

6. The rents on account of the properties of the Russian societies occupied by the Government are still being paid to the Spanish consul in accordance with the directions in your telegram No. 79 of the 6th March, 1924, but the distribution of money to the destitute Russians is not at all satisfactory, and the District Governor, Jerusalem-Jaffa district has recommended that until some form of Soviet consular representation is established, the Palestine Government should assume responsibility for the administration of the properties and for the distribution of their revenues in support of the poor of the Russian community.

7. The District Governor has pointed out also that the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission is in difficulties, internal and external, with the Orthodox Patriarchate, and that Government intervention in this case as well is desirable.

8. Unless a Soviet consular representative is likely to be appointed in the immediate future, it seems desirable that a Government official should be nominated to act provisionally as administrator of the properties; and I shall be glad to be informed whether you would approve of this course.

9. I might add that the representatives in Palestine of the Russian interests affected have now themselves requested that their properties be placed under Government control. It appears that the Spanish consul, although not formally recognised, does exercise direct supervision and control over the property and preside over a mixed Committee of the Orthodox Society and the Ecclesiastical Mission which administers the funds at their disposal. It appears also that the Ecclesiastical Mission is getting deeply into debt, and alarm has been caused by the apparent intention of the Archimandrite in charge to effect the sale of a valuable plot of land at Kattamon to raise funds.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON,

*Officer Administering the Government.*

[E 8363/71/65]

No. 215.

*Mr. Dormer to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 126.)  
Sir,

*British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,  
September 24, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 114 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that several newspapers have commented recently on the appointment of Mgr. Kean as auxiliary bishop to the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.

The "Unità Cattolica" and the "Italia" regard the appointment as indicating a new situation in Palestine and as having special significance now that the French protectorate has vanished. "It is well known that the Zionist policy of Great Britain and the British attitude of protection towards the Greek Orthodox were displeasing to the Vatican, and differences arose between the British authorities and Mgr. Barlassina when the latter made a stand against their policy. Mgr. Kean has influence and prestige and he will certainly contribute to an improvement in the relations between the Vatican and Great Britain in Palestine."

The "Popolo" uses much the same language and expresses the opinion that Mgr. Kean's appointment should induce the British Government to look more favourably on Cardinal Gasparri's proposals regarding the holy places, "proposals which are still before the League of Nations." The "Corriere del Ticino" pays a tribute to British diplomacy in seeking to turn antagonists into partisans, and ascribes its success to the hostility shown to the Holy See by M. Herriot's Government. "To French circles, where the policy of the two countries is contrasted, the appointment of Mgr. Kean has come as a painful surprise."

The "Giornale d'Italia" remarks: "While the restitution of the cenacle to Italy is still being discussed, although there should be no doubt on the question whatever, England has achieved a notable success at the Vatican in obtaining the appointment

[E 8072/1354/65]

No. 214A.

*Mr. Sterling to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 19.)*

*United States Embassy,  
London, September 16, 1924.*

Sir,

UNDER date of the 4th September, 1924, I had the honour to communicate with you regarding a new customs duties amendment ordinance in Palestine which was published on the 15th August, 1924, increasing the rate on imported articles to a considerable extent.

I am now in receipt of a telegram from the Secretary of State at Washington to the effect that the American consul in Jerusalem now reports that an American citizen there is now required to pay approximately 15,000 dollars extra duty under the above-mentioned ordinance on a shipment of matches ordered some time before the promulgation thereof, and which arrived three days after the publication of the law. In view of this incident I am instructed to inform you that I shall be very pleased to receive at as early a date as possible an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government in respect to the situation created by the application of this law upon American citizens in Palestine who are entitled, by virtue of the Capitulations, to exemption from all taxes except such as are approved by my Government.

I have, &c.

F. A. STERLING,  
*Counsellor of Embassy.*



[E 9220/136/65]

No. 215A.

*Mr. Kellogg to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 22.)**United States Embassy,  
London, October 21, 1924.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you of still another case which has arisen in Palestine wherein the jurisdiction of the American consul at Jerusalem is involved in civil and criminal cases relating to American citizens. The American consul at Jerusalem now reports that Messrs. Berlin and Pacowski, Russian nationals, who have opted for Palestinian nationality, have brought suit against Mr. Philip Skora, an American citizen, in the magistrates' court of Telaviv, which has seized the bank account of Mr. Skora for a sufficient sum to meet this judgment. The consul protested to the chief secretary of the Government of Palestine, who replied that the Palestinian Government had no power by administrative order to remove the attachment. The judgment in this case was handed down by a local court, in disregard of the rights of the American consular court.

Under instructions of my Government, I have the honour again to call your attention to the position of the United States that its capitulatory rights still persist pending the conclusion of the proposed agreement between Great Britain and the United States with reference to Palestine, and I beg that appropriate instructions in this matter be issued by His Majesty's Government to the competent officials in Palestine.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK B. KELLOGG.

of an English prelate as auxiliary bishop. Nothing has been said so far about the appointment implying future succession to the patriarchate, but as the auxiliary bishop succeeds to the titular see nine times out of ten it is certainly not comforting to Italy to think that when Mgr. Barlassina retires in a short time the Latin patriarch will no longer be an Italian. The writer recalls the "long line" of Italian patriarchs, Camassei, Piavi, Valerga, and says that "this brusque interruption in favour of the Anglo-Saxon clergy is painful to Italy." He expresses his apprehension too that Father Dotallevi, who has just relinquished the appointment of Custos of the Holy Land, may be succeeded by a non-Italian after centuries of uninterrupted succession of Italian fathers, and adds that "it may well be imagined that the religious and political situation in the Holy Land is at present most delicate."

It was satisfactory to learn from your despatch No. 187 of the 10th instant that Mgr. Kean has been instrumental in bringing about good relations between the Administration of Palestine and the Latin patriarchate, and I thought it well to mention the fact at the Vatican. If all goes well and Mgr. Kean proves himself capable it is quite within the bounds of possibility that he may eventually succeed Mgr. Barlassina.

I have, &amp;c.

CECIL DORMER.

[N 7335/1288/38]

No. 216.

*Mr. MacDonald to M. Rakovski.**Foreign Office, October 24, 1924.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your note of the 17th July, I have the honour to inform you that no transactions are taking place in Palestine in regard to property registered in the name of the Russian Government, Ecclesiastical Mission, or Lay Orthodox Society, and that the local authorities have been directed not to pass any such transactions without reference to the Palestine Government.

2. As regards the question of sending a representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Palestine in connection with this question, I shall be grateful if you would inform me precisely what steps it is proposed that the Soviet representative should take in the matter and whether he will have any official status during his visit.

3. I am to explain that in the event of the Soviet Government desiring to establish its title to any property in Palestine, the ownership of which is a matter of dispute, the proper course for it to take is to prove its title thereto in the Palestine courts. It appears, however, that some, at any rate, of the property to which you refer in your note may belong to the category mentioned in articles 13 and 14 of the mandate for Palestine conferred on His Majesty's Government by the League of Nations. In view of the obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government under those articles, an Order in Council was recently promulgated, removing from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in Palestine all causes or matters relating to the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or to the rights or claims relating to the different religious communities in that country. A copy of this Order in Council is enclosed herein.\*

I have, &amp;c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[N 7335/1288/38]

No. 217.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.**Foreign Office, October 24, 1924.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of the 8th and 18th ultimo, regarding Russian religious and charitable property in Palestine, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a note on this subject, which is being addressed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires.†

2. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald agrees that a reply on similar lines should be returned to the letter from the Palestine Orthodox Society, a copy of which was enclosed in your letter of the 8th ultimo.

\* Not printed.

† No. 216.

[13028]

2 B 2



3. As regards the constitution of the special *ad hoc* commission, to which reference is made in paragraph 6 of your letter of the 8th ultimo, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald shares the view of Mr. Secretary Thomas that such a commission, if and when it is appointed, should be composed of the Chief Justice of Palestine and two British judges from the Palestine Judiciary, subject to the condition (see the fifth paragraph of Foreign Office letter of the 24th June) that this body be empowered to deal solely with questions relating to Russian ecclesiastical property and not with any other.

4. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald concurs in the proposal contained in paragraph 7 of your letter of the 8th September, that the High Commissioner be given authority at his discretion to terminate the existing arrangement, whereby the Spanish consul administers the rents and other moneys accruing from the properties of Russian societies occupied by the Palestine Government, and to transfer these administrative duties, pending a decision in regard to the ownership of such property, to a trustee specially appointed for the purpose.

I am, &c.

J. D. GREGORY.

[E 9423/1861/65]

No. 218.

*Sir A. Young to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 29.)*

(No. 397.)

Sir,

*Belgrade, October 25, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 390 of the 20th October respecting the visit to Belgrade of a delegation from the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, I have the honour to report that yesterday morning I received a visit from Mgr. Dossitheos, Archbishop of Sebastia, and his secretary, M. Yannaros.

2. The object of this visit, so the archbishop explained to me, was to request me officially to announce to my Government that the mission was proceeding to England to confer on their Majesties the King and Queen the Order of the Guardians of the Holy Sepulchre, and to offer to the King the title of Protector, Liberator or Saviour (they were not very clear on this point) of the Holy Places. They declared that the statement made in the Belgrade newspapers that this title had been offered to the King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was untrue.

3. I said that it was usual in such cases to have made preliminary enquiries as to the disposition towards the matter of the Sovereigns who were to be approached. Some jealousy might perhaps be apprehended on the part of the Roman Catholics. I presumed that they had acquainted the British authorities in Palestine of the intentions of his Eminence the Patriarch. This, I understood from them, had not been done.

4. I am told that underlying these visits is the motive of improving the finances of the Patriarchate, which, since the revolution in Russia and other world changes, have fallen into a desperate state.

5. Another object of the visit to London, so the archbishop went on to say, was to invite the Archbishop of Canterbury to attend or send delegates to the Ecumenical Council of the Orthodox Churches to be held at Jerusalem next Easter. The late Minister of Faiths, M. Janic, mentioned to me some months ago that it was intended to hold this council at Belgrade, and I have been told that the decision to hold it at Jerusalem instead has caused some disappointment to the Serbian Patriarchate.

6. I have since enquired at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to whether, as stated in the newspapers, the delegation had in fact offered King Alexander any other title than that inherent in the Order conferred on him, and I was told that it was not so, the King (and I gathered the King of Roumania as well) had only been asked to support the interests of the Patriarch of Jerusalem in all international questions with the League of Nations, or on similar occasions.

7. M. Marinkovic, however, told me an interesting thing in connection with the projected Ecumenical Synod at Jerusalem, which I will report in a separate despatch.

8. The delegation was to leave Belgrade to-day for Paris, and expected to reach London within the next ten days.

I have, &c.

ALBAN YOUNG.



[E 9840/136/65]

No. 220A.

*Mr. Kellogg to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 12.)**United States Embassy,**London, November 11, 1924.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my note, dated the 21st October, 1924, concerning the attachment of the bank account of Mr. Skora, an American citizen, in Palestine, in connection with a suit brought against him in disregard of the rights of the American consular court. I am now in receipt of further telegraphic information from my Government reporting the execution of the judgment of the magistrates' court directly upon Mr. Skora, and that the American Palestine Bank at Telaviv has been ordered by the court to pay the amount of the judgment from funds deposited by him. To this the American consul at Jerusalem has protested. Under instructions from the Secretary of State, I have the honour to inform you that my Government looks to His Majesty's Government for such action as may be necessary to secure the recognition of American capitulatory rights in this case.

I have, &amp;c.

(For the Ambassador).

F. A. STERLING,

*Counsellor of Embassy.*

[E 9597/1354/65]

No. 219.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)**Downing Street, November 4, 1924.*

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th October regarding the proposed convention with the United States of America, and to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, that Mr. Thomas agrees that an assurance may be given to the United States Government that His Majesty's Government will consult them regarding any alteration in the administration of Transjordan, for which His Majesty's Government may decide to seek the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

2. I am further to state that Mr. Thomas sees no objection to an additional assurance being given to the United States Government in sense suggested in paragraph 5 of the Foreign Office letter under reference.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 9780/1354/65]

No. 220.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Kellogg.**Foreign Office, November 10, 1924.*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to my predecessor on the 2nd September regarding the proposed convention between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government respecting the British mandate in Palestine. I am happy to note that the United States Government is prepared to proceed promptly to the signature of the convention and will send you full powers for that purpose.

2. In that note you state that the United States Government desire an assurance that His Majesty's Government will consult them, as well as the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations, regarding any alteration in the administration of Transjordan, for which His Majesty's Government may decide to seek the approval of the council; this assurance His Majesty's Government have no hesitation in giving. With regard to paragraph 5 of your note, I am happy to state that the interpretation placed by the United States Government on paragraph 4 of my predecessor's note of the 17th July is correct, and that any special privileges granted to the subjects of any other Power will automatically be acquired by United States citizens in Palestine.

3. A proof of the proposed convention in form suitable for signature has now been printed and a copy is enclosed herein for examination by you. I shall be glad to learn in due course on what date it will be convenient for you to sign the convention.

I have, &amp;c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 11059/4300/65]

No. 221.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 8.)**Downing Street, December 8, 1924.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th October concerning the property of the "Œuvre pie espagnole" and also to correspondence on the subject of Russian ecclesiastical property in Palestine, ending with your letter of the 24th October, 1924, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, a copy of a despatch from the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine on the subject.



2. Mr. Chamberlain will observe from paragraph 3 of the despatch that no application was made to the High Commissioner under the Order in Council in the "Œuvre pie espagnole" case, and that judgment was recently given in favour of the Spanish Government; it is stated moreover that an appeal will probably be made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

3. I am also to enclose a copy of a draft reply which it is proposed to address to Sir Herbert Samuel, and to enquire whether Mr. Chamberlain concurs in the terms of the proposed procedure outlined in paragraph 4 for conducting the enquiry referred to in article 3 of the Order in Council.

4. With reference to the last paragraph of the draft despatch, I am to state that Mr. Amery would be glad if Mr. Chamberlain will consider whether it would now be desirable to inform the League of Nations of the procedure it is proposed to adopt, subject to the approval of the League, for dealing with the case of Russian ecclesiastical property.

I am, &c.  
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 221.

*Sir R. Storrs to Mr. J. H. Thomas.*

(Confidential "H.")

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your confidential despatch of the 9th October, on the subject of the operation of the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924.

2. I am in accord with your suggestion that His Majesty's Government should lay before the Council of the League of Nations proposals outlining the steps to be taken in the event of any cause being removed from the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts under the order. I was under the impression from the wording of paragraph 6 of the letter addressed to the Foreign Office dated the 8th September, 1924, of which a copy was enclosed in your confidential despatch of that date concerning the property in Palestine of the Russian societies, that it was proposed, if a claim was put forward by the Soviet Government to any religious properties of the societies in Palestine, to appoint a commission composed of three British judges in Palestine to try the case. The procedure now adumbrated appears preferable, particularly because it would avoid the difficulty to which I referred in paragraph 3 (b) of my confidential despatch of the 27th June; it would gravely impair the work of the courts if three of their British judges were to be diverted from their ordinary duties to sit as a commission for the hearing of such claims.

3. The suit to which the enclosures to your despatch refer is one which concerns the registration and ownership of property, which is not religious in character, although its revenue is dedicated to religious purposes. The parties to it are the Custodia di Terra Santa and the Obra Pia, represented by the Spanish Government. No application has been made, so far as is known, under the Order in Council, for its removal from the ordinary courts before which it has been proceeding for the past two years. Judgment was recently given in favour of the Spanish Government, and I understand that the Custodia desires to carry an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

4. With regard to paragraph 3 of your despatch, I consider that it would be of advantage if general instructions were issued to the High Commissioner to govern the method of enquiry under article 3 of the order, under which three different kinds of cases may arise:—

- (1.) Claims between different communities in connection with the Holy Places, &c., which it is designed should be dealt with by the special commission to be established under the mandate; e.g., a claim made by the Orthodox or the Latins to possession of some holy site in dispute between the two communities.
- (2.) Claims made by the Soviet Government to property, belonging to religious Russian societies in Palestine, which is registered in the name of the Russian Government or of private persons.
- (3.) Questions as to title of religious buildings which are not Holy Places or holy sites, and which, but for the order, would have been heard by the civil courts; e.g., the question as to the title of the Muristan building in

dispute between the Palestine Government and the German Evangelical Society (*vide* Sir Herbert Samuel's despatch No. 444, dated the 25th March, 1924).

5. I propose, nevertheless, to report to you in detail each particular issue under (1), (2) or (3) as it arises.

I have, &c.  
RONALD STORRS,  
*Officer Administering the Government.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 221.

*Draft Despatch to Sir H. Samuel in reply to Sir R. Storrs's Despatch of October 31, 1924.*

Sir, *Downing Street, December 8, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Ronald Storrs's despatch confidential "H" of the 31st October on the subject of the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924.

2. I desire, in the first instance, to point out that no new procedure for dealing with cases which are removed by the Order in Council from the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts was foreshadowed in my predecessor's confidential despatch of the 9th October. Paragraph 6 of the letter which Mr. Thomas caused to be addressed to the Foreign Office on the 8th September last outlines the method which it is intended to adopt in cases which concern Russian ecclesiastical property. The question of procedure in other cases falling under the Order in Council will be considered as and when they arise.

3. I note that no application under the Order in Council was made in the Œuvre pie espagnole case, and that judgment was given in favour of the Spanish Government. The Foreign Office have been so informed.

4. With regard to the issue to the High Commissioner of general instructions governing the method of enquiry into "questions" under article 3 of the Order in Council, I am of opinion that, when such a question is referred for settlement to the High Commissioner, he should place it before a small committee of three persons, consisting of the Attorney-General and two other persons acquainted with the nature of the problems involved. The committee should be empowered to make such enquiry as they think fit, either by reference to the papers already laid before the court, or, if necessary, by requesting the parties to appear and explain the situation. The committee would then report to the High Commissioner, who would be guided by their advice in giving his decision in the matter. I shall be glad, therefore, if you will furnish, for my consideration, draft instructions giving effect to this procedure.

5. I shall await the detailed report, promised in paragraph 5 of the despatch under reply, as and when each case arises, in order to consider whether the procedure decided upon for cases dealing with Russian ecclesiastical property should or should not be adopted in other cases. In the meantime, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is being requested to take up the question of informing the League of Nations of the procedure contemplated in the case of Russian ecclesiastical property.

I have, &c.

[E 11040/1343/65]

No. 222

*Sir Eyre Crowe to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 206.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, December 8, 1924*

FOLLOWING for Mr. Chamberlain from Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

"When report by Permanent Mandates Commission on Palestine comes before council, I suggest that some comment might be made on behalf of British Government in regard to fourth paragraph of general observations, i.e., that relating to Jewish immigration (see p. 4 of League of Nations print C. 661 of 11th November). It might be pointed out that this passage, confining itself, as



it does, to mere statement that immigrants lack previous training, does something less than justice to results actually achieved by Jewish immigration during past few years. I have been in communication with High Commissioner, to whom an advance copy of report was furnished at Geneva by League of Nations secretariat. He informs me that a certain number of immigrants have previous agricultural experience, and that a good many others have shown themselves adaptable to agricultural conditions, as illustrated by rapid and successful establishment of new Jewish agricultural settlements in Galilee. Further example is furnished by satisfactory development of tobacco plantations by hitherto inexperienced Jewish farmers, who employ Jewish immigrant labour in the various processes. High Commissioner adds that character of immigration has recently undergone some change. More recent arrivals contain large proportion of persons with means, many of whom are founding new industries on a large or small scale. If you agree, you might find occasion to make statement to council on above lines. Position is, however, somewhat complicated by ill-advised action of Zionist Organisation, who obtained access to advance copy of report through indiscrimination on part of someone at Geneva, and have forwarded written protest to League of Nations against this and other paragraphs. You will understand, of course, that we do not associate ourselves in any sense with action of Zionist Organisation or with terms of their protest, but we do feel that merits of the case require some corrective of a passage which might otherwise produce a somewhat unfair impression of actual situation "

[E 10275/1354/65]

No. 222A.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Kellogg.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, December 10, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence which has recently passed between us, ending with my note of the 3rd instant, on the subjects of the jurisdiction over United States citizens in Palestine and the increase in the Palestinian Customs Tariff.

2. Although the notes which your Excellency has been so good as to address to me on these matters are still under consideration by His Majesty's Government, it may be that, having regard to the signature of the Palestine Convention between the United States and Great Britain, your Government may not desire to pursue further the question of the validity of Mr. Skora's condemnation by the Tel Aviv court or of the increased customs rates. The possibility of analogous discussions arising in the future having been removed by the signature of the convention, I have the honour to suggest that the importance of the points raised in your notes under reference is no longer such as to warrant a continuance of the correspondence.

I have, &amp;c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 11488/1354/65]

No. 222B.

*Mr. Sterling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)**United States Embassy,**London, December 19, 1924.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your note dated the 10th December, 1924, suggesting that, in view of the recent conclusion of the Palestine Convention between the United States and Great Britain, no useful purpose would be served by a continuance of our discussion with regard to questions which had been raised relative to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authorities over United States citizens, and the increase of the Palestinian Customs Tariff. Having requested the views of my Government by telegraph, I am now instructed to reply as follows:—

1. The American Government's position regarding the indispensability of its assent to any dues or taxes to be imposed upon Americans in Palestine prior to the coming into effect of the Mandate Convention has not been changed by the signature of that convention. Meanwhile, however, my Government would be disposed to give favourable consideration to any reasonable request of the mandatory Power that the United States assent to the collection of increased dues or taxes from Americans in Palestine as from the date of the communication of its assent to the British Government. A similar procedure was followed with respect to a contemplated increase of customs dues in Syria shortly after the signature of the Syrian Mandate Convention between the United States and France.

2. Inasmuch as the capitulatory rights of the United States in Palestine will continue in force until the coming into effect of the Mandate Convention, the United States Government cannot recede from the position it has taken with reference to the Skora case and other cases involving the existence of judicial functions by American consuls. My Government relies upon the mandatory Power to take appropriate measures to the end that judgments rendered against American citizens by Palestinian courts prior to the suspension of American capitulatory rights and in disregard of those rights shall not be enforced by the Palestinian authorities either before or after the coming into effect of the Mandate Convention.

I have, &amp;c.

F. A. STERLING,

*Counsellor of Embassy.*



## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

[E 7182/6803/65]

No. 223.

*Consul Smart to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 125.)

*Damascus, Syria, August 8, 1924.*

Sir,

ACCORDING to reports received at Damascus, a band of fifty armed men under the leadership of a person dressed as a Shereefian officer attacked and plundered the Syrian station of Makarin, on the Transjordanian frontier. The raid took place in the evening of the 4th instant, and the raiders disappeared before any Syrian forces could arrive on the scene.

Another band of five well-armed brigands attacked a car between Muzairib and Deraa, murdered two soldiers of the mixed Syrian Legion who were accompanying the wife and daughter of a French officer, the occupants of the car. The car-driver was seriously wounded. The brigands also wounded the ladies while forcibly depriving them of their money and jewels.

In the evening of the next day shots were fired at Deraa station.

The above details are from native sources. I am making no effort to obtain the exact facts from the French authorities, whom, indeed, I much prefer to avoid on the occurrence of such painful incidents. I have on several occasions laid stress on the unfortunate effects of such raids from Transjordan into Syria (see more especially my despatch No. 66 of the 10th April, 1924). It is quite impossible for a British agent in this country to convince Frenchmen that we are not responsible for such aggressions from territory under our mandate.

French bitterness seems to be increasing against Rikabi Pasha, the present Prime Minister of Transjordan, who is charged with instigating these marauding bands for political and anti-French motives. I have the honour to enclose herewith a condensed translation of an article from the Damascus paper "Suriyyah-al-Jedideh" on this subject.\*

In the interest of Anglo-French relations in Syria, I earnestly hope that we will be able effectively to call to account the Transjordanian authorities, without whose complicity such raids could hardly take place. It is to be noted that these last incidents are only the culmination of a series of similar and less grave depredations of bands which, according to the French, are operating from Transjordan.

I have, &amp;c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 8033/6803/65]

No. 224.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 115.)

*Beirut, September 6, 1924.*

Sir,

IN his despatch No. 125 of the 8th August, Mr. Smart called attention to various outrages committed by bands of Transjordanian origin on Syrian territory.

I recently saw General Weygand, who expressed his satisfaction at and appreciation of the steps taken by the British authorities in Palestine to put a stop to such outrages. He also appeared to be very pleased with the reception accorded by Sir G. Clayton to M. Lépiessier, whom he had sent to Jerusalem to make representations in the matter.

I have also seen General Naulin, who commands the French troops in Syria. He had just returned from a visit to Deraa, whither he had been accompanied by Major A. G. Salisbury-Jones, M.C., British liaison officer. The general had by a lucky chance been able to meet Peake Pasha, and he appeared to be very pleased with his interview with that officer. General Naulin told me that he considered that things were at present going very well on the frontier, and thorough-going co-operation was being maintained.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

\* Not printed.

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[E 8994/221/89]

No. 225.

*Consul Hough to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 16.)*

(No. 118. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, October 2, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have had the opportunity of visiting Jerablus, and to submit some notes on my visit which may be of interest.

2. *Euphrates Bridge*.—Two spans are still entirely missing. The French intelligence officer, Lieutenant Armand, told me that the bridge was in the same state as it had been since its destruction, in fact, work has not been begun on it. He understood that a certain amount of material was being accumulated, but did not know how much. The statement reported to you by Mr. Russell, that a temporary wooden structure with a decauville line on it was being used to cross the gap, seems not to be accurate. Lieutenant Armand thought it impossible that the bridge would be complete by the 1st January, 1925, as previously announced, and I agreed with him. I had a talk with Captain Kemal Bey, the officer commanding the Turkish detachment, who told me also that it was hoped to have the bridge ready by the 1st January. I smilingly expressed my doubts about this, and he appeared tacitly to agree with me. I got the impression that the French were not particularly keen on the work being finished quickly, nor, for the matter of that, the Turks either. The fact is that a fairly efficient system of ferrying across the Euphrates has been evolved, and in view of the great expense that the repair of the bridge would entail this is probably held to be good enough for present purposes. The ferries are large enough to take a railway truck across without unloading its contents. The boats travel a considerable way downstream on their way across, and are towed back by land labour through the dead water by the bank without much difficulty.

3. *Turkish Sentiments*.—I had no material for coming to any definite conclusions about this. The bearing of the Turkish officers whom I met was entirely courteous and unreserved. The French intelligence officer told me he was on the best of terms with them, and found them reasonable and straightforward in their dealings with the French. I gathered, however, that they were at heart bitter against us, and intent on making us out as the enemy. This only confirms previous information. The matter of military movements towards the east I left mainly to Major Salisbury-Jones, who accompanied me. Nothing very much was to be learnt on the spot, but from other sources, which I left to the British liaison officer to investigate more fully. I gathered that an unusual movement of aeroplanes and aviation material, also heavy guns, had recently taken place.

4. It will probably be more convenient to your Department if I treat the question of the Carchemish antiquities separately, in my immediately following despatch.

5. The joint expenses of Major Salisbury-Jones and myself came to £3 precisely. If my half share of this is acceptable as a public charge on the Foreign Office vote, I beg to be so instructed, so that I may insert it in my next quarter's account, leaving Major Salisbury-Jones to submit a claim for his share to the War Office for sanction as a journey at the public expense.

I have, &amp;c.

W. HOUGH

[E 9380/218/89]

No. 226.

*Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 160.)

Sir,

Damascus, October 14, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's Damascus despatches Nos. 57 and 96 of the 19th March and 16th June respectively, I have the honour to append hereunder the translation of a paragraph which appeared in the "Alif Ba" of the 10th instant relative to the Governorship of the Djebel Druze:—

"The Governor of Mount Druze:

"We learned from a reliable source that the new Parliament of Djebel Druze held their first session, and that the first subject they treated was the question of the Acting Governor, M. Carbillet. They all agreed to choose him as Governor for Djebel Druze, and, consequently, have submitted a declaration to this effect to the High Commissioner."

The announcement, it will be noticed, is not official, and up to the present no announcement or proclamation by the French authorities has been made. Very probably this change of régime is intentionally made in as unobtrusive manner as possible, to avoid attracting too much notice to it.

In view of the very definite pledge originally assuring to the Djebel Druze self-government under a Governor chosen from the population of that State, it may be argued that the definite appointment of Captain Carbillet as Governor of the Djebel Druze constitutes a breach of faith on the part of the French authorities towards the Druzes.

Although Captain Carbillet has been nominally only Acting Governor, he has virtually obtained full control of all the administrative functions which were formerly vested in the Druze Governors. The transition from Acting Governor to titular Governor—the development just reported—has been a comparatively easy matter for the French authorities to engineer. From information which I have heard (but which is not yet substantiated), concerning the above change in the Djebel Druze, there is little doubt but that the "Parliament" consisted of members who were elected by a procedure not understood by the electorate, but arranged by the French authorities, who took steps to assure themselves that a sufficient number of the members (if not the whole "Parliament") elected would vote in favour of the appointment of a French Governor.

I have, however, no authentic news on the events leading up to the above appointment, and few persons dare to talk on a subject such as this, knowing the traditional British friendship for the Druzes and the jealousy which this has provoked in the past among the French.

I have, &amp;c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

[E 9619/230/65]

No. 227.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 5.)*

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 28, 1924.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 16 of the 30th August last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report which has been drawn up by Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Norman Mayers regarding the motor route from Beirut to Tehran.

As suggested in the above telegram, the Nairn Transport Company readily offered to grant to Mr. Mayers the return journey gratis to Bagdad, and the Parsons Transport Company made a similar offer, at the instance of Mr. Nairn, for the journey between Bagdad and Tehran. Availing himself of these offers, Mr. Mayers was absent from Beirut from the 12th to the 26th September.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 227.

*Report on the Beirut-Bagdad-Tehran Motor Route.*

THE French admittedly intend to use Syria as a centre of operations for facilitating the extension in the Near and Middle East of their commercial activities and political prestige. The interest aroused therefore in the recently created Beirut-Tehran route is very natural. General Weygand states that he hopes for important results from the opening of the line and that he intends to foster trade in light and valuable articles along it. General Vandenberg, Governor of the Great Lebanon, speaks of Beirut as a "railhead" for automobile services which will link the Mediterranean with Bagdad and Persia. Others have not hesitated to qualify the route as anything less than a new road to the East.

A diagram of the route is attached hereto.\* From Damascus, Nairn takes the desert route direct to Ramadie. Kettaneh, on the other hand, takes a northern track via Palmyra and Hit to Ramadie. From the last-named town both proceed by Felujah, where the Euphrates is crossed, to Bagdad. As will be seen later, a number of smaller competitors are beginning to utilise the same tracks, especially the southern one.

\* Not reproduced.

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Kettaneh takes his own passengers on to Tehran. Nairn transfers his passengers for Persia to the Parsons Transport Company, a small concern run by an Englishman and entirely separate from Nairn, with whom he connects at Bagdad. Both take the only possible road, that which leads from Khanikin on the Irak border via Kermanshah and Hamadan to Tehran. On some occasions it is found more convenient to use the night train which runs between Bagdad and Khanikin. The car can be shipped for a freightage of about 60 rupees, but if the transporter chooses this course he has himself to defray the railway fares of his passengers from Bagdad to Khanikin, the Bagdad-Tehran fare being an inclusive sum.

The time taken for the whole journey varies according to the length of delay in Bagdad. On my recent journey we left Tehran on Monday morning and arrived in Beirut on Friday night—a five-days' trip.

The desert track used by Nairn is as follows: The cars leave the Homs road very soon after setting out from Damascus. The going for many stretches is marvellously good. Here the desert is flat, like a parade ground or a playing field with the grass worn off it, the wheels hardly making an impression on it. There are no obstacles, so that the cars can make their own speed. In other places, notably some 80 miles west of Ramadie and again about 70 miles east of Damascus, softer going is encountered. Here the track is sandy and rutted and the plain interrupted by a certain unevenness. This is a searching test for the toughness and elasticity of the cars. In the Wadi Hauran, too, the going is jolty, especially by night. The whole journey, whether it is the hard desert level in the heat of midday, or painful going in the broken country, or the floods and mud-flats of winter, undoubtedly tells heavily on the cars. Anyone who undertakes the service—above all, if he promises rapid transit—must count on a rapid deterioration of his stock. Nairn sometimes uses up a Rapson tyre in four single journeys.

On the other hand, if the desert crossing could be made in easier stages, a good deal less wear and tear would be suffered. Less powerful cars than Nairn's Cadillacs and Buicks do indeed make the journey. It is not unusual in the desert to come across a caravan of Fords encamped for the night, their occupants and drivers sleeping, apparently unguarded, around them. These complete the trip in three or four days and charge their passengers perhaps £4 or £5 a head. Nairn has no longer a monopoly of the route. Between Ramadie and Damascus—i.e., between 5 o'clock one evening and 2 in the afternoon of the next day—we encountered the following cars:—

- (a.) Two Dodge cars, one broken down.
- (b.) One Hudson car, alone.
- (c.) One Durrant car, abandoned.
- (d.) One Buick car, which had collided with a passing car in mid-desert and which was awaiting help.
- (e.) Four Ford cars, not too new, encamped for the night.
- (f.) A Nairn convoy of three Buicks.
- (g.) Two Ford cars, going well.
- (h.) One Hudson car.
- (i.) Two more Fords.
- (j.) One Crossley car, stranded near Jebel Tenf.
- (k.) One solitary Ford, with five passengers.
- (l.) Two 1-ton lorries, a Talbot and a G.M.C., fitted each with seats for some fifteen passengers, advancing like antedeluvian char-à-bancs, 100 miles out from Damascus.
- (m.) One Reo car, piled high with luggage.
- (n.) One more Reo, in difficulties.
- (o.) One more G.M.C. lorry, fitted for passengers.
- (p.) A Nairn convoy of two cars.

The quantity of traffic on the track that day may have been extraordinary, but more than 110 cars left Damascus for Bagdad in the first week of September. It is evident that Nairn's service is developing into one for passengers who put comfort and safety above expense. For less fortunate travellers it is possible to cross to Bagdad for £15, or even £20, less than he charges. The cheaper journey is not, of course, unattended by certain risks. The second Reo car mentioned above as being in difficulties had run short of oil 200 miles out from Damascus, with an Armenian, an old Persian gentleman and his daughter aboard. They had begged oil at ransom price from a passing car, and then had broken down again 80 miles from home with ignition

trouble. The night, passed waterless and foodless, in fear of the Bedouin, had reduced the girl to hysterics. They had already been three days on the trip from Bagdad. Nairn took them into Damascus at £10 a head.

The track itself is by this time well marked. Empty petrol tins are strewn along it, and these, when they reflect the light of the head-lamps at night, are not unhelpful for keeping direction. Fourteen empty cases were counted in five minutes in mid-desert. Guides are no longer necessary. The track is in fact too well used and is showing signs of wear. It is evident that, sooner or later, a new one may have to be found, which will not necessarily, however, be far removed from the old one, and will still be able to utilise the good portions of it. In this connection it is interesting to know that a route debouching at Haifa is still talked of in Bagdad. Nairn himself is annoyed at the number of his competitors, reputable and disreputable, who utilise the immunity which he purchases yearly from the tribes and wear out the track which he alone made. He talks of obtaining from the Irak and Syrian Governments the privilege of making for himself a new track on which his cars alone will be allowed to run. Such measures will not be necessary in the immediate future, however, and, as Nairn shows no disposition to stay long in the trans-desert business, it is not likely that he will have to concern himself deeply with the question. In any case it is too much to expect, unless he falls out with the local authorities, that he will shift his headquarters to Haifa in an attempt to open up a route thence to Irak. But if the need for the desert routes to Irak continues, this problem will be one for his successors.

After leaving Ramadie the track leads by the Euphrates and is good or indifferent by turns. Felujah is reached in an hour and a quarter. From this town to the solitary police post of Khanuktah there is a splendid stretch of desert, where the cars can race at over 60 miles an hour and remain as steady as a railway train. From Khanuktah the 23 miles into Bagdad are slower and more difficult. The whole journey from Damascus is done in twenty-four hours, and has been completed in considerably less.

Kettaneh, as is known, spends longer on the journey and allows his passengers to sleep two nights *en route* at Palmyra and at Kubaissa, near Hit.

He states that his route is harder on tyres, but less bumpy than Nairn's. He uses oversized Goodyear tyres, and manages to make a dozen single trips with them. The track is clear as far as Palmyra. From thence to the Euphrates it involves the crossing of several wadis, where the track traverses gravel and stones and is not permanently marked by wheel ruts. Guides are no longer necessary, any difficult parts of the route being marked by cairns, which his drivers have placed as landmarks. It is said that, unlike Nairn's route, the northern one is not much used by free-lance cars, chiefly because, the track being so indistinct, unpractised drivers cannot trust themselves to cross from the river to Palmyra. Kettaneh's *clientèle* is also less numerous than Nairn's. In a recent week, which he seemed to consider a moderately good one, he transported fourteen passengers to Bagdad, and of these he took two on to Hamadan and two to Tehran.

From Bagdad to the northern Irak frontier the road is still only a track of varied quality, on the whole good. It passes through foothills before reaching Khanikin. Thence it crosses the border and winds through undulating country, a dusty and indifferent road, to the Pai-yi-Takht. There is a steep pull up to this pass, with hairpin bends near the top; but once it is surmounted the road is easier, as well as improved in surface, especially past Kerind. A drive through moorland country brings the traveller to Kermanshah, some eight or nine hours from Khanikin, allowing time for customs and passport delays, which are considerable.

From Kermanshah a good level road leads across and down the valley of the same name. After an hour and a half the car is again in moorland country, reminiscent of the peak district. Another level stretch and the car starts to climb the pass of Assadabad, 8,000 feet high, the ascent to which must hardly be less than 3,000 feet in 6 or 7 miles. A good road leads down from it to Hamadan, which is within six hours' easy run from Kermanshah.

From Hamadan is another five hours' going to Kazvin, along a road which is quite good and which presents the same succession of broad, extensive plain and well-graded ascent into the hill-lands. Compared with Syrian roads, the rarity of hairpin bends is remarkable.

The level road from Kazvin to Tehran takes four hours to cover. It is bumpy and frequently traversed by small streams coming down from the mountains, with which the road runs parallel. Culverts are, however, being made in places.

My return journey from Tehran to Bagdad was completed along this road in three



days. It was interesting to note that a 1-ton Ford lorry with baggage kept up our pace during that time and arrived in Bagdad only three minutes after us.

Such is the Beirut-Bagdad-Tehran motor route. What is the political and commercial importance to be attached to it, for the present and in the future?

The following instructions were sent to the French Ambassador at Constantinople in the late 18th century:—

"Sa Majesté verrait avec satisfaction qu'on aggrandît et qu'on poussât le commerce de ses sujets qui s'étendrait par Alep et Bagdad en Perse et dans le golfe Persique. Le sieur Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier sait que Sa Majesté a pensé en même temps à établir par cette route une communication pour les lettres et paquets à expédier aux Grandes Indes."

The same idea was long nursed by Talleyrand. It sounds curiously modern, and indeed finds an echo in some present-day declarations.

A Beirut newspaper constantly paints the picture of a Persia torn between the selfish ambitions of Russia and Great Britain, and only awaiting the intervention of some liberating and disinterested Power such as France. To this intervention the new routes to Persia, and especially the one through Palmyra, which is thought more susceptible to French influence, are considered the key. A local journalist goes so far as to say that the British press is deliberately exaggerating the importance of the murder of Major Imbrie with a view to discouraging French hopes:—

"L'Angleterre sait en effet que son allié avait une facile influence politique en Perse, et avec l'ouverture récente de la voie Beyrouth-Téhéran il y avait lieu de craindre que la France ne prit là-bas, entre les Soviets et les Anglais, la meilleure place."

A recent article in the "Temps" reproduces the same notions.

It is also claimed that the new route offers an excellent opportunity to French commerce. Certain light articles of high value can adopt the same route as that taken by travellers. In this way, by car and lorry, France could import into Persia such articles as clothing, millinery and haberdashery, scents, soaps, pharmaceutical products, watches, objects of fashion. Exports could consist of such goods as carpets, silk, astrakan, sables, guts from Central Asia of the kind used for musical instruments and tennis rackets. A Franco-Orient committee is said to be studying Persia in the light of new conditions, and a new "groupe d'études économiques franco-perse" to have been formed in Paris. A woman writer in the "Asie française" calls on France to consecrate her efforts to the development of the motor route between Kurdistan and the capital of Persia, to the formation of a company for the exploitation of mines and petrol deposits, and to the creation of another company to further agricultural prosperity. From Beirut it is difficult to calculate the exact weight of these schemes. They may not contain much body, but they are interesting as possibilities which may develop if circumstances remain favourable.

It is at least clear that, as regards passenger traffic, these speculators have rightly seized the importance of the route, which is in this respect an accomplished fact. Admittedly motor communication between Persia and Bagdad is no new thing, but the public is only now beginning to realise that there is a rapid and sure means of travel from Tehran to Beirut, and so to Europe.

By this road Shia pilgrims go down to the holy places of Irak. By it the merchants of Hamadan and Tehran will travel to make their foreign purchases. Parsons and Nairn only cater for first-class passengers, but a second- and a third-class traffic is growing up. It is possible to cross the desert for £5 or £6—at considerable discomfort, certainly, as has been seen, but, nevertheless, it is possible. For £10 one can travel in a Hudson car. Several Fords, piled high with luggage and complete with passengers, were seen on the Persian road. It is not impossible that in a very few years motor travel in Persia, along the roads which exist, will have made the same amazing extension as has been witnessed in Syria. Kettaneh thinks that he will be able in time to take second-class passengers for £10 from Tehran to Beirut.

The callings of my travelling companions illustrate the varied nature of the travellers who already use the route. Between Beirut and Bagdad there were two English employees of the Imperial Bank of Persia, two Poles going out to drill for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a Scotch doctor practising in Bagdad, a German commercial traveller, a Bagdadi Jew and his wife, an Iraqi from Basra, an official of the Irak railways and three English youths going out to Bagdad to work in the army canteens there. Between Bagdad and Tehran I travelled with a young Persian

nobleman, a Syrian trader returning from the Caspian provinces, an English employee of one of the large carpet firms in Hamadan, two British officers returning to Irak from a month's leave in Persia and a sub-manager of the firm of Orosdi-Bach in Bagdad. It will be noticed how many of them were British, or connected with British enterprise. Indeed, the thought naturally occurs that the prosperity of the route, at least the trans-desert portion of it, is possibly dependent on the British occupation of Irak.

Given a withdrawal of the British from Irak, the route would, under present conditions, be bound to decline. It is, however, feasible that by that time a route which offers a visit to Damascus, the Lebanon, Palmyra, Bagdad, ancient Babylon, Kerbelah, the rock inscriptions of Darius near Kermanshah, the bazaars of Hamadan and Tehran, might have replaced its British by a tourist *clientèle*, or, more remotely, by a French or French-protected *clientèle*.

The road as one for travellers is therefore already established. The position of the Beirut-Bagdad route suggests a resemblance with that which connects Calais to Marseilles. Both short-circuit British shipping lines, and both are largely employed by British travellers.

But the political value of the route to the French is doubtful. It will unquestionably strengthen the position of Beirut as the main port between Smyrna and the Suez Canal. It may possibly encourage the French to take a larger interest in Persian affairs, now that Persia is less remote from her, although Irak and many barren miles lie between Damascus and Kermanshah. What is more certain is that an attempt will be made to build up a Franco-Persian trade along the lines already described.

This commerce already exists in a casual sort of way. Cars take motor-tyres to Bagdad or bring a small consignment of caviare down from Tehran, much in the same spirit as the stage-coach brought urgently required delicacies from London to the innkeeper in Norfolk. Parsons, for example, sometimes takes his lorry down from Persia to Khanikin to bring up tyres. To increase the profit of the journey, he, perhaps, takes a load of potatoes down with him to Irak. Similarly, if he goes down with a load, he may bring a cargo of bottled beer back.

The case is one of disjointed requirements. Nairn has two Cadillac vans costing 5,000 dollars each ready to enter the field; Kettaneh has five vans, two Dodges and three Reos; Parsons has the Ford lorry already mentioned; but these are chiefly intended for passengers' luggage, and it is portmanteaux and hat boxes they carry.

Merchandise proper has nevertheless been transported, and should the proposed arrangement for reciprocal cheap transit dues be concluded between Syria and Irak, as seems likely, this commercial movement will undoubtedly be enhanced.

The plan evidently is to combine freight with passengers' luggage, a natural development from the casual trade mentioned above. Kettaneh, for example, between April and August of this year, transported 11½ tons of goods, exclusive of baggage. On one trip he took to Bagdad 250 motor tyres. On another he carried 600 kilog. of cloth, for which he was paid 7½ gold piastres a kilogramme. He has in addition taken to Bagdad a consignment of books for the Ministry of Education, motor spare parts, boots and shoes made in Damascus, boxes of Damascus crystallised fruits, arak, odd cases of champagne, a quantity of electrotypes, some gramophones and discs, odd personal effects, clothes and some cinema films. The "Pathé Gazette," as shown in Bagdad, is said to be practically up to date. The movement of these articles, it will be noticed, is all eastward.

As regards exchange between Syria and Persia, this so far has been negligible, perhaps owing to heavy customs dues in Irak. Persian carpets, for example, would have to pay 20 per cent. transit dues if sent to Europe via Irak by any other route than the Khanikin-Basra one. A quantity of electrical fittings were recently sent from Beirut to the French Legation in Tehran. These passed through Irak duty free.

Kettaneh hopes, nevertheless, to bring from Persia to Beirut such things as carpets, guts, furs, extracts of flowers and roots for perfume making. Silk in the cocoon is too bulky for this method of transport; but local spinners might spin the Persian silk *sur place*, and then export it. He might take to Persia all kinds of articles *de luxe*. If Kettaneh secures, as he hopes, the Persian mail for Europe, this commerce would graft itself by a natural process on to his regular inward and outward journeys.

It will be noticed how many of these items—silks, films, motor tyres, scents, champagne—are of special interest to French commerce.

This trade proposition is not, however, so simple as it appears on a map, and it would be very hazardous to foretell for it anything but a small development. A recent writer in the American magazine "Asia" says that Beirut is for Bagdad a quicker and a better port to Europe than Basra, and Alexandretta is the logical outlet to the sea for



Mosul. It is not so simple as all that. The future may see some specially adapted type of lorry crossing from Palmyra to Abu Kemal and thence down the Euphrates to Ramadie, or following the Kettaneh or even the Nairn route. But this will necessitate a definite series of intermediary depots for refitting and repairs. The prospect of regular commercial traffic along the Persian road is more feasible. A small number of old lorries, ex-army for the most part, were seen between Khanikin and Tehran, so that in some particular cases it must pay to use motor transport on this road. Two of them were said to carry agricultural implements. Road-tolls, however, constitute a very heavy handicap against this development. 27s. per passenger is paid in toll between Khanikin and Tehran. Similarly, a 1-ton lorry pays £6, and a 2-ton lorry £9. Including toll, it would cost £50 to send a 3-ton lorry from Bagdad to the Persian capital. Heavy wear and tear on the cars must be reckoned with. Finally, there is the road to be thought of. After a few months continual traffic there might be no road left, particularly if there were no foreign advisers in Persia to see that dues collected on the highway were spent, in part at least, on its upkeep.

In any case one cannot imagine that it will ever be possible, unless conditions are very much changed, for the bulky consignments of tea, cotton goods and sugar from Basra which, on camels, packmules and carts, are seen waiting at the frontier to pass the customs or toiling slowly up the pass of Aveh, to move up into Persia by means of motor transport. Further, this is not included in the schemes of those who wish to expand trade along the Beirut-Bagdad-Tehran route.

An English member of a firm which manufactures and exports carpets from Hamadan assured me that, as far as he could see, it would not pay to send even these down to Khanikin by motor lorry, and certainly not over the desert to Beirut, although this saving in time on their journey to America would be of some value. Even if money costs 2 per cent. per month in the Tehran bazaar, an economy of two or three months would make little difference to the financial aspect of an ordinary delivery, unless it were in some class of goods very urgently required.

Another Englishman who was going to Kermanshah with the intention of buying wool in the vicinity for export to America for carpet making thought the Beirut route equally unlikely to benefit him, and said that the natural channel for his purchases would be by Basra. A Syrian merchant spoken to had been up in the Caspian provinces with the intention of buying silk. He had made enquiries and had found that to transport a kilogramme of cocoons, apparently a very bulky commodity, from Enzeli to Beirut in hired lorries by one of the desert routes would cost some 20 fr. Their value at that time in France was 60 or 65 fr. the kilogramme. He was not prepared to pay such heavy freight. An alternative route was offered to him by the Caspian, Volga and certain canals to Hamburg. This would have cost 3 fr. per kilogramme, and he was only kept from such an attractive proposition by his mistrust of the Russian Government. He finally decided not to buy silk this year.

It is most unlikely, therefore, that heavy goods will utilise the Beirut-Bagdad-Tehran route. Lighter and more valuable goods are already passing along it, though not in important quantities. This latter exchange will develop, but whether to an extent which will justify French expectations is problematic. As regards passenger traffic, that is already in being, is thriving, and is evidently for the moment the most important aspect of the venture.

The opening of the route has already benefited French shipping lines and the towns of Beirut and Damascus. It has proved an immense advertisement for certain makes of American cars. It may some day yield the advantage to France which some of the more "colonially" minded Frenchmen hope from it. It will help to confirm Irak in her office of a transit country for Persia, and in that way react on existing routes to that Empire through Russia or Turkey, as well as on any route which may come into being via Mohammerah to Isfahan.

In the matter of commercial possibilities, French interest is testified by the reported preparation of a commercial motor caravan which is to travel along the route with samples of "parfumerie, savonnerie, pharmacie, horlogerie, mercerie, rubannerie, lingerie." It will carry catalogues and offers to transmit orders to manufacturers.

Beirut, October 26, 1924.

No. 228.

*Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 30.)*

(No. 19.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, November 29, 1924.

FRENCH High Commissioner informs me that he has been recalled and is to be replaced by General Sarraill. In view of latter's record at Salonica, I fear that change may adversely affect Anglo-French relations in these parts, which are now happy.

[E 11158/10588/89]

No. 229.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 11.)*

(No. 150. Confidential.)  
Sir,

Beirut, December 1, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 19 of the 29th November, reporting the recall of General Weygand, I have the honour to inform you that the news, which became commonly known yesterday, has been received with feelings of almost universal regret, which are, in many cases, akin to consternation. I believe that for once these feelings are really sincere. By his simplicity, devotion to duty and straightforward frankness the general had succeeded in convincing the mass of the people of this country that his real desire was to advance their interests, and in this manner he had gained both their respect and their confidence. A telegraphic avalanche of protest to Paris seemed likely, but General Weygand has expressed his wish that no such telegrams should be sent, and his wish has been respected.

The manner of his recall is as surprising as the suddenness with which it has been effected. About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 29th November he received from the Ministry of War a telegram stating baldly that General Sarraill had been appointed French High Commissioner and that General Weygand would return at once to reassume his duties on the Supreme War Council and to take over the direction of the centre for higher military studies. In recognition of his services General Weygand would receive the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour. From the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to which the High Commission is attached, he had, up to this afternoon, received no communication whatever. I should imagine that this method of getting rid of a most distinguished soldier, who has, during the past eighteen months, rendered services of very real value to his country as a civilian administrator, is almost unprecedented. General Weygand has simply replied that, unless otherwise instructed, he proposes to leave Beirut on Friday, the 5th December.

The general, who feels that for once in his life he is confronted with a simple situation which admits of but one solution, is obviously much hurt and profoundly disappointed. As he himself says, the year and a half which he has spent here have been a time of preparation, and he has been hoping that the year 1925 would see the fruition of many pending questions, such as the promulgation of the organic law, the settlement of Syria's shares in the Ottoman Public Debt, the settlement of the Tobacco Régie question, &c. The preparatory work has been done. It remains to be seen whether his successor will take advantage of this work or will prefer to start all over again on his own lines, thus losing valuable time.

The choice of General Sarraill seems a surprising one, even taking into account the views and tendencies of the present French Government. The mainstay of France in these parts has been the clerical influence, and it is opined that the clerics will receive short shrift from the new High Commissioner. There is no doubt that in the time of General Gouraud local ecclesiastical influence and interference was excessive. Since the arrival of General Weygand this undue influence has been restrained. I know for a fact that General Vandenberg, the present Governor of the Lebanon, found the repeated attempts at interference of the Maronite Patriarch in administrative matters intolerable, and that he very plainly reminded him what the duties of a patriarch really are.

I have heard from persons who are hoping for the best that General Sarraill's character has of late somewhat changed under the influence for good exercised upon him by his wife. I sincerely trust that this will prove to be the case. Otherwise, in



view of his record while in command at Salonica, one cannot refrain from fearing that the improvement in Anglo-French relations in this region, which, though gradual, has been very marked, will receive a severe set-back, and that we may go back to the period of stupid unreasoning suspicions and intrigues.

With General Weygand's departure many changes are inevitable. The Governor of the Lebanon will certainly go. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Goudot, would in any case have been leaving shortly, and it is clear that General Naulin, who acts as Assistant-Commander of the Forces, feels that his tenure of office is uncertain. It is also probable that on the civil side there will be changes, and possibly another post will be found for M. de Reflye, the Secretary-General.

In a word, it seems likely that, in order to satisfy the exigencies of French political intrigue at home, an administration which was becoming daily more efficient is to be broken up. The result can hardly be favourable to real French interests.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 11423/10588/89]

No. 230

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 18.)*

(No. 155.)

Sir,

Beirut, December 8, 1924.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 150 of the 1st December, I have the honour to report that General Weygand, having received no further communication from Paris, left Beirut on the 5th December as arranged. Probably his explanation of an otherwise inexplicable silence is the correct one, namely, that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs felt that a dirty piece of work had been done and that in the circumstances it was best to say nothing. M. Herriot may later have an unpleasant quarter of an hour, as General Weygand intends to ask for an explanation and to speak his mind plainly. There is as yet no news as to when General Sarraill may be expected.

The send-off given to General and Mme. Weygand was, it is generally agreed, a striking one. During the few days preceding their departure the Residency was visited by many deputations and individuals. Among the deputations was one composed of some fifty vehicles containing ladies of various races who chose this manner of expressing their feelings to Mme. Weygand. Part of this procession proceeded later to the Serail to acclaim General Weygand.

On the 5th December General Weygand proceeded with a mounted escort from the Residency outside the town to the quay, and during his progress through the town was, according to the newspapers' reports, accompanied by an ever-growing crowd of young men, who, on his arrival at the quay-side, removed him from his car and carried him in triumph. At the landing-stage were assembled various guards of honour and a large number of deputations, officers, officials, notables, &c., while a squadron of aeroplanes appeared overhead. After a rather lengthy period of farewells, due to the number of those who wished to shake his hand, the High Commissioner, his wife and personal staff embarked on the "Pierre Loti" for Marseilles by the northern route.

Among those who are believed, and no doubt rightly, to feel little or no regret at the departure of General Weygand are the local freemasons and many Moslems, both of whom hope to profit by the expected slump in clerical influence. The freemasons expect to find in General Sarraill a kindred spirit, through whom they will be able to advance their personal interests. The Moslems, who have always disliked their inclusion in the State of the Great Lebanon, where they are in a permanent minority as compared with the despised Christians (it will be remembered that the Moslems of Beirut, Tripoli and other coastal towns have before now agitated unsuccessfully for inclusion in the Syrian State, where the majority is preponderantly Moslem), are now hoping to acquire more influence and to play a bigger part than in the past. Quite possibly they will be disappointed as, to judge from the complaints made by the Christians as to the undeserved tenderness shewn to the Moslems, it seems probable that the scales have during the Weygand régime been held evenly between the two elements.

There is a certain feeling of resentment of the frequent changes of High Commissioners which have occurred. It is urged that a stable policy is necessary, and it is pointed out that, despite recent political changes in England, the High Commissioners for Palestine and Irak have remained unaffected. Since the French took over here there have been in the space of five years four High Commissioners (Picot, Gouraud, Weygand, Sarraill). These frequent changes are harmful to the country, and it is considered unfair that, as in the present case, a High Commissioner who has found his footing, learned to know the country and gained the confidence of the majority of its inhabitants, should summarily be removed in order to meet the requirements of French home political intrigue. One newspaper states that, although the Lebanon is honoured by having had as its High Commissioner such distinguished generals as Gouraud, Weygand and Sarraill, it would be more in the real interest of the country if France could supply less eminent men who would remain for longer periods. It may even prove later that the present change has been to the detriment of French interests, and I am not the only one who fears that owing to it the maintenance of cordial Anglo-French relations in these parts will become increasingly difficult.

(Copies sent to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.



## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 5661/11/91]

No. 231.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 1)*

(No. 405.)

Sir,

*Ramleh, June 21, 1924.*

WITH reference to Mr. Scott's despatch No. 660 of the 22nd September, 1923, addressed to your predecessor, regarding the recall of the Mahmal by the Egyptian Government in July last, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of an official communiqué of the Egyptian Government announcing that the Mahmal will be despatched to Jeddah as usual this year.

2. I have learned that the decision of the Egyptian Government was taken after they had been approached officially through the Arab agent in Cairo on behalf of King Hussein, who expressed his willingness to receive the Mahmal with full honour and consideration, should the Egyptian Government decide to resume its despatch. I understand that His Majesty further intimated that he would be willing to set aside for the use of Egyptian pilgrims two wards in the hospital at Mecca, where the Egyptian Medical Mission could administer to the wants of their compatriots.

3. The reconciliation between the two countries has been received with great favour in Egypt.

4. The Mahmal will leave Cairo for Suez on the 30th instant, and will be embarked on the 1st July for Jeddah, where it is due to arrive on the 4th July. El Lewa Moussa Fuad Pasha, a member of the Senate, has been appointed Emir-el-Haj.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Jeddah.

I have, &amp;c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 231.

*Communiqué officiel.*

LES difficultés surgies l'été passé entre le Gouvernement égyptien et celui du Hedjaz et qui avaient empêché le départ du Mahmal ont été aplanies. Il a en conséquence été décidé que le Mahmal partira cette année comme par le passé, le Gouvernement égyptien ayant reçu l'assurance qu'il sera accueilli en territoire hedjazien avec tous les égards qui lui sont dus.

*Bureau de la Presse, Le Caire,  
le 17 juin 1924.*

[E 5478/1354/65]

No. 232.

*Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquis della Torretta.*

My dear Ambassador,

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1924.*

SIR W. TYRRELL promised, in his letter of the 18th March, on the subject of the assurances which His Majesty's Government are to give to the Italian Government in regard to the Irak mandate, that a further communication should be sent to your Excellency when His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad had been consulted on various points. Sir H. Dobbs's reply has now been received, and I am therefore able to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed draft memorandum, embodying the assurances desired by the Italian Government. It will be seen that certain textual amendments have been made; these have been necessitated by the changes in the situation since the original draft was prepared.

Your Excellency will realise that effect cannot be given to these assurances until the treaty and the draft instrument to replace the mandate have been definitely approved by the League of Nations, when notes regarding the assurances can be exchanged. In the meanwhile, I shall be glad to learn that the new memorandum

meets the views of the Italian Government, as, after consultation with the Irak Government, His Majesty's Government find that they are quite unable to make further concessions on the points at issue.

I have not thought it necessary to enclose copies of the Irak Treaty or of the subsidiary agreements, as these documents have already been brought to the attention of the Italian Government through their presentation to the Council of the League of Nations in June last.

It will be remembered that, according to your Excellency's letter No. 307 of the 8th February to Mr. Oliphant, the Italian Government desired to learn the contents of the memorandum of assurances regarding Irak before taking a decision as regards the Palestine assurances. Now that the Irak assurances are available, I trust that the Italian Government will see their way to accept the Palestine arrangement, and that it may be possible to exchange notes in the form already decided upon.

Believe me, &amp;c.

EYRE A. CROWE.

[C 19108/19108/19]

No. 233.

*Memorandum by Mr. Headlam-Morley and Mr. Childs respecting Cyprus.**I.—The Acquisition of Cyprus in 1878.**The Cyprus Convention.*

THE text of the "Convention of Defensive Alliance"—better known as the Cyprus Convention—concluded between Her Majesty's Government and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey on the 4th June, 1878, under which we occupied Cyprus on the 12th July in the same year, is as follows:—

## "ARTICLE 1.

"If Batum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

"In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the Government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories. And in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagements, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."

2. It will be seen that this convention contained provisions of the highest political importance, for by it the British Government entered into a formal engagement to maintain the integrity of the Turkish dominions in Asia against Russia. The general guarantee of the integrity of Turkey incorporated in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 having broken down, Great Britain now acts alone. It was a far reaching military commitment of a kind to which the Government and Parliament have in recent years been very averse. The arrangement about Cyprus is subordinate and secondary; the conditional and possibly temporary occupation of the island appears merely as providing a convenient base for the maintenance of British influence and authority on the mainland, influence and authority which were to be used for two purposes, first for defence against Russian aggression, secondly, necessary reforms of the Government in Asia Minor.

3. It is now for the first time possible to give some consecutive account of the reasons for which this very important step was taken, owing to the recent publication of the lives of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. In this, as in other similar matters, the records of the Foreign Office are very defective. They seem to contain practically no information as to the preliminary discussions, for Lord Beaconsfield, who, as Prime Minister, took an exceptionally active part in the direction of foreign affairs, does not seem to have used the Foreign Office machinery,



and Lord Salisbury, at the time when he became Secretary of State, conducted the most important correspondence privately, and we have here no copies of his letters.<sup>(1)</sup>

4. The general situation in the spring of 1878 is well known. Russia had conducted a successful war against Turkey, and in February the Russian army was at the gates of Constantinople. The Cabinet had therefore to consider the methods they would have to adopt in order to safeguard British interests in the Balkans, the Levant and Asia. The first step determined on after much vacillation was to order the British fleet to sail through the Dardanelles and to take up its position in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. This it did on the 13th February. On the 3rd March the Russians concluded with Turkey the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano. The terms were not officially communicated to the British Government, but soon became known. They were quite unacceptable. In Europe, they included the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria, extending both to the Adriatic and to the Ægean; this would have implied a complete domination by Russia of the Balkans, including Constantinople and the Straits. In Asia they included the acquisition by Russia of Kars, Ardahan and Batum; this would have gone far towards making the Black Sea a Russian lake and would have opened the whole of Turkey in Asia to Russian influence and invasion. The British Government therefore demanded that the whole treaty should be submitted to a conference of the Powers. In this they were on very strong ground, for there was practically not a single clause which did not imply a modification of the treaties of 1856, and it was an agreed doctrine that a European settlement could not be altered by one party to it without the consent of all the others.

5. It was necessary, however, for the Government to determine the precise points to which, whether or not a conference was held, the British Government should object. On the 21st March Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, sent a note to Lord Beaconsfield in which he briefly specified what he considered ought to be the British requirements. He did not propose either then or at any future time, by threat of war, to prevent the Russian acquisitions in Asia, but he suggested that, as compensation for them, there should be secured "two naval stations for England, say, Lemnos and Cyprus, with an occupation, at least temporary, of some place like Scanderoon, for the sake of moral effect." On the 27th March there was an important meeting of the Cabinet at which, to quote Lord Derby's diary,<sup>(2)</sup> the Prime Minister—

"addressed us in a set speech to the effect that peace was not to be secured by drifting, that an emergency had arisen and that every State must look to its own resources: and that the balance of power in the Mediterranean was destroyed. He said that he proposed to issue a proclamation declaring emergency, to put a force in the field, and, simultaneously, to send an expedition from India to occupy Cyprus and Scanderoon (Alexandretta). Thus the effect of the Armenian conquests would be neutralised, the influence of England in the Persian Gulf maintained, and we should hold posts which are the key of Asia. Cairns and Salisbury both supported the Premier, showing clearly by their language that they were aware of the plan now proposed and had discussed it with him in detail; others supported more vaguely. I declared my dissent."

6. Originally the proposal to occupy Cyprus was then connected with the projected despatch of Indian troops to the Mediterranean, and was conceived as a rather high-handed act, involving direct aggression against Turkey. It was this which led to the resignation of Lord Derby. During the next months, however, the plan was radically altered; under the hand of Lord Salisbury, who now became Foreign Minister, it was stripped of its rather melodramatic qualities and became the centre of his whole Eastern policy. In his mind the problem of our attitude towards the treaty of San Stefano and the great advance of Russian power which it involved divided itself into two separate compartments, Europe and Asia. He dealt

<sup>(1)</sup> In particular it is to be regretted that we have not here copies of the correspondence which he conducted during the month of April 1878 with Mr. Layard, then Ambassador at Constantinople, for, as is apparent from the extracts printed in his biography, it contains a valuable exposition of his motives and point of view. The matter is of great importance. After Lord Salisbury left office, neither the Department nor his successor would have for reference the full statement of the reasons for which this very serious step was taken. All that was available was the despatch of the 30th May, which was written for publication. This must add to the difficulties in securing continuity of policy.

<sup>(2)</sup> "Life of Benjamin Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield)," by Moneybags and Buckle, vol. VI, p. 266.

with each with equal decision and foresight. His proposals for the European problem were incorporated in the important despatch of the 29th March, in which the grounds for opposing the creation of a Greater Bulgaria were urged with much cogency. Here Great Britain did not stand alone. He could expect, and he received, the support of Austria-Hungary, and, as is well-known, his policy was crowned with success: it was consummated in an agreement with Russia of the 30th May.

7. The Asiatic problem was different, for here Great Britain would have to act alone. The policy was matured in Lord Salisbury's mind during the months of April and May. It was explained in a series of letters to Mr. Layard, the recently appointed Ambassador to the Porte, and also by Lord Beaconsfield in his correspondence with the Queen. The idea of making the Russian acquisition of Kars and Batum a *casus belli* was rejected.

Lord Salisbury to Sir Henry Elliot, the 3rd June, 1878:—<sup>(3)</sup>

"... The first point in our communications with Austria which seemed quite evident was that we should get no help from her as to Turkey in Asia. This was not unnatural on her part, but it forced us to face the question whether we were prepared to go to war for Kars and Batum alone. This expedient on the whole did not commend itself, for it was quite evident that when we had taken them, unless we were prepared to defend them, we should have done nothing; and if, for the sake of the rest of the Turkish Empire, we were prepared to defend their north-east frontier, was there anything in these particular positions which made them worth a bloody war with a doubtful issue in the first instance? If we had had anybody to help us the matter might have been different. But, standing alone, we have thought it better to take measures (not yet quite complete) for the protection of Turkey in Asia, and not to go to war about the Armenian conquests."

The problem, then, was to find some other means by which the danger of Russian aggression might be impeded. This was to be found in an alliance between Great Britain and Turkey for the defence of her Asiatic dominions; this alliance, however, to be effective, would require a military and naval station, either on the soil of Asia or in close proximity to it. Where could such a station be found, except in Cyprus?

Lord Salisbury to Mr. Layard, the 2nd May, 1878:—<sup>(4)</sup>

"The mere presence of the Russians at Kars will cause Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria to turn their faces northward. Then a Russian party will arise—and consequent disorder—and the languid administrative powers of the Porte will be overtaxed, and a chaos will follow, of which, in some form or other, the Russians will take advantage to reduce the Porte to impotence and to turn its provinces into Russian satrapies. The presence of England is the only remedy which can prevent this process of destruction from going forward. I think we might very properly enter into a defensive alliance with the Porte, undertaking to join in defending her Asiatic Empire from any attacks of Russia. I cannot, however, say this definitely, for, though I find it is agreed to by such of my colleagues as I have seen, I cannot be certain that the Cabinet will sanction it. Personally, I think that such an arrangement would prevent any further encroachment of Russia, and would also check that turning Russia-wards on the part of the inhabitants of Western Asia, which I dread. But, to give any strength or value to such an undertaking, some port in the Levant would be an absolute necessity. It would be ridiculous to attempt to exercise any such protective office from such a distance as Malta."

And again, on the 9th May:—

"The great problem which the Turk will have to solve as soon as he has got rid of the Russian army off his soil is, how to keep his Asiatic Empire together. . . . If he has his own strength alone to trust to, no one will believe in his power of resistance. He has been beaten too often. The Arabs and the Asiatics generally will look to the Russian as the coming man. The Turk's only chance is to obtain the alliance of a great Power—and the only available Power is England."

"Is it possible for England to give that alliance? I cannot speak yet with confidence, but I think so. For England the question of Turkey in Asia is very

<sup>(3)</sup> "Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury," by Lady Gwendolen Cecil, vol. II, p. 261.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 266, &c.



different from the question of Turkey in Europe. The only change possible for the Asiatic Christians would be to come directly under the Government of Russia. There can be no question of autonomy—of young and struggling nationalities and the rest of it. Now, the direct government of Russia is pleasant for nobody, but to Christians of a different rite it is the most oppressive conceivable. Even, therefore, for the sake of the Christians, England would not be restrained by any consideration of humanity from engaging to resist the further advance of the Russians. And the vast majority of the populations of Asiatic Turkey are Mahometans, to whom the Turkish Government is congenial and as good as any other Mahometans get except our own. And while Russian influence over the provinces of European Turkey would be a comparatively distant and indirect evil, her influence over Syria and Mesopotamia would be a very serious embarrassment, and would certainly, through the connection of Bagdad with Bombay, make our hold on India more difficult. I do not, therefore, despair of England coming to the conclusion that she can undertake such a defensive alliance. But for that purpose it is, as I said before, absolutely and indispensably necessary that she should be nearer at hand than Malta."

Lord Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, the 5th May:—<sup>(\*)</sup>

"If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte, and England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened.

"Cyprus is the key of Western Asia.

"Such an arrangement would also greatly strengthen Turkey in Europe, and altogether she would be a stronger barrier against Russia than she was before the war.

"If this policy be carried into effect, and it must be carried, your Majesty need fear no coalition of Emperors. It will weld together your Majesty's Indian Empire and Great Britain. As Lord Beaconsfield is soon to have the honour of an audience of your Majesty, he will reserve this great subject until that time."

8. To this project the Cabinet gave its approval on the 16th May, and the whole scheme was explained in a letter of the same date to Mr. Layard:—<sup>(\*)</sup>

"Two conditions, however, are indispensable. If our defensive alliance is to be worth anything, we must not be hampered by divisions at home, and we must have every facility for exercising vigilance and giving assistance in Asia. To meet the first object it will be necessary that the Porte should give us specific assurances of good government to Asiatic Christians, similar to those given in the treaty to Russia, and should thereby invest us with a special privilege of advice and remonstrance in case of any gross abuse.

"To meet the other, the Porte should concede to us the occupation of Cyprus. It has the double advantage of vicinity both to Asia Minor and Syria; it would enable us without any act of overt hostility and without disturbing the peace of Europe to accumulate material of war, and, if requisite, the troops necessary for operations in Asia Minor or Syria, while it would not excite the jealousy which other Powers would feel at any acquisitions on the mainland.

"We should not desire to acquire it in any way which could indicate hostility to the Porte or any acquiescence in partition. We should therefore propose to hold it as part of the agreement by which we undertook to defend the Asiatic Empire against the Russians, and we should distinctly stipulate that, as both these engagements were consequent on the Russian annexations in Armenia, as soon as these should cease, both our defensive alliance and our occupation of Cyprus should cease also."

9. The crisis came at the end of the month. In Lord Salisbury's mind, and also in that presumably of Lord Beaconsfield, the Cyprus Convention was the key of the whole situation; though the arrangement with Russia regarding Europe was practically complete, it was not signed until after the other part of the settlement—that concerning Asia—had been carried through, and, if the Asiatic project had

<sup>(\*)</sup> "Life of Lord Beaconsfield," vol. VI, p. 291.

<sup>(\*)</sup> "Life of Lord Salisbury," vol. II, p. 269.

failed, the whole plan, which was the basis for the Congress of Berlin, would have fallen to the ground. This is shown by a telegram which was despatched to Mr. Layard on the 23rd May, which contains his official instructions, a telegram which has never been published. The proposal was put before the Sultan as an ultimatum with a time limit of forty-eight hours; if it was not accepted, then the friendship of Great Britain would be withdrawn, and the result would be the partition of the whole Turkish Empire:—

"Propose most secretly to Sultan following defensive alliance, to secure his territory for the future in Asia:—

"If, at any future time, Russia shall attempt to take possession of any portion of the Asiatic territories of Sultan, as fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms (to be agreed upon later between the two Powers) into government of Christian subjects of the Porte in Armenia; and, in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by England.

"It is impossible for England to exercise the necessary vigilance over Syria and Asia Minor and to accumulate, when required, troops and material of war in time to be of use in repelling invasion or frustrating attempts to excite rebellion in Asia Minor or Syria unless she possesses a stronghold near the coast. Presence of English in Cyprus will enable them to strengthen Sultan's authority in Syria and Mesopotamia, where, after late events, it will probably be much shaken. As England has no desire to impoverish Porte, she will pay yearly whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island. This alliance will be conditional on Russia retaining Kars and her conquests in Armenia. If they are given up, Cyprus will be evacuated and this treaty will be at an end.

"Press an immediate acceptance of these terms with all energy in your power. Point out that this arrangement makes safe Asiatic Turkey, the field from which the Sultan's army is supplied with men, and that it must be accepted at once if Sultan wishes to retain the goodwill of England. The present opportunity, if neglected, will never recur. We are on the point of an arrangement by which Russian army will be withdrawn from Constantinople, and the autonomous Bulgarian Principality will either be limited to north of the Balkans or got rid of altogether. If the Sultan does not consent to the above arrangement, these negotiations will be broken off at once, and the capture of Constantinople, and the partition of the Empire, will be the immediate result. Nothing has saved the Sultan from this extremity, for which not only Russia, but other Powers, wished, except the friendship of England; but England will desist from all further efforts unless Sultan agrees to allow her to protect his Asiatic Empire by an alliance on these terms. Make Sultan understand that you must have written engagement as above not later than Sunday evening, and that the most absolute secrecy must be observed."

10. On Sunday, the 25th May, the answer was telegraphed by Mr. Layard that the Sultan accepted the proposed convention, and after this Lord Salisbury proceeded on the 30th May to sign the secret agreement with Russia. In this, a paragraph, which at that time was obscure, refers to the Cyprus Convention:—

"In consenting not to contest the desire of the Emperor of Russia to occupy the port of Batum and to guard his conquests in Armenia, the Government of Her Majesty do not hide from themselves that grave dangers—menacing the tranquillity of the populations of Turkey-in-Asia—may result in the future by this extension of the Russian frontier. But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the duty of protecting the Ottoman Empire from this danger, which henceforth will rest largely ('d'une mesure spéciale') upon England, can be effected without exposing Europe to the calamities of a fresh war."

11. Certain minor points of detail having been arranged by telegram, Mr. Layard signed the convention on the 4th June. Meanwhile Lord Salisbury wrote a long despatch to Mr. Layard, containing a very clear exposition of the motives by which Her Majesty's Government had been influenced.<sup>(\*)</sup> It is to be noted, however, that this despatch (which was drafted entirely in his own hand) was

<sup>(\*)</sup> See Appendix I.



not completed until the 30th May, that is, some days after the consent of the Sultan had been given. It appears not to have been despatched that day, and could not have reached Constantinople until after the convention had been actually signed. It was, in fact, not, as it purports to be, the instructions in accordance with which Mr. Layard was to propose the convention to the Porte, but a reasoned defence of the policy written afterwards with a view to eventual publication.

12. On the 1st July, 1878, an annex to the convention was signed, containing the following clauses:—

- (a.) Declared that the Mussulman Religious Tribunal would be continued in Cyprus.
- (b.) Provided for the administration of Evkaf funds (religious endowments).
- (c.) Provided for payment to the Porte of any excess of revenue over expenditure, the excess to be calculated on the average of the five years preceding 1878.
- (d.) Empowered the Sultan to sell or lease lands in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown or State. (This article was abandoned by the Porte under a supplementary convention signed the 3rd February, 1879, in return for a fixed payment of £5,000 per annum.)
- (e.) Authorised Her Majesty's Government to acquire by compulsion land required for public purposes.

In contrast with these clauses dealing only with administrative matters, the sixth and last clause was of great political interest and importance. The text runs thus:—

- (f.) That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the convention of the 4th June, 1878, will be at an end.

It would appear as if this clause had been omitted by inadvertence in the original convention. It is referred to in the telegram of the 23rd May.

13. For the moment complete secrecy had been maintained except that Lord Salisbury appears to have given some information to Count Shouvalov. On the 7th July, just before the termination of the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury communicated the text of the convention officially and confidentially to M. Waddington in an important despatch. This course was rendered necessary, for it could be foreseen that the French would regard the acquisition of Cyprus as a menace to the privileged position which they had so long occupied in Syria. In this despatch Lord Salisbury writes:—

"Your Excellency is well aware that the advice has been from various quarters repeatedly pressed upon Her Majesty's Government to occupy Egypt, or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal. Such an operation might not have been at variance with English interests and would have presented no material difficulties. But this policy has never been entertained by Her Majesty's Government. We had received an intimation from the French Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of their objection under existing circumstances. Her Majesty's Government have constantly turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that kind.

"They have been likewise recommended to occupy some port on the coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, but they felt that, however carefully guarded, such a proceeding might, in the present temper of men's minds, be construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia; and they did not desire to be suspected of designs which are wholly absent from their thoughts. They have, therefore, preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional occupation of a position less advantageous indeed, but still sufficient for the purpose and not exposed to the inconveniences I have mentioned. How long the occupation will continue it is impossible to foresee; but Her Majesty's Government are not without hope that Russian statesmen will in due time satisfy themselves that the territory they have acquired is costly and unproductive, will recognise the futility of any plans which in any quarters may have been formed for making it a stepping-stone to further conquests, and will abandon it as a useless acquisition."

(\*) "State Papers," vol. LXIX, p. 1347.

As will be seen later, this reference to Egypt is of great importance. M. Waddington, in communicating this to the French Government, took the opportunity of placing on record the importance of French interests in Syria and laid special stress on Lord Salisbury's repudiation in the name of his Government of "a policy which might tend towards material occupation, whether of Egypt or only on the banks of the Suez Canal, or on the continent of Asia." In a further despatch to Lord Lyons, Lord Salisbury says:—

"The interests of France as a great Catholic Power in the Lebanon and in the holy places of Palestine have always been scrupulously respected by this country. . . . England has a special tie to Egypt because it is the highway to her Eastern possessions, but the great economical and philanthropic objects which European diplomacy is pursuing in that country interests France and England in an equal degree. Neither Power desires to establish any territorial settlement in Egypt or to interfere in any way with the dynasty of the Khedive at present established there under the suzerainty of the Sultan."

14. Immediately after the convention was made public, on the 8th July, a British squadron under the command of Lord John Hay, appeared before Larnaca, and on the 11th July the administration of the island was formally taken over from the Turkish authority. Naturally enough, the publication of this convention and the sudden occupation of Cyprus caused much sensation both here and abroad. On the whole, public opinion seems to have approved of the step. During the prolonged crisis there had been violent outbursts of Nationalist and, as it was called, "Jingo" feeling, which was not entirely satisfied by the other parts of the settlement made at Berlin until the Cyprus Convention was known. It was to a very large degree this which enabled Lord Beaconsfield to claim that he had secured "peace with honour." On the other hand, Mr. Gladstone characterised it as an "insane" convention. It need not be said that it elicited the warm approval of Prince Bismarck who, twenty years before, had regarded the voluntary cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece as a clear indication of British political decay.

15. It is impossible in reviewing these events not to make a contrast between Lord Salisbury then and in later years. In 1878 we find him in a very serious crisis acting with great promptness and decision. Within a week of the time he became Secretary of State, he boldly took the lead in Europe, and in the Cyprus Convention he worked out and carried into effect a policy which, had it been successful, would have been a turning point in the history of the Near East. We find here no trace of that caution, which often appears to be indecision, and the somewhat wearied cynicism which characterised his policy in his later years. It is, perhaps, not too much to suggest that the failure of his great scheme for ameliorating conditions in Asia Minor left a permanent impression upon his mind. But in addition to this it is probable that he was more strongly influenced than appears in the written record, by his association with Lord Beaconsfield. The imagination, sometimes fantastic, sometimes almost prophetic, and the bold conceptions of Disraeli, joined to the profound but sober intelligence of Salisbury, for a short time gave to British policy a combination of strength and insight which it has seldom reached.

## II.—Earlier Suggestions for the Acquisition of Cyprus.

16. So far we have dealt with the acquisition of Cyprus in close connection with the political crisis of 1878. There is, however, another aspect of the question. The suggestion was not a new one, and even if this crisis had never arisen it might well have been thought desirable to strengthen the British position in the Levant, and to secure some vantage ground for watching over the development of Syria and Mesopotamia; both might be of fundamental importance for safeguarding the road to India.

17. From 1830 until the opening of the Suez Canal the question of constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and thereby providing rapid communication with India, had, from time to time, occupied attention in Great Britain. Between 1830 and 1840 this project was in the first flush of novelty and attractive enterprise. The early surveys of the proposed route were made by General Chesney and the Euphrates Survey Expedition sent out by His Majesty's Government in 1835. From 1830 to 1840 the project was discussed several times in both Houses of Parliament, was the subject of much press comment, and caught public imagination.



18. There is evidence that it was regarded from this point of view both by Lord Salisbury and by Lord Beaconsfield. To Lord Salisbury, anyhow, the demand for a naval station, Lemnos or Cyprus, and the temporary occupation of Scanderoon, represented no new idea:—

"The acquisition of some strategic post as a means of securing England's influence in the Eastern seas had been under discussion in Cabinet for the whole of that month [March 1878]. It had been in the thoughts of Lord Salisbury for a longer period. More than a year before, when he was at Constantinople, he had discussed it as a step desirable to be taken in the event of the Turkish Empire's collapsing. Colonel Home, an officer of the Intelligence Department, in whom he had great confidence, and who was at Constantinople at the time, had suggested Cyprus—or it had turned up in conversation between them—and the idea had so far developed that Lord Salisbury had instructed him to explore and report upon the island from this point of view—instructions which were never carried out, owing to the officer's being called elsewhere; "(\*)

and in March 1878, while he was still Secretary of State for India, he made arrangements for an officer to set out at once in strict secrecy to investigate the situation on the spot.

19. There can be little doubt that these considerations were also in the mind of Lord Beaconsfield. Disraeli visited Cyprus in 1830, as a young man of six and twenty. He spent only one day there, but has recorded his impressions of the island in romantic and appreciative phrases. He thence passed direct to Beirut, Syria, Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine, a visit which stirred him as a Jew, influenced him deeply, and provided him with scenes and material for his novel "Tancred," written fifteen years later. He may have been a young man at the time of his visit, but there is evidence that he already saw countries and peoples and their geographical position not only as to the historical past, but with an eye looking to the future.

20. The conquest of Syria by the Egyptian forces of Mehemet Ali, under his son Ibrahim Pasha, began in 1831. The war in Syria, in which France strongly favoured Mehemet Ali, while Great Britain and Austria eventually gave armed support to the Sultan, was practically ended by the bombardment of Acre and the capture of that place on the 4th November, 1840, by a combined British, Austrian and Turkish fleet. During this period, therefore, and for many years afterwards, Syria and Palestine in their every political and religious aspect—as an important part of the Ottoman Empire, as a country across which lay the short route to India, as a country holding the key of the East, as a country in which French ambitions completely traversed and threatened British interests, as the land of biblical scene and prophesy—commanded much attention in England. Should Palestine, it was asked, after the capture of Acre, be restored unconditionally to Turkish rule or should some change securing better government be made? It was a time when the question of the restoration of the Jews to Palestine was already a subject of discussion in various sections of the British press.<sup>(1)</sup> From the combination of the Egyptian withdrawal, and British interest in Palestine there presently emerged a very curious proposal. Nothing less than that Great Britain should annex Cyprus and Acre by way of compensation for having ejected the Egyptians and thus recovered Syria for the Ottoman Empire. The proposal met with wide approval in England, where public opinion was still robust and stood in fear of none on such matters. It was argued that the annexation would provide material guarantees for the future safety of Syria and Palestine, give confidence to the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, and ensure the stability of that Empire.

21. It will be noticed that the arguments used by Disraeli and Lord Salisbury in support of the occupation of Cyprus in 1878 bear a significant resemblance to those used in 1840–41. In fact, it seems that the two British statesmen in shaping their policy in 1878 drew upon the proposals of 1840–41, which international

(\*) "Life of Lord Salisbury," vol. II, p. 214.

(1) The subject is treated at length in Sokolow's "History of Zionism," vol. I, Chapters XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV and XXVII. See also articles in the "Times" of the 9th March, 1840, 17th August, 1840, and in the "Globe" (called a "Ministerial Paper") on 31st July, 1840.

In his diary, under date of the 4th November, 1840, Lord Shaftesbury, the chief English protagonist of the restoration of the Jews, records that he had—

"... used every effort to persuade the 'Times' to take just views on the Syrian question. I have been successful. Lord Palmerston told me this evening that the concurrence of the Tory papers had smoothed 10,000 difficulties."

jealousies had then brought to nothing. It may even be suggested that in thus boldly adopting and giving effect to the earlier proposals they were not unmindful of the public approval that scheme had won then and were encouraged to hope for similar approval now. It should be noted, too, that some of the avowed motives for British annexation in 1840 are hardly to be distinguished from motives of present-day Zionism. It was declared that with England in possession of Cyprus and Acre, the way would be open for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine and the return of biblical truth to the Holy Land. These considerations appear to have carried much weight in England at the time.

22. Disraeli's novel "Tancred," as has been said, was written in 1847, and has much of the story cast in Palestine and Syria. The native characters he draws have an extraordinary knowledge of British politics and aims; and he represents British policy in that part of the world as the subject of daily native gossip. Two curious assertions which he puts in the mouth of a Jerusalem Jew may be cited: "... the English want Cyprus, and they will take it ...". Later, the same character is made to say: "The English will not do the business of the Turk [overthrow of Ibrahim Pasha] again for nothing. They will take this city [Jerusalem]; they will keep it ...". These trifles should not be laboured; they had their origin in events of the time, as the two foregoing paragraphs show. But they also reveal the ideas then floating in Disraeli's mind. When he came to the negotiations with Russia in 1878 his views were inevitably affected by his earlier knowledge of Syria and Palestine and the trend given to his imagination forty or fifty years earlier.

23. Bearing the foregoing general facts in mind, it becomes of interest to recall certain personal matters concerning Disraeli. By blood a pure Jew, he was by professed faith a Christian and Anglican. This unusual combination in himself he ever explained and defended by the argument that Christianity was the obvious and logical development of Judaism.<sup>(1)</sup> It may be observed too that in his sympathies he was consistently a Jew and a Zionist. He steadily supported the Bill in the House of Commons for removing Jewish disabilities (which the Lords repeatedly threw out), and over a long course of years regularly voted in favour of the measure and made it the subject of some of his most eloquent speeches.<sup>(2)</sup> Throughout his life he held and displayed an unwavering affection for the Jewish race, the Jewish faith, Jewish history and the land of Palestine, and found cause for pride in his Jewish blood. Not without reason did his enemies publicly attribute his Near Eastern policy to his "Semitic instincts."<sup>(3)</sup>

24. Viewed after the interval of half a century, even in the partial light of the general facts here brought together, the conviction can scarcely be avoided that the charge contained part of the truth, and that if "Semitic sympathies" be added we get yet nearer to Disraeli's inner personal motives. It becomes, let us say, a reasonable assumption that in securing Cyprus for Great Britain he felt that, sooner or later, the step would bring Palestine and Syria within the orbit of British control.

### III.—Cyprus under British Administration.

25. The great scheme foreshadowed in the Cyprus Convention was never realised. Lord Salisbury, indeed, began work by appointing military consuls in Asia Minor, but he was soon confronted by the extreme difficulty of getting any real reform in Turkish administration. Even had he remained in office, it seems probable that his hopes would have been disappointed. In fact, the whole project broke down when Lord Beaconsfield's Government fell in the year 1880 and was succeeded by a Liberal Administration; in 1882 the military consuls were withdrawn. Perhaps even more important was the intervention of this country in Egypt resulting as it did in a British occupation and virtually British government of that country. By this we secured a military and naval base in the Levant and acquired control over the Suez Canal. This necessarily made Cyprus much less important than it otherwise would have been. The military effect and diplomatic complication resulting from the occupation of Egypt absorbed the whole available energy, and inevitably Cyprus and Asia Minor were neglected. Moreover, on grounds of general policy, it would have been impossible for this country to extend its influence over Asiatic Turkey at the same time that it practically acquired Egypt. To have done so would almost inevitably have aroused the most active opposition both from France and Russia and would not improbably have brought about a general coalition against us. We

(1) "Life of Benjamin Disraeli," by Money Penny and Buckle, vol. III, Chapter III.

(2) *Ibid.*, vol. III, Chapter III.

(3) "History of Zionism," by Sokolow, vol. I, Chapter XXVII.



have seen that in order to make the Cyprus Convention in the least acceptable to the French it was necessary formally to repudiate any desire for the occupation of Egypt and the Suez Canal. As soon as we settled in Egypt it was a natural corollary that the ambitious schemes for Asia should be given up. Germany was quick to step into the place which we had left vacant.<sup>(14)</sup>

26. Cyprus, however, remained. No steps seem to have been taken to develop it either as a naval or military base. It was found not suitable as a sanatorium for troops. While it seemed possible that the harbour of Famagusta might be made suitable as a naval base, this would have required certainly a very large expenditure of money. It would obviously have been difficult to justify this expenditure on an island which was not under full British sovereignty. In fact, therefore, little was done.

27. It does not seem necessary to enter into questions regarding the administration of the island during the next twenty-six years. At first the Government were confronted by difficulties of a legal nature regarding such matters as the continuance of the Capitulations and the establishment of jurisdiction over territory which had not become formally part of the British dominions. In this connection it may be interesting to rescue from oblivion a remarkable memorandum by Sir Julian Pauncefote of the 16th September, 1878, in which, after quoting the convention and additional article, he continues:—

"It is patent in the face of Europe that the cession by the Porte to Great Britain of the right to occupy Cyprus and administer its government, was in fact a cession by compulsion; though the compulsion was exerted rather by the dangers in which at that crisis the Porte found itself exposed than by the action of Great Britain.

"The possession of this island, or of some similar post, by Great Britain, had become a matter of political and strategical necessity, and its seizure by force of arms would have been justified under the doctrine of self-preservation."

After referring to the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 he continues:—

"The occupation of Cyprus, though Great Britain was not actually at war when it was resolved upon, may be viewed as an application of the rule of self-preservation in another form and under different circumstances, and the annex to the Convention of Defensive Alliance, as recording the conditions by which Great Britain has consented to limit the dominion over the island which she has asserted for the purpose of self-defence.

"If this position be a sound one, Great Britain has the right to insist that her occupation and administration of Cyprus shall be unfettered and untrammelled by any treaties between foreign Powers and the Porte applicable to the Ottoman Dominions in general; and, indeed, the additional article of the 14th August, which gives express power to make treaties in Her Majesty's name for the regulation of the commercial and consular relations and affairs of Cyprus free from the Porte's control, points to the substitution of new treaties for those previously affecting the island. But there is another ground upon which it may be contended that the Capitulations and treaties between the Porte and foreign Powers are abrogated *quoad* Cyprus;

and on this basis he proceeds to argue that the Capitulations are no longer valid, arguments which he supports by appealing to the doctrine *rebus sic stantibus*.

28. Much has happened since this was written and it would, I think, be impossible for anyone in Sir Julian Pauncefote's position now to press the doctrine of interest and self-preservation in the way in which he does. As regards the legal aspect of our administration of Cyprus at the time the position seems to be quite untenable, as is shown in a memorandum by Lord Cairns of the 23rd September, 1878:—

"In considering this question, I do not think we can look on Cyprus as in any sense acquired by conquest. It is quite true that we might have taken it by force, and that had we done so we should have held it free and clear of all obligations attaching on Turkey. But we did not take it by force, and we acquired it deliberately, and for obvious reasons, by an arrangement which was described to be the reverse of alienation, and still more of forcible alienation. We could not, in my opinion, now contend that this arrangement carried with it the incidents of conquest.

<sup>(14)</sup> See annex, p. 21.

"We must take the arrangement, then, as it really is. The Porte has given us every power in and over Cyprus, which it possessed; but we have got nothing more than what the Porte could give. And we have this for a limited time, the Porte retaining the reversion."

29. In general, of course, the island profited greatly by the substitution of an ordered British administration for Turkish maladministration, under which it had suffered for over 300 years. The development was, however, seriously impeded by financial considerations. Unfortunately, in the annex to the convention, the British Government had undertaken to make an annual payment to Turkey equal to that of the surplus revenue while under Turkish Government. This saddled the island with an annual "tribute" of £95,000. As a result, it was found impossible to make the revenue balance the expenditure, and eventually it was necessary to pay an annual grant to the island from Imperial sources. The sum annually paid to Turkey, in fact, did not go into the Ottoman Exchequer, but was earmarked for payment to the Turkish bondholders, and for this reason it apparently continued, even after the full annexation to Great Britain in 1914.

30. When war broke out between Great Britain and Turkey in 1914 the legal basis of our occupation of the island lapsed. The legal advisers of the Foreign Office gave as their opinion that—

"the state of affairs contemplated by the convention of the 4th June, 1878, and the annex of the 1st July, 1878, is a temporary one, and, I think, that strictly these instruments would be cancelled by the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, and Cyprus would be in the position of Turkish territory in British military occupation if no further steps were taken by us."

They also advised that, strictly speaking, it would not be possible to declare a protectorate:—

"A protectorate implies the existence of a State to be protected, and Cyprus is not a State, thereby differing from Egypt which is a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty. Cyprus is merely a bit of Turkey in British occupation and under British administration."

31. The only conclusion that could be come to from these opinions was that the best thing would be to annex Cyprus at once. "When peace negotiations take place the question of retaining Cyprus can then be examined." This proposal was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the 12th October; the necessary Order in Council was prepared and was published immediately after the outbreak of war on the 5th November, 1914, at the same time that a protectorate over Egypt was announced. This act seems to have caused no difficulty or discontent in the island. The Mahometan population, being as they were a minority, regarded British rule as a safeguard and accepted the new situation, showing no tendency to identify themselves with the Turks. The Greeks, of course, welcomed the definite separation from Turkey, and large numbers of them served as muleteers and in other capacities during the war.<sup>(15)</sup>

#### IV.—Cyprus and Greece.

32. The preceding paragraphs will have shown that the British Government were, when they acquired the administration of and eventually annexed Cyprus, influenced almost entirely by their policy with regard to the Turkish Empire and also by the desire for strengthening the naval and military position of this country in the Levant. In 1878 no great importance was attached to Greece and the Greek point of view, and, indeed, it may be said that the matter was not one on which it was supposed that the Kingdom of Greece had any real interest.

33. None the less, from that time onwards, it has become more and more apparent that the Greek point of view could not be entirely neglected.<sup>(16)</sup> When Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Larnaca in 1878, he was waited upon by a Greek deputation

<sup>(15)</sup> "Conscription was not applied during the war, but Cypriots were recruited by voluntary enlistment for service with the Salonica army as muleteers and transport drivers. Some 12,000 men were thus engaged and proved of considerable use, not only as muleteers, but as releasing for combatant duties British troops that would otherwise have had to be employed on this work. Enlistment was popular with the people, and could no doubt be repeated on a larger scale were the necessity to arise again." (Report from Admiral de Robeck, the 18th September, 1919.)

<sup>(16)</sup> The following account is based almost entirely on "Cyprus under British Rule," by Captain Orr, pp. 140, &c.



headed by the Archbishop, who, in his address, used the following words: "We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected." And from this time onwards the official representatives of the Greeks in Cyprus took every opportunity to put officially on record their desire for union with the Kingdom of Greece. So long as Cyprus was held under the 1878 convention it was, of course, quite out of the question that any encouragement should be given to this conception. The British rights over Cyprus were nominally at least temporary and conditional, and the control of the administration, which was all that had been conceded by the Sultan, could not be transferred to any other Government. Quite apart from this, the British Government held themselves to be responsible for the Mahometan population, which was about a quarter of the total population of the island, and they would not have considered themselves justified in transferring them to a Government which would almost certainly have had a very unfavourable influence on their condition.

34. In answer to telegrams advocating the union of Cyprus with Greece, Mr. Gladstone in 1881 reminded the inhabitants that "they must remember that the island is occupied by England as part of the Turkish Empire by virtue of a convention with the Porte. Proposals contravening that convention cannot be discussed." This, however, did not prevent him on a later occasion, in a letter to the Duke of Westminster of the 13th March, 1897, saying: "I subjoin the satisfaction I should feel were it granted me before the close of my long life to see the population of Cyprus placed by a friendly arrangement in organic union with their brethren of the kingdom and Crete."<sup>(1)</sup>

35. On the general merits of the Greek claim it may be noted first that in this case there is no *historical* right of Greece to Cyprus of any kind whatsoever. As has been repeatedly pointed out, never in its whole history has Cyprus been united to Greece, except when they were both portions first of the Roman then of the Byzantine and Turkish Empires. Even at the height of its greatness, Cyprus was never included within the Athenian Empire. Geographically also the claim has no basis. Cyprus is 200 miles distant from Crete or any of the other islands which might conceivably be included in the kingdom, and is essentially connected, not with the other islands of the Aegean, but with the mainland of Syria. It is not in the direction of Cyprus, but to Constantinople and Smyrna, that Greek ambitions have always turned; there can be little doubt that if Cyprus were annexed to Greece it would be treated as a remote and unimportant dependency. None the less, the evidence is clear that there was, at any rate among the intellectual leaders of the Greek population, what they believed to be a genuine desire for union. Avowedly this was based on sentimental grounds of nationality; feeling themselves to be Greeks, they wished to be brought into political union with their mother-country. Captain Orr, who appears to write with real knowledge, lays stress on the fact that the desire for union does not imply any dissatisfaction with British administration, especially among the peasantry, except on one point. He says that "the claim for union with Greece on the part of the Greek-speaking community arises less from an ambition to exchange British domination for that of Greece than for a desire that the administration should be conducted in their own language by officials for the most part sharing their ways of thought and used to the same social standard." There is, he represents, a real gulf between the English officials, who keep apart even from the educated Cypriots. It is another aspect of the same thing that the Cypriots themselves should desire to have access to administrative posts under the Government. This is a motive which it would not be unfair to say is characteristic of the Greek race, and one which would specially appeal to the educated and half-educated part of the community. It would probably not be unjust to suggest that the personal motives of being appointed to a lucrative post under the Government would often carry more weight than mere national sentiment or the desire for good administration.

#### *Offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1915.*

36. At an early period of the war the suggestion for union with Greece was brought up under rather remarkable circumstances, and it will be convenient to take this opportunity to give an account of a curious episode which, however much we may

<sup>(1)</sup> Quoted from a pamphlet entitled "Memorandum on the Island of Cyprus," of the 6th March, 1919, which contains the text of numerous memorials and petitions in favour of union, both before and after the annexation, and extracts from the English press, chiefly favourable to the idea of union.

regret it, must, from the very fact that it took place, be a permanent landmark. Moreover, it had been made the subject of bitter criticism of the Foreign Office, which I venture to suggest is undeserved. It is an episode which has been succinctly but correctly described by Lord Curzon in the following words:—<sup>(2)</sup>

"In October 1915, when Mr. Asquith's Government were endeavouring to persuade Greece (then under King Constantine) to come to the rescue of Serbia—at that time threatened with invasion by the enemy—Lord Grey offered Cyprus unconditionally as a bribe to the Greek Government to induce them to fulfil their treaty obligations. This offer was made without the knowledge or authority of the Cabinet, and with the approval only of the few heads of Departments who were most intimately concerned. Most fortunately it was refused by the Government of M. Zaimis, headstrong in its confidence in the threats or promises of the Kaiser, and it was stated in Parliament that the offer had in consequence lapsed."

37. At the beginning of October 1915 a critical situation had arisen in the Balkans.<sup>(3)</sup> A new Austrian invasion of Serbia had begun; Bulgaria had mobilised, and it was obvious that unless immediate help could be given Serbia would be crushed. The Central Powers would, moreover, get complete control of the railway to Constantinople, and the whole situation in South-Eastern Europe would be irretrievably compromised. The immediate problem was then, what could be done to save Serbia? Strong pressure was being brought on the Allies to send a large expedition to Salonica. It is not necessary here to enter into the acute controversy which arose upon this point; it is sufficient to recall that the War Office were very reluctant to commit themselves to sending out any large number of British troops unless they were assured of the friendliness, if not of the actual support, of Greece, for it is obvious that an Allied force advancing into the interior from Salonica might be fatally compromised by any hostile movement from Greece. The problem of the moment, therefore, was to induce the Greeks by some means or another to join the Allies. The official policy of the British Government was to bring in Greece and Roumania at the same time, and identical offers were being made in this direction at Bucharest and Athens. These included the promise to send 200,000 troops, to which was added an engagement to secure for Greece the north coast of the Aegean and Thrace.

38. It was at this juncture that a completely new suggestion was made, namely, that the British Government should offer Cyprus to Greece on condition that the Greeks agreed to join the Allies. This proposal seems to have been entirely due to Mr. Ronald Burrows, Principal of King's College, an ardent Philhellene and an intimate friend of M. Veniselos. To quote the words of his diary, which were written on the 13th October:—

"Over and above our general insistence on the need for sending large forces to the Balkans, I suggested, and Seton-Watson approved, a plan for rousing public opinion in Greece. The Governor of Cyprus was to be instructed to inform the Archbishop and the Greek members of the Legislative Council that we were ready to give Cyprus to Greece at once, and to guarantee for ten years the territories Greece won by the Treaty of Bucharest, on the one condition that Greece should enter the war immediately on our side. The Governor was to be further instructed to enable the Archbishop and his friends to go to Athens without delay and appeal to the King and Parliament, informing them that the offer now made would never be repeated. The British Minister in Athens was also to be instructed to consult Veniselos throughout, and to secure that our offer was published in the Veniselist press before the Government was able to give its answer. Danger of loss of prestige to England in case of refusal was to be avoided by our offer being expressly made not for our own sake, but for that of Serbia; a corollary to this offer to Greece was to be a suggestion to Russia that she also might make the sacrifice of offering Bessarabia here and now to Roumania on similar conditions."

This suggestion was communicated the same day to the Prime Minister's private secretary, who arranged an interview at the House of Commons between

<sup>(2)</sup> Confidential print "The Future of Cyprus," p. 86, of the 3rd January, 1919.

<sup>(3)</sup> The story has now for the first time been published in George Glasgow's "Life of Ronald Burrows." The account is based upon this, which has been compared with the official records.



Mr. Burrows, who was accompanied by Mr. Seton-Watson<sup>(20)</sup> and Lord Robert Cecil. Mr. Burrows explained the plan. Lord Robert Cecil "took full notes, was clearly impressed by it, and promised to get it brought before the Cabinet."

39. In a minute of the 14th October, Lord Robert Cecil, after referring to other matters, adds:—

"We ought also to offer to secure for Greece Southern Thrace with Smyrna and the hinterland, and as a pledge of our sincerity in these matters, to transfer to her until the end of the war, at any rate, possession of Cyprus. It seems to me that if we could present to the Greek people the immediate possibility of occupying Cyprus, it would be more attractive than any amount of promises of advantage at the end of the war."

This, it will be noticed, was in reality a very different proposal from that of Mr. Burrows. Cyprus, according to it, was only to be handed over to the Greeks temporarily as a pledge that the other promises would be carried out. On the next day, however, the matter had gone further, and a telegram to the following effect was sent to Athens on the 16th<sup>(21)</sup>:—

"Everything that passed with M. Veniselos when he was Prime Minister was on the assumption that Greece would support Serbia according to her treaty."

"It is a great disappointment to find that Greece is not going to do so, and we cannot think the explanation, of which Greek Minister here has given us a copy, is satisfactory or absolves Greece from her obligations."

"His Majesty's Government are asking the support of Greece for Serbia, believing that it is especially in the interests of Greece to prevent Serbia from being crushed. If Greece is prepared to give support as an ally to Serbia, now that she has been attacked by Bulgaria, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give Cyprus to Greece. Should Greece join the Allies for all purposes she would naturally have a share with them in advantages secured at end of war, but the offer of Cyprus is made by His Majesty's Government independently on condition that Greece gives immediate and full support with her army to Serbia. Time is of importance, and you should ask M. Zaimis to give an early reply."

On the same day the following additional telegram was sent to Sir F. Elliot:—

"You should make communication about Cyprus at once; it is quite independent of the other proposal, which is now being considered by Roumanian Government, and as to which it would be well to say nothing to Greece till the answer from Roumania has been received, when I will give you further instructions."

On the evening of the 16th, Mr. Burrows had another conversation with Lord Robert Cecil between 8 and 9 p.m. "He wished to ask my advice about the steps to be taken in Cyprus itself. After a long discussion he wrote out a cable to Sir John Clausen, the Governor of Cyprus, in the sense I desired, and read it out to me. He then wrote a note in my presence to Mr. Bonar Law, as Secretary to the Colonies, to cable it, and despatched it by special messenger to him on the spot." The text of the telegram as sent was as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government feel that in the present emergency no effort must be spared to induce Greece to go to the help of Serbia in accordance with her treaty obligations. They have therefore offered to give Cyprus to Greece on condition that Greece gives immediate and full support with her army to Serbia. Please communicate this fact to the Archbishop or other leading personages in Cyprus, and suggest to them that if they wish to take advantage of this

<sup>(20)</sup> Mr. Seton-Watson was specially interested in Serbia and took an active part in all matters connected with that country. On the other hand, he had no special knowledge of or interest in Greece, and throughout he had no personal responsibility for the Cyprus suggestion.

<sup>(21)</sup> The draft of the telegram is in Sir Edward Grey's handwriting; it was apparently drafted on the evening of the 15th October. It was sent for approval to the Prime Minister, Lord Kitchener, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain. It was also seen and approved by the King. It was despatched on Saturday, the 16th, at 1:30 p.m. The statement attributed to Lord Robert Cecil by Mr. Burrows, "that my plan as regards Cyprus had been adopted in its entirety by the Cabinet," was apparently not correct in this sense that it was not actually brought before the Cabinet, but only approved by the Ministers separately. As will be pointed out below, it had also not been adopted "in its entirety."

opportunity for securing the union of Cyprus with Greece, which is unlikely to recur, they should immediately proceed to Athens and press their demand on the King and Parliament. You are authorised to give them any assistance in your power with this object."

The next day Lord Robert Cecil sent in the following memorandum:—

"A telegram was sent off last night, at my request, by the Colonial Office, informing the High Commissioner of Cyprus of its proposed cession, and telling him to inform the Archbishop and leading personages so that they can go to Athens and press the policy."

"I think M. Veniselos should be immediately informed of all this, and I think also that our press should be told. Perhaps the press might be postponed till Tuesday."

"I further suggest that a telegram should be sent to the Allies informing them. It should also be suggested to Sir G. Buchanan that as we are offering Cyprus to Greece, and £10,000,000 to Roumania, Russia might offer Bessarabia or some part of it to Roumania in return for immediate action. Similarly, Italy should be stirred up about the rifles. Indeed, I think, Sir R. Rodd should be told that feeling here is getting very critical of the Italian attempt to wage war on limited liability principles, and that we hope she will be induced to send the rifles to Russia with all the ammunition that can possibly be spared without any further delay."

40. Up to this point it is quite clear that the Foreign Office and the Government, having received an ingenious suggestion from an outside source, had acted with great rapidity and apparently had done everything in their power to make this suggestion effective. In fact, however, from the point of view of Mr. Burrows, everything had gone wrong.<sup>(22)</sup> Mr. Burrows, who was an ardent Veniselist, never expected that the King or the Greek Government would accept the suggestion. The very essence of his plan was that if carried out in the way he had originally intended, it should stir up a popular movement which would force the hands of the existing Government and probably drive them out of office, and compel the King to reappoint M. Veniselos. He did not therefore wish the offer to be communicated to the Greek Government at once. What he had hoped was that the plan should be at once communicated to the Archbishop of Cyprus and the Greek members of the Legislative Council before it was published anywhere else. The Archbishop, with some other prominent Cypriot, should then be put on a British destroyer, be sent straight off to Athens, land there, and himself make for the first time the announcement in Athens. The Greek Government would only be informed at the time of the landing of the Archbishop and would have no time to refuse it. The idea was that the Archbishop, supported by a wave of passionate enthusiasm, should make his way to the Chamber, and it was hoped that the expression of feeling would be so effective as to carry away the Government with it or drive them out of office. It was a plan the effectiveness of which depended on every detail being carried out with the greatest care. The whole thing is obvious melodrama, almost we may say comic opera. But, indeed, at Athens politics often tend towards melodrama and comic opera.

41. What we have to note is, however, that the practical steps taken by the British Government were not in accordance with this plan, and the whole thing was inevitably doomed to failure from the moment that the offer was made direct to the Greek Government, before the other steps had been taken. We do not know the reason for this. Lord Robert Cecil does not appear to have recorded officially his conversation with Mr. Burrows, at any rate no such memorandum is to be found among the papers. He doubtless discussed the matter personally with Sir Edward Grey, but we do not know whether the whole scheme as Mr. Burrows conceived it was placed before Sir Edward Grey and he altered it, or not. According to Mr. Burrows's account, it was the protest of Sir Robert Clausen by which the scheme was wrecked, but it is to be noted that the telegram to Sir Robert Clausen was so worded that it would not and could not have the effect which was desired, and this telegram had, according to his own statement, been seen and approved by Mr. Burrows. In his diary he says: "I saw . . . and . . . and found that all the younger members of the Foreign Office were indignant that the scheme was spoiled, and that it was Grey

<sup>(22)</sup> This paragraph is based chiefly on private information which I received at the time, and which has since been confirmed by Mr. Seton-Watson.—J. W. H.-M.



personally who was responsible for it." There does not appear to be now in the Office any personal recollection on the matter.

42. Under these circumstances it was only to be expected that the whole scheme would quickly collapse. First of all Sir Robert Clausen, who we may imagine must have been very much puzzled by the instructions which he received, telegraphed on the 17th October as follows:—

"Your cypher telegram, private and personal, of 16th October: Offer of Cyprus to Greece.

"It is certain that any such communication from me will not be kept secret here. Question therefore arises what is to be said to the Moslem representatives of more than a quarter of the population consistently loyal to British rule since 1878, mostly hostile to present Turkish Government, and expecting not without cause that under Greek rule they would be expatriated or extinguished by political or economic pressure, even if retaining their British nationality. I suggest that I should be instructed to point out that the offer of cession necessitated by Turkish infatuation, promise effective British protection in Cyprus, and facilities for emigration elsewhere under the British flag in an Aegean island if possible.

"Alternative course would be to make no official communication here, but if considered advisable to publish report of offer elsewhere. This would probably lead to [?] apprehensive deputation by the leading Greeks here and would avoid necessity for explanations to either Moslems or Greeks now or hereafter if the offer falls through.

"I will await instructions. Next ordinary steamer is on 24th October to Egypt, transhipping here."

The last sentence is instructive; he had never been told to arrange that the Archbishop should be sent to Athens on a British ship of war, but this was an essential point; unless this was done a fortnight must elapse before the Archbishop could even get to Athens. Sir Edward Grey minuted thus: "I should leave it alone now till we get a reply from Greece."

43. The reply from Greece came on the 20th. Sir F. Elliot had communicated the offer to M. Zaimis on 17th October; M. Zaimis said that he could not reply until he had seen the King, which he would do at once. On the 20th October Sir F. Elliot telegraphed:

"This morning I went to M. Zaimis to ask for his answer to offer of Cyprus. My Russian colleague came with me; Chief of Staff came out of Prime Minister's room as we went in. M. Zaimis said that in view of military opinion that it would be only courting disaster to go to help Serbia, it had been decided not to take action, but to maintain a neutrality benevolent towards the Allies. No offers whatever would move the Government from that attitude.

"I asked what number of Allied troops in Macedonia would be sufficient to induce Greece to join us. He replied, however many were sent, General Staff were convinced that they would arrive too late and that it was a mistake to send them there at all as they could be better employed in France or Asia Minor. He will send formal answer through Greek Minister in London."

With this the whole thing was really at an end. The same day Mr. Bonar Law telegraphed to Sir Robert Clausen:

"Private and personal. Secret. My telegram of 18th October and previous correspondence. The report of offer to Greece may become known here to-morrow. You should therefore, if you think it advisable, when news reaches Cyprus, give Moslems general assurances that their loyalty is recognised and that in any event every step will be taken to guard their material and spiritual interests. You should take no action with regard to instructions contained in last two sentences of my telegram of 16th October."

44. The result then was that Mr. Burrows's rather fantastic scheme was never even tried: instead of that we get the formal official offer to Greece, which was inevitably declined. As he himself understood, there was never the slightest chance of its being accepted; what King Constantine and his advisers desired was not Cyprus, in which they were probably little interested, but Smyrna, Thrace and perhaps Constantinople. That on which their actions all depended was a knowledge of the precise numbers of Allied soldiers who would be sent out to Salonica. On

neither point were they satisfied and the offer of Cyprus was but a drop in the ocean. All that remained to be done was to take such steps as were possible to prevent this offer, the knowledge of which got abroad, from being interpreted by the Greeks as a recognition by the British Government of the principle that Cyprus ought really to belong to Greece.

45. The official answer of the Greek Government to the notification presented by Sir F. Elliot was made in a note communicated by the Greek Minister on the 22nd October, 1915. The greater part of the note is occupied with a restatement of the reasons why it was quite impossible for the Greek Government to forsake the policy of friendly neutrality; the essence is that though it was in the interests of Greece that Serbia should not be annihilated, the security of Greece itself was a major interest; Greek military assistance would under the actual circumstances be ineffectual: it would bring about the destruction of Greece without the least hope of saving Serbia. With regard to the offer of Cyprus the note runs as follows:—

"The Royal Government finally desires to express to the English Government its gratitude for the noble thought which it has conceived in proposing to them the cession of the Island of Cyprus. Nothing could be more agreeable to them than this offer which, by opening up attractive prospects to the national aspirations, is of a nature to fill the hearts of the Greeks with joy. But, tempting as it might be, it could not modify the gravity of events by which Greece finds herself confronted or make more effectual the armed assistance that she could give to Serbia."

46. In the absence of Sir Edward Grey, M. Gennadius was received by Lord Crewe, who said to him:—

"As regards Cyprus, I suppose the Greek Government would understand that the offer had lapsed. The Minister said he supposed they must regard it as not merely suspended. I answered that whether it is never made again or made at some future time must depend on circumstances which could not now be foreseen. All I could say now was that it is non-existent."

47. In a telegram of the 25th October Sir F. Elliot reported that he had called on M. Zaimis to ascertain whether the Greek Minister had correctly conveyed Lord Crewe's intimation that the offer of Cyprus had lapsed. He found that he had not made it categorical enough and corrected it accordingly.

48. With this the incident closes. On the 26th October, in answer to a question in Parliament, Sir Edward Grey said:—

"His Majesty's Government felt bound, in the very critical position in which their Serbian allies were placed, to make every possible effort to obtain for them the only assistance which was immediately available. Accordingly, they made it known that, if Greece would give full and immediate support to Serbia against Bulgaria, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give Cyprus to Greece. As Greece has not seen her way to support Serbia, the condition on which the offer was made has not been fulfilled, and it has, therefore, lapsed."

And on the 9th November, when asked whether British territory had been offered to any foreign Power without first consulting the Cabinet, the Prime Minister replied:—

"The only instance in question is Cyprus, of which the offer was made in an emergency, after consultation with the heads of the Departments most concerned."

#### V.—Later History.

49. The annexation of Cyprus in 1914 was, as we have seen, a sudden act undertaken to meet an emergency of the war. It was understood at the time that the future of the island would have to be reconsidered when peace was made in connection with the whole Eastern settlement. The victory of the Allies, of course, rendered any suggestion that the island should be returned to Turkey out of the question; the only other State which could put forward any claim was Greece. The matter was, however, one in which the other Allies, both France and Italy, were strongly interested—France because of her interests in the adjoining mainland, and Italy because of her great ambitions for the expansion of her dominions in the Levant. Neither Power seems ever to have suggested the cession to itself of the



island; but neither was indifferent to its fate, and both preferred that it should continue under British sovereignty rather than pass to Greece.

50. The secret arrangement—better known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement—concluded between Great Britain, France and Russia on the 16th May, 1916, contingently gave France an important interest in Syria and South-Eastern Asia Minor. In view of the future position assigned to France in these regions, the strategical relationship in which Cyprus stood to them, and the apparent readiness with which His Majesty's Government had offered Cyprus to Greece a year earlier, the French Government secured the insertion in the arrangement of a provision that Great Britain would not cede the island to any Power without previous consultation with France.

51. In the island itself the agitation for union with Greece started again at the end of the war; it was inevitably strengthened by the offer of 1915. Despite pressure brought to bear upon him, M. Veniselos refused to bring the matter before the Peace Conference. He recognised that under British administration the Greek population lived under conditions entirely advantageous compared with those of Greeks in Ottoman territory, and his efforts were concentrated on the acquisition of Smyrna. There is, however, no doubt that he intended to take the matter up with His Majesty's Government at some future date when circumstances would be more favourable.<sup>(23)</sup>

52. The island figured, however, in the negotiations which took place at the end of the war between M. Veniselos and Italian statesmen, who were endeavouring to reach a settlement of Græco-Italian difficulties before the Peace Conference assembled. In this way the future of Cyprus was hypothetically considered, brought into a Græco-Italian secret agreement, and thus, eventually, into the dispute between Greece and Italy concerning the Dodecanese Islands, without His Majesty's Government being party either to the discussions or the agreement at the time. The story is worth giving in outline.

53. At the beginning of December 1918, M. Veniselos went to Rome to open the discussions just mentioned with Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino. M. Veniselos, having insisted that Italy should withdraw from the Dodecanese Islands, then in Italian occupation, Baron Sonnino asked why he did not request His Majesty's Government to give him Cyprus. M. Veniselos countered by enquiring whether Baron Sonnino would agree to give Greece the Dodecanese conditionally upon Great Britain ceding Cyprus to Greece. Sonnino remained silent, nor did he reply when the question was repeated. The truth was that anti-Greek feeling was very strong in Italy at the time, and the Government felt themselves unable to give way on the Dodecanese.

54. The fall of the Orlando Ministry on the 21st June, 1919, and the accession to power of Signor Nitti, with Signor Tittoni as Foreign Minister, provided the opportunity for another attempt to compose Græco-Italian differences. But Tittoni also was strongly opposed to surrendering the Dodecanese, and at one point negotiations were interrupted for four days owing to his refusal to give up Rhodes. However, differences were at last so far composed that at the end of July 1919 a draft agreement, under which Greece was to receive possession of all the islands, merely awaited signature. But on the 28th July Signor Tittoni read in the Paris "Daily Mail" an unfounded report that Great Britain proposed to cede Cyprus to Greece forthwith. He thereupon insisted that the agreement should contain an additional clause, providing that, in any event, the cession of Rhodes should be delayed for five years from the 29th July, 1919, and should then be dependent upon a plebiscite of the island; and that, even so, the question of cession would only arise if and when Great Britain had ceded Cyprus to Greece. M. Veniselos accepted these conditions, and the Græco-Italian Agreement was signed on the 29th July, 1919.<sup>(24)</sup>

55. M. Veniselos subsequently declared that the proposal making the cession of Rhodes dependent upon the British cession of Cyprus to Greece had its origin entirely with Signor Tittoni. Commander Talbot writes:—

"I questioned M. Veniselos specifically as to the origin of the proposal that Rhodes should be ceded only if and when Great Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece, and he gave me his solemn assurance that the proposal was made to him by

<sup>(23)</sup> This and the following paragraphs are based on a report of Commander Talbot, who was attached by His Majesty's Government to M. Veniselos during the Peace Conference, dated the 18th December, 1919. (Print South-Eastern Europe, Part II, Enclosure 3 in No. 6.)

<sup>(24)</sup> By a Græco-Italian agreement of August 1920, the period before which a plebiscite in Rhodes could not be taken was increased to fifteen years.

Signor Tittoni entirely on his own initiative. He told me further that he himself had insisted that this condition in regard to the cession of Rhodes should form a separate document to obviate the necessity of its becoming public when the present agreement was read in the Greek and Italian Chambers; he himself intended to maintain absolute secrecy in regard to this condition in order to avoid causing any embarrassment to the British Government, and he had obtained a promise from Signor Tittoni to the same effect."

56. The Italians then endeavoured to obtain from us an undertaking regarding the island similar to that we gave to France in the Sykes-Picot Arrangement in May 1916. On the 3rd August, 1920, the Italian Ambassador in London asked Lord Curzon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to assist the Italian Government in their difficulty with the Greeks by giving a pledge that His Majesty's Government would not cede the island to Greece without prior Italian agreement. Lord Curzon demurred to the proposal, and said he could not ask the Cabinet to agree to any such step. He added that, while he could not speak for any future Government, he knew that his principal colleagues would not favour the cession of Cyprus.

57. The proposal was renewed by the Italian Ambassador in an interview with Sir Eyre Crowe on the 11th November, 1920. Lord Curzon's minute, dated the 13th November, on the account of this interview contains the emphatic statement: "I am going to make no engagements about Cyprus, except that I give it up to nobody in my time." In the Treaty of Sèvres, signed the 10th August, 1920, the only political reference to Cyprus was the recognition of the British annexation of the island on the 5th November, 1914. But this treaty, which never became operative, remains no more than the expression of Allied policy at the time.

58. Cyprus also figures in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, concerning the mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Article 4 of this convention is significant as recognising the strategical importance of Cyprus, and as strengthening the British undertaking to France given in the Sykes-Picot Arrangement of May 1916, not to cede the island to any third Power without the consent of France. This article closely follows the terms of the undertaking in the Sykes-Picot Arrangement, but gives the reasons why France concerned herself with the island, and provides not only against cession by Great Britain but against alienation. It runs as follows:—

"In virtue of the geographical and strategical position of the Island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said Island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government."

59. The British annexation of Cyprus proclaimed on the 5th November, 1914, was eventually recognised by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne (article 20), which was signed on the 24th April, 1923, and came into force on the 6th August, 1924.

#### VI.—Attitude of the British Government.

60. The result of the diplomatic discussions connected with the general settlement of the East was to strengthen our position as regards Cyprus. We bound ourselves by a specific engagement not to give up the island without the consent of the French, and the Italians opposed the idea of any cession to Greece, for any such cession would have much strengthened the Greek claim to Rhodes. It remains only to record the decisions made from time to time by the successive administrations in this country.

61. On the 3rd January, 1919, Lord Curzon put forward a memorandum dealing with the whole matter. In view of its importance this is printed in the appendix.<sup>(25)</sup> On the 18th September, 1919, Admiral de Robeck, at that time Commander-in-chief of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, sent in to the Admiralty a memorandum on the subject of Cyprus. In this he strongly urged that "it is all important for us to retain this island, a view that I think their Lordships share and will press to their uttermost in the right quarters." In the course of his memorandum he laid stress first on the naval advantages derived from the possession of Cyprus; he then proceeded to show its importance as an air base, and it is interesting to observe that this completely new factor in warfare strengthened the considerations which had led to the acquisition of the island more than thirty

<sup>(25)</sup> See Appendix 2.



years before. It forms an important strategic position on the air route to India and Mesopotamia, and in addition provides a basis from which aeroplanes could examine the whole coast line, territory, in which, as he says, unsettled conditions may be expected to exist for a considerable time. In a minute dated the 10th October on this paper Lord Curzon wrote that the report would be useful when the question was considered by the Cabinet "next week." Ten days later Lord Curzon stated that the Cabinet did not discuss the question of the cession of Cyprus, as everyone was opposed to it.

Since that date the agitation for union in the island has continued and has secured a certain amount of support in this country. In October 1920 a delegation arrived from Cyprus with the object of winning support for the cause of union. In consequence, a statement of policy by His Majesty's Government was made in the House of Commons on the 15th November by Lieut.-Colonel Amery, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. He said:—

"By direction of the Secretary of State, I informed the Cyprus delegation on the 25th October that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to assent to the union of Cyprus with Greece. His Majesty's Government is not aware that there is any unanimous desire on the part of the Greek population to change their present allegiance under which they have attained unexampled prosperity; but even if it were otherwise, account would have to be taken of the views of the large Turkish minority who would be violently opposed to the union of the island with Greece."

62. This declaration of British policy was not regarded as final and conclusive by those who agitated for the union of Cyprus with Greece. On the 3rd June, 1923, the so-called "Third National Assembly of Cypriotes" passed a number of resolutions referring to union with Greece, and to the political situation in the island generally, and sent a representative to London to press their views on His Majesty's Government. The representative, M. S. J. Araouzo, duly presented the resolutions, and on the 30th July had an interview with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. The reply of the Secretary of State (the Duke of Devonshire) to the resolutions was given in a letter to M. Araouzo, dated the 14th August, 1923, certain paragraphs of which should be quoted, especially paragraph 4, which contains a final refusal to consider cession of the island:—

"4. As regards the expression of desire for union with Greece, the Secretary of State pointed out that . . . in 1915, His Majesty's Government was ready to consent to such an agreement, but that it was refused by the Government of Greece. The course of events since that date has been such as to render it, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, impossible to renew the offer, and the matter must be regarded as closed."

63. One of the resolutions asked that a special commission should be sent to Cyprus to investigate "the awful and hopeless condition of public affairs, the financial distress of the people, and the maladministration of the island." To this the Colonial Secretary replied (paragraph 14) that he had "carefully perused the recent reports on the island and he sees no evidence of any of these evils, nor does the Assembly or yourself furnish any proof of their existence . . ." In conclusion, the Secretary of State said (paragraph 15) that he wished "to impress upon you, and through you the members of the National Assembly, that the surest way to increase the prosperity of Cyprus is to co-operate with the existing Government, which has one aim, namely, the good of the people of the island, whatever their race or religion."

64. The foregoing declarations of British policy regarding Cyprus in 1920 and 1923 were made by Coalition and Conservative Governments. Contrary to Greek and Cypriote expectations, the same policy was followed by the Labour Government, which came into power in January 1924.

In a memorial, dated the 25th February, 1924, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. J. H. Thomas), the Archbishop of Cyprus states that:—

"The Right Honourable the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, replying by letter dated the 14th November, 1919, to a Cyprus deputation, wrote: . . . that he fully knows the sentiment existing among the Hellenic population of Cyprus for the union of the island with Greece, and that the aspirations of the population of the Island of Cyprus would meet with the

early and sympathetic attention of His Majesty's Government when it should examine the future of the island.

"But unfortunately," the Archbishop's memorial adds, "after the termination of the Great War all these official promises were overlooked and forgotten . . ." ("")

On the 14th April, 1924, in reply to a question in the House of Commons as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the future of the island of Cyprus, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, said: "His Majesty's Government are not contemplating any change in the political status of Cyprus."

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY.  
W. J. CHILDS.

December 18, 1924

#### ANNEX.

WHILE it is not within the purposes of this memorandum to discuss the strategical position of Cyprus, a few observations may be made on a related subject which the present writer has had special opportunities for studying on the spot.

2. It is the great probability of Cyprus becoming in the future—though perhaps not for a century or more—a position of infinitely greater importance to us than it is at present. Southern Russia, Cis-Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia, Asia Minor, Syria, Irak, Persia, are at the present time regions almost entirely undeveloped. They carry, too, a comparatively scanty population. Owing to their natural fertility, favourable climate and great mineral resources, it is inevitable that sooner or later these regions will possess populations enormously greater than now and become the seat of great industrial activity. Political frontiers, whether of the present or the future, need not be considered in discussing this prospect. The point is that, in that immense sector of land and water lying east of Cyprus into Persia and north of Cyprus into Southern Russia, we shall some day have populations which, from their numbers, wealth and external interests, will insist upon making their weight felt in the world.

3. For these regions, or for the greater part of these regions, the Gulf of Alexandretta (in the mouth of which Cyprus stands) occupies a position of vantage not altogether obvious from the map. Owing to the configuration of land and water in this part of the world, and to the profoundly important, widespread and conflicting political interests which converge upon Constantinople and the Straits and render exclusive Russian control of the Straits difficult to secure, the Gulf, as providing a possible alternative outlet to the Mediterranean, has long had an interest for Russia and the Russian Caucasian provinces. With Constantinople in effect unattainable, the Gulf was regarded in South-Eastern Russia as a substitute outlet to blue water by no means to be forgotten or underrated. If we accept developments of the kind indicated in the preceding paragraph as being possible in the future, our continued possession of Cyprus assumes an importance beyond the present.

4. In another and more local aspect Cyprus, in its relationship to the Gulf of Alexandretta, has a yet greater and more definite meaning. Again we need not take into consideration those mutable things, political frontiers. This aspect has to do with the geographical fact that on, or near to the Gulf of Alexandretta—certainly not farther west than Mersina—lies the inevitable outlet for a great part of Asia Minor, Northern Syria and Northern Irak. The deep re-entrant angle here formed by Asia Minor and Syria brings a great area of land within comparatively short distances of the Gulf. This by itself is much, but mountain ranges and the routes through them possible for railways conspire to place the position of a great seaport of the future somewhere between Mersina and Alexandretta. Behind Mersina is a gorge through the Taurus—already used by the railway. No other access to the sea so easy exists east of the Meander Valley which leads to Smyrna. Northward from Mersina is found another direct and comparatively easy natural route leading to Kaisari, Sivas and the heart of Asia Minor. Eastward from the Gulf of Alexandretta are two similar routes, about

(\*) This reference to a letter from Mr. Lloyd George is included here for what it is worth and no more. It seems likely enough that such a letter was written; but it should be noted that the most vital part of Mr. Lloyd George's communication is not given by the Archbishop as a direct quotation, but as his own paraphrase of the Prime Minister's alleged promise. Nor has it been possible to obtain any official or other verification of the letter.



50 miles apart, the northern one of which is now followed by the railway. In the reverse sense all these four natural routes from west, north, east and south-east—and they are the only ones—converge upon the Gulf of Alexandretta. Owing to this fact, it follows that, given the necessary railway communication and harbour facilities, somewhere in this angle of the Mediterranean will arise a port serving Asia Minor as far west as Konia, north to Yozgat and Sivas, and eastward to the neighbourhood of Lake Van. And this port will attract alike the trade of Northern Syria and of Northern Irak.

5. These possibilities were understood by the German interests directing the construction of the Constantinople-Bagdad Railway, and led them to fix upon Alexandretta as the most favourable position for their Mediterranean port and obtain a concession for its construction.

6. In 1913 the present writer spent several days at Baghche, 30 miles north of the Gulf of Alexandretta, in the company of a German official. He was at the time styled "Delegate of the German Ambassador at Constantinople," and his political duty at Baghche was to supply the necessary diplomatic protection and support for the numerous German officials then stationed there as the working headquarters of the Bagdad Railway Construction Company. The Delegate had been long in Asia Minor and knew the country from Angora to Van and from Alexandretta to Mosul, and was deep in the counsels of those behind the railway company. It was no secret that the construction of a harbour at Alexandretta was part of the Bagdad Railway scheme, and had just been begun. So we discussed the prospects of the port in much detail, the more so that I had just passed over the two converging routes from Konia and Sivas to the sea at the Gulf of Alexandretta, was about to traverse the other two routes coming from the east, and already had no doubt that on the Gulf, or close to it, would be the position of a port for a great portion of Asia Minor. The Delegate was delighted to find me so much in agreement with his own views, and presently became enthusiastic. What his countrymen were doing at Alexandretta was, he said, merely a small beginning that would grow into great things with the passage of time. He could discover scarcely any limits to the future prosperity of the port. It was recognised by the German interests as a development vital to the whole Bagdad Railway scheme. He foresaw trunk railways and feeder railways eventually making Alexandretta the one port for 150,000 square miles of fertile territory; it would in time become, he said, the greatest commercial centre in the Mediterranean.

7. Political events have supervened to prevent the realisation by Germany of these expectations, even in their earlier stages, and political frontiers as at present drawn do not favour the future of a port on the Gulf on the great scale once in prospect. But the natural advantages of the position remain unchanged and unchangeable, and sooner or later will assert themselves.

8. Even for the Turkish State as it now exists, the coast line between Alexandretta and Mersina must provide the future outlet for a great part of Asia Minor. If the Turkish State flourishes and grows, there, with certainty, will be a rival of Smyrna; if the Turkish State decays, some other more competent Power will take over the Turkish dominions and find on or near the Gulf a chief outlet for Asia Minor. In either event, Cyprus, as a British possession, will be most fortunately placed against possibilities to come. It is likely that Disraeli, in taking Cyprus, saw more clearly and farther than he knew, and that his description of the island as "the Key of Western Asia" was not entirely extravagant hyperbole.

November 21, 1924.

W. J. C.

#### APPENDIX 1.

*The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Layard.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 30, 1878.*

THE progress of the confidential negotiations which have for some time past been in progress between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia makes it probable that those articles of the Treaty of San Stefano which concern European Turkey will be sufficiently modified to bring them into harmony with the interests of the other European Powers, and of England in particular.

There is, however, no such prospect with respect to that portion of the treaty which concerns Turkey in Asia. It is sufficiently manifest that, in respect to

Batoum and the fortresses north of the Araxes, the Government of Russia is not prepared to recede from the stipulations to which the Porte has been led by the events of the war to consent. Her Majesty's Government have consequently been forced to consider the effect which these agreements, if they are neither annulled nor counteracted, will have upon the future of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire and upon the interests of England, which are closely affected by the condition of those provinces.

It is impossible that Her Majesty's Government can look upon these changes with indifference. Asiatic Turkey contains populations of many different races and creeds, possessing no capacity for self-government and no aspirations for independence, but owing their tranquillity and whatever prospect of political well-being they possess entirely to the rule of the Sultan. But the Government of the Ottoman dynasty is that of an ancient, but still alien, conqueror, resting more upon actual power than upon the sympathies of common nationality. The defeat which the Turkish arms have sustained and the known embarrassments of the Government will produce a general belief in its decadence and an expectation of speedy political change, which in the East are more dangerous than actual discontent to the stability of a Government. If the population of Syria, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia see that the Porte has no guarantee for its continued existence but its own strength, they will, after the evidence which recent events have furnished of the frailty of that reliance, begin to calculate upon the speedy fall of the Ottoman domination and to turn their eyes towards its successor.

Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan and Kars will not become the base from which emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte. As a monument of feeble defence on the one side, and successful aggression on the other, they will be regarded by the Asiatic population as foreboding the course of political history in the immediate future, and will stimulate, by the combined action of hope and fear, devotion to the Power which is in the ascendant, and desertion of the Power which is thought to be falling into decay.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to accept, without making an effort to avert it, the effect which such a state of feeling would produce upon regions whose political condition deeply concerns the Oriental interests of Great Britain. They do not propose to attempt the accomplishment of this object by taking military measures for the purpose of replacing the conquered districts in the possession of the Porte. Such an undertaking would be arduous and costly, and would involve great calamities, and it would not be effective for the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view, unless subsequently strengthened by precautions which can be taken almost as effectually without incurring the miseries of a preliminary war. The only provision which can furnish a substantial security for the stability of Ottoman rule in Asiatic Turkey, and which would be as essential after the reconquest of the Russian annexations as it is now, is an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to fulfil it, that any further encroachments by Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by force of arms. Such an undertaking, if given fully and unreservedly, will prevent the occurrence of the contingency which would bring it into operation, and will, at the same time, give to the populations of the Asiatic provinces the requisite confidence that Turkish rule in Asia is not destined to a speedy fall.

There are, however, two conditions which it would be necessary for the Porte to subscribe before England could give such assurance.

Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte, on the occasion of the conference at Constantinople, that they were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and oppression, and it will be requisite, before they can enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that they should be formally assured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these regions. It is not desirable to require more than an engagement in general terms; for the specific measures to be taken could only be defined after a more careful enquiry and deliberation than could be secured at the present juncture.

It is not impossible that a careful selection and a faithful support of the individual officers to whom power is to be entrusted in those countries would be a more important element in the improvement of the condition of the people than even legislative changes, but the assurances required to give England a right to insist on



satisfactory arrangements for these purposes will be an indispensable part of any agreement to which Her Majesty's Government could consent. It will further be necessary, in order to enable Her Majesty's Government efficiently to execute the engagements now proposed, that they should occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor and Syria. The proximity of British officers, and, if necessary, British troops, will be the best security that all the objects of this agreement shall be attained. The Island of Cyprus appears to them to be in all respects the most available for this object. Her Majesty's Government do not wish to ask the Sultan to alienate territory from his sovereignty, or to diminish the receipts which now pass into his treasury. They will, therefore, propose that, while the administration and occupation of the island shall be assigned to Her Majesty, the territory shall still continue to be part of the Ottoman Empire, and that the excess of the revenue over the expenditure, whatever it at present may be, shall be paid over annually by the British Government to the Treasury of the Sultan.

Inasmuch as the whole of this proposal is due to the annexations which Russia has made in Asiatic Turkey, and the consequences which it is apprehended will flow therefrom it must be fully understood that, if the cause of the danger should cease, the precautionary agreement will cease at the same time. If the Government of Russia should at any time surrender to the Porte the territory it has acquired in Asia by the recent war, the stipulations in the proposed agreements will cease to operate, and the island will be immediately evacuated.

I request, therefore, your Excellency to propose to the Porte to agree to a Convention to the following effect, and I have to convey to you full authority to conclude the same on behalf of the Queen and of Her Majesty's Government:—

"If Batum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further portion of the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, as fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms (to be agreed upon later between the two Powers) into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and, in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."

I am, &c.  
SALISBURY.

## APPENDIX 2.

### *The Future of Cyprus.*

#### *Memorandum by Lord Curzon.*

IT seems not unlikely that at the Peace Conference the question of the future of Cyprus may once again be raised, and that M. Veniselos may press for its cession to Greece. So many important considerations are involved in this question, and the situation has been so much changed by the results of the war, that I make no apology for asking that no hasty decision be arrived at, as was done in October 1915, and that both sides be carefully weighed before a step is taken that, like the cession of Heligoland, conceded in a similar spirit of generosity, may have ulterior consequences, which at a later date are universally deplored.

Cyprus, the administration of which was taken over by Great Britain (for reasons of politics and strategy) by the Cyprus Convention of 1878, was placed under a British High Commissioner in that year. In 1880 it was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. On the 5th November, 1914, after the outbreak of war with Turkey, it was annexed by Great Britain.

In October 1915, when Mr. Asquith's Government were endeavouring to persuade Greece (then under King Constantine) to come to the rescue of Serbia—at that time threatened with invasion by the enemy—Lord Grey offered Cyprus unconditionally as a bribe to the Greek Government to induce them to fulfil their treaty obligations. This offer was made without the knowledge or authority of the Cabinet, and with the approval only of the few heads of departments who were most intimately concerned. Most fortunately it was refused by the Government of M. Zaimis, headstrong

in its confidence in the threats or promises of the Kaiser, and it was stated in Parliament that the offer had in consequence lapsed.

When the Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in May 1916, by which the French were promised the reversion of Syria, Alexandretta and Cilicia, the French Government, warned by the untimely generosity of our Government in the previous year, pressed for and secured the admission of a clause by which we undertook not to cede Cyprus to any third Power without previous consultation with them. This was aimed both at Greece and Italy, the succession of either of whom would be equally unpalatable to them.

In January 1918 the Greek papers published a series of articles in which they declared that the island had been promised to M. Veniselos by Great Britain at the end of the war. M. Veniselos issued a denial of this interested canard, but in an interview with Lord Granville on the 9th January, 1918, said that "he was himself firmly convinced that at the end of the war His Majesty's Government, after all their declarations in favour of government in accord with the nationality and consent of the governed, could not but cede the island to Greece." The British representative wisely, as I think, begged him not to be too sure.

In March 1918 the new Archbishop of Athens, who had recently visited Cyprus, and been received with the utmost attention by the British authorities, reciprocated this courtesy by expressing in an address, on his enthronement in Athens "his personal conviction that Cyprus can be regarded as actually belonging already to Greece, in view of the liberal and Phil-Hellenic sentiments of Great Britain."

We must therefore be prepared, when the fate of the Aegean Islands comes under examination, for a formidable agitation on the part of the Greek press and Greek politicians for the cession of Cyprus to Greece, although it belongs geographically to an entirely different system, and although in the course of its long and chequered history, during which it has fallen to Egypt, Persia, Assyria, Rome, Great Britain (under Richard I), Venice, Genoa and Turkey, Greece is the one Mediterranean State to whom it has never belonged. The claim is, of course, based exclusively on racial grounds, about 220,000 of the population being Greek or Greco-speaking, and 60,000 Moslems.

More recently, in a Cabinet paper on the destinies of the Near East, Mr. Balfour appeared to contemplate the surrender of Cyprus as a possibility at the Peace Conference.

These are my principal reasons for thinking that the opposite side of the case should be stated without delay.

Let it be conceded at once that the sentimental case for surrender can easily be represented as a strong one. The Greek elements in the island, or their political spokesmen (for it is difficult to gauge the sentiments of the Cypriot peasant, who only wants good government and reasonable taxation) have kept up a constant agitation in the Legislative Council and in the press, and a plebiscite could have but one result. So, for the matter of that, would a poll in Egypt, or possibly in Malta, and in a score of other countries or places where conditions of history, geography, strategy or politics have compelled not England alone, but every Great Power to override purely ethnical considerations. Furthermore, in Cyprus there is a very powerful minority of Moslem inhabitants absolutely loyal to British rule, whose relations with their Christian neighbours would experience a very sharp and ominous change were the controlling hand of Britain withdrawn.

The conditions that appear to me to render that withdrawal so undesirable have, however, a far more than local significance. They arise out of the position of British possessions, and responsibilities in the Near and Middle East, as affected by the already achieved consequence of the war, and still more by the creation of new ambitions and interests on the part of other Great Powers, who are for the first time making an active appearance on the stage.

If the position of Cyprus be examined on the map it will be seen that it is situated less than 200 miles to the north of Port Said, and that its extremities are separated by only 65 miles from the Syrian coast, 100 miles from Alexandretta, 80 miles from the port of Mersina, on the Cilician coast, and 150 miles from Adalia, on the Anatolian coast, upon which it is known that the Italians have passed a longing eye. It thus occupies a key position in relation to all these areas, where, in the years that lie ahead so strenuous a competition will be waged for the command of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant.

On the mainland to the north, at no great distance, are the Cilician Gates in the Taurus, now pierced by a railroad, through which lies the mainland route from Europe to Egypt, Arabia and the Persian Gulf.



To the east is the port of Alexandretta, assigned to France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This place is certain of a great development in the future, and is the natural and inevitable trade outlet of Bagdad. The British possession of Cyprus will be a more effective guarantee for Alexandretta becoming a free port in reality and not only in name than any paper provision.

If an Armenian State is set up in Cilicia and the vilayets, either under French or other auspices, the possession of Cyprus might, in the event of any future menace, supply an invaluable protection to its interests.

France aspires to set up a French dominion in Syria, and herein she is likely to find herself in sharp antagonism to the new Arab State at Damascus. Our position at Cyprus may enable us to hold the balance between the two opposing forces. France, established in Cyprus, the reversion to which she covets, would be in a position of overwhelming advantage.

If the Italians gain a footing at Adalia and develop there a powerful naval base, it may be very desirable that we also should possess a naval station east of Malta.

Should a strong Power get hold of Cyprus, it would be a menace to the Suez Canal. In the hands of a weak Power it might not be able to withstand attack, and might pass, by sale or conquest, into unfriendly hands. In the hands of any Power, strong or weak, it might be converted into a formidable submarine and air base, which in time of war would cost a good deal in patrol and supervision, even if it were not a serious menace.

The history of the island shows, however, that none but a strong Power has ever succeeded in holding it. Its fate has been linked with that of the opposite mainland. Its cession to Greece would offer a tempting spoil for those who are stronger than Greece.

Is it not apparent, however, that whatever comes of the ambitions of France or Italy or Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, the interests of Great Britain in that region, created by the Protectorate of Egypt and the custody of the Suez Canal, augmented as they are likely to be by the Protectorate of Palestine, and by the responsibilities which we must assume towards Arabia and Mesopotamia, would render it an act of signal unwisdom on our part to surrender any position so central and commanding, and, if not actually vital to ourselves, certain to be so vital to our neighbours and possible rivals? When we ceded Heligoland to Germany it was supposed to mark the dawning of a new era of friendship. In fact, it helped to bring about the present war. The cession of Cyprus might not inconceivably have consequences, though on a smaller scale, scarcely less to be deplored.

The heavy burden imposed upon the revenues of Cyprus, by the so-called Turkish tribute, even though since 1907 it has been relieved by a grant-in-aid from His Majesty's Government of £50,000 per annum, has been the main cause why the island has not prospered more than it has done under British administration. It has been the fashion to smile or sneer at Cyprus in House of Commons debates, and there has been a general tendency to discourage its value and depreciate our stake in its fortunes. This is, in my judgment, a very narrow and short-sighted view. The island has great possibilities. With more railways, good harbours<sup>(27)</sup> and a Liberal Administration, a very prosperous future lies before it. Had Germany realised her Middle Eastern ambitions, and had she been fortunate enough to secure Cyprus, I should like to see what she would have made of the island in ten years.

I earnestly commend these views to my colleagues, and hope that we shall not lightly throw away an asset which, though it may seem of relatively small value now, may turn out in the next quarter of a century to possess a very great and powerful significance. If Greece wants more islands let Italy disgorge the Dodecanese which are a part of the Grecian Archipelago, and to which Italy has no claim but that of very recent conquest.

January 3, 1919.

C. OF K.

P.S.—When I first thought of examining the case of Cyprus a year ago, I did not like to do so until I had sought the opinion of our military and naval authorities. I was favoured with a joint note of the Naval and General Staffs dated December 1917, on the strategic value of the island, which I may be allowed to cite. The considerations named in it have manifestly not lost but gained in strength by all that has since happened.

<sup>(27)</sup> Large sums have already been spent on the harbour at Famagusta, which is an excellent one, and was described a few years ago by a naval authority as capable, with a little further expenditure, of being converted into the best harbour of the Near East.

*Joint Note by the Naval and General Staffs on the Strategic Value of Cyprus.*

1. The principal duty of the navy in this part of the Mediterranean is to protect the sea route to the East through the Suez Canal, which route may be described as the main artery of communication (and of trade) of the British Empire. The naval policy necessitated by this duty has for many years been based on the condition that our interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could only be threatened by hostile fleets operating from bases a thousand miles distant from the vital area in which those interests lie, which fleets could be observed and their hostile movements controlled by our fleets based upon Malta. A cardinal factor of this condition has naturally been that no strong naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour east of Malta, if such harbour be capable of transformation into a fortified naval base.

Both the Greek and Turkish navies are not likely to be developed to any extent, so that these Powers may be excluded from consideration.

2. As a result of the war it seems almost certain that part of the coast of Asia Minor and Syria will go to Italy or France. This extent of coast contains several ports which might be converted into naval bases without great difficulty. Although these Powers are our allies at present, it would be unsafe to assume that this state of affairs will continue. It would also be unsafe to assume that the peace conditions eventually imposed on the Central Powers will stop further pan-German striving towards the East (less virile races than Germany have, after a crushing defeat, been ready for their revenge in a comparatively short space of time). It may also be remarked here that the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, one of the stepping-stones on Germany's road to the East, approaches the sea at the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta, the one weak point in this long line of communication.

It is clear then, that the condition on which British naval policy in this part of the Mediterranean has been based, will almost certainly cease to exist after the war.

3. If Cyprus remains in our hands it ensures our having the means of creating, if need be, a set-off to any hostile naval bases which may be developed in the Eastern Mediterranean on the flank of the Suez Canal route. It might be argued that Cyprus, having no adequate harbour, is useless. This, however, is not the case, as a harbour can be constructed as soon as the necessity arises to justify the outlay. There is no great physical difficulty, and it would be an easier undertaking than constructing harbours at Dover or Gibraltar.

Further, the acquisition by us of Mesopotamia will probably give us a new route to India, passing through some port on the coast of Syria. This would still further enhance the potential value of Cyprus to us. To sum up, Cyprus, in certain eventualities, would afford us the means of countering the effects of a hostile naval base on the coast of Southern Asia Minor and Syria. Further, so long as it remains in our hands, it cannot be used against us.

4. From the military point of view the potential value of Cyprus lies in the fact that it forms a possible base for landing or aircraft operations on the mainland of Asia Minor. It has been pointed out above that the Bagdad Railway approaches the sea closely at the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta, and that is the one weak point in this line of communication. The interception of this line of communication would sever all connection by railway between Anatolia and Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia. Even in the present war, although we have made little use of Cyprus for military purposes, the mere fact that it is a British possession has been of great value to us, since it has constituted a permanent threat to the most vulnerable and most vital point of the Turkish communications, and has compelled the Turks to maintain considerable forces in this area throughout the war. As an aircraft base Cyprus would be of great value, since it is within easy reach of a large number of bridges and other important points on the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways.

In view of the fact that our interests in the Near East may be endangered if Germany succeeds in remaining dominant in Turkey, the value of Cyprus may, in the opinion of the General Staff, tend to increase rather than to diminish in the future.